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CLASSIFICATION CHANGE To UNCLASSIFIED By authority of EO 11652, 6-1-72 Changed by <signature> Date NOV 9 1973
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[page 1] 189 ## DECLASSIFIED Authority: NW 91526 CLASSIFICATION CHANGE To UNCLASSIFIED By authority of EO 11652, 6-1-72 Changed by <signature> Date NOV 9 1973 # GEMINI VII TECHNICAL DEBRIEFING December 23, 1965 NOTICE: This document may be exempt from public disclosure under the Freedom of lnfor• mation Act (5 U.S.C. 552). Requests for its re lease topersons outside the U.S. Government should be handled under the provisions of NASA Policy Directive 1382.2. [page 5] # TABLE OF CONTENTS # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Paragraph Page Number | 1.0 | COUNTDOWN | | |-|-|-| | | 1.1 Crew Insertion.. | 1 | | | 1.2 Communications.. | .1 | | | 1.3 Crew Participation in Countdown.. | .1 | | | 1.4 Comfort... | .1 | | | 1.5 Environmental Control System. | .2 | | | 1.6 Sounds.. | .2 | | | 1.7 Vibrations.......... | .2 | | | 1.8 Visual.. | .2 | | | 1.9 Crew Station Controls and Displays.... | .3. | # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT | 2.1 | Lift-Off cues.... | .3 | |-|-|-| | 2.2 | Roll Program........... | .4 | | 2.3 | Pitch Program.... | | | 2.4 | Aerodynamics. | | | 2.5 | Environmental Control System. | | | 2.6 | Maximum q.... | .5 | | 2.7 | Windshear.. | .6 | | 2.8 | DCS Updates.. | ...6 | | 2.9 | Engine 1 Operation. | .6 | | 2.10 | Engine 2 Status. | .7 | | 2.11 | Acceleration g's... | .7 | | 2.12 | POGO... | .7 | | 2.13 | Guidance Initiation. | .7 | | 2.14 | BECO.. | .8 | | 2.15 | Staging. | .8 | | 2.16 | Engine 2 Ignition. | .9 | | 2.17 | RGS Initiate.. | .9 | | 2.18 | GO/NO GO. | .9 | | 2.19 | Systems Status.. | .9 | | 2.20 | Acceleration... | ..10 | | 2.21 | Fairing Jettison. | .10 | | 3.0 | INSERTION | | |-|-|-| | | 3.1 Post-SECO. | .10 | | | 3.2 SECO plus 30 seconds....... | .11 | [page 6] 14.0 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## TRAINING | 14.1 | Gemini Mission Simulator.... | .185 | |-|-|-| | 14.2 | DCPS (Launch abort simulator). | .191 | | 14.3 | MAC Engineering Simulator.. | .191 | | 14.4<br />14.5 | Translation and Docking Trainer.<br />Planetarium... | 192<br />.193 | | 14.6 | Systems Briefings.. | .194 | | 14.7 | Flight Experiments. | .198 | | 14.8 | Spacecraft systems tests. | ..202 | | 14.9 | Egress training.. | ..204 | | 14.10 | Parachute Training. | .205 | | 14.11 | Launch simulations.. | .206 | | 14.12 | Reentry simulations.. | ..206 | | 14.13 | Simulated network simulations.. | ...206 | | 14.14 | Network simulations. | ..206 | | 14.15 | Flight Plan training.. | ..207 | [page 7] ## 7.0 LANDING AND RECOVERY | 7.1 | Impact... | .54 | |-|-|-| | 7.2 | Checklists....... | .55 | | 7.3 | Communications.. | .55 | | 7.4 | Systems Configuration. | .58 | | 7.5 | Spacecraft Status.. | .59 | | 7.6 | Postlanding Activity.. | .62 | | 7.7<br />7.8 | Comfort..<br />Recovery Force Personnel. | .63<br />.63 | | 7.9 | Egress... | .63 | | 7.10 | Survival Gear.... | .63 | | 7.11 | Crew Pick Up... | .64 | # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 7.0 LANDING AND RECOVERY (cont.) | 8.0 | SYSTEMS OPERATION | | |-|-|-| | | 8.1 Platform. | .64 | | | 8.2 OAMS. | .65 | | | 8.3 RCS.. | 73 | | | 8.4 ECS. | .75 | | | 8.5 Communications. | .91 | | | 8.6 Electrical.. | .95 | | | 8.7 Onboard Computer.<br />8.8 Crew Station.. | .99<br />.101 | | | 8.9 Biomedical. | .115 | 9.0 OPERATIONAL CHECKS | 9.1 | Apollo Landmark Investigation.. | .122 | |-|-|-| | 9.2 | Cabin Lighting Survey..... | .130 | | 9.3 | HF Test... | .130 | | 10.0 | VISUAL | SIGHTINGS | | |-|-|-|-| | | 10.1 | Countdown... | .131 | | | 10.2 | Powered Flight.. | .131 | | | 10.3 | Orbital Flight. | .132 | | | 10.4 | Reentry.. | .138 | [page 8] | | 3.3 Insertion Activities... | .15 | |-|-|-| | | 3.4 Post Station Keeping... | .17 | | 4.0 | ORBITAL FLIGHT. | .18 | # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 5.0 RETROFIRE | 5.1 TR T-2:00 Power Up and Alignment Checklists.......32 | 5.1 TR T-2:00 Power Up and Alignment Checklists.......32 | 5.1 TR T-2:00 Power Up and Alignment Checklists.......32 | |-|-|-| | 5.2 | TR-26 Events........ | .33 | | 5.3 | T-5 GMT Stop Clock.. | 34 | | 5.4 | T TR-256. | .34 | | 5.5 | T-1 TR | .34 | | 5.6 | T-0<br />R | .35 | | 5.7 | Retropack Jettison. | .40 | | 5.8 | Communications.. | .41 | | 5.9 | Updating... | .41 | | 5.10 | Post Retro Jettison Checklist. | 42 | # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 6.0 REENTRY | REENTRY | REENTRY | REENTRY | |-|-|-| | 6.1 | Reentry Parameters Update.. | .42 | | 6.2 | 400 K... | .43 | | 6.3 | Acceleration Profile. | .47 | | 6.4 | Spacecraft Control. | .47 | | 6.5 | 100 K.. | .48 | | 6.6 | 50 K.. | ..48 | | 6.7 | 35 K Checklist. | .49 | | 6.8 | Communications.. | ..49 | | 6.9 | 26 K Checklist... | .49 | | 6.10 | 10.6 K Barostat.. | .50 | | 6.11 | Main Check Deployment. | .51 | | 6.12 | Post Main Checklist. | .51 | | 6.13 | Single Point Release.. | .51 | | 6.14 | 2 K Checklist.. | .52 | | 6.15 | Landing... | .52 | | 6.16 | Postlanding Checklist.. | ..52 | | 6.17 | Blood Pressure Measurement. | .53 | [page 9] 11.0 EXPERIMENTS # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 6.0 REENTRY (cont.) | 11.1 Celestial, Space, and Terrestrial Radiometry | 11.1 Celestial, Space, and Terrestrial Radiometry | 11.1 Celestial, Space, and Terrestrial Radiometry | |-|-|-| | | (D-4/D-7)... | .140 | | 11.2 | Star Occulation Measurement (D-5). | .146 | | 11.3 | Simple Navigation (D-9). | .148 | | 11.4 | Visual Acuity and Astronaut Visibility<br />and Vision Test (M-9)... | .154 | | 11.5 | Synoptic terrain (S-5) and weather (S-6)<br />photography.. | .158 | | 11.6 | Proton Electron Spectrometer and Tri-Axis | | | | Flux-Gate Magnetometer (MSC-2 and MSC-3)....160 | | | 11.7 | Optical communications (MSC-4). | ..161 | | 11.8 | Landmark Contrast... | .165 | | 11.9 | Cardiovascular reflex conditioning (M-1)....166 | | | 11.10 | In-flight exercises (M-3). | .167 | | 11.11 | In-flight phonocardiogram (M-4) and | | | | In-flight sleep analysis (M-8). | .167 | | 11.12 | Bioassay body fluids (M-5) and<br />calcium balance study (M-7). | .168 | | 11.13 | Miscellaneous.. | .172 | [page 11] ONFIDENTIAL 1.0 COUNTDOWN 1.1 Crew Insertion Borman I have no comment. I thought it went very well. Lovell Likewise, no comment on crew insertion. I think we got quite a bit done.. It was very orderly. Borman Timing was good and it was done properly. 1.2 Communications Borman Communications were good. I had no troub l e at al l. Lovell I had no trouble w ith communications in the cockpi t or the spacecraft, but the communications in the va.n from the suiting area t o the other area a.re rather poor. Maybe we should try to get that improved sometime. 1.3 Crew Participation in Countdown Borman Again, I think they have been used on 4 or 5 launches, and I thought they were fine. Lovell Right. Countdown procedure and crew participation is just what you expect now. 1.4 Comfort Borma.n Comfort was fine. No problems? Lovell No problems for comfort , but I was surprised when I got in the cockPi t, because there was a lot more there than there was when I got in itfor the stowage review. But, it a ll turned out for t he best . No problems. [page 12] 2 1.5 ECS Borman ECS worked fine. We had no trouble with ECS at all during prelaunch or launch. Lovell That is true. The purge was a lot slower and itwas just perfect for the final countdown. Itwas too fast for the SIM Flight, which we went through, a.nd I got an ee.:r block age. For the countdown, itwas ju.st r ight . Very slow. 1.6 Sounds Borman We had been well briefed on a ll the soundsz the gimbaling, pre-valve, a.nd erector. As a matter of fact, when the erec tor started down there was no sound. We had been told that probably there might be a clanking or something. I hes.rd nothing. All I saw was the sky. Lovell 1.7 Vibrations Borman Vibrations. No comment. I had no problems. Lovell Is this liftoff vibrations? Borman No, this is countdown. Vibrations of the spacecraft during countdown. Lovell No, nothing we had not heard before. 1.8 Visual Lovell The windows were perfect. We had no fogging. Borman No fogging. CONFIDENTIAL [page 13] CONFIDENTIAL 3 Lovell The windows were heated previously as a result of 5's pro- blems, and our windows, I thought, were perfectly clean. Didn't you? Borman Right. 1.9 Crew Station Controls and Displays Lovell No comment. Exactly how we had planned it for months. Borman Exactly the way that we had seen it, and no problems. ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT 2.1 Liftoff Cues Borman Stoney came in loud and clear, counting the countdown. Lovell Came in loud and clear. :Borman We lmew exactly when i t was, and I for one had absolutely no question in my mind when we lifted off. It felt like I had been t ied back, a.nd someone cut the string a.nd there was a slow but definite acceleration at lift-off. Lovell I thought you could just about put 01P COMM, V1bration, and n oise together,beca us e the motio n,v ibrati on , and noise all contributed to a definite knowledge that you were going somepl ace. Borman In other words, what you are saying is that you had no pro- blems determining lift-off. Lovell No, it went. Borman Okay vibration was nominal during lift-off. Again, perhaps CONFIDENTIAL [page 14] 4 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) it is because we were so well briefed on the simulations we have run, but I had no problems. Lovell There was a little more noise than I expected, but a little less vibration. Borman Jim said there was a littlemore noise than he expected. Even so,, itwas not oppressive, or a problem at all. Visual. I did not have any visual cues. I was watching the instru ments. 1What about you, Jim. Did you pick up any? Lovell I had the clouds, end there was a visual cue. Just normal cloud cues . Borman # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) Cockpit displays were good. The fuel pressure and oxidizer pressure were nominal the whole flight. Just perfect. 2.2 Roll Program Borman The roll program, was so short itwas almost like a spike• We hardly even noticed the roll program. Did you Jim? Lovell I did not notice itat all. I heard you call itout, but I did not notice it. Borman I called itout , but we only rolled,I think,about 2 or 3°. 2.3 PitchProgram Borman The pitch program started just as in the simulator, which is very accurate on this. It looked exactly the same on the ball, and there wae no problem. Lovell The pitch program for the RGS followed exactly what the IGS CONFIDENTIAL. [page 15] 5 was giving for the entire launch. The needles were just matched perfectly--nulled. I did not see any unusual attitudes that some of the other people commented on. 2.4 Aerodynamic Borman Age.in , we had had this described to us ma.ny times, and it seemed to follow right along. In the maximum q region we got some vibration and noise, but after we got through maximum q itwas just like going supersonic in a fighter. You just slip through, and from then on itwas just like riding on a train. Lovell I don't think itwas bad either. 2.5 ECS Lovell Pressure went up to 5.5 in the initial stoppage, and it slowly leaked down to 5.1, and stayed there. Borman I was cool during lift-off. Lovell I was too. Comfortable. Borman Comfortable. I mean cool in the sense that it means comfor- table. Of course we can not very well comment on the cabin atmosphere because we were sealed. 2. 6 Maximum q Borman We ha.ve already discussed this. There was some noise build up and some vibration, but nothing to worry at all about or even discuss . CONFIDENTI [page 16] 2.7 Wind shear Borman Wind shear. I did not notice any. Lovell I did not notice any wind shear either. Borman You could not see any on you attitude gauges either, could you? Lovell No, that is what I mean. Borman The attitude gauges stayed pegged. Right? Lovell They stayed nulled throughout the entire flight. I was amazed at the accuracy with which the RGS was following the IGS program. 2.8 DCS Updates Lovell Came through on schedule. Borman No problem? Lovell No trouble. Borman Have any trouble punching the light? Lovell After the second update, about 2:23, the g's are too high. to let you punch off the light. So, you have to wait for staging, and then punch the light. 2.9 Engine 1 Operation Borman Engine 1 oper a tion, I thought, was norma.l. But I did not ice a sl ight hint of a POGO a.round a.bout, I would esti mate, two minutes. The slightest, faintest hint. I do not think J im even noticed it. [page 17] CONFIDEN 7 Lovell I did not notice any POGO. 2.10 Engine 2 Status Borman It seemed to me that from about 3 minutes and 30 seconds to a.round 4 minutes, the noise and the feel was a littlebit different than itwas a.fter that, as if itwas vibrating& little bit more. But this was sort of, a.gain, a sensing type thing, The inatrwnents were all nominal, a.nd itmay have just been me, I certainly ca.n not complain about the operation, 2.11 Acceleration g's Borman Any problems, Jim? Lovell No problems. They were pretty nominal, weren't they? I could not see the g meter. Borma.n They were right on the money. And, of course, the g's we ha.ve are all experienced in the centri.fuge , and so on. One thing, when the g's dropped at staging and at SECO I had no sensation of tumbling and no sensation of disorientation. Nothing at all. 2.12 POGO Borman I've mentioned that I detected a slight hint of one tha.t was so small we cannot even really discuss it. 2.13 Guidance Initiation Lovell We had a guidance initiation. Itwas in the form of booster CONFIDENTIAL [page 18] 8 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) CONFIDENTIAL yaw deflecting downward, more so than booster pitch deflec ting. Booster p itch deflected sl ightly t o the right, indi cating, at guidance initiation, a booster-high trajectory. But, they both came right back to null just after guidance initiation, and that was it. Borman We did not have the feeling that we were lofted, and then a sudden pitch down. Lovell No , th9re was no change of booster performance at all. It was just t hat the needles deflected at guidance initia tion to say that we had gui dance initiation, and af ter that they nulled and stayed that W83' from there on. 2.14 BECO Borman At BECO, the whole spacecraft was engulfed in a red flame. I noticed that out of the corner of my eyes. Jim, you probably had a better view than I did. Lovell Yes. Flames came up thP. side there to the window . Borman There was a definite, very brief instant of it, probably in the order of milliseconds , but it did envelope the space craft and I, in my own mind, wonder if this is not the place where we are picking up some of the smudge on t he window. 2.15 Stagins- Lovell Well, I did not notice any smudge at the time of staging. Slayton You did not notice any? [page 19] 9 that particular time. 2.16 Engine 2 Ignition Borman Again, it is so well simulated that-- Lovell It is very smooth. Borman It is very smooth, and away you go. 2.17 RGS Initiate Borman Well, we have talked about that. Lovell Yes, that is what I was talking about back previously. 2.18 GO/NO GO :Borman GO/NO GO. Houston, on the ground, came through great. We got a GO/NO GO before the 30 seconds we were waiting £or spacecraft separate. So, we knew we were in good shape before we ever had the possibility we would have to burn. Of course, we also had the IVI's onboa.rd and they are very good also. 2.19 Systems Status Borman The systems were all great. No problem, during powered flight. We got two delta P lights. Lovell Oh, yes, that is right. :Borman We are talkingabout spacecraft systems. We got deltaP light on BECO in the first stage that went off at staging, then came back on during second stage flight, and then the [page 20] 40 10 10 Section 2 delta P light did not go out and it was... Lovell No, Section 1 went on and out again during the flight. It went out at, I think it went out at SECO. Borman That is right. Lovell But Section 2 came on and we saw that one for the next 14 days. 2.20 Acceleration Borman Acceleration during stage 2 was right on the money, right on the program. I read off, I think it was about six and a half g's maximum. We read this off after SECO. 2.21 Fairing Jettison Borman F airing Jettison, I did not even hear it. I was concentra ting on the horizon , trying to get set for turning around. Jim j ettisoned the fairing and punched the Spacecraft SEP. I did not see a.nything or hear a.nything. Lovell I saw debris and heard it and had a definite knowledge that a squib had gone off. There had been an explosion. 3.0 INSERTION # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) Borman 3 .1 Post SECO Maneuver controller was easy to reach. I had itout, and there was no problem. It came out and was ready to go. Attitudes and rates, there were none. The thing was as solid a.a a rock as far as I could determine. I was watching CONFIDENTIAL [page 21] CONFIDE 11 the horizon, and the attitude remained constant and the rates were so minimal you could not even pick them up. I noticed no transients, we experienced no as far as I know that was discernible. Lovell Did you try to damp out the.. Borman There was nothing to damp out. Lovell Okay. Borman In fact, I did not use the thrusters at all for that. It just sat there. 3.2 SECO plus 30 seconds Lovell I have the IVI readings on a card. Do you have those cards that we took off? Borman Yes. Lovell I am sorry. We did not get forward-aft, left-right, u.p or down because they were so quick, and I was trying to get the camera. But itwas 17 1n the fore and a.ft wmdow, 13 in the left-right, and up and down was 20. Borman What do you mean. you did not get them? They a.re there. Lovell No, I did not know a.ft or forwa.rd, or left or right, or up or down. Borman Oh, I see. Lovell I just saw that they were so small that I just wrote down the numbers as a ... CONFIDENTIA [page 22] 12 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) Borman 17, 30, and 20. There might have been a 13, 17, and 20... Lovell About what the numbers came up with. Borman Spacecraft separation. We separated with minimum delay be tween thrusting and Spacecraft SEP. Jim actuated the space craft separation. I did not hear the thrusters firing. I could not hear them; and I did not even helU' spacecraft separation, but -- [page 23] CONFIDENTIAL 13 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) so rapidly. It was tremendous. It looked like one of the autogenous lines had been cut. I guess it was cut with a pyro, and it was really bending and this was causing it to translate as well as rotate. And in order to stay with it, I was having to use quite a bit of fuel; although it was certainly a nominal task. I also went through several con- trol modes switchings. I started out in PULSE and I could not get around fast enough, so I went to DIRECT and then slowed it up in RATE COMMAND. Slowed up the direct rate I was using with RATE COMMAND, and left it in RATE COMMAND without using the hand controller for a while. Finally went to PLATFORM. When I went to PLATFORM, we had been off to one side of the booster. When I went to PLATFORM, it yawed me back around, and I lost sight of the booster. So we went out of PLATFORM and flew the rest of it in PULSE Mode using the reticle on the horizon for stabilization and using the maneuver controller for thrust. This is all on onboard tape, incidentally. The air to ground communications, throughout the flight were superior. Lovell Borman # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) I was really amazed at the communications, especially the primary station. The UHF was outstanding. We have already discussed GO/NO GO. They came through loud and clear before we ever SEP spacecraft. We had no need for [page 24] 14 CONFIDENTIAL a velocity correction. Lovell As a matter of fact, right now would be a good time to men- tion that address 72 read Borman Nominal was 25 804 and address 72 read 25 804. Lovell Can you imagine that? Right to the foot! 25 804. I could not believe it when I punched it up. Borman The orbit quantities were given to us, I think, by Bermuda. Of course, at this time we really were not interested in. them, although they were sort of nice information. We had a GO/NO GO. Lovell It was 87-178 the initial forward quantity that was called up to us. Borman Tha l'!1JU readouts : Jim read 72 and when he saw itwas 25, 804, we had a GO/NO GO from the ground. I do not believe you even rea4 the rest of them out, did you? Lovell No, I did not bother reading out the rest of the addresses 94, 97, 52, or 73, because I saw the 72 nominal. I saw the IVI's were right in there so we did not bother reading out anything else. Borman Debris • I did not notice a:ny debris. Lovell I noti-od debris. I was looking out at Spacecraft SEP and Jet Fairing, and noticed debris. I also noticed debris be t ween the spacecraft and booster when we first turned around. CONFIDEN # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) 15 Borman Could you identify any type of the debris? Lovell No, pieces. That is all I could tell. 3.3 Insertion activities Lovell We followed the regular procedure. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) Borman We did not have s;ny problem with safing our switches. No problem. I did not even stow my D-ring at insertion. I was too busy trying to stay on the booster, and I did not get itstowed for the first orbit,I guess,or half an orbit. Lovell What we planned on doing was gettingpictures of the D- ring. I got the br&cket up at staging, and I actually had a minute after guidance initiate to reach back there and get the bracket and stick itup. Itworked out very nicely before the g's started building up again on second stage. The bracket was up and in place s;nd no problem at all. Then at SECO, I went around to pick up the camera, because we had the camera. stowed where the Agena control bq..x ie l ~o ated., I managed to get the camera up, and itwas a lready plugged into the electric&l wire. illI had to do was turn the auxiliary switch on, put iton the bracket, and push the button, and itstarted taking pictures. Just about that time, Frank mentioned be was going to start thrusting pretty soon so I had to go back and punch off the spacecraft. Then I read up address 72. So , I hope the pictures come out. [page 26] 16 Borman We were looking right into the sun;B I hope they do too. The drogue pins were no problem. Jim got them, but again, not until well into the first orbit. As a matter of fact, I pulled my own yesterday morning there. The problem is solved; I think they are easy to get to. Lovell Yes. They a.re easy to pull out. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) Borman I think that we have covered station k eeping wi th stage II booater,partia lly. I will mention that the booster, being without attitude control, translatingalso with this im pul se itwas pickingup from the venting, is definitely an order of magnitude more difficult than station keeping with a stabl e vehicle like Spacecraft 6. Lovell First of a ll, you do not have. anyone controlling the thing; you do not exactly know where itis going to go, and it might translate because it is venting and ha.a a slight thrust. Borman I know a couple of times we got in a little too close and I backed out, because you just do not da.re get as close as you do the way this thing is spewing. We got a real good picture, a good l ook at the nozz le. I thought that it looked like the nozzle was bent in on two places on the booster engine. It l ooked like the nozzle, the ablat ive skirt had been bent in. But then, itmay have been jus t a [page 27] CONFIDEN 17 shadow, because the next time I looked at it, it looked just like a new engine. The booster itselfhad no apparent da mage. The only thing we could see was this big spewing where the venting was coming from. I did not see any vent~ ingfrom the roll nozzle at all. Did you? Lovell No, the venting came from some line right along the bottom. edge, near the engine section of the booster. That is right. Borman Lovell It was a line of some sort that was open, and fuel was spewing out of it. Borman I hope they got the data they wanted on the D-4 and D-7 Experiments. Itwa.s,again,a very uncomplicated maneuver, one that we practiced many times, and itworked just lik~ it does in simulation. Had no difficulty at all. Toe lights on the booster worked fine. 3.4 Post station-keeping Borman We did not do anything with stowage on the first orbit at al l . D-ring, pins I have already mentioned, we did not get those in at all. Lovell Arm restraints went down at 55 seconds. Belts- We did not even loosen them until aft er we had done D-4, D-7. The life vests we left right on the harness for the entire flight, but the ha.mess did not stay on us for the entire flight. CONFIDENTIAL [page 28] 18 The sequence light test. This was done after the first orbit. We really had this insertion checklist in two phases, one at insertion and then one after D-4, D-7. 4.0 ORBITAL FLIGHT # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) CON 19 00:21. So when we reached this limit and we were in darkness, I went ahead and separated, thrusting down. Lovell We actually separated earlier than 00:25. We actually separa- ted at 00:21. Borman That is right. So we separated because we were in da.rlmess and because we had reached the limit on fuel. We had been in darlmess for awhile. One thing I did notice was that the docking light was not particularly helpful on that stage of the business. I guess itis because we were not close enough to the booster. Lovell We tried but the docking light just did not work. :Borman I suppose because,a.gain,we were looking at a lighted horizon with the docking light , and itdid not work as well as it did l ater on with Spacecraft b, The booster measurements went off. We got indications on the needle ,on the measure ment needle .. Lovell The recorder did not get on until 27 minutes. That is a guess. I am not too sure, but as I understand it, they had live transmiss i ons up until th.at time, to Bermuda, 8Jld An t i gua., wherever it is, so we were okay there. Borman The booster measurements were normal. Again, the simulator was perfect for that. The lights. Jim McDivitt had made some comment about not being able to judge distance because CONFIDEN [page 30] 20 20 20 CONFIDE they only had two l ights on there. We had four lights on and I will be darned if I will try to judge distance by four lights or fifty lights. You have got to have illumination or you have to have a stable vehicle. Lovell You have to have something that illumin a tes the vehicle, not a light that flashes because you cannot tell from a flashing light. Especially on vehicles rotating. I do not think that it is possible to control them. You have to have a controlled vehicle before you can judge distance from it, as far as I am concerned. The GO/NO GO, 17-1 T were no R problem. We ran through the platform-off post station- keeping checklist just the way it is listed. Lovell Yes, that is where we caught most of the things. Borman That is where we caught most of the things like putting the D-ring away and the drogue pins and so on. Only one time in flight did we require attitude control fuel to change attitude for critical delay time playback. There was no problem. Communications, as always, were superior. The D-4/D-7 Void Measurement was again no problem; just lined up on the black and ran for t wo minutes. Purging of the fuel cells. This is the first of a long-- [page 31] CUNHDENTAL 23 21 21 Lovell Yes, but we did not do it then, did we? Did not we wait until we powered down and then waited two hours? Borman That is right. This is one of the things that they had in the flight plan that we asked them to change because Yes, we did not purge the f'uel cells then. Lovell Borman Originally, this came right after power down and all of the fuel cell people recommended that you purge before power down, or wait until two hours after power down. So we did not do it at this time in the flight. This was changed. D-4, D-7 star measurements. There was no problem. The stars were well selected, and we were right on them. Right Jim? Jim copied down, on the procedures book, a check where we got the maximum return on the needle. Lovell D-4, D-7 was a well organized experiment as far as Brentnall keeping us hopping about what to do. I will have to admit that. CONFIDENTIAL # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) 22 Borman He did a very good job. We knew just what to do. We had all the equipment with us and everything went very smoothly. MSC-2 and 3 turned out to be not much of a problem because at about the seventh day we turned it on and left it on for the rest of the flight. The Berigee Adjust Maneuver. Jim made the perigee Adjust Manuever. We did it on stars with- out a platform. I was timing for Jim and I think I fouled up. We planned to use a perigee to 102 miles, and I think we wound up with about 15 feet per second too much. It seemed like about 117 miles. One of the reasons that was causing this was we had come back into the vicinity of the booster, and just about midway through the burn the booster venting that was still occurring suddenly lit up, became lit up. It looked like we were flying through a lot of foreign objects or debris. I was afraid that we were going to hit something. At the same time this trailing wire came forward and slapped the spacecraft. [page 33] 23 noise and I thought we had hit some of the stuff t~twas spewing out of the booster. I wasn't sure that itwas just fuel. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) Lovell I think the ground people thought that this wire came for- ward because it had gotten in the way of the thruster fire. It definitely came forward after I stopped burning, because I stopped burning and this wire came slapping forward. It still had the momentum, you know. It slapped right in front of the window. I think the people got the impression that the thing had hit a thruster. It hit in front of us, then we stopped burning. But we stopped and then that thing hit and we added some more because we were still at Epogee. The first of many powerdowns was no problem. We went right by the check list. Some of these switch functions in the space craft, particularly toward the latter part of the flight, toward the 12th or 13th day--we were getting, I won't say lax in making them, but it seemed more of a chore to make these things right to the minute. Things like the BIOMED recorder and so on--we lost interest in having them turned off on the second. We knew what they needed to be turned on and off for. We didn't do as good a job from about the 10th day on as we did the first part as far as making those right to the minute.. Borman [page 34] 24 14 Lovell As a .matter of fact, why don't we get out the flight plan. I think we might have a lot of comments on it. Borman Let's start from the beginning. Lovell The recorder w as on at 27 .minutes. D-4/D-7 measure.ments. The GET of.measurement that the COLD IR was outside the two degree field of view of the booster was at 30 ,13. Borman At 40s58 we had 84 % fuel left. We were right on the flight pla.n there. Lovell There was another GET of measure.ment where the spacecraft was lined outside the field of view or the booster at 38:00. Borman We saw the booster for 2 or 3 revolutions after tl:at. The lights were still working. We called itout and t~ ground got readings on this. Lovell The moon and booster were in view at 43:00. The booster and . moon were in view and we might get an erroneous read:tn.g because we were al most on the . moon. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) Borman Here we have a note that at 2z32 the fuel cell Delta P l i ght blinked off at 2 ftours and 30 m inut es and then came back on. That is the section2 dalta Plight . Lovell Okay, then as far as stowage goes, the · M-1 cuff was t urned on at 3z03, :Borman We put the bypass hoses on at this time also-- the ECS bypass hoses, Incidentally, they turned out to be not too . m.uch of a problem, They were very handy for the type or [page 35] CONFIDENTIA 25 work we did without suits on. Lovell Right. We took the s/c out of the horizon at 2:08 to get some measurements,as requested fro.m DOD,after we measured the stars. This is after we powered down the equipment. We connected the bypass hoses at 2:32. This was 2 hours plus 32 minutes. Lovell Crew status reports. We bad 3 or 4 a day. Borman 5:20,we started unpacking the meals. This is one thing that we had trouble with• lbth left and right food boxes were jam packed. Fortunately ,we changed the lanyards. v,e changed this during our stowage review , &l though itwas difficult we got them out. Several of the meals had lost vacuum. Lovell Which . made them more difficult to get out. Borman Really you can't co.mplain about this. The people did the best they could. We had an awful lot of food to store and we were able to get them out. Lovell We had several blinkinge of the Delta Plight during this period. Itwent out at 6 hours, a littleleas than 6 hours, then came back on again at 6:27. Borman One thing that I wanted to find out about, and I still don't understand, is why we turned on the crossfeed valve right after launch. The FC 02 pressure was just on the minimum CONFIDENTIAL [page 36] 26 CONFID or 150 pai at launch. I called up Houston and said I would like to leave the gauge in the FC02 position rather than the ECS o 2 positlon. Chris said, "No, unless we really felt strongly about it, they would rather have it in the ECS o position". So we left itthere and after we 2 were inserted and we were stillwith the booster, they came in with a recommendation that we open the cross feed. When we did, this immediately raised the pressure to 250 psi. The thing that was bad was that we had over 100% o:xygen and we were down to about 100 lbs. on the FC02• We agreed that we would fly at least 50 lbs. above the do.me, So, I really didn't see the need for opening that valve although itdidn't cause a:n:y problems. They wanted to pump up and make sure. Lovell Borman Lovell Borman Itworked fine and we got right back up to 250 lbs. That is one syste .mthat did work fine. The first 7 hours was prettyno. minal. All throughout the flight plan we have notes that the Delta Plightwent out and came back on and so on. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT (cont.) 27 those three times a day with the exception of the last day and one other day when we got only two. I think this is a very good idea. It is difficult and requires discipline because the last thing in your mind is the desire to exer- cise. You get lazy very easily. We did a very extensive operation with the bungee and also isometrics three times a day. Borman They were programmed 10 minutes. I think a more reali stic one would be about five .minutes , three times a day. I did 60 pulls on t he bungee cord with both hand s, 20 wi t h each leg, and then ended up with 10 with each ar .m on the bungee cord in ad dition to the few f or th e crew status reports. Lovell I did 60 pull s on the arms and 60 on each leg and itdidn't . make any differ ence. I could have done 20 on each leg and w ould have prob a bl y been better off. Borman At 45 hours Jim started taking off his suit. During that first 45 hours our noses were clogged and stuffy, our eyes were irritated, the cabin was hot; it was miserable. As soon as Jim started taking off his suit, the cabin even though he was out of the suit and I was in, got better than it was with both of us in our suits. [page 38] 28 CONFIDENTIAL # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman At 49t53 we got a picture of Houston with the 250 . mm l e ns. I hope it comes out. Okay at 69t40 we did a Perigee Adjust Maneuver, Delta V 12.4, 16.5 seconds, and came right on the money, using the stars, no platform. I don't think that there is any problem at all with the proper stars in.making a gross adjustment. Lovell I think itwas an excellent idea to do itwithout a platform, it takes two people. One person times and the other person burns on the star fro .m attitude. Both people check the attitudes by looking at the star charts and getting the updates. Then ma.king sure that the s/c is alined right and the reticle is up to get the accuracy pretty good. After that, once you get its et in your mind what you are aiming at, one guy is in the cockpit with the watch or event timer and clocks it. The other guy bas to look out the window because you can't go back and forth. Ifyou look in the cockpit at the watch, you can't adjust to look out f or the stars. So it takes two people for that. I think you can do a good job without a platform. Borman Borman [page 39] CONFIDENTIAL 29 and having the HF/DF on. I'm not sure what kind of data they got but I hope they got something. The first one we had to do on the HORIZAN SCAN%3B it took some fuel and I wonder really if it was worth it. Borman At about 166,40 we noted our drift rate picking up and we finally determined this was from the water boiler venting. It resulted in a left yaw rate and this continued periodi cally throughout the mission. It certainlywould not be objectiona.l ifwe had fuel to counteract it. During a night period, in which we didn't do any attitude control at all, I timed the rates during the 13th day, and when we woke up they were about 7 degrees per second. I timed them around the horizon and came up with 7 degrees per second. About the only thing you can say about itis that itrequires fuel to stop it. [page 40] 30 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) shut down 1 we put itin a different control mode and it still fired t he same t wo t hrusters. Every time you turn off ACME bias power it would go"boop," "boop" just like that. Every time we were without attitude control for extended periods we ended up with a left yaw and a left roll. Finally a.t 191>48 we got both crewmen suitless. That was the best decision in the whole flight. The perfor:m.e.nce of the Cryo bottles was fantastic. Lovell That was one thing we were worried about. The eyd.rogen bottle I thought was never going to last. F orty per cent of the eyd.rogen bottle was still left at the end of 14 days. One thing I wanted to try was to blow the squib. Remember they said t1Did you blow the squi b?" I forgot about it. Just prior to retro, I wanted to go over there and blow that squib that opened up into a vacuum. Borman Lovell It would have taken several hours for it to do any good. Yes, I know, I just thought maybe we could hear it or something. Borman One thing that cropped up more and more as the mission progressed, it seemed to get worse as it went alongwas the fa.ct that things were cm celled because of weather. We picked up large areas of clouds over the U. S •·and over s. CONFIDENTIAL [page 41] CONFIDENTIAL. 31 Amer i ca. About the o nly area that stayed clear was North west Africa. A lo t of the experiments a.nd a lo t of the Apollo landmarks were shot because of clouds. Borman On the 6 launch, the second time, we were able to track it. We were not able to pick up lift-off because of clouds again, but when it got to the con level, above the clouds, we were able to pick it up and we tracked it using IR until we couldn't see anymore. Even above the con level I think we were tracking the exhaust from the stage two en- gines using PULSE mode. I hope we got some good data on that. Borman At 266:16 we really got cold%3B the suit inlet temperature dropped below 40 degrees and we started squirting water out of the suit inlet hoses. We informed Houston about this and they determined that the water boiler had frozen up and they recommended a procedure to clear it. We did this with Gemini 6 watching;B essentially it involved putting the radiator to BYPASS and changing some switches. Lovell Evaporator heat on. [page 42] 32 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) inches in diameter at the exit from the water boiler vent. Lo vell There were only two problems that we really had. There were the Fuel Cella and the two thrusters. We a lso had a cold Spacecraft. Borman Yes, that is when we had that water boiler pr oblem. Lovell Before that; the first time we woke up, itwas 20 degrees oolder inside. Borma.n Oh yes, I'm sure what had happened du.ri ng the night was that we vented the water boiler, used the water boiler. This is the day when we woke up and had such high rates o.n the S/C. We have all that in the cabin temperature survey. The wall tem perature was 20 degrees lower. Lovell Itwas just freezing in there. 5.0 RETROFIRE 5.1 TR-2:00 Power Up and Alignment Checkli st Borman We had a slightl y different procedure as far as retrofire goes. Powering up for i t took two hours. The power up and a lignment checklistwas called up from the ground since we had open circuited two stacks. We turned o ur ma. in batteries on and the squib batteries back on at TR minus two hours. Lovell During the flight they had powered us do wn on the squib batteries and put in the bus ties about the l ast week of the [page 43] CONFIDENTIAL 33 flight. Borman We were flying with bus ties and fuel cells and no squib batteries. Lovell To conserve the squib batteries for the retrofire period. Borman Right. Lovell Because of that configuration, and because of the fact that we lost two stacks, we had to modify our power up procedure. Borman Right. Incidentally because of the fact that we had two degraded thrusters, 3 and 4, we didn't use the PLATFOR mode at all for this alignment. We aligned it all manually. The thrusters were degraded, but there was still enough in them to allow you to get fine maneuvers, fine control. I used less control by turning off the circuit breaker for thruster No. 12 and used 11, giving back thrust and this would give you right yaw. Borman 5.2 TR-26 events At T-26 the event timer was set, we didn't read anybody because of our orbit , and we weren't able to start our event ti mer countin g d own until T -20. Lovell T-20 Borman Read out from Carnarvon. [page 44] 44 34 CONHD 5.3 TR-5 GMT Stop Clock Borman At TR-5 Jim got the bug on the eight minutes, no problem. Lovell Yes, I got that okay. 5.4 TR-256 Borman TR-256 Sequence light came on exactly on schedule. Lovell The digital clock never lost a second during the entire flight. Borman We didn't touch it. Lovell We didn't touch that digital clock one time during the entire flight. That is the best instrument in the whole S/C, especially for this type of flight when you have a lot of updates and everything. Borman Electrical was no problem. Control system, the RCS worked perfectly. It just worked beautifully. 5.5 TR-1 Borman Retro attitude minus 20 degrees pitch. The ball had been. aligned for two revolutions and it was perfect. If we had not had the ball, I would have been happier if we had retro fired in the daylight. SEP OAMS, as advertised. You hear it. Lovell Yes! Borman You feel it slightly. Lovell That is right, and you even feel SEP ELECT. CONFIDENTIALE [page 45] 35 Borman Yes, and you really feel SEP ADAPT. It felt like I had put in forward thrust at that time. Lovell Yes. Borman Itwas really a good thud when we separated the adapter. Retrorocket squibs were armed a t TR-30. Arm AUTO-RS 1 I1RO was actually done at about TR -10 . Lovell We did that a littl e bit early . Borman The event timer was perfect. MDU, Jim got all the readouts and they were exactly what had been called up. Lovell Yes. There was one or two that the last digit was one nun- ber off, but that is nominal. We didn't bother that. 5.6 TR-0 Borman From the time we got the countdown at Carnarvon we really didn't talk to anybody at all until we heard Houston at TR-10 seconds come in with a count through Canton. Lovell We didn't think that they were going to come in, as a matter of fact. Borman No, we were wondering... Lovell That is a very poor place to retrofire. Canton had poor communications compared with the rest of it. Borman But they came through that time. Lovell Yes, they came through. Borman We really didn't need them because we had every indication CONFIDENTIAL [page 46] 36 that our timing was good on-board. They did come through but not until TR-10 seconds. At TR equals zero the s/c attitude w as 20 degrees down. s/c rates were easy to con trol, but I thought that the thrust fro.m those retro-rockets was high. I really had a sensation of being accelerated. Didn't you Jim? Lovell Well, it was different from what I had expected because we were so used to zero g flight. Borman The only thing I could do was fly instruments, the needles and the ball. Trying to hold it right on the ball. Borman I was very glad that I was in RATE COMMAND. I had to con- trol it in RATE COMMAND a little bit, particularly on the fourth retro rocket. The first three went bing, bing, bing. Then there was a pause of about ½ a second and the fourth one went. The fourth one seemed like it was a little mis- aligned, I think it was left yaw. I had to bring it back. I would like to emphasize this. I thought those retros were really powerful, and that you were holding on to something that if you really didn't have good control it could get away from you pretty easily. Lovell But, I was sure happy to hear them go. CONFIDENT # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) 37 Borman Control mode was Rate Command, and the IVI readouts there- did you write those down? Lovell I have them here. Borman We called them off and we have them. Lovell This is what I've been using. It was 298, and 112. Borman And 3 left. Lovell Yes, and 3 left. Borman What were the nominals? Let's just make a note of what the nominals were. Lovell This is usually about.... Borman They called up the nominals. Shepard They were 113 and 296. Love l Yes. That was 2 off from nominal, I recall that....298 actual, and 112 actual, 298 aft and 112 down as the actuals. Borman And 3 right. Lovell And 3 right. Borman So we got in close to the nominal, and when you figure this out on our onboard charts you come up with a bank angle of 50 degrees. Lovell That's why I couldn't understand the 35--well, maybe I'm wrong but let's take a look at this thing again. Let's go through it. Borman All right. [page 48] 38 CONFIDEN Lovell That's a minus 1 error here, right? And a plus 2 error there, right? Borman Right. Lovell Okay, so I went in here and got to a plus 2 error here, right? Borman Right. Lovell Went up here to a minus, here's the zero mark right here, to a minus one error; where this thing crossed this thing right up to here, plus 2, and by gosh, it came right out to 50 degrees or 53 degrees. Borman They gave us 55 degrees roll left, which is what the nomi- nal level was... Lovell I've got it right here. Fifty degrees and 60 degrees is what they gave us. Bank left 50 degrees and bank right 60 degrees. Borman Yes. Lovell And so I looked up the chart and it said 50 degrees as the back up angles--everything was working just like a charm. and then I went back here to the bank contour line to get out our down range deflection, and it was 1 or 2 miles, I think it was, no, 5 miles overshoot%3B which was just about as close as you can hack it. And I thought oh boy, this is really, talk about nominal reentry, this is the one CONFIDENTIA [page 49] CONFIDENTIAL 39 that's going to be it, and then they came up with 35 degrees, 45 degrees, and I misinterpreted it; I was arguing with Frank after retrofire and he says no, that's 30 degrees--50 degrees. ## Borman 50 degrees. Lovell 53 degrees is what he's saying. He just wants to get it down to a little finer line. And then Frank called back. again and said, "No, it was 25 degrees," so I don't know what the story was there. Borman The FDI as far as the retrofire goes, it was no problem. It worked out fine, and I just like to have it, I think. If you really were forced into it you could do it on rate needles, but you'd have to have a lot of confidence in your ability to hold it. I wouldn't want to do it with- out Rate Command; and again, I did it in Rate Command. I'm not even sure how much the thrusters were firing during retrofire. Did you notice? I was watching the ball, and I didn't notice. PCSD Rep Did it light up the horizon pretty badly? Lovell It was really not too bad. But actually%;B yes, it did, it lit it up quite a bit. FCSD Rep. Okay. Lovell There was a point in the flight plan that they wante d the [page 50] 40 40 40 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Pilot to evaluate the horizon for a night, no pl atform, retro. And the thing is this: you can turn out a ll the lights , you can get lined up for BEF retrofire, w ithout a plat£orm ifyou get the stars and everything. But once you start firing, you &re going to have to use the ra.te needles, if' they are working, to hold position, because you can't see the horizon 8J1Y longer, because the thrusters do blank out 8J1Y sight outside. And also, if you've got the lights turned up in the cockpit, so that you can see thingeJ that means that you can't see outside. So, you have to go either outside to get cues, or you have to turn the lights out in the cockpit. And ifyou're going to use stu£f inside, then you have the lights on. I would be hesitant to make a night retrofire without platform too. I think I would probably wait £or a. da.y one. Borman # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) 41 Borman That was right on the money. The retro pack jettison was accomplished 45 seconds after, when the amber light came on, and you could feel and hear this one going%3B of course, it was pitch black so we couldn't see a thing. This was one of the things that we didn't see, the RETRO ADAPTER, the ADAPTER, or the RETROPACK. Lovell No, I didn't see any of that stuff go at all. Borman Total darkness. Lovell Besides that, the thrusters blank out anything you could possibly see. 5.a Communications and 5.9 updating Bor:ma.n Com.unmications were rather sketchy there. I was very glad though, that we were able to get through to Houston. I think itwas over Guaym.as when they came up and told us to change in retro angle, and bank angle; I don 't know who did that but that was good work on the ground following up that computing, and getting us real time updates, I guess they must have done itafter tracking. Lovell Yes, That's probably what it was. Borman That's probably how they did it. And that was darn good. Lovell Yes. Borman Because the 35 degrees, I was flying right between 35 de grees and O degrees most of the time , and if we'd have followed the 50 degrees, we'd have ended up way short. CONFIDENTIAL [page 52] 42 CONFIDENTIA So that was very good work on the ground's part. Lovell It looks like the initial computation of retrofire time was off, and they already had a good orbit on us. Borman I don't know what it was, but they corrected it when we came in. 5 .10 Pos t Retro Jettison Checklist Borman The pos t retro jettison checklist was accomplished with no problem. Oh , I'm thinking; we did have some discussion about as far as the retro goes . With the--we ' ll cover this more fully under su.i.ts. The question was whether to leave those hoods on or off for retrofire. We found th,'3-t the noise and the--I don't know why ~e didn't notice this at launch, but we did dur ing reentry , the noise from the air blowing in the G5C suits was an impediment to crew discussion. Lovell It would go on the mikes and make a lot of noise on the mikes. The mikes picked up a lot of whistle. Borman. Plus the fact that the vision out of that thing certainly needs to be imporved. So, we didn't kno,1 what to do--·,.;e finally decided to leave them on for retro.fire. 6.0 REENTRY # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) 6.1 Reentry Parameters Update Borman Reentry. 400,000 feet, we had that time updated%3B and at 400,000 feet I rolled left 55 degrees, because this...or fifty degrees, the value of the backup angles at that time. [page 53] 43 6.2 400K Borman Spacecraft attitude a.t 400,000 feet wa.s difficult to deter mine. We di dn't h.a.ve & horizon until we were below 350,000 feet, a.nd I was having &lot of trouble trying to find it. Jim, you got the horizon first on your side. Lovell Yes, the horizon ca.me up first on my side. Well, we did not have itright at 35 0,000 feet, but we coul d look out be tween RCS firings and see the airglow, ifyou'd stuck your face right up there an d look out. But when you're doing the reentry on the instruments you have the lights up so, one guy ca.n't do it,you have to have two guys; one to look out and find out where the horizon is and-- Borman That was a heck of a thing. I'd like to be a.ble to cross check between the balls and the horizon once in a while to make sure that I knew exactly where we were. As it tu.med o ut this wa s a completely instrument reentry. We fin a. lly found the horizon &nd Jim would tell me yes, it's about in t he right pl &ce. But I just watched the ball. And I think that it would be vecy difficult t o back up a reentry by watching out the window. One person could provide backup guidance for you, and tell CON ENTIAL [page 54] 44 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) CONFIDENTIAL 45 your per cent of miss verses per cent of capability. And down on that range what it was really doing was, we were coming in a little bit short, and it was sacrificing the cross range in order to get the down range cleared up, be- cause the cross range was very small anyway. Lovell There was a bias in the down range needles between his ball and my ball, and I think, that fortunately, my ball was the one that was out. Because when he was right on. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Borman You said we were overshooting &11 the time. Lovell Yes. He was right on I said you were overshooting, it was about a needle and a half width bias. Borman Okay. The initial indication of g's, I remember Jim called over and said, "how many g's are we on now." I said less than one" and you said "get serious." I think you couldn't believe it. The first onset you feel like you have about a ton on you, but then as it builds up it never seems to get much worse. It's almost as if it were a step function. As soon as you get the g you really notice it, and then you don't notice it much more. And the maximum g's that we pulled during the reentry were 3.9. Lovell Yes, that amazed me. I actually thought we did pull more g's. Borman 3.9 g's. So, it was a long extended time. [page 56] 46 Lovell Yes. Borman During the laterpart of it I started out in PULSE Mode and :rolled over the 55 degrees in PULSE Mode, and. then when we eot Guidance Initiate I went to DIRECT. I was finding that in order to keep the cros11 range zeroed, and we had been told thatWa lly had trouble with his cross range, I was banking back and forth quite frequently maneuvering the spacecraft around the full lift point, from one side to the other and I was overshooting a little bit in DIRECT. I was also starting to pick up some pitch and yaw oscillations, so then I went to single ringRATE COMMAND. And boy, this was really a great control mode, it"'8.S steady as a :rock. You could put itright where you wanted and itst~ed there . But pretty soon we eot dow a:round, I guess it was when the g's were coming off, after 3.9 g•s. I started losing itin single ring RATE COMMAND so I threw two rings on and itheld itlike a rock. :But they were sure firing. Lovell Borman Oh, yes. Boh, those thrusters were really firing. And we started getting abla.tion off the heat shield. Itwas coming back in and hitting the nose of the spacecraft, and that was pretty [page 57] 47 sensational. Jim was giving vivid descriptions on what was happening, and I was watching the ball. Lovell That's one thing that no one had ever told us before. I was amazed. Maybe it was peculiar to the spacecraft. ## Borman No, Tom and Wally had mentioned it. Lovell Oh , is that ri ght? That ablative material went back and hit the forward end near the recovery section, rather the RCS secti on; and I thought well, I never heard of this before, and I was a little worri ed that maybe we were too fa:r off, a.nd the stuff was going to start getting into recovery sections. Bu t it tiirned out to be okay. Borman Another thing was that the windows really got scrounged up on that ree.ntry; that's something else. I could hardly see out of my window. Stu.ff was coming over from the heat shield and hittingit. Itwas really gunky. ## 6.3 Acceleration Profile Borman Okay. The acceleration p rofile was very smallo It was a very high 11.ft reentry, and of course, this results in a low g and long duration build up. No problem at all. 6.4 Spacecraft Control Borman Spacecra.ft control was excellent until we g'Ot down to 100,000 .feet or even below 100,000 .feet . We turned on CONFIDENTIAL [page 58] 48 the LANDING SQUI:B a.t 100,000 feet and sat th.ere and watched. it. Borman 6.5 100K Feet I started losing it; I think we may have run out of RCS fuel between 100,000 feet a.nd 50,000 feetJ at lea.st I thought we had. 6.6 50K Feet Lovell Well, didn't you turn off the RCS? Borman I didn't turn that off until after we got on the drogue. We were starting to build up the yaw and pitch rates. Then at 50,000 feet, I was anxiously awaiting the drogue, because these rates were building up a little. They weren't very bad yet, though. I pushed the drogue expecting it to de- crease, and all it did was amplify them. And we got a real ride on the drogue for a while, sounded like the one Jim and Ed discussed. It was really going pretty bad. Lovell Our angles were what? About 70 degrees. We pitched up? Borman Oh no, I estimate we were oscillating back and forth maybe 20 degrees. Lovell From the drogue here pitching up we were rolling back and forth more than 20 degrees on that initial part. [page 59] 49 Borman We'll have to see. We don't have readings on that. Lovell Okay, because I'm sure we did more than 20 degrees. Borman Then I threw the motor valves back open again on the thrus- ters, and that seemed to stop it. So I left them open a while and finally turned them on again and it stopped, and it settled out, and it was pretty smooth on the drogue. As a matter of fact, when we got down to main chute, it was steady as a rock on the drogue. Lovell Yes. 6.7 35K Checklist Borm an I turned off the RCS motor valves a.nd blipped t he thrusters to clear the lines between 30,000 feet to 26,000 feet. And Jim then opened--The 40K ba.rostat worked fine. 6.8 Communicatiol_!!! Borman And we gave the reentry status report. I'm not sure th&t Houston heard it, but we told themthe drogue was all risht and okay. 6.9 26K Checklist Borman Jim, at 26,000 feet you opened the vent air snor kel [page 60] 50 CONFIDENTIAL Lovell Borman Lovell and we got a cabin full of I don't know what itwas. You had your hood off. Why? I took my hood off to try to find the horizon, so I made the reentry with the hood off. Okay, I had my hood on, and I think when we opened up the snorkl e; the w ay that works, the snorkl e draws air through t he suit compressor, and then into the suit circuit• I had my hood on; and the flow comes out of an opening back here in the hood, and flows down . I got an eye ful l of something that was an acid. Borman Acid, eh? Lovell Yes. Really burned my eyes. My eyes were watering when I finally got the hood off. Borman We11 , we accomplished all t he checklists, and we had no problems; as a matter of f act, i t went pretty smooth in the time between the drogue deploy and the 10.6 barostat. Borman 6.10 10.6 K Barostat It was just like the simulator. One thing I did notice, initially, when we were on the drogue, the altimeter was completely inaccurate. You couldn't even read it. We were oscillating so badly that it was jumping in thousands of feet per second, oh maybe not thousands, but the needles were going all over the place%;B and I remember thinking boy, ONFIDENTIA [page 61] -CONFIDENTIAL 51 if this oscillation doesn't stop, I'll have to punch the main chute on the amber light, rather than the altimeter. But the oscillations did stop. Borman 6.11 Main Chute Deployment I punched the main chute at 10,600 feet as indicated on the altimeter, and just a millisecond after that, the yellow light came on the 10.6 barostat light. The thing deployed immediately into a reefed condition, and we examined it in the reefed condition and it looked very good. Lovell Frank thought it was in the reefed condition for 3 months. Borman It seemed like it stayed reefed for a long time, then it unreefed, and I couldn't find one gore or one panel that was ripped or frayed or anything. Lovell It was a good chute. Borman Perfect chute. 6.12 Post Main Checklist Borman We accomplished the post main checklist, and then we braced ourselves very well and went to the single point of attitude. 6.13 Single Point Release Borman When we went to the single point attitude it was exactly the same as we had had it at St. Louis--where they'd rigged--they had a test after John and Gus's flight. They put a test capsule suspension at St. Louis, and this was CONFIDENTIAL [page 62] 62 52 52 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## 6.3 Acceleration Profile (cont.) exactly the same. You get a good whack and then you sit there and vibrate back and forth for a little bit. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## CONFIDENT 53 swimmers there in a.bout 4minutes, and so I put the HF antenna back down to keep itfrom getting da.maged. And we conducted the electrical check. I musts~ that I'm gl ad that the electrical check was simple, because itwas hot in there, and we were tired. I was worried about this before and I would never have been able to sit there Blld go t hrough this complicated, long check. Lovell ## Borman We had both planned, that what we were going to do was take off our suits in the spacecraft, and wear our orbital flight suits. And I think that we probably would never have gotten out of the suits, because we were just too hot and too beat. It was even hot in the spacecraft, so Jim came through with the idea of opening the repress valve, and this was great. We had all that oxygen and you weren't going to use it. It blew all that cool oxygen out and we had 02 HI RATE and the snorkel on. So we stayed pretty cool when you get right down to it. So it was a good idea. I don't know if you got the blood pressure measurements or not, did you? Lovell 6.17 Blood pressure measurement I took them, I don't know whether they came out ornot. I put the reprogre.mmer on in the water and started ta.king blood CONFIDENTIAL [page 64] 54 4 CONFIDENTIAL pressure measurements and--but that's hard to do. I ought to comment on that. Because to take a blood pressure measurement you had to pump up the thing and leave your hands still, and leave your arms still until it bleeds down%3B well it takes a little while for it to bleed down. Meanwhile, Frank's got the checklist out and the guys out there are putting on the collar, and we're trying to throw switches and take this and that; I just thought I might as well start doing it with my other hand. Same way with the blood pressure they requested over Guaymas during reentry, I make a complete testimonial here; I think once the reentry starts that everything else gets left aside, and you don't mess around with blood pressures, or experiments or anything else. From then on it's sort of a case of surviving the darn thing. I didn't want him messing around looking for a blood pressure; so we didn't do it. About that time we couldn't find the horizon any- way. Borman [page 66] 56 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) arm doing the blood pressure work. And that complicates the recovery phase of it quite a bit. Borman Yes. Lovell I think it also compromised the blood pressures that way too. Borman We didn't feel like running foot races when we finally hit the water. We had planned to get out of our pressure suits into that orbital flight suit , but the effort was just too great . So,we jus t opened the repress valve to ge t some more cooling in there and sat . Lovell That's right. We opened up the repress valve%;B did we have the cabin fan on? Borman No, we didn't have the cabin fan on. We had the snorkle valve with the suit fans and the 02 HI RATE and the re- press valve open. Borman The checklists w ere all right then as far as you 're con- cerned? L ovell Yes. I thought th e recove ry phase w as very good. I t hin k I missed one or two. I know I didn ' t turn all the s tack switches off, but the power and control switches were off during the reentry phase; so, there was no problem there . 7, 3 Communications [page 67] 57 with them in the wa ter. The communications with Houston via UHF were poor. Once we were on th e drogue th ey kept callin g us as king us to confirm main chut e. I'mnot sure they ever heard us conf irm main chute. Lovell I've often wondered about that. Watching the other space- craft come in, why they don't call; and I found out that they do call but they can't get through. Must be the relay planes trouble or something. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Borman Communications with recovery forces on UHF was excellent. HF: we extended the HF antenna, put out HF-DF tone for awhile. Again I am not sure if anyone picked it up or not. We retracted it after it had been up only 8 minutes, be- cause of the fact that we did not want to get the HF antenna broken off during the recovery operation. Lovell There was no need for HF communications since we vere so close to the recovery group. Borman The chopper w as over us about 5 or 6 minutes after landi ng. We had much better UHF communications, so, we di d not use HF. On point of impact, onboard data. W ithin the l i mits of the readability of that scal e, itwas excellent . Do wn range and cross range needles were fine. We actua ll y ended up about 8 or 9 miles from the carrier. You just can't get much finer infomation out of the down range and [page 68] 58 cross range. Lovell Did you have any kind of a malfunction in the acceler- ometer? Borman No, but Spacecraft 6 did. I don't remember that being a condition of the bet. Lovell I didn't either. Borman Ground Information. The ground gave us excellent informa- tion, as far as everything we needed to know, including recomputing the guidance angles after retro. The ground did an excellent job. Tracking data, I don't remember receiving that. When Spacecraft 6 was entering, they kept telling them that they were fine, and they were going right down the slot and everything. I do not remember ever hearing from the ground on anything like that on ours, do you? Perhaps we did and we were so engrossed in flying. it, that we did not notice it. Lovell Well, we had good communications prior to blackout over Guaymas. After we started guiding, going into the atmos- phere, communications went to pot. Borman Status of recovery. I do not think recovery could have been any better. Lovell Very smooth. 7.4 Systems Configuration Borman The ECS, as we said before, we had 2 HI RATE with both CONFIDEN [page 69] CONFIDEN # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) 59 suit fans, snorkel valve open, and the vent valve open. We a ]so opened the repress valve. Electrical: We per formed a simple electrical check. We turned off 3 and 4J l eft 1 anrl 2 on, and watched for the variation in voltage on the main buses. The bus that is fed by land 2 bat teries varied with wave action. Lovell That is right. But 3 and 4 did not move from zero. Borman And then you turned off squib batteries 1 and 2 also didn't. you? Lovell I left squib battery 3 on. Borman Squib battery 3 was the only one that was on. Lovell Control: We turned off the platform, the computer, the circuit breakers to the thrusters, and the RCS thrusters. Borman [page 70] 60 60 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) RCS system, and I know what that smells like it. It did not smell that way. I got a burning sensation in my eyes, which was different. Now, I might have got a more con- centrated one. I still had my helmet on, and zipped up. You had your helmet off. I believe, that with the snorkel open, the compressor pulled the ambient air through the snorkel through the compressors and into the suit circuit. That is why I got a concentrated dose of whatever was on the outside, which caused my eyes to water and to burn. Whether it was the ablative material, the shingles, or the RCS fumes, I do not know. Borman The main chute was perfect. Lovell Looked beautiful. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Borman I could not see a rip or a tear or any fraying or any- thing; it was just perfect. The windows were foggy in flight. I thought they fogged over and the visibility out of them during the hot part of the reentry, was very poor also. Lovell They started to burn a little bit. Started to peel off on the outside. I do not know what it was. Borman When we got on the water they were fogged over with hu- midity and salt spray. I guess you have to expect that. Leaks: There were none, that I know of. Couldn't see [page 71] 61 any or hear any. Lovell I did not see a:ny leaks. Borman Elec trical Power: We mentioned we had 1 and 2 main batteries on, and when we evacuated the spacecraft, we turned all four of them on per the checklist. Turned off everything but the rescue beacon. F.lectrical power w as amp l e, very good. We were running both suit fans. L ovell Oxygen: W ent to repress valve open. Borman We went through that swiftly, as a matter of fact , to keep cool. Lovell We noticed before we got out that both the bottle pressures were down to zero. Borman Hatches: A fter one of the swimmers said we were clear to open the hatches, I unlocked mine. It operated very freely and easily. I could budge itabout 2 i nches, but I could not lift it. I probab ly could have if I had exerted a l ot of effort, and gotten my Jegs up under me. However, the swimmer was righ t outside, and I asked him to hel p. Ile helped and itcame rig ht open, worked very well . We had the suit on and left them on. Lovell We were warm, undoubtedly. Getting out of the spacecraft as quickly as we did helped us. Borman That was the smart thing to do. CONFIDENTIA [page 72] 42 62 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) CONFIDENTI Lovell I wouldn't want to sit in there with our suits on. Borman Plus, I thought the visibility of that suit during re- entry left a lot to be desired. That is why I had to pull my hood back to find out where we were and what position we were in. I think the suit is an excellent one, but it is going to have to be improved. We better grab it and start working, modifying it%3B to make it acceptable for Apollo. The sea condition was very good; 2 to 4 foot waves. We bobbed around, although I got a little queasy, I did not get nauseated, Jim didn't either. Lovell The sea condition was outstanding for landing. Borman. 7.6 Postlanding Activity Postlanding activity was well organized. We were a little busy. We did not get thru until about 10 o'clock that night. Is that right? Lovell Yes, that is right. Borman We had a little misunderstanding about riding a bicycle. We understood we were not supposed to ride until 18 hours after impact. They wanted us to ride it that night after we had been through a full day of medical exams, and finally had a good supper. So, we told them they would have to hold off until 18 hours after impact. FCSD Rep You are still in the spacecraft for this part. CONFIDENTIAL [page 73] Borman Okay. On postlanding we just sat there. Lovell Well, we went through the check-off list. That took all the time. I saw the swimmers, checked the electrical system, that they wanted us to do for postlanding. By that time the swimmer had the collar up. I could see the collar going up, and then he got the jacket on. Borman We had good communication with the swimmer through that jack. Lovell Excellent communications with the swimmer. 7.7 Comfort Borman It gets pretty warm in that spacecraft. I would hate to spend any great deal of time in there without any FCS. Lovell I can speak as an authority on that. 7.8 Recovery Force Personnel Borman We covered communications, it was excellent. Flotation collar was fine, worked good. 7,9 F.gress Borman Egress w as normal, just as we practiced in Galveston Day se veral times. T hese helicopters did a fine ~oh. I think someone said itwas about 23 minutes after we landed that we were on our way back. 7.10 Survival Gear Borman Even the underarm life preservers inflated this time. Wonder of wonders. No problem. CONFIDENTIAL [page 74] 64 -CONFIDENTIAL 7.11 Crew Pick Up Borman The crew pick up was nominal. Lovell Nothing else. Everything was fine. 8.0 SYSTEMS OPERATION 8.1 Platform Borman We aligned the platform 3 times. Each time it worked. just as advertised. Daytime alignment, of course, was no problem. We got very ample yaw reference out the window. Lovell Caging, for fast heat dropout took approximately 23 minutes. Boman Night time, the initial alignment is a litt1e difficult i f you do not have a full moon. With a fu 11 moon it is al most as easy at night as it is in the daytime. It rea 1 .ly lit the terrain up. Lovell To get your initial spacecraft attitude, the full moon is very nice. Borman R ight, without a full moon, I think itwoul d take you a littl e whi le to align to get your Sp acecraft BEF, so that you w ould not have to torque the platfom too far for alignment. Lovell You get to know the stars. "!3orman Yes, you have to use the stars. Itwould be difficult to pick up the ground and track it. Platform Morl es: CAGE. Jim ~aid that took 23 minutes for a fast heat drop out. FIDENTIAL # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## CONFIDENTIAL 65 SEF worked perfectly. BEF worked perfectly. ORB RATE seemed to be fine. We used it preparing for the rendezvous with Spacecraft 6. After running ORB RATE for approximately an hour, and then going back to align SEF, we did not notice a great amount of misalignment. The only time it was on FREE was during reentry. I guess the FREE worked fine. Lovell No problem about displays, were there? Borman No, not at all. Lovell Been using them for a couple of years now. Borman No problem about controls. The PLATFORM mode worked well. During our last alignment, we had degraded operation in thrusters 3 and 4;B so we aligned it manually for 2 orbits. It was very easy to do, and it worked fine. We had all the confidence in the world as far as attitude reference is concerned. 8.2 OANS Borman OAMS operational check, Pad: I think we went around the horn about 3 times before they were satisfied. Lovell It took three circuits to get them. Borman Right. Inflight OAMS: The only operational check we had is when we lost the complete authority in yaw right, thrusters 3 and 4. We noticed this first in PULSE mode; [page 76] 99 66 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) we switched to DIRECT and in DIRECT we did not get any ignition at all as far as I could tell. In the OAMS PULSE yaw right, we were getting slight little pops. It seemed we had about control authority that we had before we experienced the problem. We went to DIRECT, to see what effect DIRECT had on it and we got some thrust, but it was B Whishing. We weren't getting any sound of the thrusters. It was a whishing sound. I think we were only getting an impulse either from the oxidizer or the fuel escaping. Lovell We couJd hear a cJicking of the solenoids or the operation of the valves, what ever they were back there . They w ere working all r ight, but we were not e etting any resuJtant thrust. Borman Right. Systems Monitoring: Source pressure was fine. Went right down the predicted schedule. Lovell As a matter of fact, the source pressure dropped, just as predicted, when we ran out of initial OAMS fuel before we went to the reserve tank. It came back in again when we actuated the squib. Borman No, that wasn't the source pressure, that was the regulated pressure. Lovell I mean the regulated pressure, I'm sorry. Borman The source temperature worked fine throughout the flight. CONFIR [page 77] 67 The regul at ed press ure st ayed at 300, right on the money, throughout th e ent ire flight until the auxiliary tank was actuated. We ot:>erated the auxiliary tank when the nressure dr opped about 30 psi . Yes . Itwent down to about 260 or 270. Lovell Borman Right. It came right back up, and the system worked just exactly as advertised. The propellant quantity gauge worked fine. For most of the flight it was right in agreement with the ground computations. Lovell What was the final propellant quantity reading? Borman About 2 percent to 3 percent. Lovell And we still had 300 psi regulated pressure. Borman Source pressure remained about 1,000 psi. Monitoring of OAMS propellant remaining: On board information I thought. was good. The OAMS propellant quantity gauge, worked fine. Lovell At least it was on the side favoring us. [page 78] 68 end up in two pulses of "bump," "bump", that would tend to yaw left and roll left. And the natural tendency of the spacecraft to yaw left due to water boiler venting, I guess, and perhaps ECS venting, was aggravated by this added impulse of two blips when we shut down the ACME. How about the selector controls and switches in the cockpit? Lovell No comments there. [page 79] 69 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) aligned the platform for reentry that we were able to get enough control out of 3 and 4 to align the platform. When we did this, of course, in order to get yaw control we went to roll jets pitch, and that worked fine. I don't have anything to add to that malfunction. We heard the solenoids working. When we went to DIRECT we could feel we did get an impulse, but we did not seem to get ignition. It sounded more like a swishing noise. The ground analyzed it and seemed to think it was a problem with the valve seats. I'm not certain what it was. I do know that we also tried secon- dary drivers and that didn't help. I could tell that wasn't the problem when we first heard it. Lovell [page 80] 70 70 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) ate and after I started f lying the needles. Lovell Because you were overshooting with DIRECT? Borman Right. I was not able to get the fine control I wanted. Itwould not stay in there. Itseemed like the spacecraf't was picking up a torque in roll also, and I was having to watch it too close. Lovell Borman And this was different th&n what we had in the simulation. Yes. REENTRY RATE COMMAND we never used. DIREC'l! we used once for tracking the Reentry Minuteman in order to catch it. Itwas moving so swiftly. We al so used itin the ini tial phases of reentry, and itworked fine. The PULSB mode, of course, was the one we lived with most throughout the 14 days. I thought itwas an ex cellent mode. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) Lovell Itisa gas saver and even when you do have a platform the PULSE mode is adequate for mos t of the work you can do-- for any attitude control, ground terrain observations-except for rapid rotations where you need a faster authority. :Borman Right. All ground tracking, PULSi was adequate. We did not have any problem at al l. We were able to track the Polaris usingPULSE. Everything except the reentry~we could use PULSE mode. The IlORIZONSCAN mode was fine. The only thing I noticed there was at sunrise and sunset some times, we were driven to a 30 or 40• nosedown pitch attitude [page 81] *CONFIDENTIAL 71 by the thrusters. The scanners worked great except at sun- rise and sunset. Lovell They would lose lock... Borman Sometimes they wouldn't lose lock but, remember, they drove the spacecraft nose down. About 40° pitch down. Lovell The one big thing, which was the question in all our minds, actually happened. Another spacecraft nearby will interrupt the HORIZON SCAN mode. Borman Right. Lovell It does effect the scanner operation, so it is something you have to take in consideration. Borman That's right. When 6 got between us and the sun, the scan- ners were inoperative and lost lock. PLATFORM mode worked excellently when we had it, and we used it to align the first two times we had the platform. I think that you can do a finer job, and you can align the platform more closely manually. This is because the deadband on the PLATFORM mode is larger than you can control manually. But it certainly is a worthwhile mode and for station keeping it is a super- ior type of operation. Translation maneuvers at spacecraft separation at SECO + 30--I did not hear the thrusters. I just thrusted. Jim hit the SEP spacecraft. Did you hear the thrusters? CONFIDENTIAL [page 82] 72 72 12 CONFIDENTIAL Lovell No. I did not hear the thrusters. One reason why we didn't hear the thrusters in that particular case, whereas we did later on, was the fact that we had our hoods on and the air was blowing in and making a lot of noise. It was strictly by feel and by sight. No sound. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) Borman Right. Perigee Adjust Translation. Accelerometer bias was what they thought it was prelaunch, and it remained that way throughout the flight. This was a no platform Perigee Adjust, so, really that doesn't have any meaning there. The timing on the first Perigee Adjust Maneuver was off, thanks to me. Jim made the maneuver. We did it without a platform on a star. And, as I mentioned earlier, about this time we were in close proximity to the booster, and we started fly- ing through some particles, but I was not sure exactly what it was, so I told him to stop thrusting as we approached this. Then, when we got in there, when we stopped thrusting, this wire came forward, hit the hatch, and I lost the timing again. We thrusted, I guess, a little too long. I am not sure exactly how long it was. I think we were aiming for a perigee of about 102, and ended up with about 120. Maybe they changed their minds and went for a perigee of 120. I don't know. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) 73 the flight plan. They e;a.ve us one minute and 16 or 17 sec onds, &nd the flight plan called for 46, I think. Borman Well, we may get that cleared up when we talk to the ground. But, itwas greater than I thought we had planned to do. Updating throughout the flight was excellent. Checklist wa.s fine and, of course, we did not use the computer. Lovell We might mention here that both Frank and I think making adjust maneuvers without a platform is very feasible. You can use the reticle for alignment and use the stars a.s a reference. Since you a.re usu.a.lly using the aft thrusters, you do not have thruster light to worry about. You can turn down the lights. It takes two people thoughf one per son to burn, hold att itude on the star, and watch the star reference and the other person to time. It required two people, but it is & very feasible method of doing it. I think you get some very good accuraciea with it, because we found out from the second burn. [page 84] 74 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) CONFIDENTIAL have said, itis a very tight and fine mode. We used it during most of the reentry. R EENTRY RATE COMMAND we did not use. DIREC~ I used for the first part of the reentry, and itseemed that we were picking up rolling torques , and I was also starting to pick up pitch and yaw oscillations as the gs were coming on. They were slight ones but I really wanted to get the spacecraft steady, end I was real ly trying to lock itin on the attitude indicator, so we went to RAT~ COMMAND. I didn't see any reason to bringback a lot ofRCS fuel anyway. REENTRY RATE COMMAND we did not use. The PUISE mode wa.s used in the reentry prior to guidance initiate, and itworked fine. Retrofire attitude control was excellent and I'm gl ad we bad RATE COMMAND there because we had no outside reference at all. Retrofire was done on the ball with the rate needles, and I thought the rockets were outstanding. Yes. h, outstanding, I thought they were a littlemore powerful than I had anticipated. [page 85] 75 turned on the RCS Heaters on the second dtcy and left them on through the entire £light. They sequenced and went on and of£, I am sure, but we did not know about it. We never saw the light, and we did not have to worry about it . Lovell Borman The temperatures kept right around 80° a ll the time. [page 86] 76 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) FID than the 4-C suit, but mobility in the Gemini cockpit with the 5-C suit still restricts the person such that itde grades his performance for long duration missions. It is stillquite inunobile in the 5-C suit. We still have a lot of trouble with it. The suits checked out all right prior to the flight. We did not do any integrity checks with the light weight suits during the flight. The air flow through the suit was adequate where the flow got to the body. However, there were many pockets where the &ir became stagna.nt, especially in the crotch area.. Itwould heat up in local areas of the body and would not provide adequate cooling. Humidity goes right a.long with temperature. The areas where the air flow did not go across the body, was very humid. We also noticed that itgave you sort of a wet clammy feeling when the cool airwent in there. It gave you sort of a. cold, clammy feeling where the flow went th.rough. Places where the airdid not res.ch were hot and clammy. Also, the humidity in the ca.bin was very, very low when we were in the suits. The ca.bin was dry and hot. Very, very poor. Borman [page 87] 77 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) during tape dumps. We had no evidence of CO2. Comfort in any pressure suit is compromised. It restricts mobility and the Gemini cockpit is just not that big for long dura- tion flights where you can live with the suit. Suit con- trols were very adequate, no problems there. We had abso- lutely no problems with the 02 demand regulator. The elec- trical umbilical is ungainly and heavy. The connection right angle sticks out in the cockpit. It could be better designed. We did not have fingertip lights. Our mode of operation, with the suit on, was primarily with the hood off, the cover visor on, and the gloves off. Many times we also unzipped the big zipper through the crotch and up the back, and left that zipper open. We found that the big opening in the neck, with the crotch zipper closed, most of the air would go out through the neck and would not adequate- ly vent the lower stomach area. We had planned in our flight plan to try going suitless. As per plan, about the second day, I got out of my suit and found after settling down to the environment that the skin became drier. There were no wet spots or dampness in the underwear area. I put my suit inlet hose along side of me on the center stowage area with the opening facing aft blowing air down alongside the seat blowing aft. The exhaust hose was put back into its stowage [page 88] 78 IDENTIAL position, with the screen on, a long the lower right hand footwell e.rea. This provided adequate ventilation du.ring most of the time. When we exercised we found out we built up quite a bit of extra heat. I would then move the inlet hose to a position along side of me, along my left leg, and tie itdown along the side pedestal with the opening facing upward. This would provide more cooling into the basic cockpit area and woul d actually keep me a lot cooler then I had been before. We fo und out that without suits on, the cockpit actually became bigger. There was more oppor tunity to move a.round. You could move the body, there was lees hesitancy to exercise, less resistance to exercise, you could get to things easier. You actually had more con trol and more comfort without the suit on. We stowed the suit on the seat, putting the visor a.long the outer part of the top of the seat rest a.nd doubling the legs back against the back of the seat. We stowed the harness in the juncture of the back and the seat of the ejection seat. During zero g we were floating up and we never touched the back pa.rt of the seat. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) Borman I have some flight notes tha.t I will just read out for the record. Ventilation without suits, The bypass hoses on the Gemini provide excellent return ducts for the suit compres- [page 89] CONFIDENTI 79 sors. They were mounted with the inlet on the outside wa.11 near the individual crewma.ns outboard knee. The suit inlet hose wa.s then positioned to secure different !low patterns. ]ecause no provision had been made for special inlet hoses, only two positions were tried. The one most often used was the suit inlet hose located near the inboard shoulder point ingforwa.rd. This produced a flow pattern from righ.t to left down across the body. The body was never really in the flow but a very comfortable circulationpattern was set up. The other primary pattern consisted of leaving the suit out lethose in the same place, but putting the inlet hose nea.r the outboard lrnee, pointing 90• from the direction of the outlet hose. This pattern al so produced a comfortable flow pa ttern. In truth, I believe the cabin is so small in volume compared to the amount of air introduced by the suit circuit that almost any- arra.ngement would provide enough &ir to provide efficient cooling. We also have some sketch es of how this went. Lovell We a lso believe, after spending several dteys without suits on that the theory that at zero g there would be no con• vec'Ji.on cooling••• # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman I am sure that there isn't a:riy, due to oha.nge in the heating condition. CONFIDENTIAL [page 90] 80 CONFIDEN Lovell The mass of the airbeing pushed out by the compressors is enough to give adequate flow throughout the entire Gemini cockl)it. We had no problems with air flow. Borman It would have been a very, very difficult task to stay in those suits for 14 days if not impossible. We certain- ' ly would have been in much worse shape when we got down. Lovell I believe so. We were requested from Houston to try the hose position evaluation where by the inlet and outlet hoses we.re together. Borman Yes. Lovell We tried it and to be perfectly honest, with the small cock- pit and the amount of flow out of the inlet hose, we did not find much difference, it was adequate, but it was awkward to use it that way. We did find out that if my exhaust hose was put on Frank's side that we would get stagnant spots on my side of the cockpit where although I wasn't uncomforta- ble... Borman •.. that is with yo~ inlet hose being turned off. So all these flows were introduced on my side and both the return hoses were on my side. That is right, they were on your side. I found stagnant Lovell areas, I wasn't uncomfortable, but I did find stagnant area.a where there was no flow going on on my side. You have to [page 91] CONFIDENTIA # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) 81 have adequate positioningof the exhaust and inlet hoses. Borman I think really to solve the whole problem, if you want to design efficient cooling for suits offoperation in space craft, design itthe same as you would on the ground. Lovell Right, I think you are right. Borman You would have no problem. For instance, in most of the airplanes now that are pressure cooled the flow is so great across them that you have a continuous flow pattern in there, coming out usually from one inlet located up around your right shoulder and a couple in around your feet. I don't think you have to worry about the bugaboo of no convection in zero g because it is overshadowed by the large kinetic energy input through the large amount of air. Lovell Cabin pressure was 5.5 on lift-off, came down to 5.1 and stayed there exactly 5.1 for 14 days. It did not move when we jettisoned the adapter and went on the bottles, it stayed exactly 5.1. The only time I saw it move was on the water when we used all the oxygen up and it went to zero. Borman Well, it was below 5.1 when we opened the Inlet Snorkle. Lovell Inlet Snorkle.. yes, that is right. Borman You were talking about the inlet bottle pressure. Lovell Yes, that's right, the bottle pressure. CONFIDENTIAL [page 92] 82 Borman The temperature va.ried with the suits on and the suits off operation. I have gone through my notes here, and I note that it says when we both had suits on and we were just barely cool enough w ithboth suits on and the :B pumps run ning. On the other hand, when we were both out of the suits, the :B pumps only running, we were very comfortable. When we were up working and opera.ting, we noticed that the temp erature level in the cockpit was just right. We were run ning most of the time with the suits full cold, the heat exchanger full cold, and maximum air flow on both controls. Then for several days when we went to bed, we left the con trols that way, a.nd we would wake up very cool. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) 83 it was very comfortable. Borman That is right but the last couple of dqs we turned dollll the suit flow at night and ithelped out. Lovell To compensate for this thing we turned down the suit flow. Borman There's a lot of inertia in the cooling system and ittakes &long time from the time you make a move on the oontrols before you can feel it. Lovell Just to regress here one minute. When I was out of the suit and Frank was in it, we put my suit flow to .i'ull decrease &nd his to full increase to give him ma.rlmum cooling in the suit. I was not uncomfortable with the full decrease flow in the cockpit. Borman The humidity in the cabin was higher with the suits off. It was a much more comfortable cabin. Your skin didn't get dry, and the nose problems we had the first 3 or 4 days went away. I am not sure that we can contribute this solely to being out of the suits or whether it was the fact we were becoming more acclimated to the 100 per cent oxygen. Lovell We have some accurate figures. I believe though, that with suits on the humidity-temperature range was about 20 degrees difference. With the suits off they went around 10 degrees, I suspect. Borman We have them all there. The only time the CO2 jumped at all CONFIDENTIAL [page 94] 84 * Suit-off operation is significantly better (stated as 1,000% improvement). * Comfort without suits was very good. * A cabin fan was used only once to alleviate stagnant areas, which it did effectively. * The cabin fan has a considerable electrical load, preventing continuous use. * The cabin pressure regulator worked perfectly. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) was during tape dumps, it would go up and then come back down but we knew this before flight though. Comfort day and night, with and without suits.. There is just no com- parison.. I have the notes that I wrote down while we were still up there. There is no comparison between suit on and suit off operation. The suit off is 1,000 per cent better. I think I may have been conservative. It was maybe a lot better than that. Comfort without the suits was by and large very good. We used the cabin fan only once in the entire mission during one of the checks with the suit off. This was when we had Jim's suit inlet hose blocked off and my inlet hose operating in my side and the two suit outlet hoses in my side of the spacecraft. As we already mentioned here, Jim noticed some stagnant areas in the spacecraft, and we turned on the cabin fan to see if this aleviated the pro- blem, and it did help. There was a definite circulation with the cabin fan on. The only problem is the cabin fan draws a considerable electrical load, and we did not have the power to run it continually. The cabin pressure regu- lator worked perfectly, it never worked at all. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Lovell Borman That is right, never heard it, thank goodness. That's the pressure relief valve. Right, never heard it. It never actuated. The cabin pressure regulator was as [page 95] CONFIDENTIAL 85 steady as a rock. As Jim has already mentioned it stayed 5.1 the whole flight, and I never saw it budge at all, until you opened the snorkel. Right. Lovell FCSD rep Lovell C abin vent va.lve. We had a double vent valve with the tip bent up to protect the stop. We never used tha.t until we got d own to the checkl ist during the reentry portion of the flight. Borman The Cabin Repress Valve was on the entire flight because we had the M-1 Experiment hooked to it. Then, of course, we actuated it again when we got on the water just to get some cooling oxygen into the spacecraft. I have no comments on it, we had no problem with it, the friction had been in- creased on it so that it worked quite well. It stayed in the open position for the entire flight. The Cabin Air In- let Valve, we used... Lovell Just during the reentry phase.. Borman Right. Just during the reentry phase. Lovell ...with the snorkel valve, that is when I think I got a whiff of that stuff through there. Borman All the time with the suits off, we were running with the Cabin Air Recirculation Valve closed. The rest of the time when there was one person in the suit and one person out of CONFIDENTIA [page 96] 86 the suit we r&n. with it in a 45 degree position. When both people were m the suits, we ran itin the 45 degree posi tion. Lovell I'd like to make one comment· on the C&bin Inlet Valve, I think a. future procedure wou l d be to either open the visor or unzip the hood prior to using the snorkel va.lve, so you do not get this concentrated ambient flow into the suit in a small concentrated area. Okay. Primary o2 System Monitoring. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) 87 ly. That bottle had a big enough heat leak so that it main- tained pressure itself. As I said, it started venting on the 8th day. We never used the manual heater on the ECS 02 bottle. Lovell As a matter of fact, the primary 02 helped, rather we util- ized the primary 02 to pump up the pressure on the FC 02 sometime in the early part of the portion of the flight. Borman Yes, we used the crossover valve. When you hit the squib. or when you hit the switch to open the solenoids, even though we had been led to believe that it takes some time for that pressure to build up, it looked to me that it went to about 250 in the FC 02 bottle almost immediately. It went from 100 to 250 almost immediately. I imagine it will come down when we talk about the FC 02 problem. Borman Secondary 02 System Monitoring was nothing, we checked it... all the time, but GO/NO GO decision once a day. It stayed exactly the same throughout the entire flight--5400 and 5300. Lovell Itd idnot budge at all. Borman Quanti ty meaaurin g .• we do not measure except for pressure, and as we said that stayed constant. Flow rates, pressures, end controls were nominal in the secondary o 2• You could not tell when we had gone off the primary onto the seconda.ry [page 98] 88 o 2. We have already talked about the co2 partial pressure. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) It was below zero the entire flight except during tape dumps when it jumped up due to a glitch that the tape dump puts in the TM system. Radiator operation and configuration ••• We ran radiator on all the time except for two checks that were made. Actually when we opened circuited the fuel cells be fore we brought them back on the line, we went to RADIATOR BYPASS twice. Then we went to ·RADIA'IDR BYPASS once when we wanted to get the water out of the ECS System. One time during the flight we were pickingup water. This might be a good place to cover that. We were picking up water coming out of our suit inlet hose, in quite large quantities. We called the ground, and they suggested that perhaps the vater boiler was not venting. They called up the procedure that included puttingon evaporator heat, turning off the radia tor and going to bypass on the radiators and rota.ting the spa cecraft at 10 degrees per second. This threw out large amount of water and things got back to normal. Later on in the flight we noticed the same thing, but we were busy align ing the platform and other things and we did not want to setup rol l -rates. All we did was put the suit coolant to warm and put both suit fans on and blew the water out of t he system, and that wor ked also. We did notice that during [page 99] CONFIDENTIAL 89 the flight, down in the vicinity of my right foot in the center pedestal lower area there, around the cabin heat exchanger, we got a lot of condensation. Itwas very we t on the walls a.nd the blotter paper was sopping wet, a radius of about 12 inches on the lower right pedestal, on my side. I do not know how it was on your side. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Corman Yes..here it is here...it was 158 hours and 27 minutes when we got up, and we had a wall temperature of 64 degrees and a pilot hatch temperature of 66 degrees. Comparing this with 144 hours and 53 minutes, the hatch temperature had been 84 degrees, so there was a 20 degrees drop during this one evening. I attributed this, plus the fact that we no- ticed large drift rates when we woke up, to the fact that the water boiler must have been operating during the night. It was the only time during the flight that we noticed these large drops in temperature...the very cold wall temperatures. We were on double loop, B pumps most of the time. Finally, went to A pump twice in the flight when people were in the suits in order to stay cool. We went to double A pumps, of course, when we were powered up. Lovell We bad one time when we bad one A pump on. Borman Twice we had it on. Lovell # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Twice, but just one primary pump. We did not go to two A pumps. Borman No. A pump in the primary loop was on twice to keep cool. Lovell Right. The secondary loop A pump was not on. Borman Never on except during periods when the platform was running. Lovell Right. Borman Now, as I mentioned before, when we were running both B [page 101] ONFIDENTIAL 91 pumps with the suits off, itwas comfortable. When we got the suits on, &nd both B pumps going, itwas not enough to handle the load. Lovell It was marginal. Borman That is right. Normal mode was all we used on water manage- ment. Lovell Never touched the--- Borman Never touch the condensator. Lovell The drink gun worked as advertised. Borman One thing I would mention is the fact that this logging every ounce you drink was an operational nightmare. Lovell I think the gun is adequate for flights if all you want to do is to know the total quantity of water that is going out for ballest purposes or CG purposes. I do not think there is a requirement to know just how much each crewman is drink- ing as long as it is adequate. There is no need to log, all you have to do is report counter readings once a day for the guidance people and fuel cell people to know just how much water is being consumed. Borman Right. It says flush mode. We never used the Flush mode or Evaporator Fill mode. 8.5 Communications Lovell The interphone Operation and Quality was okay, without the CONFIDENTIAL # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) 92 hood on. The G5C suit made communications poor, because of the flow of the air to the hood. Other than that I thought the interphone was pretty good. Borman Yes, we should mention the fact th.at the G5C suitwith the hood zipped did introduce a lot ofnoise. Lovell Yes, a feed back into those two mikes and there was a lot of noise. Borman The quality of the interPhone was excellent. With the suits offwe didn't use them most of the time, just like t alking in a room, so we didn't need it. My UHF was a little fuzzy during countdown. Lovell Mine was good. :Sorman Yes, yours was good and mine was a little fuzzy. I could hear people all right but they claimed that I was a little weak. In orbit, I just can't say enough nice things about the UHF. Lovell UHF was excellent in orbit for the entire 14 days. Very little static. High quality reproduction. Borman With the squelch on zero. Lovell Right, the squelch on zero. Borman The UHF performance during recovery was excellent. No peo- blems with that at all. Lovell We did have trouble getting back to Houston. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) 93 I was very pleased with the entire Voice procedure operation Borman a.round the world. I thought they did 8J1 excellent job. We didn 1 t have a:ny problems at all. They were quiet when they were requested to be during our sleep period. Lovell Borman Lovell They were outstanding. They were outst&nding, yes. The voice tape recorder operation was fine. There were no hitches as far as operating the voice recorder. It was easy to, well, that's three feet of change. We used mostly the CONTINUOUS mode rather than the MOMENTARY. I used MOMENTARY when we just wanted to make a comment. As a mat- ter of fact, I think the MOMENTARY position does save a lot of voice tape, because you don't have it on and forget it. However, we had a procedure with the voice tape that was going to record the quantity of urine that was dumped. And this led us to leave the voice tape on quite a long time when we weren't doing anything or saying anything--and using quite a bit of tape. I think that it would be helpful if we had some sort of a little light of some sort to let you know that the tapes on. When we have a flow meter which was being evaluated for future flights and might be a standard piece of equipment then it would certainly be nice to have [page 104] 94 4 some indication ifthe tape is on. On long flights you can't ha.ve the tape on all the time like the short flights- you ha.veto conserve tape. Cartridge change was no problem. The controls were adequate. Data Recording? We tried to record as much data as we could. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) CONFIDENTI 95 with Spacecraft 6 in the air, I thought went very well. It posed no problems. Communications Controls &nd Switches Voice Control Center, Audio modes, Keying and Antenna Selec tion, were all nominal. We might mention in Sleep Configu ration--we never used the Sleep switches bees.use we had the situation where we pretended itwas night and went to sleep every evening and the ground never call ed us. I don't think they ever violated that for the 14 days. They never called us during the sleep period. Lovell Borman So that worked very well. Beacon Control was no problem. We didn't use the Reentry C-band Beacon until reentry. The TM controls, tr8Jlsmitter, and antenna again were no problem. Itwas operated just a.a advertised due to all instructions from the ground. 8.6 Electrical Borman Lovell Borman Lovell Now we have some interesting things to talk about. Well, we monitored the electrical system pretty closely. Yea.h, I guess we did. The only thing we can say here is reiterate what we have probably said before. On lift-offwe had delta Plights come on for fuel cells--both sections. 1 blinked on and off several times and went off. 2 blinked on and off several times and stayed on through insertion and stayed on [page 106] 96 most of the time during the 14 days. We have recorded in the fli ght book of the flight pla.n--those times th.at itwent off and on to the best of our lmowledge. I'm au.re we missed several of them. Borman When we were sleeping particularly. Lovell When we were sleeping we missed them, but it appears to me that there are two things now that these fuel cells have a lot more latitude than we really first realized: 1) We can operate with the fuel cells with delta P lights on more than we thought we could. As a matter of fact, we were doing normal purges with the fuel cell delta P lights on which the systems book said flatly not to do. But we had some excel- lent guidance and assistance from the ground in keeping the sections running. Borman I think so, too. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Lovell I think that's what kept Stacks 2C and 2A going as l ong as they did go . The gauge is a little inaccurate to monitor the system. Ifwe are going to have troubles with fuel cells as we did on this flight, and if the ground is going to keep requesting accurate stack a.mp readouts. The gauging system is poor beca use it is ha.rd to read accurately the amps when they are down in the low 1 and 2 amps. Each indicator is canted a dif ferent way-alternately throughout the 6 stack [page 107] 97 readouts. The ones that are canted inward away from you are hard to read. Borman The fuel cell, as Jim said, was an interesting thing. We finally lost stacks 2A and 20 about the 11th or 12th day. stack 2B re .mained on and I'm sure there is a whole history written on the ground of the things they did and tests they ran at McDonnell when we were in the air to see just what they could do and how far they could go with these fuel cells. I thought they did a.n excellent job,and we ended up being able to run them the whole time. As a matter of fact, we turned on our Squib batteries about the 10th day-used the Bua Tie switches and were running entirely on the f'uel cells the latter part of the flight. CONFIDENTIAL [page 108] 98 Borman The onboard cues for monitoring the electrical system are adequate. We found out one thing in this flight, that is the Delta P lights really don't mean a lot. We had been told before the flight never to purge if you had a Delta P light. We ended up violating every single one of the car- dinal rules that we had. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) 99 99 littlebackground information on it. How else could we know itwas going to be good for 24 hours, and what had they do ne to prove it would be good for 24 hours? They read it to us over CS~, it eased my mind a lot because I wasn ' t anxious to miss the WASP. On the 13th day, I wanted to be able to go the full 24 hours rather than have to land in the Pacific. So the whole story of the electri cal monitoring, as far as I a.m concerned, was great work by the ground. The main batteries held constant between 22.5 and 22.7 amps for the entire mission, and we checked them once a day at the GO/NO GO stations. When we turned them on ·2 hours before retrofire they carried their share of the load and were operating fine when we were in the water. We turned off the squib batteries about the 10th day and used the bus tie switches. We ran entirely on fuel cell power for the last five days. When the squibs came back on, the voltage was 25.5 after they had been turned off for five days. They operated properly for the last 2 hours of the flight. s.7 Onboard computer [page 110] 100 pitch down at guidance initiate. Attitude indications were nominal all the way through. At insertion, the nominal velocity on address 72 was 25,804 and when we read it up, it read 25,804. The orbit maneuvers using the computer and the platform were right on the money. The accelerometer bias did not vary, and we burned them off on the IVI's by inserting them through the MDIU, and it came out very well. I did not burn on time, we burned on the IVI's. Borman The updates were all made in the PRELAUNCH mode as agreed on before flight. There was no problem, no misunderstanding, I think F0D did very well i n this regard. I know t hat in Gemini 5 t here was a little mix-up, but we had none of that. Borman [page 111] 101 Borman The MDU worked perfectly the entire flight. Computer modes, PRELADNCH , ASCENT, CATCH-UP, RENDEZVOUS, REENTRY, were all perfect , no anomalies in any of those, 8.8 Crew Station Borman # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Controls and di splays, The sequent ial te lelights o~erated exactly as programmed. At minus 2:56, t hey came on to the second. They al l turned green when they were punched, no problems there. The event timer was used only intermittantly throughout the f light for timing, and for the last 20 minutes. Itworked f i ne. The IVI's also worked exactly as planned. The F light Di rector Indicator was again, a nomi- nal case. One slight difference betw een the simulator and the Flight Director Indicator i n the spacecraft, was the little outer roll gimbal i ndi cator in the simulator always came up to the top. I'd grown used to flying the reentries by using that as a lift vec t or. In the spacecraft when we got all set up for reentry, low and behold, the outer roll gimbal was down at the bottom, so I had to fly the re ci procal of it. But it was just a minor change and I ended up acclimating to it with no problem. I think it is just a function of how you happen t o go through zero. If you go through zero just a little bit to one side, the gimbal goes to the top, and ifyou go through the other side, it goes to the bottom. [page 112] 102 Borman GLV fuel and oxidizer pressure gauges were nominal. The concept of sticking the decals on the outside of the gauge is poor at the best. But, we all know this has been done, and they're not going to change the gauges, and itworked fine. I would suggest never going this way again. I think we ought to change the meters in the future. Borman [page 113] CONFIDENT 103 was recorded on the accelerometer was about 6.75 g's. I understand that the actual value was over 7. On the nominal profile, it is. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Lovell Was the reentry a little higher than 3.9? Borman I don't know, I doubt if it was, it was so near full lift. Switches and circuit breaker panels. We had a couple of cases knocking off circuit breakers. We did have one fuel cell control circuit breaker pop on us twice. Lovell I am not real sure it popped. I don't know whether I hit it inadvertantly twice. Borman No, you didn't. The second time I watched it pop. Other than that, I thought the switches and circuit panel s were well located. I think it i s very important that we have those guards on there, particularly with changing suits. Lovell The fuel cel l switches, the power and control switches, should be LIFT to move switches. They should be over center locks that you have to lift to move them up. There was a guard over i t, but still itwas so easy to reach up there and hit those things . I was always worried about throwi ng the control switch of f, whic h would have really fouled up the fuel cells. Borman You mean like the squib switches? ... Lovell Yes, like the squib switches. I think that is the way they ought to be ~ecause you never touch them unless deliberately. [page 114] 104 Borman Yes, that is a switch that is never moved unless there is a failure in the fuel cells. Lovell Borman They should be a little better type of switch than they are. Mirrors. Operating without suits on, I found that I seldom needed the mirror. I don't believe I used it more than 2 or 3 times except to check and see how far my beard had grown. How about you, did you? [page 115] 105 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Lovell We had to use the levers of the swizzle stick to get the thing back together again. T his was bad. We also used the swizzle stick to keep the manual heater switch down on the FC H 2 which is a real big pa.in. I t is a very a. mall switch and you have to hold itfor a long tiine. That gets to be a lot of trouble. [page 116] 106 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) light. The center panel and the right panel were all right. There is no question that the lighting system on the LEM is superior. Lovell We used the red lightingmore than I thought we would ever use it. We never used it in simulations. The red lighting turned out ve-ry nicely when we started looking out the window, using the stars, getting oriented and things of this nature. [page 118] 108 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Just off the nose it would blurr out. There are two theories, one group of people say it's the nose cover that is ablating on launch, others say it is staging. We saw quite a bit of flame at staging and it looked like there were severa l streaks there caused by staging. There ' is also a general depos it like a stagnat ion point right there that might have been built up during the entire launch, which might be the nose cover. So, itmight be the combination or both. Borman Itmight have accumulated due to the urine dumps throughout flight.seve~al times we saw urine crystals come·back e.nd hi t the nose cone. We never saw them actually hit the window. I am not sure that some of it, that was practically invisible, might have hit the window. It did seem to get worse w ith flight. l-zy- window was not nearly as bad as Jim's. [page 119] 109 Room was dismantled, was not there this time. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Intensity control was good, no problem. We had two white lights in the center cockpit, this was our request a long time ago, and after using it I think we ma.de a mistake. We never did use the thunderstorm light that we stuck in place of the red lig ht. Right now Frank and I think we could have used the red light again because we both did use red lights a lot more than we thought we were going to, for night work. It gets your eyes accustomed to the night, and you can see the airglow and stars a lot better. If you have bright lights on in the cockpit , at night, with glare off the window and your eyes adjusted to the white lights, you could never see out. It ' s just black . Onboard data: checklist cards preparation, excellent. [page 120] 110 # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) CONFIDENTIAL I took the core card, and after I read the various cores for the reentry parameters, I got the nominal IVI's, also the bank angle updates and things of this nature, all on one card ·. Then I went back to the other section and transposed them in there . Borman One of t he most import ant things about the checklist on this flight was t he fact that we had them about a month before the fl ig ht. We used them in training, and the peopl e respons i ble for that di d a great job, Chuck Stough and Ted Guillory. Lovell That is important. On GT-4, because of the newness of the system, we were stillrearranging cards and books just prior to the f light. Learning from that flight, on GT-7 we really gained a lot by having the cards and books early in the game so we could train with them. Checklist cards useful ness was outstanding. [page 121] 111 best way to do itwould be to fly over them w ith an airplane # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Lovell and then change the scale to whatever you wanted it. The photographs were important , but I don ' t think you have to spend valuable fuel and time to get them. An airplane can do the same job getting photographs that we need for Apollo landmarks. Borman Lovell Borman Lovell That's right. No question about that. I found it difficult to move the map overlay. It got better as the flight went on. Yes, because we wore it in. The overlay we have, with periods, orbits, and the map underneath, I think that can be improved. We needed a very simple device with two rollers on the end, or some system a little bit more elaborate, but a lot easier to handle. Borman I don't know, it worked all right toward the end, Jim. If you get it too elaborate, or too easy to roll, then it is going to change on you. Lovell It has to have a system where it can ' t change. Borman It was valuable. You knew where you were all the time. Lovell We used it more than we used the star charts. Mainly, we - used the star charts for the no platform burns, for retro fire posit i on, and for SEF and BEF positions. Borman By and large the maps and overlays were well prepared . They were available early to us. We knew how to us e them and i t [page 122] 112 ANFIDÉ was a very , very fine job by FCSD people responsible for them. Borman Data books: We were using a system that was started in GT-4, furthered in GT-5 and I think it is working out very w ell . Ifthere is any derogatory remarks on it at all , it is the r equired amount of loggingyou have to do. It is really a double entry system. But, hopefully this will cut down the pos tflight activities and give people a better idea of what they are looking for. I would not suggest even for a moment that we change it. We did delete some of the redun dancy to endeavor to save voice tape. We tried to log everything in the book, but many of the things we did not put on voice tape that were already in the book because we wanted to save the tape. We only had 20 tapes for 14 d ays. Everything that was done is in the books. Most of the critical things that were time significant are on the tape . Star cha.rte, Polar and Mercator. We used the Mercator almost exclusively. Borman Lovell I'm not saying the Polar was not any good, but the Mercator was very adequate and we knew how to use it. I enjoy that particular ty:pe of chart a little bit bet t er. [page 123] CONFIDENTI 113 Lovell did you? No, I think we have enough stars on there. I think they're adequate. # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Borman Stowage at l aunch was a l i ttle gruesome. When we got in we found all the stuff stuffed on the floor over our feet. Once we got into orbit and started going through our pre arranged procedure there was absolutely no problem. We used the food bags to put the refuge from each meal in. We usually stored three meals in the front until we were ready to dispose of them, and then we would put them behind the seat. We filled the debris guard areas we had behind the seats in about eight days. A.fter that we stowed the used ones in the bags we had. For reentry, we placed them over the seats as we had done before. It worked fine. Lovell When we first started training for the flight , there always seemed to be a de-emphasis on exactly how much we were going to stow. For instance , the size of the food bags was a lot smaller than i t turned out. The size of the tissue we used was a lot smaller. I think that we ought to look at it realistically early and make sure that we get the right s i zes. We were led down the path there on that first stowage rev i ew in St. Louis. Borman Yes. We caught up with it on the third one though. We doubled the size of everything. [page 124] 114 CONFIDENTIAL Lovell That i s right . :Sorman We took an actual meal and ate i t and got the refuse . Lovell It was very fortuna te that we did this . It caused us to l ook for new places to s tow t hings. Borman As it was it worked out real fine. The cockpit was cleaner when we reeentered than when we left. Another item that was very helpful from the cockpit cleanliness standpoint were these by-pass hoses with the screens on them. They acted as vacumn cleaners on the whole flight. All the gar- bage and refuse would get collected on them. We could clean them off and put them in the bag and it worked great. Lovell We never had any large amounts of dandruff or anything floating around. Borman # TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) 115 left- hand food box in addition to the defecation gloves and the urine sample bags. One thing we :might note is the horrible odor every time we opened those boxes to put some thing away. Lovell Borman Itwas a necessary evil, Frank. We were a little concerned when we opened the vents on the boxes for the reentry that the smell might be with us for a couple of hours, because we had to open them early before we put our suits on. But evidently the vent is just fine. It is large enough that itequalized the pressure, but it is not large enough that itlets the odors escape into the cockpit. Borman 8.9 Biomedical Oral temperature measurements and thermo. meter, no p:roblem. Although, itseems strange to . me that we have to have a TM temperature. T hat thing got in the way. Lovell Yes, the tube got in the w ay and floated around, and you almost poked your eye a couple of times with the thing. I t is a thin probe. It is very awkward because there are two of them. One is in the lightweight headset, and i f you do not have the suit on, you have to stick it down through here. Ifyou have the helmet on, it is supposed to be sticking out here, and itgets in the way. If they want inflight te . mperature , we should take along a regular [page 126] 116 # ONFIDEN thermometer. We had a lot of glass in the cockpit. I do Borman not see why we cannot carry some sort of a plastic thermo meter. It seems ridiculous to me to have to TM a temperature, I must admit I did not even know I had a blood pressure cuff on except when I filled it up. It did not cause any skin problems or anything. It is probably as good a way as we can go. Lovell It seemed like I pumped up nzy- cuff a lot more inflight than I had to on the ground for the same m easurement. Sometimes we would not get the comment that, your "cuff is full" from the ground until after your arm was quite puffed up. Some times your arm really got to be sore. I do not know what you can do about it. [page 127] 117 # ONFIDEN (cont.) actually . You left itright over the circuit breaker panel, didn't you? Did it come out during reentry? Lovell Borman Lovell No. There was no problem. There is no water problem. There might have been a little air in it because we got air in the food all the time. I do not know how it got in because the food packages were evacuated. We would put the gun in and pump it up with water, and yet there was air in the food every time you opened it up. There was probably some air in the water, but it did not bother us too much. Borman No. I thought it was a minimum amount, too. The water tasted good. It was cool. The gun, as we have already commented, was very adequate. I think it is inconceivable that we continue to have to log drinks the way we did. I think if people want to know how much water you drink, you can read them off the counter on the gun, and that is it. We went crazy logging these things by numbers and counter numbers and everything else. It is operationally unacceptable. For flights that are not primarily medical all they have to have is a counter reading once or twice a day for the systems people. They could just divide it by the number of crew and come out very close to what the actual consumption per man is. Lovell [page 128] 118 suggestion on the food is that they try to reconfigure the meals so that Meal A is more like you would think of as a breakfast, with:maybe SQme toast, cereal bars, and sausage pattiess rather than fish, potato soup, and clam chowder for breakfast. The idea of .making our day like a regular Houston day was a very, very valuable one. I t would also be rather nice to have the meals correspond to the type of meal you would eat on the Earth. We ought to have a break fast that is brea . kfasts a.nd so on with lunch and dinner . One breakfast we bad shrimp, sauce, peas, and I think potato soup. This is all right, but itwould be more desirable to have had something like cereal cubes and sau sage patties and things like that, so . mething you are more used to. [page 129] 119 lasted 14 days. We could have lasted a lot longer on the food. But that does not mean there is not room for improve- ment. Borman The concept, as far as packaging and everything goes, is good. What is lacking now is really an adequate quality control for uniformity. If everyone of the food bags had been as good as the good ones, there would have been no problem. Some of them did not have velcro on them, some of them burst, and that sort of thing. # ONFIDEN (cont.) 120 Borman Sleep periods . This is one of the areas where we really made a wise decision. We decided that we would sleep simul taneously on the regular Houston schedule. We did slide it back every day to correspond with the precession of the orbit . When we were scheduled for house-keeping and sleep , we would close up the windows. We found that the polaroid filters were not adequate t so , we cut up an aluminized food bag and placed it between the window and the polaroid shield. Then, it was really dark inside, it cut out the heat, and this left us with a real simulated night. As far as we were concerned, it was night time . We would get up the next day , go to work, and itkept us regular. It kept ue relatively on a constant type of schedule. I thought itwas very , very good. Lovell We are going to have to go to that for any of the long flights , any of the lunar missions. For any of the long flights we are going to need to use a regular Houston or Cape day and not change the routine . [page 131] 121 # ONFIDEN (cont.) was a pain in the neck. We decided to leave it on though on the theory that ifwe turned it off the first thing the experimenter would say was, ''Wellyou turned it off'. It was not a valid test ." Then some crew in the future would have to fly with the thing. So , we left it on for two weeks and listened to it " clank". As far as I know it didn ' t do any good. Maybe that ' s the end of the M-1. Invariably, in a state of semi-consciousness it would rouse me again. I did not like that. Lovell Sleep configuration was very easy. You just clasp your . hands t ogether and hold them there. When you wake up your bands are still clasped together. There are no pressure points. You can have a book up there , go to sleep holding the book, and wake up the next morning and the book is still right there , still at the same page. It was outstanding. If mattress companies ever find out how to make a zero-g mattress they would really have a fortune. Borman Lovell [page 132] 122 9.0 OPERATIONAL CHECKS 9.1 Apollo Landmark Investigation Borman # ONFIDEN (cont.) We should first mention the weather because this casts some reflection on the whole i dea of Apollo l andmarks as a navi gational aid. The weather was the big bugaboo in this flight as far as achieving any A pollo land.mark photography . I do not know whether itwas the particular t argets we were trying to get or what. Invariably, there were clouds. Lovell As can be seen from the map, anything south of 15 degrees north l at itude in Africa is no good for Apollo landmarks because it is i nvari ably cloudy. South of 15 degrees north l at i t ude is in vari ably too cloudy for Apollo land.marks . Borman Right. Lovell All of South Ameri ca is out . As a matter of fact everything. south of 15 degrees north latitude all the way across the m~p is no good. We found out that North Africa and South west United States and parts of Mexico, as previous crews stated a long time ago, (that includes Saudi Arabia , Paki stan Va lley) have predominantly clear weather in the morning, but not in the afternoon. [page 133] 123 Lovell Right. Weather is the big bugaboo on Apollo landmarks, or using earth landmarks for Apollo. Borman The acquisi tion data was good. The pointingdata was good on all the experiment updates, except for one. They missed the time on an S-5. We caught it, and did itourselves be cause we knew where the a.rea was supposed to be. The point ing data given was great throughout the flight. The updat ingwa.s fine. We bad no problem.a at all. Pointing instruc t ions were good. Borman [page 134] 124 # ONFIDEN (cont.) over the target. Bo rma.n Evidently the people who called them up were taking this into consideratio n, because the sun angles for a ll the Apollo l andmark attem pts were good as far as photograp hy goes. Sightings were tough on a lot of them, primarily because of clouds. Lovell Apollo landmarks of i nterior Afri ca, whi ch they gave us several times, (like islands, lakes, Leopoldville in the middle of the Congo) , were very difficu ltbecause there is nothing down there but jungle and litt le streams and things. Borman By far the best l andmarks a re interfaces of beaches and water. Lovell That is right. Sandy beaches with blue water. There is no doubt about that. Borman There is good contrast, and with a good map you do not need the photographs. I do not understand the value of the pho- tographs, I do not see why they do not engage the Army Map Service to aerial photograph these areas and print the pictures according to the scale they want. It would be a H relatively easy job to do and certainly would be much less expensive than taking the fuel to do it on an operational mission. Borman The designated targets were clouded over more often than not. We did take some alternate targets and pointed o ut [page 135] CONFIDENTIAL 125 some prominent featu:res along coastlines in Africa. We have them logged and we will be able to go over them with t he Apollo landmark people. Even an area like Dakar, which you would think would be a r elatively clear area, we tried three times to photograph and each time itwas cloudy. Lovell Borman Mostly in the afternoon. The maps and Apollo landmark data package was all right. One of the problems with the maps was it is difficult to orient the map segments on the page, so that several of the targets were anywhere near the middle of the map. You might end up with a map with an Apollo landmark right on the edge of it. Itis then difficult to associate the surrounding terrain with it . The big map that we had in the front of the book solved a lot of this problem. We could get the big picture from the bigmap and then go to the detailed one for the detailed pictures. # ONFIDEN (cont.) 127 that I was going up hill or going down hill in the elliptical orbit. [page 138] 128 # ONFIDEN (cont.) CONFIDENTIAL Borman Pe rhaps, the colors were a little deeper i n the photographs than were the landmarks but photographs are very adequate presentat i on of colors . I think probably any variance in the photographs i s due to vari~nce i n sun angle . Lovell We understood the targets well enough, I don ' t see any problem there at all . We didn't use the maps with gloves on. You can hardly use anything with gloves on. Borman The best thi ng you can do w ith gloves i s t ake t hem off and stow t hem as soon as possi ble. Lovell The Apollo Landmark Book size was adequate. Any smaller s ize in maps gets to be too thick or too small , and you really can't read them in detail. I did like the bigmap of the w orld broken up in four sections, because that gave us a good approach to the targets. We could use that much be tt er than we could the orbital plotboard . Borman # ONFIDEN (cont.) 129 Borman Certainly this factor of weather l eads me to believe that the whole ide a of na:vigating Apollo by a landmark needs t o be reevaluated. It seems to me that a much more desirable feature woul d be a series of radar beacons placed throughout the world, similar to the ones that are used by SAC, or some type of e lectronic gadget not dependent upon cl ear weather. You cannot choose the weather you want, and in our f ourtee.n day mission, for abo ut el even days we had lousy weather. The number of primary targ~ts p hotographed. How many did you photograph? Lo vell We have nine Apollo l andmarks logged in the Apol lo land.mark sectio n: Sequence 85 - clouds at nadir. Sequence 137 - no luck, clouds overhead. Sequence 94 - unable, because of clouds. Took a point of land nearby. Sequence 58 - C loudy. Sequence 70 - Okay. Sequence 85 - Just weather is the remark. Sequence 108 - Clouds, resulting in poor picture . Sequence 130 - Weather. Sequence 97 - Weather. M os t of the landmarks they gave us, that were down below the 15 degrees north l a titude ended up w ithweather. [page 140] 130 # ONFIDEN (cont.) Borman The number of primary targets photographed was 1. Evalua tion of sequence 350B and 35IB, I maintain that the maps are entirely adequate. We evaluated them looking at the Cairo area and the Dead Sea, and I see no reason for the photographs. Jim ha.a a different feeling about that. 9.2 Cabin Lighting Survey Borman We did not have. We have already talked about the lighting, glare, the dirtywindows, and so forth. I felt that this was a pain in the neck, and I would like to make sure that somebody got some useful data out of that. We went around the earth in the HORIZON SCAN mode once with the HF transmitter on, and I wonder i f there i s anything at all going to be learned from it. Lovell I am beginning to wonder whether the HF system is worth the cost to put it into orbit. Borman You might be better off with another UHF set. Lovell That is right. Go to something that is compatible, like single side band. Borman HF was adequate when UHF was adequate. As far as any over- the-horizon transmission with HF, there was not any. Lovell It was very, very poor. [page 141] CONFIDENTIAL 131 Borman The reception on HF during the flight was very poor. Lovell Right. 10.0 VISUAL SIGHTINGS 10.1 Countdown Borman We did not have any visual sightings. No wasps, bees, bugs, or anything in the spacecraft. 10.2 Powered flight Borman I did not look out at lift-off. Lovell I think we went through clouds, didn't we? We went through an overcast. FCSD rep It looked like Frank steered it right through a hole in the overcast. Lovell Could anyone see us after we went through the overcast? Or was that the end of i t? FCSD rep No, the hole was big enough so that you were in sight. Lovell Could you see staging? FCSD rep No, you dis&ppeared from sight before staging. Borman At BECO the spa.cecra.ft was enveloped. in a yellow flame. BECO &nd sta.ging &re so cl ose that you cannot tell the difference. Engine 2 ignition was very smooth, no noise, no bang.1.ng. The horizon ca.me into view just like the simulator. Ve-ry, very adequate presentation. At SECO I did not notice a thing, just & stop and a oessa.tion ofnoise. I did not see CONFIDENTIAL [page 142] 132 any flames, debris or anything. A lthough you did at Lovell Fairing Jettison and Spacecraft Separation. On Fairing Jettison, I saw debris fly, especially during the turnaround. 10.3 Orbital Flight Borman As for .man-made objects sighted, we took sightings of the booster. We had no difficulty in sighting the booster at turnaround and in station keeping with it. We maintained the flashing light in sight throughout the first orbit, we saw them on the second orbit, and the third orbit during the night phase. Lovell Borman But you could not tell distance by the flashing lights. No. As a matter of fact, I think it would be impossible to tell distance at night unless you have some sort of illumination. Lovell Yes, ifthe lights are illuminating the vehicle, by spread ing it over the vehicle, maybe you could tell. You cannot tell the way they are now. We picked up Spacecraft 6 on the final rendezvous phase, I guess at about five miles. Is that right? Borman Right. Again, this is entirely dependent upon where the sun is. Spacecraft 6 was able to see us a long time before we could see them, because we were in a position where the sun # ONFIDEN (cont.) # ONFIDEN (cont.) 133 was reflecting off our adapter, and they were in a position so that the sun was not reflecting off their adapter. It is a strange phenomenon, but it is entirely dependent upon the sun. Once we acquired Spacecraft 6, it certainly was no problem of maintaining a visual on it. Itwas no different than it is on the ground in the daytime. Lovell I agree. Borman We sighted two satellites. We saw the Minuteman reentry at exactly the right time and exactly the right place. It looked l i ke a meteorite. Lovell Very brilliant. It broke up toward the end. Borman Very brilliant, itbroke up toward the end, and there were several different pieces flying around. I was surprised at the speed at which itwent in. I was also surprised at the control authority required to track it. We did get on it though before itbroke up and went out. I hope they got good data on it. Lovell We saw, what we think, were two sat ellitesmoving. Borman Yes, we took IR readings on one of them. Itwas a de£inite satellite in a polar orbit. We took photographs of two satellites in the polar orbits. One of them was below us, crossing from left to right, and the other one wa.s above us, crossing left to right. We picked them up first in the handle of the [page 144] 134 Big Dipper. Itwas definitely a satellite, and ~e tracked it on the IR and we used the recorder. It will be interesting to see if they got any data of it. We were never close enough to see any satellites and to pick them out as far as definite features. Lovell They were just points of light. Borman Just light points. There certainly was not any problem viewing the ground. As we have already mentioned over the radio, we were able to see the Astrodome. The horizontal markings, or the east west markings, on the S-8/D-1, pattern stood out loud and clear when we acquired it. It is very akin to flying an ai rp l ane at high altitude. Roads stood out well, rivers stood out well, and beaches particularly well. Towns were a little more difficult to determine, but when you had them you could easily see the l ayout and appar ent size. Also, the atmosphere made a vast difference. If there was any sort of haze or cloud , it definitely cut down your vision. When we finally got over the Himalayas in daylight, itwas easy to see why itwas so clear. lovell [page 145] CONFIDENT 135 excellent viewing is where the ai:r is clear. Itis the same way with airplanes. But, I think you ha.ve a better chance to look below than you do in an airplane. There is a better chance of seeing something, but you still have the haze problem. Borman When we first got up and had a full Moon, we did not see many more stars than you see on an ordinary flight at thirty or forty thousand feet. However, during the latter part of the flight with a quarter Moon, we found that there were more stars visible. We have a drawing here of the number of stars we could see in the Pleiades, which has been recorded. Lovell The big thing to remember here is the fact that the Moon has a big effect on the number of stars you see and which ones you can use for celestial navigation. Borman Right. [page 146] 136 CONFIDENTIAL visible. Cloud coverage, there was a lot of it. The first three days were relatively clear and from then on there were lots and lots of clouds. About the only area that was consistently clear was the Sahara and the Red Sea a.rea. The States were cloudy, as was Mexico, South America, Southern Africa, and a great deal of the ocean was cl oudy. [page 147] CONFIDENTIA # ONFIDEN (cont.) 137 zon. And with no Moon, the best sextant sighting spot to use was the upper a irglow, because it wa s the sharpest of the two. The area between the upper air glowarea and the earth's horizon was too milky during a no Moon to get a good sharp contrast (you could see stars through it), but you couldn't find out exactly where the horizon was. So it varied between full Moon and no Moon. Borman Very drastically too. Also, your ability to pick out the earth, and determine yaw from earth's passage wi t h no Moon, wa.s zilch. W ith the full Moon it wa.s just as good as itwas in the daylight. Lovell The Moon is very bright up there, very bright. Borman Both attitude and translation thrusters firing were apparent. The aft firing thrusters were not apparent. But the forward thrusters were apparent at night and so were the transla- tional, up, down, sideways. The attitude thrusters were also apparent with puffs, sort of like subdued flashbulbs appearing out to the side of the window. They were just little flashes of light in the background, and we couldn't determine anything from them. Lovell We couldn't determine anything. Borman But you could on Spacecraft 6. Lovell On Spacecraft 6 the thruster firings looked as though they CONFIDENTIAL [page 148] 138 went out about forty feet against a dark background. You could see this light haze going out about forty feet. It wasn't a bell shaped pattern, as we thought itwas going to be, but itwas like a garden hose, straight out. At a distance we could not see the bright flash of ignition in the chamber itself. All we could see was the haze going out. But as we got in closer, we could start picking up the bright flash, ma.inly because of attitude I suspect, as we were getting closer to see it. It had no effect on our spacecraft at all. They actually fired about twenty feet away with their forward firing thrusters to us, and departed. Borman They got in back behind us in the adapter and fired their forward firing thrusters and . made the curtain jiggle. 1 don It know how far away they were when they did this. 1 hope they can tell us, and give you some idea of the effect that these thrusters :might have on the EVA Mission . It ' s just like firing a rocket at night. I guess that's the way we expected it to look. That is exactly what you are doing, firing a rocket at night. # ONFIDEN (cont.) 139 s.ee Retro Pack&ge jettison. At reentry we didn't have a lighted horizon at 400,000 feet. We didn 1 t have a lighted horizon until we were below 400,000 feet. This was not particularly to my liking; although we picked itup about 330,000 feet. After then, itwas all right. Lov ell We saw ionization. Borman Yes, we did. Lovell The whole window started to be just a glow outside. Then it got into the ri?18S of this ionization layer. It started out to be just glowi?18. Borman When we went subsonic it looked like there was a bunch of steam and flame that engulfed the nose eection. I think this may have been when the spacecraft finally went subsonic, right before drogue deploy. You could see the spacecraft oscillations, and you could reference them with the drogue, which was relatively steady. You could also reference them with the sky. You didn't have any stars or anything, but you could just pick out the motions across the sky. At times itwas pretty violent. It would be intereeting to see the magni~u.d.e of the oscillations and the rates. Borman The drogue deploy was very evident. We saw the drogue chute. We saw the Rand R Can come off, and then I saw itfollowing us down in the parachute, off to one side. Main chute CONFIDENTIAL [page 150] 140 deploy was very nice. Lovell Ma.in chute deploy, vecy enjoyable to watch. Borman During landing and recovecy we had the S2F in sight before we ever hit the water. 11. 0 EXPERIMENTS 11.1 Celestial, Space, and Terrestrial Radiometry (D-4/7) Borman I think we have more valuable data on D-4/D-7 than all the others put together. Lovell Right. Borman Updating techniques and communications procedures were excellent. Evecything ca l led up on D-4/D-7 was right on the money, including the time and pointing locations for the reentcy vehicle. Lovell They did an outstanding job of giving us the right information onboard. Borman We were perfectly trained in equipment setup and usag e. Jim didn't have a question about it. I think there w as no problem at all. L ovell We got evecything going. I hope that we got some good data. Borman Cooled Spectrometer checks were nominal. CONFIDENTIAL [page 151] CONFIDENTIAL 141 I don't know what else to say, as far as we lmow, every thi ng was perfect, it'sall logged, they have the records, they have the TM. Lovell We saw the needle go down when we jettisoned the fairing cover af ter the fifteen second timer delay, after we did our separation maneuver. I saw the cover go by when we jettisoned. Borman Did you? Lovell It is right above the right hand window. Borman I did not see that. The booster measurements were no problem at all. It was just like the way the simulator worked. It was just fine. Very good. We had no problems making the reticle measurements. They were very close to zero on both the IR and the spectrometer. Power- down procedures. Did you have any? Lovell No. Booster background measurements were no problem at all. Borman Okay. The Milky Way measurement without the cooled sensor was performed exactly on time. We had no problems with the equipment. No problems with any of this. [page 152] 142 The Void was very easy to pick out and to take the readings. The Zodiacal light test was deleted in real time. We substituted Sirius for the Zodiacal light. Borman The star measurements were done with no problem. Night land measurements are noted on the tape and in the log book. We did have some problem with these because the night land was covered with clouds. So we were trying to skew the spacecraft along and avoid clouds. I'm afraid that we may not have always missed the clouds. The same situation existed with the night water measurements. We had very good luck on the Polaris. We had good luck on the Polaris and good luck on the booster. We should have had pretty good luck on Gemini 6. We were able to track it. We had good luck on the sled. Lovell We hope we had good luck on the sled. Borman They called us up from the ground and said they had a thousand percent on t hat. [page 153] -CONFIDENTI 143 Lovell You could track the Polaris launch in PULSE. Borman You could track everything in PULSE except the reentry vehicle. The reentry vehicle was pre t ty fas t and you had to go t o DI:-tECT . Lovell I have to give credit to the pe rsonnel, the experimentor , Brent nall. :Borman He hus t l ed and he did his work. He made sure that we knew what we were doing. It was well done. Lovell This is the firs t mi ssile t hat was ever l aunched from a submarine, their ORI, I guess. To launch at the exact ti.me so that we would be in the exact position, I thought was an ama zing piece of coordina ti on among all people involved. :Borman I just hope t hey got all the data. [page 154] 144 # ONFIDEN (cont.) Borman We always had the ACQ off when we were transmitting. The only possible problems that we could have had with this experiment was when we lost our tape recorder. We could not put some of the data on tape. We had to always take the data over a receiving station. Lovell Or use the recorder . Borman Or use a recorder. Lovell One problem which we did have and which I was not briefed on was the fact that I inadvertently left the gear on one time and it gave a nine second pulse on the main ammeter system. We could not figure out what this glitch was coming in on the Main Bus. Borman This was right after we lost the thru s ters . We thought there might have been something in the ACME bias power or something in the in,rerter that was breaking down and putting out a glitch. We called the ground to tell them we found it and they said t hat i t was ex ac tly what the ground had thought it was. Borman Cloud illumination lightning%3B we got some good lightning shots for them. Day land measurements, we got. Ascension Calibration was done twice. [page 155] CONFIDENTIA 145 Lovell Listen, that was done twice? Borman Yes. Lovell Was this the NADIR to 35 degrees West? Borman Yes. Lovell Of course we never saw Ascensio n so I di d not ... :Borman Yeah, we never saw Ascension but i t was the locati on of t he area where we wanted t o find. Lovell I think we did that once, or did we do 19 once? Borman Yes, it is the same thing. Cumulus clouds. We got some cloud measurements. Star measurements, the only the thing we got there was the lightning. Celestial measurement. We got that. The stars, we did not get the Zodiacal light. We got the stars, the milkyway, the void. 23 Moon measure- ments. We got the Moon. We got all the missile measure- ments. I do not think it is necessary for us to record it off our log book. Lovell We missed the Titan launch. Borman Yes, we did not get the liftoff because of clouds. But we picked them up when we picked up their contrails.. Lovell Yes. Borman We also threw in an extra satellite. It will be interesting to see if they got any data out of that. The CONFIDENTI [page 156] 146 Sun measurement was done. That was a real interesting one, because in order to get the Sun, we had to put up t he polaroid lights , and wear sun glasse s, and then poi nt at it . Lovell Hot Earth Measurement s: we had that bi g fire in North A frica that was there all the tim e. That was a targ et of opport unity. We got Hot Earth Measurements of thi s f i re in Nort;h Afric a. Borman The tape recorder was used properly. Voice recorder usage was adequate. Flight cont ro l procedure: the only time we had to do anything at; all different was to go to DIRECT t o pickup t hat reentry vehicle . The res t of the t ime it was a very well organized, well bri efed , well t rai ned, and I thought a well-run experiment. Lovell That is right. I thought it was quite a bit of data and work to do in that experiment. Borm an As a matter of fac t , I t hink the equipment on thes e represented about 3½ million dol lars. So it was a pre tty hefty piece of equipment . 11.2 Star Occulation Measurement (D-5) Borman Now we go from the sublime to the ridiculous. The star occulation measurement D-5. The equipment [page 157] "CONFIDENTIAL 147 never worked and we fooled around with itfor hours trying to ma.lee it work. I a.m sure somebody is going to sit down stairs now and ground check it okay, but, it did not work. We did everything and we traded itback and forth to . make sure that both of us saw the same results. Lovell Borman We had been briefed on this, we used itin the set up at St. Louis where we had seen how it changed. We had bad adequate briefings. We had accurate presentations on it. Lovell Borman Primarily you could not calibrate the equipment, the reticle would not change from red to green. We made a couple of measurements where we just used the calibration lmob at a certain settingand let italone. But this equipment was inoperative. I thought itwas a little strange, too, when they called up and said, ''We have just found out that this equipment is sensitive to RF interference." "Turn off all your transmitters and see if this affects it." I think we ought to know before we go charging into the 3rd or 4th day of flight that the equipment is sensitive to RF interference. It see . ms to me tba.t perhaps there was not a very good Qual. test done on this piece of gear. I have ONFIDENTIAL [page 158] 148 nothing else to say about the D-5 except the equipment did not work. Lovell Well, star acquisition and identification, which has nothing to do with the equipment, was outstanding with the chart. A ctually , I would like to put in a little pitch here, for the sill!Ulator, because the visual part of the simulator was a big help. It gave us a good idea of what we could expect in flight. And the Planetarium's work was very valuable in conjunction with the simulator. I think that we did not waste time with any of our star recosnition stuf'f. They did come in handy. As a : matter of fact, ifyou really get to know that celestial sphere, you can really get around without the earth. Borman 11.3 Simple Navigation D-9 Jim used this test exclusively. He was trained at Ames. But we actually used the sextant down here before the flight many times with the experimenters. We used it in the simu.lator. Lovell Let me give so . me comments on this sextant. There are a lot of co. mments on the tape. Number one, the D-9 sextant alignment CONFIDENTIAL [page 159] ONFIDENTIAL 149 # ONFIDEN (cont.) was fine, the stop watch was an excellent idea. The lighting on the sextant angle reading was too bright. It was a white bright light. Everytime you read the sextant out you lost your dark adaptation because we were looking at this white light. And all it had to be, since the spacecraft is dark anyway if you are looking at stars, is red, or dimmer light to read the angle out. The reticle was fine during the first part of the flight, and then for some reason it became a double image. I found out that I never used the reticle during the full. Moon or even at half Moon I could see the dark lines. without having to light up the reticle. One of the big things about the sextant, the mechanical aspects, was the fact that the light was not split 50-50 between the upper prism and the lower telescope. It was a 20-80 split and therefore one image would be bright and the other one dim. This was fine if you went from the start of the horizon where you would have a bright star and a dim horizon. You had a control, but if you went from, say, two stars to measure the angle between two stars to check the align- ment of a sextant, (because the angles are already known) one star would be bright and the other star real dim if you got them within a certain angle of each other. But as soon as you got that other dim star, then the bright [page 160] 150 # ONFIDEN (cont.) star, you could not tell when they were overlapping. Lovell You had to have two stars of the same magnitude in lock. So, I had practiced and trained in the one with the 50-50 split which I thought was a lot better than this 20-80 which we finally ended up with. And this also is true when you took star to Moon limb shots because they had it arranged that most of the light came from the Moon. Eighty percent of the light passage was from the Moon and they had filters to cut that down. And 20 percent came from the star. Well, the filters were not dark enough for the Moon, and as soon as you got those stars somewhere near the limb they just faded out of view. You could not see. it so you had a hard time getting star to Moon limb shots. Lovell We noticed one big thing in navigation with the sextant. With a full Moon, you are going to have a hard time using the stars under the Moon. It just blanks out the light. It is just too bright, it dims the stars and ruins your dark adaptation. On no Moon nights or quarter Moon nights, most of the stars come out and the navigation is a lot better. We found out also on full Moon nights as we said before, that we'd use the bottom Earth's horizon, which is probably an upper air horizon and had the sharpest line of identification for angles. [page 161] ON 151 Lovell On no Moon nights, the whole air glow layer seemed to be of the same consistancy. And the sharpest part was the upper air glow layer where we could bring stars down to it. Did you find it difficult at times to get the stars acquired at the angle? Borman Lovell Right. We found out, due to the window design, that if the stars were not lined vertically with one another, if we were taking star to star shots or star to Moon shots, it was hard to get the sextant lined up. The best way to hold the sextant was the way it was developed originally: just up and down. If you had to move it around here to get a star over here, or horizontal or angle shots, you had to move the spacecraft around to get the window in line, to get all the view. Now we could shoot angles up to about I think 45 degrees, if we had the right window alignment and had bright enough stars. But anything above. that and most of the time around 35 to 40 degrees, one of the two, either the upper prism or the lower telescope would get in the way of the rim of the window and get lost to view. Then we couldn't do anything with it. I remember there were a couple of times when you picked up the wrong star too. Borman Lovell Yes. [page 162] 152 Borman Even though you know the star very we l l , using the system of estimating the angl e i n ahead of time, you l eave your self open to pic king the wrong st ars. Lovell Yes, one of the big things about the sextant is you have to be sure you can identify the star when you are looking inside the sextant after you get the thing down because. you might get the wrong star. That is why you should use stars in sextant navigation that have identifying features. in the field of view of the sextant. For instance Capella was a very good one because it has the 3 little stars. around it, I guess there were 2 stars, I forget. Three stars. # ONFIDEN (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) 153 we had to read the digital clock to get an exact time of the reading, the reflection from the Moon, all that stuff complicates visual sightings. Borman Row about picking out a proper horizon? You even had trouble doing that. What horizon were we going to use? Lovell Th at is right. We don't know what horizon we are going to use. Borman The horizon is dependent upon the Moon. Lovell So sextant sightings are going to be very difficult. Borman And the accuracy of this instrument, as advertised, is phenomenal. But the accuracy to what? If we do not know what horizon we are measuring to. Did you mention the fact that the green filter cuts out everything? Lovell Well that is right. Yes, the green and blue filters , one of the modes as a matter of fact , was to use the green filter for the horizon. Unfortunately you stick the green filt er in there and then look for the horizon and it is gone. Borman Everything is gone. Th e re is nothing. All you see are the stars up above, you do not see any horizon. Lovell So the filter idea was useless as far as the sextant goes. Borm an Also the blue filter, you stayed dark adapted and then tri ed the blue filt er in daylight as was requested. CONFIDENTIAL [page 164] 154 CONFIDENTIAL Lovell Th at was a little scientif ic experiment w hich we were asked to do: to see ifwe could see the blue horizon line, blue air glow in the daytime by keeping dark adapted and using the blue fil ter. Borman The results were negative. Lovell That is right. Borman Anything else? Lovell I think we hit everything on the sextant . Borman We had no equipment malfunctions with the sextant other than t he f a ct that you got double vision. Lovell A nd t he sextant was not as bulky to oper a te on t he space craft as iti s on l and. It is a pretty bulky piece of equipment, but itis not bad. 11.4 Visual Acuity and Astronaut Visibility and Vision Test (M-9) Borman Updating techniques and communications procedures: This was an area that was outstanding. It seems redundant to comment about it everytime, but is is true. Equipment set up and usage for the vision test and the M-9 experiment, no problem. We tried this in the simulator and we tried it in flight and it was the same. Lovell The photometer left a little bit to be desired. Borman Oh, I think we are talking not just about the tests that CONFIDENTIAL [page 165] CONFIDENT DENTIAL 155 # ONFIDEN (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) we did every morning. T he vision test and the other one. # ONFIDEN (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Borman The M-9 vision test also caused no problem. As a matter of fact we did a little interesting experiment of our own. We used the brace, the head brace and the bite board everytime but once, and then we co.m.pared the results, with and without using the head brace or bite boards, the last day. We noted this in the log book. There was no difference in the outco . m.e, so I have begun to wonder if it is necesary. One of the great points o:f interest, was trying to observe this ground observation at Laredo a.nd we picked it up 3 times, I believe. Acquisition is very difficult, be cause of the poor terrain features. I never did really see the smoke pots, but we did see the dashes that they had in the block. We had a real good pass at ita.nd we had itacquired excellently and I called off 3numbers and they are listed in the l og book, I think there was a 3-1-3 or a 1-3-1. Borman I would be interested to know if I was right on a:ny of these because you could see the:m. I should have been able to see the . m. on that one. 1-3-3, I gu.ese itwas we called off. No, 3-1-3 ground observation. Lovell I had one pass where I saw itand by the time I got to see the squares or the rectangles we were already by it [page 166] 156 I guess from what I could see of the thing, I think itwas a 2-3-4, that was all I had of it. Basically, we had a picture from Gr-5. Borman We had pictures from G'11-5 with us in the cockpit to help us acquire it . Lovell We could see the red ground with no strain at all. We knew where to look and it was just difficult to find. Borman You might mention that if they had gone to Yuma, if we had not had to change our launch trajectory, it would have been great. You could pick out the area of the Salton Sea there even from where we were, 3 or 4 hundred miles south, it stood out like a sore thumb. Lovell I do think though that for the amount of time that you are over the target, the amount of squares they were expecting you to read are too much. Borman [page 167] 157 # ONFIDEN (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) had not had a chance to warm up for 10 minutes. We were at such a low fuel state then that itwas either then or never, so we did it, and I hope they got the data. Now this window measurement business was always a l ittl e nebulous to me. I am not sure exactly what they were going to get out of it. :But itseems like they a.re scratching. Lovell I do not understand the procedures too well. I mean I went th.rough the procedures, followed them exactly, but the pho tometer leftme out to lunch. We tried to get the dope, but I do not see what they are going to get out of it. Borman We did not have much confidence in that. We did it exactly the way it was practiced. We did practice it in the simula- tor and it is recorded on voice tape. They came back though and said that TM did not make much sense to them, and I think that is probably right. Voice tape recorder usage, by and large this was another experiment that was well han- dled, preflight and during flight. We admit that we spent a lot of time on this one and with all the visual acuity data they got ahead of time, and were briefed by the princi- pal experimenters many, many times. I thought that it was handled as well as it could be handled. The site in Aus- tralia. We were over Australia [page 168] 158 in the da ylight--of course the site was not manned because of the few pa sses we'd have to have . When we were over Australia we didn't have attitude contro l . Lovell We might menti o.n one thing. I think with the l ong flight like we had, ifwe had the fuel we could ha ve become m ore skilled in observing the site and probably have gotten better results . Borman No, we could not have on this one, because after the 3rd day the clouds were the factor the whole time. We had only 3 days to observe that, and everything else was cloudy. Okay, it was cloudy, but I suspect that the more passes over the thing, you would get better. But we just did not have the fuel and the weather was bad. Lovell [page 169] 159 pictures over Brazil that have never been gotten before. They were not called up. We took them with the IR color shifted .f i l m. We got so me pictures of Mexi co t hat we re n ot ca lled up. # ONFIDEN (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) Lovel l Borman Lovell Borman We · got a good sequence over North Africa. We got several good sequences over North Africa.. But I am sure tha.t they have been used before. We also took a sequence along the southern coast from New Orleans through Florida using color shifted IR to evaluate the film more than anything else. I hope this comes in handy. We got some shots of the island chains off Florida, to see if they can determine any effect from the hurricane that went through, Betsy. Lovell As a matter of fact, we got a strip sequence of Cuba too. Borman All these are targets of opportunity done without attitude control, but they were all targets that were listed before flight. We got the mouth of the Amazon, and I think that is the first time that has been photographed. Now on the S-6 the weather photography we tried in the l ast pa.ss to ta.ke a successive revo l ution p icture of weather devel opment. Ve got one good shot over the Andee. We al so got some good sho ts of wave cl ouds over the Andes during the l atter p art of the flight. We l ooked for hurricane or tropical storm Alice in the [page 170] 160 CONFIDENTIAL Indian Ocean but we never did see it . L ovell We had an S- 6 weather to ge t that too, but we never did see it. Borman Air to ground relay of data was good. Voice recorder usage, thi s is one area where we are not r ed undant. If we had time t o record a ll t he photographs we put in th8 logbook and not on the voice recorder in an effort to sav e tape. Ever yt hing that was done, though, was logged either S-5, S-6, or in general pho tography. Now, another item that is going to degrade this was the scum on your window. Lovell Yes. The window is an area which we a re going to have to work on. Borman As it got worse and worse, we shifted so that I was taking the pictures, but I had scum on my window also. The major problem though, here was just lack of fuel. We could not orient the spacecraft to control it the way we wanted to. 11.6 Protron Electron Spectrometer, Tri-Axis Flux-Gate Magnetometer. Borman We turned the switch on and left it on. I think we should have reams and reams of data, although unfortunately with the tape recorder being shot, I do not know what good it is going to do. Lovell W ell, they got real time telemetry over the stati on. Borman Right. CONFIDENTIAL [page 171] 161 Lovell After seeing GT-6 1 s film of our back area, the straps hanging off our spacecraft looked like they were all intertwining in that boom area. It could probably foul up that boom somewhat in future flights. I mean in a future fligh t ifwe stillhad t hat same problem itmi ght foul up th at boom and tear off th a t wire. There is a wire that goes out to the end of that thing. Bo rman All the experiments we talked about so far were well presented before hand. We knew exact ly what we were going to do, and the only reason we weren't able to uo itwas 1) weather, 2) lack of fuel, and 3) in the case of the D-5, the equipment broke down. I think we got a substantial amount of S-5 and S-6 done. As a matter of fact we got everything done that was called up and we got a lot more done just in general pho t ography. 11.7 Optical Communications (MSC-4) Borman Optical communications, MSC-4. Okay, acquisition of the ground t a rget. I have never been bet ter locked in on White Sands in my l ife than CONFIDEN [page 172] 162 # ONFIDEN (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) ONFIDENTIA we were, when we went by there , and saw two blinks of the laser. We had the photograph in front of us marking where the laser was located . We saw Holoma n , we s aw White Sands but we never did see the beam except the short flashes . Lovell The magnitude of this laser is a lot less than either Frank or I suspected after our briefings by the experim enters and by ac tua lly looking at one at Houston. Obviously this laser at Houston was a lot shorter and can be very much magnified . T racking was no problem~ Borman We acquired one over Hawaii; we were able to track it easily. The problem is acquisition of the light. Lovell The light beam is a lot smaller point than we suspected. Borman And then again the big bugaboo in this whole experiment was weather. Ascension never got up, we never got ground. equipment at Ascension.We never got really good passes at White Sands because we were always about 300 miles South. And Hawaii was available to us on only 2 passes. We acquired the laser on both passes, but were not able to get the handheld laser on the beam on the ground. # ONFIDEN (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) 163 No. 1) it did not have as much light gathering as was required for this particular equipment. It should have a larger magnification. 2) It had a green filter over it which was supposed to enhance picking up the beam, but all it did was fade out everything. You could not see terrain features and you needed to see terrain features. to find out where that beam was located. Yes. to know where th e beam was. Borman Lovell You could look out and....we had photographs of the area. where the beam should be coming from. And we could acquire it by our naked eye by just looking out and seeing it. But, as soon as you went to the telescope of the laser, everything faded out to this green color. Unless you just happened to pick up the beam you're lost and I never was able to pick up the beam thru the telescope. The filter was just too strong. I much prefer to have a clear view. So I could pick out the terrain features. The reticle of course.... Borman Lovell Of course, we knew that was shot before we took off. We never had a good check of this thing though, at night, and I wish we had had a good night pass over something, but we never did. Because I feel that we probably could have probably picked up the beam a lot better at night. -CONFIDENTIAL [page 174] 44 164 # ONFIDEN (cont.) ## Borman (cont.) CONFIDENHAI Protective glasses. To tell you the truth the one time where I was really trying to get onto the Hawaii pass I took them off . I did not use them. And they were in the way, they were cumbersome and together with the telescope, itwas just too hard to find. Borman I used mine, but I did not put them on until right before Jim was supposed to transmit . Lovell Of course, I had them, I had them on and I transmitted and found out that I could not see anything so I just pulled them off and started transmitting by going back ... because as I understand it the operator really does not need them ifhe i s right next to it. Borma n The bigword on this one as far as the retic l e goes , w~ should go back to that is for the day time you do not want that green in there. At night time you are going to need a lighted reticle. You cannot see the reticle at ni ght. Lovell That is right . So you need a better acquisition device on the laser, a better, bigger telescope with more light gathe ring and clarity of the te.rrain of the target. I would imagine PULSE mode would be great for tracking the thing. Borman Yes. I tracked one at Hawaii very easily. No problems. The tracking is a nominal task, there is nothing to it. CONFIDENTIAL [page 175] CONFIDENTIAL 165 But the other business of acquiring is very difficult, Particularly with the reticle set. 11.8 Landmark Contrast Borman We did one of these with the D- 5 photometer . We knew it was bad, but we put the calibrationneedle in the full "up" position, told the experimenter that we were doin8 this and took the data. Nowt they will have to check it to see how itworked. Lovell We did just one. Borman We had an equipment malfunction. Right. No sense talking about it anymore. Spacecraft control was no problem. We accomplished all the mechanics of doing it, but unfortunately the equipment we knew was malfunc- tioning before we did it. Right? Lovell Right you are. CONFIDENTIAL [page 176] 166 # -CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) 167 period, was that we did not want to have the people say, "Well, you did not run it the whole time so the experiment was not valid." We left it on and put up with it in the hope that we could get rid of it once and for all. Lovell Obviously, it did not work. :Borman So far as we know it did not make any dif£erence. And it did not seem to make any difference inflight or post flight. Lovell Itwas a waste of time. 11.10 In-flight exerciser (M-3) Borman It is a valuable piece of equipment. We used it not only for the crew status passes, we exercised with it 3 times a day and I thought it was very worthwhile. It is a simple piece of gear but it is a good device. Right? Lovell Although, I imagine we can improve on exercise equipment in the future spacecraft. :Borman Perhaps, the biggest deteriorati on that we noted in the muscles was in our legs , and that exerciser was-I do not know how you can improve on that much. 11.11 In - f l i ght phonocardiogram (M-4) and In-flight s leep analysis (M-8) Borman Well, the equipment problems with M-8 were that the thing. is operationally incongruous. You cannot have those [page 178] 168 wires on your head and stringing down the back of your neck, and not expect to catch them on something in a small space craft. Now, we found that we couldn't keep the helmet on. I kept iton for two days, but my head became extremely hot, and I was uncomfortable. So when I took itoff I ripped all four of the leads off. And I think that the whole thing is extraneous a:nyway. I felt after 14 days I was perfectly capable to judge my own condition, and my own awareness, and my own degree of alertness I did not need that bunch of wires hanging on my head to tell me or to tell somebody on the ground how awake or how asleep I was. Lovell Inflight phonoca.rdiogram, I have no comments because itwas stuck on me atprelaunch , and it stayed on me during the entire flight. # -CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) 169 urinate into is unsatisfactory. We ended up with urine all over ourselves everytime we tried to use it. It was sort of happenstance. If you lucked out, you didn't get a leak. But based on the experience that we had up there, I would think that the way to go is a simple overboard device where you vent right to the atmosphere, and urinate into a tube Essentially the same thing you do in C-47. Borman We carried the flow meter along and the Delta P across the flow meter and the filter can be incorporated with it. I am sure this is enough to allow you just to urinate right into a relief tube right overboard. I do not see any reason to go through this stage where you have urine all over yourself 4 or 5 times a day. A very unacceptable device. Do you agree? Lovell Right. I think we can improve on the urine dump system tremendously. Borman I think they ought to start looking into just a dump right overboard. You do not use a rubber condom or anything. Lovell Because that things puts back pressure which is really sort of dangerous I think, and besides that, it is uncomfortable. And when you have back pressure... Borman Yeah. When you have a big enough receiver and you urinate [page 180] 170 CONFIDENTIAL a stream into a vacuum, it is going to go right on over- board. I do not understand why...okay. The defecation bags were fine. And we really used them this time. The defecation bags were really put to use in this flight. I think we used a total of 15 of them. Lovell Yes. Borman And they were fine. I have no comments on those. It seems to be the best solution you can have to the situation . Lovell For this p articular type spacecraft. Borman For this particular type ••• For the Gemini Sp acecraft. I do not know what other approach you could have to them. I thought their marking was easily done. The finger hole I never used that at all. One of the big assets, we might as well put itinhere, was the fact that the food that we ate caused well formed bowels, so we did not have any loose stools or any of that problem. I never had any occasion to use that finger device in there at al l . Any other comments? No. Lovell Borman The water intake, the water counter number. The gun was satisfactory. The recording that goes with it is completely unsatisfactory. I think the only way we should CONFIDENTIAL [page 181] -CONFIDENTIAL 171 consider using that gun again is to read down a daily counter number, and let the people use that as a--we ra.n into a regular night mare. Recording drinks used and drinks .••• Lovell Borman It was too much. I think our water intake was adequate. And again I do not think this is something we need to be hounded about from the ground. Aperson seems to have enough problems without being reminded that he is drinking enough water; I do not see any reason at all to have this com~ plica.ted bookeeping system. The food intake was not a problem. We recorded the food. One thing we might note, the food was pa.eked out of sequence. So when we got itout, we did not end up eating Day 1, meal A, B, C, Meal 2, A, B, C, but we did always eat Meal A first, Meal B the second meal of the de.y, and Meal C, the third meal of the day. Al though, itmight be day 1, meal A, day 13, meal E, and day 6, meal C. Lovell Also, while we are talki.ng about food, we better ta lk about the stowage of the food. Itwas right up to the maximum. Borman That is right. Lovell And in fact it was a little bit overboard for 14 days. CONFIDENTIAL [page 182] 172 -CONFIDENTIAL Rather tightly packed in. We really had to work to get it out. Borman But aga in , th i s is one of those things we were operating right up to th e maximum capabi l i ty of the spacecraft , and I guess we had to expect that, e.ven though we did get it out. So I would not say itwas unacceptable. 11.13 Miscellaneous Borman Celestial and terrestial observations, and significant observations or anomolies affecting other operational or experimental data. Lovell Well, we got to see Mars just near the sun by looking at it just at sunset. Borman Mercury you mean. Mercury. We saw Mercury. And we made some other observations here for the scientists. Lovell Zodiacal light came in loud and clear after we found out how to look for it. Borman Right. Lovell We could not see the Gegenshein though, we knew exactly where to look. Borman Okay. We also made several night passes counting meteors. One at 215 hours plus 23 minutes, 25 seconds, I made one night pass counting meteors for the entire 30 some minutes. And I saw. 1 meteor under Taurus and Pleiades and it was below us, and it was short and white. The ONFIDENTIAL [page 183] CONFIDENTIAL 173 next night pass, ending at 217:17 I counted discrete flashes of lightening for the entire pass. I collnted 206 discrete occurrances o:" lightning. This was with the spacecraft level in HORIZON SCAN mode, looking out one window with no yaw control. Now, we also saw individual meteors at different times in flight that are recorded on the tape recorder . But unfortunately we did not see this great shower that was supposed to come out of Gemini. Lovell I saw two in a period of about 10 minutes out of Gemini. They headed below us, of course. Borman Alright, the meteors. Another significant observation that we made was a brilliant display of the Aurora. The Southern Aurora over Australia. And we have some pictures here. Lovell Sketches. Borman Sketches of what itlooked like , and we will cover this in the scientific debriefing . Lovell And we measured the time it took for s tars to occult to the airglow layer, and for Venus to go through. Borman I think this would be best to di scuss when we talk to the scientists. Lovell I think so. Borman Do you have anything else that was significant? As far CONHDENTIAL [page 184] 174 CONFIDENTIAL as operati onal experimental data? Lovell No. Borman We already mentioned the fact about the a ir glow changing with the M oon. Oh, I tell you one thing that is significant and we looked for it time and time again. This was the com plete inability to observe stars in daylight. Lovell Oh, yes. Borman I hope we put that one to bed, because we tried and tried and tried. We strained, we squinted, we l ooked at all angles. Lovell Looked at all the angles. Borman Looked at al l the angles, and we were never once ab l e to observe a star in daytime. Now you can observe just at sunrise and just at sunset, but never in the daytime. Lovell When that sun comes up those stars go. Borman That is right. And you get a black horizon--I mean a black sky above a blue horizon. I do not know what the reason for this is, but I will vouch for the fact that you can't see it. Lovell Right. CONFIDENTIAL [page 185] CONFIDENTIAL 175 12.0 PREMISSION PLANNING 12.1 Mission Plan (Trajectory) Lovell Well, of course, it varies here, this is the last. Borman It changed. We had one all wired and written up for a 72 degree launch azimuth and this changed with the addition of the GT-6 mission. But I thought the people were very flexible, and adapted rapidly to the change. Lovell Well, we are talking about the mission plan, and they are talking about the trajectory alone. There is no doubt about it that our mission, as originally set up for our fuel, was adequate. But, when we introduced GT-6 and the rendezvous mission, the amount of experimental work which we had to do also was not reduced at all. This compromised the results of our experimental work by having to use the fuel for the rendezvous. Although, I think the rendezvous was important, or that it was higher priority, I would like to have it put on the record, that the results we gathered from the rest of the flight were not as good as could be expected, because of the fact that we just did not have the fuel. 110 pounds of gas went down the drain, too. Yes. Borman Lovell 12.2 Borman Flight Plan I thought the people did a great job there . CONFIDENTIAL [page 186] 176 CONFIDENTIAL Lovell There is no doubt about it. The only way you can plan a mission of this length of time is real time flight planning. Call up the data you want for the day, it is a regular work day schedule. Call up what you want, and we will put it down and we will work at it; we will run it off that night. 12.3 Spacecraft Changes Borman I do not know of one major change in the spacecraft that we wanted that we did not get. GPO was very cooperative about everything. Of course, the big thing that we wanted, that we got after a hassel, was the ability to operate suits off. We planned this from the beginning with our first stowage review, and we finally made itby going the route of getting the suits that we could take off. And I think this contributed much to the satisfactory completion of the mission. Don't you? I have got personal notes here that were made during the flight. Every other page it says suits off was the only way to go, "I do not know how I stayed in the suit for six days," and so on. The suit I am sure has done more to increase the bugaboo of physical deterioration in space flight than a:n:y other single item. Fa.r more than zero g. CONFIDENTIAL [page 187] CONFIDENTIAL 177 12.4 Mission Rules Borman They are routine now. We have no real arguments. Lovell The only thing I can say about mission rules is the fact. that they can be changed by the Flight Director to suit the situation. There is enough flexibility in them that allows the mission rules to meet the problem at hand. Borman Although, we did not have any problems that required us to change them. No, we did not. Lovell 12.5 Borman Experiments The only experiment that I thought was not well presented pre-miss ion was the laser. That was a sor t of half baked preparation for quite a while, and at the last they brought the equipment down to Hou.ston and itcame out prettygood. CONFIDENTIAL [page 188] 178 CONFIDENTIAL Lovell When we were first introduced to the equipment back at the stowage review up at St. Louis, we didn't lmow enough about the experiment to really analyze the equipment, to find out whether itwould be adequate or not. Borman That is right. We should have.picked up the reticle light ing on that. Lovell Because we did not pick up the reticle lightingand we did not pick up the green filter. Borman No. The green filter looked all right when we used iton the ground. It is just the fact that we were not able to observe .from .far enough a~ to pick it up. Lovell That is right. Borman The lighting contrast k . Lovell Also, experiments to the M-1 experiment was sort of a last minute glitch. Borman Yes. Lovell We had a lot of compromise. Not compromise but a lot of failures. Borman Putting the M-1 into the ECS system you mean. Lovell Although, I will have to admit that the whole thing worked out fine. The mechanics of the M-1 experiment did last 14 days and was absolutely no problem as far as operation of spacecraft or the ECS system. CONFIDENTIAL [page 189] CONFIDENTIAL 179 Borman Right. Lovell It did complicate the pre-mission planning. Borman E very other experiment I thought was well presented. The experiments division, with Dick Moke help i ng out did a good job. I WP~ very , very satisfied in other words, wi th the whole bus iness . 13.0 MISSION CONTROL Borman Describe and discuss updating on the status of spacecraft and mission. 13.1 GO/NO GO's Borman Once a day oper a ti on, wh ere we r ead out certain parameters in the spacecraft , reported th~mto the ground, and they have a GO or NOGO for the r-ext area. 13.2 P1A and CLA _llE.dates Borman They were extrem~ly easy to handle . They cam e up in blocks of ab out 6 or 9, No problem , si nce we deci ded to use a rolling reentry in the event of contingency landing. Lovell We had very little writing to do. Borman Very little writing. And I might add, based on that reentry, if I had to do it again, that is exactly what I'd want: a rolling reentry, if I did not have a load in that computer. Because I think it is very difficult to look out the window and observe a horizon during a reentry. At least it was during ours; especially during a night reentry. CONFIDENTIAL [page 190] 180 # -CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) CONFIDENTIAL 13.3 Consumables # -CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) Borman My goodness, we had 30 per cent 02 left when we jettisoned the adapter. 30 some per cent FC 02 and about 40 per cent FC hydrogen. The OAMS were a little different situation. We cut that off at about 2 per cent. I was a little dis- turbed on the real-time flight planning in the last couple of days when they were sending up for more experiments than they knew we had fuel to do. And telling us to sift them out. This sort of puts the onus of not doing it on the pilot. I guess in the long run it is the best way to do it, but they would call up and say, "well, here is a whole lot of updates that you can do if you have the fuel." Well, they knew darn well, we didn't have the fuel. That is right. Lovell Borman Lovell In ma.ny cases itturned out to be weathered a:nywa.y. And we had been briefed that there was a rather large error in the quantity- Nadout on the quantity gauge, and .fortun ately .for us itl ooked like itwas in our favor. Borman We also had the Volkswagon tank which helped out. So we knew exactly where we were then. Lovell But we should, in future flights, make sure that the spa.oe cra.ft has enough f'uel fo r adequate BEF alignment, and for at least a coupl e of revolutions with enough reserve to m.a.ke CONFIDENTIAL [page 191] CONFIDENTIAL 181 Borman sure that in case something goes wrong with the thruster, they could utilize more fuel to keep that alignment. Right. Well , as itworked out, we came out all right, any way. Because we just said we were not going to do anymore ifwe got to 5per cent to 6per cent. Tb.en they came back and said that one time, I sa id , "Well, we're at 6 p er cent," and they said, "we thought you would go ahead and go to 5 pe r cent." And this is an awful nebulous thinking. Besides the gauge is hard to read to that accuracy . Lovell Borman Th.a.t is right . Okey-. We have already discussed, I think, the consumables on the fuel cells and the batteries. We turned off the squib batteries, about the 10th~. The fuel cell consumables were never a problem. Lovell Main battery voltage was never real l y hi gh, I thought. I have been led to believe that 22.5 volts was sort of a minimum voltage for a battery. T hey were up about 23 or 22 .8 in the early part of the flight, and they were down to about 22 .6, I guess, towards the end of the flight. 13.4 Flight pl an changes Borman [page 192] 182 CONFIDENT know whether this was programmed, or whether we just burned too long. Other tb&n that the .flight plan went very well. 13.5 Systems [page 193] 183 # -CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) the OAMS squib just to see ifyou can hear it." At this stage of the game we were depending upon the OAMS fuel for realignL"lg the platform. I thought that by then we were in a stage of the mission that we were operation& l rather than interested in blowing something to see ifwe cou.1.d hear it . Especi a lly for a night a lignment . Lovell Borman Right . And I agree with you a thousand times itw ould not make any difference, but on the thousand and first time, it might have made a difference ifwe lost our OAMS , and I could not see any reason to do it J so we did not do it. Another item, that I did not like , came up as far as flight plan changes go. The request that was put in as part of the flight plan , and never was in the flight plan. That was to get a blood pressure over Guaymas after retrofire. As it turns out, we tried to do this , but we could not find the horizon and so we did not do it . I woul d strongly, as a matter of fact, I w ould not even consider it. After retro fire, as far as I am concerned , the blood pressures, and a ll the other non-oper a tional equipment can go by the way side . Right . # -CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) Lovell Borman Right then the important thing is to get on the ground. L ovell Yeah, actually the retrofire time , the triple orbits before CONFIDENTIAL [page 194] 184 retrofire, when you are getting ready for reentry, should be exclusively devoted to that.. We should be doing nothing else. Borman Right. 13.6 Experiments real-time updates Borman Experiments real-time updates: all we can say is that it was done fairly well. [page 195] 185 14.0 TRAINING 14.1 Gemini Mission Simulator Lovell Since there were three crews that had been through these simul ators quite extensively, and only one that required any more knowledge or any more oper ation of it , we decided to use the simulator at Houston as a systems trainer. Most of our basic t raining in the early phases of Gem i ni 7 was done on sys tems. We used the Houston trainer to gain knowledge of the systems .. Towards the end we also used it for launch and reeentry training. Borman We made no effort to keep it up to stowage configuration. Lovell We made no effort to keep the Gemini Mission Simulator at Houston in any kind of a GT-7 stowage configuration. We just merely used the flying portions of it to get acquainted with systems and procedures. It was a procedures and systems trainer. [page 196] 186 CONFIDENTIAL Borman We got a lot of good reentries. Lovell Well, that ' s procedure s. We got a lot of good reentries, and we got a lot of good lift-offswith the trainer. One thing that helped us out quite a bit on procedures was the visual displays. Borman For stowage we kept the wooden mock-up in Houston up to our configuration . It came up better than I 've ever seen it before . We did several exercises on the Gemini Crew Station Mock-up. We used that as di stinct from the simulator for stowage. Lovell The stowage mock-up was also used for ex:periments, to copy down updates, to put together equ ipment, to find out what electrical leads went where, and to practice using equipment in s ide the spacecraft. That wey we didn't have to tie up the valuable Gemini Mission Simulator , that had a lot of electronics attached to it, with tr a ining that required only a sim ulat ion of space and envi r onment. We acquired a pretty good knowledge of the sys tems with the si mulator. # -CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) 187 There's one area of procedures and systems training which can be improved, and that is the use of more correct. procedures between ground and simulator. A lot of times. we got into the simulator to do a reentry or launch, and we didn't get the parameters which you normally get from Mission Control. There have been five manned launches, with tapes on all of them, where the communications between the ground and the spacecraft are well documented. We ought to incorporate those in training. So you could copy down updates, you could get the 0.8, you could get systems failures and how the ground handles them, and things of this nature. I think we could simulate them a lot better now, especially in Houston. Borman Lovell I think Lynn Taegart was doi ng that. Lynn was attempting to follow that procedure. We requested that they get some tapes from MCC from GT-5's launch, but by the time we left there, they hadn't yet arrived. Launch was very realistic. Borman I don't think that we flew a simulator with our roll program in it and it really didn't make any difference. I guess what we are saying about the CONFIDENTIAL [page 198] 188 CONFIDENTIAL Houston simulator is that we don't have to keep it right up to the final configuration. It's a basic trainer. Borman It helps a lot to get in there and get the work done, rather than not be able to get in itbecause it is being mod i fied to bring it up to the latest configu ration. As long as the math f low is proper, and the basic parts are t here, you can almost leave it the same for every launch. Lovell It s hould be updated as far as basic sys t ems. We had the fuel cell panel put in ours; we wouldn' t want batteries, because of a lot of sys t ems trainin g on fuel cells . That is important . We don't have to have every little item like on the Cape simulator for initial simulator t rain i ng. Borman I was very pleased with the Cape si mulat or. We've had very good w ork out of it, and itwas right up to the l atest s towage configuration. I believe we were only shot down on the simulator once. It wasn' t working perfectly every time we got in it , but at least we got val uable training out of i t . [page 199] 189 Lovell Right. One area that does need improving is the coordination between the simulators, the Cape and Houston. Borman You're talking about SIM NETS when we ran with Houston, which was almost a total waste of time, on our part. Borman That's right. Lovell We wasted an awful lot of time just waiting around, because there wasn' t the coordination between the two. Borman It was not the coordination , itwas just the interface. Lovell That's what I mean, the interface. They weren't connected properly. We did get a lot of bum dopeJ itwasn' t the lack of training, itwas the lack of proper training. Lovell Station keeping with the booster occurred down here at the Cape only. I thought that was fairly realistic when it was working. I thought it helped some. Borman I thought it helped a lot. CONFIDENTIAL [page 200] 190 CONFIDENTIAL Lovell Retrofires procedure-wise was very good. The horizon, visual display, really is a big item. It made all the difference in the world between what we had before with no display and what we have now. As far as training goes, that is a very big item. The Houston Simulator ought to have a visual display as soon as possible. Retrofire reentries were all as programmed. Borman We had visual at Houston; we just did not have the targets. We had the stars at night. Lovell We had the stars, but we had the occluding disc, and we did not have the horizon. Borman Reentry on the Mission Simulator was good, a very close approximation to what we flew in the spacecraft. I think that was very valuable. On GT-4, we had only flown about two or three reentries. We had to go up to St. Louis to fly these. Lovell GT-3 and GT-4 were both that way. Essentially what we are saying about the Gemini Mission Simulator at Houston is that it is the basic trainer for systems an:l procedures. The one at the Cape is a fine mock-up for the final flight plan simulator. We go right through CONFIDENTIAL [page 201] 191 the numbers in the flight plan, and the SIM-NETS with the entire network. 14.2 DCPS ( Launch abort s imulator) Borman We used itand itwas very effective. It never worked closed loop as well as i t was supposed to. We did not have any visual with it, but nevertheless the runs that we got there I thought were invaluableJ we certainly could not do without them. The noise and the sensations seemed as close as you could get to them without running on centrifuge . It was a good program, the tapes were good. Lovell I think it is a very necessary simulator. It was not working completely like we wanted it to work, but it was just being put into operation when we were at Houston. We did not have much of an opportunity to use it. 14.3 MAC Engineering Simulator Borman We ran a whole week at MAC, two days on reentries and three days on station keeping, and that was a very worthwhile week. It was concentrated effort, and the station keeping simulation was as close to what we saw CONFIDENTIAL [page 202] 192 as you could possibly get. It was just fantastic. It was really well done, and the reentries were also. We got a real good feel for the reentries. We had the people from FOD and the people from FCSD up there at the time. We understood not only the procedures for flying the reentries, but the why's, the how's, the limitations of the systems. Lovell Well, that's where we dug out the procedures a ctually for the reentry technique. Borman That's right. That's where we developed the proced ure of following the roll needle up to 3G's . That was proba bly as good a week in trainingas we bad the w hole time. Lovell 14.4 Translation and Docking T rainer In the little work that I did, it is representative of the actual case, if not more sensitive. :Borman It's more sensitive. It is a more simple t ask to dock in space that it i s in the Tr anslation and Docking Trainer . Lovell As long as it is .more co:mplioated there is no problem. [page 203] CONFIDENTIAL 193 Borman I was really surprised at that. 14.5 Planetarium Lovell The Planetarium is one which I have to admit I degraded for the last trip. I said I didn't want to go and we weren't going to go. Then we decided we'd better go, and I think right now itwas well worth it. The last trip to the P lanetarium was the best one. Borman We got more dope on the actual orbit. We had settled on our flight path, and they displayed it, and it was amazingly accurate. Lovell We worked out our initial burn at the Planetarium, the stars we were going to burn on for our perigee adjust burn. I took a chart along that I made up at the Planetarium to use for the zero, seven, and four- teen days in the celestial sphere. It worked out fine. When you go there, that's what you have to do. You have to take the azimuth that you are going to launch on, take all the charts that you are going to have; and run through that type of mission. To go there and just learn all the stars might be okay for basic training like we did several CONFIDENTIAL [page 204] 194 years ago. After you get assigned to a specific mission, you better start learning the stars you need to use for certain burns and things of this nature. That's a good place to do it. I thought pe~haps, since we had the visual display, tba.t we could eliminate the Planetarium because the visual display had more real feel for it, and it does. However, the visual displays in the simulators don't carry the .magnitude of the stars that you can actually see. Borman And they are not flexible enough. Lovell Borman Tba.t1 s right. They are not flexible . You can't change them. Lovell So the Planetarium was helpful. Borman Spacecraft orientation. As Jim said, we studied the burns and made the first two burns on the stars. The Planetarium was very helpful for this. Remember, you were all set to find Corvus and then Spica and we had it all lined up before we ever launched. Borman 14.6 Systems Briefings We had one hundred and twenty - six hours and thirty minutes of systems briefings and ONFIDENTIAL # -CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) # -CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) 195 it's all well documented and scheduled. Another thing that was very helpful to us was Mike Brzezinski, the way he scheduled all the systems briefings and all the training. We didn't fool around with any of it. It was set up well, and went like clockwork. I think this was one of the real fine points of our training. Mike came down to the _ Cape a week early and the whole schedule was set up apa week before we got here, and with very little change after that. He did an outstanding job, and as far as I am concerned, that's the only way akan amo best you sva to run it. Lovell That's right. There's no sense running around doing it yourself when we have a nice, well run organiza- that can do this work for us. portion Borman As far as any figures or numbers on the time spent in the different ph ases of training, they are all availab l e. I f anybody wants themwe have the fina.l report, and we have a weekly report. Borman It was very helpful to us to just have to deal with one person, rather than dealingwith the Planetarium people, the people at MAC, the people at the Cape. The only thing we did at all was contact Mike. We [page 206] 196 CONFIDENTIAL never contacted anyone else. We didn't go direct to anybody. Borman We might mention that the systems briefings were really of two types. We had preliminary systems briefings by our FCSD people at Houston. At Mc Donnell, du.ring the SD1S flights and altitude chamber tests we filled in the dead time with systems bri efings from the people at McDonnell. This was a good way to go also. For instance, while one crew was flying the MAC Rendezvous Simulator practicing station-keeping, the other crew was getting systems briefing. So, we didn't have any dead time. It worked out well. Borman The station-keeping ,on the booster was more difficult than it was on GT-6, primarily because the booster was venting, and tumbling and trans lating. Also because of the fact that we really didn't have a lot of time. We were having to use fuel in order to get set up before night, for the separat~on burn. However, once we got it squared away, there was no difficulty at all staying with the booster at a distance, I'destimate from about sixty to one hundred and fifty feet. During CONFIDENTIAL [page 207] CONFIDENTIAL 197 the booster station keeping we did observe the ablat i ve skirt on the engine. At one time it appeared that there were two poi nts right at the edge of the skirt that might have been rolled in. It looked like maybe there were two approximately twelve inch sections that might have been rolled in. It may have been shadows cast off the booster. By and large, I would say that the engine looked very well. Lovell To me the engine looked brand new. It had a gold cast to it. It looked perfectly good to me. Borman I did not notice any venting out o~ the roll nozzle, which is unusual. We thought the venting came out of the relief for the PSV valve on the side of the booster. We just discussed this with the Martin people. They were a little surprised to hear this. The venting we saw came out ninety degrees to the longitudinal axis of the booster . It looked like it came out r i ght at the edge of the Lovell tank. Borman And this is the Pressure Sequencing Valve drain. And the next one is, "If so, what was its condition?" It looked great. "D idyou get pictures?" Yes, CONFIDENTIAL [page 208] 198 CONFIDENTIAL we got pictures with a 16 mm. We did not get pictures with the Hassleblad because we could not unstow the Hassleblad at this time. 14.7 Flight Experiments Borman Simulations: The one we used most frequently was the GMS for the D-4/D-7 tracking. We also used it for the sextant. Although it wasn't a good utilization, we used it for the D-5. Lovell Borman Lovell Just for procedures. Most of our experiment simulation was done in the mock-up. The wooden mock-up. Borman Translation and Docking Tr ainer. We used the Translation and Docking Trainer for some tracking trainingwith the laser . Itwas not all I had hoped itwould be. Nevertheless it did give us training and convinced us itwould be no problem in tracking with the laser. This was borne out by the flight that the ma i n problem would be acquiring it. We picked up the fact in the docking trainer that the reticle is not visible CONFIDENTIA [page 209] -CONFIDENTIAL 199 at night. The Translation and Docking Trainer was helpful in station keeping. We didn't really do any training at McDonnell for the experiments. Lovell We did mostly the station keeping and the reentry at McDonnell . Borman And you went to Ames. Lovell Just for the sextant. The sextant briefing at Ames I thought could have been done at Houston. I got more information out of Bob ~ilva on the roof of the Cape here , than I did really out of Ames . The two simulators I used out there really didn't help me out I at all. I think the simulator and a star field in the Gemini simulator plus work outside on the roof would be more valuable than Ames, which I passed on to Wally and Tom. Borman We had many briefings ..• Total t i me spent on experi ments i s two hundred hours and thirty minutes. A great deal of that time was briefing. I felt , that by the time we took off , we knew not only the pro cedures for every experiment , we knew the hows , the whys, and the wherefores . I thought we were CONFIDEN [page 210] 200 # -CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) 201 the equipment. All the other equipment seemed to come in well. Borman Yes, but we always depend upon the experimenters for the training. You lmow, like on the sextant. Maybe this is the way you have to continue to go. FCSD Rep This is the way the program is set up, for the experi menters to actually do the briefing. Borman Yeah, and then the hardware training. That is the way it did work. That' s probably the best way. The S-8/D-13, we went to the trainer. I guess what we are really saying is that we should emphasize to the experimenter that they have a responsibility for providing training and for providing training hardware. Lovell That is the big thing. The experimenters, or the experiments group, has to provide the training to get adequate results from their experiment. Otherwise they are not going to get adequate results. Borman Lovell That is right. And t he training equipment and the training periods have to come early enough in the program so that we work out any problems that evolve. For instance, a classic example was the laser when we ran into the reticle problem. We did not find out until too late in t he game [page 212] 202 # CONFIDENTIAL to change anything. We could not put a lighted reticle on the laser. Borman In all fairness, we ought to point out about the laser too, that it was severely handicapped when we changed the launch azimuth. Because initially they had not planned to work anywhere except at White Sands. Then with the change in launch azimuth, White Sands went down the tube pretty well, then they had to scrounge around and try to get to Hawaii and Ascension. The experiment equipment, by and large, I thought was readily available on this flight. Thanks mainly to Lou Allen and the pressure he put on the people. Training equipment was pretty well available, early in the game. Borman 14.8 Spacecraft systems tests We covered a lot fewer of the spacecraft systems tests than previous spacecraft had, based on our experience on Spacecraft 4. Let me see exactly what it was. Spacecraft tests, 169 hours and thirty minutes for the Prime Crew, and 193 hours and 30 minutes for the Backup Crew. I do not think there is any reason to cover things CONFIDENTIAL [page 213] CONFIDENTIAL # CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) 203 like Systems Assurance and so on in St. Louie. It is a waste of time . At St. Louis you should plan on co vering the S IM flights , the Altitude Chamber and the Horizontal SEDR. And, down at the Cape, I thought even though we cut out six days of testing and we did not have a Wet Mock , I saw absolutely no impediment at allto our launch training. I do not think that any of it is necessary. I do not think we cut out one necessary thing. Lovell I think that you could use your t ime more wi sely in simula tor training , in recovery training , and in training you are really going to use than in study of some of the sys tems assurance tests where you spend hours in the spacecraft just throwing switches. You reach a point there where you are not learning any more. Borman I think you should follow, at St. Louis, the SIM f light, the Altitude Chamber, and the Horizontal SEDR. And down here at the Cape, we want to do the SIM flight, the Joint Combined Systems test , the EIIV test , and finally of course , the SIM flight and Stowage Review. # CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) Lovell That is somethi ng which we put in , and I think ought to be included inall._. the stowage is one thing that changes constantly right after launch, and it ought to be put in just before launch. A week or so before launch to make sure everything is correc t . [page 214] 204 CONFIDENTIAL 14.9 Egress training Borman Briefing, Gulf Exercise, and Survival Gear. All went off well. We had it done on Spacecraft 4, so we only went off in Static Article 5. We did not use the Boiler Plate No. 201 and it worked out fine. We had the helicopter pickup. Lovell I think the helicopter pickup was well worth itthough, because i t was exactly what you do on recovery. Might as well do it in practice. Borman And that is strange how that got thrown in there . That one time on Spacecraft 4, we just thought, we ll, itwould be nice to come back by helicopter, rather than back by ship. And itworked out to be very valuable as a matter of fact. I think that is good training. I think that you should have the Gulf exercise. No question in my mind that you should have that, Lovell That is about the most realistic type training you can possibly get. Borman We were well trained in the use of survival gear. Of course, I think that it is a very good idea. We had it laid out here in the crew quarters all the time we were down here, and we stopped in and took a look at it. CONFIDENTIAL [page 215] ONFIDENTIAL 205 We were thoroughly briefed on the ejection seat by NASA people. I thought we were well prepared for that. 14.10 Parachute Training Lovell I think that all the parachute training that is required is launch off the island for a water landing. I think that is all the Parachute trainingyou need, because that is .most likelywhere you are going to la.nd. You are going to land on la.nd during an abort, so there would be all kinds of people to help you or you are not going to make ite:nyway. Guess you would be too close to the booster. I think the water landing training is very important, especially when you are using new equipment like our new su i ts . Ifwe had the 4C suits again for this flight, I think that, since we had rotated so early from Gemini 4, that we could have eliminated that and not have any real probletll!I. Borman I think that all t he t raining should be conducted with training suits o n. It does not :make much sense to go out there in a swimming euit o And we .might mention that we had one suit out there for CONFIDENTIAL [page 216] 206 # CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) ## CONFIDENTIAL, our training. We switched in and out of a single suit, wet, or not wet, and got it all completed by one o'clock. 14.11 Launch simulations 14.12 Reentry simulations 14.13 Simulated network simulations 14.14 Network simulations Borman Launch simulations, Reentry simulations, and Simulated Network Simulations, and Network Simulations, at the Cape down here, for us, were a total waste of time. We have already mentioned this earlier, but because of the fact that the simulator was not playing with the MCC, I would not say the launch simulations were a total waste of time. We did get some launches, but I am afraid that the time spent was not profitable. CONFIDENTIA [page 217] CONFIDENITAL 207 We wasted an awful lot of time on that. Itisnot that Lovell they would not be profitable. I think that is reallywhere you get the good tra.ining because you get ••• Borman I am not going to recolDlllend eliminating it. I would recommend fixing itso that it pl&ys prop erly. Lovell That is right. Because you get the actual operatingwith the people that a.re going to be conducting the flight, get the communication procedures down, get the whole bit. Un fortunately the whole bit was not working. Borman That is right. I think this is recognized by all sides. I understand that Gemini 6 was much better after we left. 14.15 Flight plan training I really do not think you would c.all that tra.ining. It is sort ofprocedures that you go through, and I hope that the people that come behind rea.lize how biga hand they can have in ma.king the flight plan and how early they should get into the business, because there a.re so many people with their own little inputs. If the orew does not get in early and keep things under control, you will end up with a.n impossible situation• CONFIDENTIAL [page 218] 208 Fortunately, I think, that the people that you have to work with now, Bill Tindall, and Barney Evans, are pretty good. One of the first things I would recommend to anyone to do, is to start talking to the Mission Planning people as soon as they get assigned to a flight. From then on, keep their fingers on the flight plan. I think that is reflected in the amount of time we spent on ours. 133 hours was spent i n that training just on preparing and reviewing the flight plan. I think itpaid off because we ended up with one that was reasonable and one that we coul d work wi th. I would not call it training though , as itwas sort of doing flight plan ning. # CONFIDENTIAL (cont.) ## 15.0 CONCLUDING COMMENTS Borman Lovell Borman What else do you have to say James? We are back home, that proves the mission was a success . There is one thing that I have to say I think the system we have set up here in FCSD now to handle these flights, this task force organizat i on, is outstanding. I was very well pl eased with the support we got from everybody. Lovell I do not think we could have done it ourselves and having gone through i t before when we did not have the [page 219] CONFIDENTIA 209 organization set up this way , it sure made a difference . Borman And every part of the Center came through . It was very effective at the stowage mockups and the Design Re view to have Kenny Kleinknecht or Chuck Matthews right there and to make a desicion and then it stuck . That was very , very helpful from the very beginning there . The first day we went to that stowage review up there , we had the basic concept solved and we had the ECP's in to get the stowage the way we wanted it. It was very helpful . I do not think there was one thing that we really wanted in the spacecraft that GPO did not provide. Lovell Borman Everybody was very cooperative , I thought . But that was another it em that I strongly recommend the crews to do. , .. is attend Management Meetings ... particularly while the space cr aft is in St . Louis . You will find a lot of decisions are made and you can get in there and get your voice in . The people listen to you as long as you are not unreasonable , and you will end up making an awful lot of money in a very short time ifyou will get to the decision making. CONFIDENTIAL [page 220] 210 is keep a close tab on what goes on at the CCB. Jim Bilodeau is the best point of contact there. He kept us informed. For instance, let us say we wanted another stowage bag in the right footwell. Rather than just. going through the back door and trying to get Carl Stone to make up a bag, we immediately submitted a requirement to the CCB. We found that time to react on this thing was amazingly short.. You could get one in on a Thursday and it would be acted on by Monday. Then, after you had this clearance through the CCB, things went smoothly. I guess what I a.m sayi ng is the system works a nd just plow in and use it. That is it.
Image notes
248 visual notes
Page 1
The image shows the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in purple ink, with a black line crossing through it diagonally. The word appears to be partially obscured by this line and has a blurred effect. The text "DECLASSIFIED" is present at the top left of the image.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in large, dark letters across it, with a black line diagonally drawn through the word.
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The image contains text that has been redacted or marked out. The visible text says "CONFIDENTIAL".
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in blue ink, with a black diagonal line struck through it, indicating it is no longer confidential or has been marked as such.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in purple ink. A thick black line is drawn diagonally across the word, obscuring part of it and indicating that it has been redacted or invalidated.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in purple ink across the center, with a thick black line drawn diagonally through it. The background is blurred.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line struck through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line struck through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in dark blue ink with a diagonal black line struck through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in dark blue ink, with a thick black line drawn diagonally across it from the top left to the bottom right, indicating that it is no longer confidential.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in dark blue ink, with a thick black line drawn diagonally across it from the top left to the bottom right, indicating that it is no longer confidential.
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a diagonal black line crossing through it, indicating it is redacted or not to be disclosed.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in blue ink and crossed out with a black line.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it, with a black diagonal line obscuring part of the text. The text is in a dark, somewhat smudged font.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in dark blue ink across a white background. A black diagonal line is drawn over the text, obscuring parts of it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in dark blue ink with a black line drawn diagonally across it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in dark blue ink with a black line drawn diagonally across it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it, with a black line drawn diagonally over the text.
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The image is not a chart. It shows a partial view of a United States fifty-dollar bill. The visible portion includes the Lincoln Memorial and text that appears to be part of the bill's design.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it, with a black bar crossing through the center of the text. The word appears to be in a dark, possibly blue or purple, ink. The overall impression is that of a document that has been marked as secret or private.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line struck through it, indicating it is redacted or classified.
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped over what appears to be a document or image. The stamping is thick and black, obscuring the content beneath.
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped over what appears to be a document or image. The stamping is thick and black, obscuring the content beneath.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it, obscuring any underlying content.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it, obscuring any underlying content.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped over it, with a horizontal black line crossing through the word.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image shows a diagram with a horizontal line, which appears to be part of a label or graph. Above the line, there are several dark blue shapes that are somewhat abstract and resemble building structures or a stylized cityscape. Below the line, there is a dark blue, jagged shape that looks like a reflection or a base. The image is highly abstract and lacks discernible text or data points that would allow for chart data extraction or extraction of specific key information.
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NFIDEN
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in large, dark letters.
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The image contains a stamp or watermark that reads "CONFIDENTIAL". A black horizontal line crosses through the word.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line through it, indicating it is a declassified document.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in large, dark letters. The background appears to be a document or paper with some blue and white markings.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it, with a black horizontal bar obscuring part of the text.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black bar striking through it, indicating that the document or information is marked as confidential.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black bar striking through it, indicating that the document or information is marked as confidential.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it, with a black horizontal bar obscuring the middle section of the text.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it, with a black line through the middle. The text is partially obscured by a dark, textured overlay.
Page 38
The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it, with a horizontal line through the middle of the text. The background appears to be a dark, smudged area.
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line crossing through the middle of the text.
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CONFIDEN ITIAL
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line drawn through it.
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line drawn through it.
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The image contains handwritten text that appears to be a log or record. The legible parts are: "Lovell T-20" and "Borman Read out from Carnarvon." The rest of the text is largely obscured by a thick black line.
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CONHIDE
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CONFIDENTI
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The image shows the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it with a black line through the middle. The stamping is in a dark purple color.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in a large, bold font. The text is dark blue and appears to be watermarked or stamped onto the background.
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it, with a black line striking through the text.
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ON
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in blue ink over a white background. A horizontal black line is drawn through the center of the word.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in blue ink over a white background. A horizontal black line is drawn through the center of the word.
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The image is a silhouette of a train with a thick black line running horizontally through its center, obscuring the lower half. The train appears to be composed of multiple cars, with a distinct locomotive at the front. Some markings are visible on the train cars, but they are illegible.
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The image is a silhouette of a train with a thick black line running horizontally through its center, obscuring the lower half. The train appears to be composed of multiple cars, with a distinct locomotive at the front. Some markings are visible on the train cars, but they are illegible.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line through the middle, indicating that the document or information is classified.
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CON
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a thick black line drawn through it, indicating that the information is not to be disclosed.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
Page 0
The image is a document with the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in a dark blue color. There is a black horizontal line running through the text, obscuring some of it.
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The image is a document with the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in a dark blue color. There is a black horizontal line running through the text, obscuring some of it.
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NFIDENTIA
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CONFIDENTIA
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it, with a horizontal black line drawn through the word.
Page 0
The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped over it in dark blue ink, with a black horizontal line crossing through the middle of the word.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped over it in dark blue ink, with a black horizontal line crossing through the middle of the word.
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line drawn through it, indicating that the information is no longer confidential or has been redacted.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it, obscuring any underlying content.
Page 0
The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL". The text is partially obscured by black bars, indicating redaction.
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL". The text is partially obscured by black bars, indicating redaction.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDEN
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" written in black marker, with a thick black line drawn horizontally across the middle of the word.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line drawn through it. The text is layered over a dark blue, textured background.
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line drawn through it.
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line drawn through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black bar striking through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black bar striking through it.
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The image contains text that appears to be stamped or heavily marked over. The word "CONFIDENTIAL" is clearly visible, with a black bar striking through it. The text underneath is obscured but appears to be a repetition or variation of "CONFIDENTIAL."
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CONFIDENT
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in a thick, dark blue font with a slightly distressed texture. A solid black line runs horizontally across the lower portion of the word.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in black, with a purple background behind the letters. The word is partially obscured by the stamp.
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The image contains text that is partially obscured by a black line and smudging. The visible portion of the text reads "CONFIDENTIAL".
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped over a blue ink blot. A black horizontal line runs through the middle of the word, obscuring parts of it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped over a blue ink blot. A black horizontal line runs through the middle of the word, obscuring parts of it.
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a thick black line horizontally crossing through the center of the text, obscuring portions of the letters. The text appears to be handwritten or stamped in a dark blue ink.
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The image is not a chart. It contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in large, dark letters.
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The image contains a "CONFIDENTIAL" stamp across it. There is no chart data to extract. The surrounding text discusses the comfort and operational efficiency of wearing suits versus operating without them in a spacecraft. Key points include:
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The image contains a "CONFIDENTIAL" stamp across it. There is no chart data to extract. The surrounding text discusses the comfort and operational efficiency of wearing suits versus operating without them in a spacecraft. Key points include: * Suit-off operation is significantly better (stated as 1,000% improvement). * Comfort without suits was very good. * A cabin fan was used only once to alleviate stagnant areas, which it did effectively. * The cabin fan has a considerable electrical load, preventing continuous use. * The cabin pressure regulator worked perfectly.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in a dark blue color. A black horizontal line bisects the word.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in a dark blue color. A black horizontal line bisects the word.
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black bar struck through it.
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The image contains a large, prominent "CONFIDENTIAL" stamp across it, with a horizontal black line running through the middle of the text. The stamp is in a dark blue, somewhat distressed font, suggesting it is a watermark or official marking.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black bar through it. There is no chart or other data to extract.
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The image contains a scribbled-out section of text. The surrounding text mentions Lovell, Borman, and a "big change in temperature" noticed approximately "5 or 6 days after the mission started" in cabin temperature surveys.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it, with a black horizontal line through the middle. The letters are dark blue and appear to be stamped or written on a white background.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it, with a black horizontal line through the middle. The letters are dark blue and appear to be stamped or written on a white background.
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The image contains text that appears to be stamped or written over another document. The prominent word is "CONFIDENTIAL", with a black line horizontally crossing through it, indicating redaction or a similar marking.
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The image contains text that appears to be stamped or written over another document. The prominent word is "CONFIDENTIAL", with a black line horizontally crossing through it, indicating redaction or a similar marking.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in blue ink, with a black line drawn through the middle of the word.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in blue ink, with a black line drawn through the middle of the word.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in large, dark blue capital letters. A thick black line also cuts horizontally through the word.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in large, dark blue capital letters. A thick black line also cuts horizontally through the word.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in large, dark letters across a white background. A thick black line runs horizontally through the middle of the word, obscuring parts of the letters.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it, obscuring any underlying content.
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CONFIDEN
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in dark blue ink, with a thick black line bisecting the text horizontally.
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped over a document with a black line crossing through it.
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CON
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it, with a thick black line through the middle. This indicates the document is classified.
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CONEL
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The image contains text that is largely illegible due to blur and damage. The visible text appears to be "CONSTRUCTION". A horizontal black line runs through the center of the text.
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The image contains a stamp that says "CONFIDENTIAL".
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The image shows the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it with a black bar, indicating that the content is not to be shared.
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The image contains text that is largely illegible due to heavy black scribbling over it. Some words like "DISPLAYS", "PROGRAMMED", "GREEN", "TIMER", "FLIGHT DIRECTOR INDICATOR", and "RECIPROCAL" are partially visible. The text appears to be a description of controls and displays during a flight, with some noted differences between a simulator and the actual spacecraft's Flight Director Indicator, specifically concerning the outer roll gimbal indicator.
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The image contains text that is heavily obscured by a dark overlay, making it impossible to extract any meaningful data or information.
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CONFIDENTIA.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written over it with a thick black line crossing through it.
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The image displays a document with the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in large, dark lettering, with a thick black line drawn through the middle of the word.
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CONFIDENTI
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The image shows the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it, partially obscured by a black horizontal line.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENT" with a black line drawn through it.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image shows the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in large, bold, purple letters, bisected by a thick black line.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line drawn through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line drawn through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it, with a black line bisecting the text horizontally.
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The image is a drawing of a train car.
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*CONFIDENTIAL
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line struck through it, indicating a redaction or removal of information.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it with a black marker.
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it, indicating the document is not for public disclosure.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped over it with a black line across the middle.
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it, partially obscured by a horizontal black line. The text is dark blue or black against a white or light background.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDEN
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it, with a black line going through it.
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it, with a black line going through it.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in large, dark letters.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in large, dark letters.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it with a thick black line running through the middle.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it with a thick black line running through the middle.
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FIDENTIAL
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it in dark blue ink, with a black line drawn through the middle of the word.
Page 145
The image appears to be a scanned document with a thick horizontal black line across it. Above and below the line, there is dark blue, illegible text or imagery that is heavily obscured and pixelated. There is no discernible chart or tabular data present. The surrounding text refers to the Moon, stars, Milky Way, and Earth as references for navigation, suggesting a discussion related to space or celestial observation.
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The image contains text that appears to be "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped or written across it, with a black line drawn through the middle.
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This image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in dark blue ink over a white background. A thick black bar also runs horizontally across the word, obscuring parts of it.
Page 150
The image contains text that appears to be a stylized representation of the word "CONFIDENTIAL". The text is in a dark, possibly blue or black, color with a distressed or painted effect. A thick black line horizontally bisects the text.
Page 152
The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it.
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in dark blue ink, with a black horizontal line striking through the center of the text.
Page 153
The image is not a chart. It appears to be a photograph of a dark, possibly steam-powered, train engine. A thick black line crosses horizontally through the middle of the image, obscuring a portion of the train. The train has visible wheels and a textured, dark surface. The background is white or very light gray.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it, indicating that the information within is not for public disclosure. There are no charts or tables present.
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ONFIDENTIAL
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it, indicating that the information within is not for public disclosure. There are no charts or tables present.
Page 156
The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in dark blue ink across the center.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it. There is no chart data to extract.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image contains text that has been redacted or obscured by a black bar. The visible, but partially obscured, text reads "CONFIDENTIAL".
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The image contains text that has been redacted or obscured by a black bar. The visible, but partially obscured, text reads "CONFIDENTIAL".
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a horizontal black bar crossing through it.
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This image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line through it, indicating that the information is classified or private.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in a dark color, obscuring any underlying text or image. A thick black line runs horizontally through the word, further obscuring it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in a dark purple ink across a light background. A thick black line is drawn through the word, partially obscuring it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it, indicating restricted information. The surrounding text discusses an experiment involving voice tape recorder usage, practiced in a simulator and during flight. It mentions that the experimenters were briefed multiple times and that the "TM" aspect of the experiment did not make sense to them. The experiment took place over Australia.
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CONFIDEN
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIA
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NFIDENTIAL
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black bar crossing out the word.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black bar crossing out the word.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in large, dark blue letters. A black line is drawn horizontally through the middle of the word.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIA
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a diagonal black line through it, indicating it has been redacted or invalidated.
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The image shows the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in purple ink, with a black diagonal line struck through it.
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The image shows the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in purple ink, with a black diagonal line struck through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a diagonal line crossing it out.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it diagonally.
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The image displays the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a diagonal black line crossing through it, indicating that the document or information is no longer confidential.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it with a diagonal line.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line struck through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line crossing through it, indicating that it is no longer considered confidential.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black diagonal line struck through it, indicating it is not confidential.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black diagonal line struck through it, indicating it is not confidential.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black diagonal line struck through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black diagonal line struck through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in black ink, with a horizontal line drawn through the word. The stamping is somewhat smudged and overlapping with a blue-inked background, making some letters slightly obscured.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped across it in black ink, with a horizontal line drawn through the word. The stamping is somewhat smudged and overlapping with a blue-inked background, making some letters slightly obscured.
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-CONFIDENTIAL
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The image contains a prominent stamp that reads "CONFIDENTIAL". This indicates that the content of the document is classified and should not be shared.
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The image contains a prominent stamp that reads "CONFIDENTIAL". This indicates that the content of the document is classified and should not be shared.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a horizontal line struck through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a horizontal line struck through it.
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The image contains text that reads "CONFIDENTIAL", stamped over a document.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in dark blue ink, with a black line horizontally crossing through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped in dark blue ink, with a black line horizontally crossing through it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black bar across it, indicating it is a confidential document.
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The image shows the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped on a document, with a black diagonal line drawn over it.
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The image contains the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a diagonal black line crossing it out.
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The image shows the word "CONFIDENTIAL" with a black line struck through it.
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A scanned typewritten document page with 'CONFIDENTIAL' stamps at the top and bottom. The page is numbered 27 in the upper right corner. The document appears to be a transcript of a debriefing conversation between astronauts Borman and Lovell, discussing exercise routines and suit removal during the Gemini 7 mission.
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A scanned typewritten document page marked CONFIDENTIAL at the top center with a strikethrough-style stamp. The page number 45 appears in the upper right corner. The text is a transcript-style dialogue between two speakers identified as Lovell and Borman. At the bottom center there is a redaction bar obscuring some content.
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A scanned typewritten document page with 'CONFIDENTIAL' stamps at the top and bottom center, page number 73 in the upper right corner. The page contains transcript-style text with speaker labels on the left margin.
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A scanned typewritten document page numbered 90, marked CONFIDENTIAL at both top and bottom with stamped/printed banners. The page contains a technical debriefing transcript with dialogue attributed to astronauts Borman and Lovell discussing temperature readings and cooling pump operations during a spaceflight.
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A scanned typewritten document page with 'CONFIDENTIAL' stamps at the top and bottom (struck through/redacted with horizontal lines), and a page number '93' in the upper right corner. The page contains a transcript-style debriefing with speaker labels and their statements.
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A scanned typewritten document page with 'CONFIDENTIAL' stamps at the top and bottom (struck through with a line), page number 95 in the upper right corner. The page contains a transcript-style debriefing with speaker labels and typed text.
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A scanned typewritten document page from a NASA technical debriefing, marked CONFIDENTIAL at both top and bottom with redaction stamps. The page is numbered 99 in the upper right corner. The text is a transcript-style debriefing with speaker attribution ('Borman') at the bottom left. The document discusses electrical systems, batteries, fuel cells, and the onboard computer during the Gemini 7 mission.
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A scanned typewritten document page from a NASA technical debriefing transcript. The page contains a dialogue-format transcript between astronauts Lovell and Borman discussing film quality, window contamination, and photography during the Gemini 7 mission. The page is numbered 107 in the upper right corner. 'CONFIDENTIAL' stamps appear at the top and bottom of the page, with the top stamp partially redacted/blacked out.
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A scanned typewritten document page numbered 120, with 'CONFIDENTIAL' stamps at the top and bottom of the page. The page contains a debriefing transcript with speakers identified as Borman and Lovell discussing sleep periods during the Gemini 7 mission.
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A scanned typewritten document page from a NASA technical debriefing transcript, classified as CONFIDENTIAL. The page shows a dialogue-format transcript between two speakers, Lovell and Borman, discussing observations made during a spaceflight mission. CONFIDENTIAL stamps appear at both the top and bottom of the page.
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A scanned typewritten document page with 'CONFIDENTIAL' stamps at the top and bottom, page number 127 in the upper right corner. The page contains a transcript-style dialogue between two speakers, Lovell and Borman, discussing observations made during the Gemini 7 mission.
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A scanned typewritten document page marked CONFIDENTIAL at both top and bottom, numbered 129 in the upper right corner. The page contains a technical debriefing transcript with speakers identified as Borman and Lovell discussing Apollo landmark navigation and weather interference during the Gemini 7 mission.
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A scanned typewritten document page with 'CONFIDENTIAL' stamps at the top and bottom (struck through with redaction marks), page number 167 in upper right corner. The page contains a transcript-style debriefing with speaker labels and dialogue in monospaced typewriter font.
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A scanned typewritten document page from a NASA technical debriefing, marked CONFIDENTIAL at the top and bottom with strikethrough redaction stamps. The page number 169 appears in the upper right corner. The document contains a transcript-style dialogue between astronauts Borman and Lovell discussing urine collection/waste management systems used during the Gemini 7 mission.
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A scanned typewritten document page with 'CONFIDENTIAL' stamps at the top and bottom (struck through with lines), page number 201 in the upper right, and a transcript-style dialogue between multiple speakers.