PURSUE-RELEASE-03 Serial 1a45cf49-0f4b-4c26-bbfc-fe7256c9a91d

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THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY AND
OVERHEAD ☑
RECONNAISSANCE

The U-2 and OXCART
Programs, 1954 - 1974

Gregory W. Pedlow and
Donald E. Welzenbach

Secret

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"

# The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance:

The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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# The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance:

The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Gregory W. Pedlow
and
Donald E. Welzenbach

History Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

1992

Secret

# The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance: (cont.)

## Chapter 1

Searching for a System

| The Need for High-Altitude Reconnaissance..              |    | 1           |
|-|-|-|
| Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance.                     |    | .2          |
| New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance..                  |    | 4           |
| The Air Force Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft.. |    | 8           |
| Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA....               |    | 13          |
| Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance.                  |    | 17          |
| The BEACON HILL Report..                                 |    | 17          |
| Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack.    |    | 19          |
| The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel..               |    | 22222233 21 |
| British Overflight of Kapustin Yar....                   |    |             |
| The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282            |    | 24          |
| The Technological Capabilities Panel                     |    | 26          |
| Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282.           |    | 27          |
| A Meeting With the President...                          |    |             |
| CIA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282                | .  |             |

# The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance: (cont.)

## -Secret NOFORN

| Hiring U-2 Pilots                                       | 73   |
|-|-|
| Pilot Training                                          | 75   |
| Final Tests of the U-2...                               | .76  |
| Three Fatal Crashes in 1956.                            | 79   |
| Coordination of Collection Requirements                 | 80   |
| Preparations To Handle the Product of U-2 Missions      | 82   |
| The Impact of the Air Force Project GENETRIX Balloons.. | 84   |
| AQUATONE Briefings for Selected Members of Congress     | 88   |
| The U-2 Cover Story......                               | 89   |

## ♦  Chapter 3

U-2 Operations in the Soviet Bloc and Middle East, 1956-1958

# The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance: (cont.)

## ♦  Chapter 3 (cont.)

| The Deployment of Detachment A to Lakenheath            | 94   |
|-|-|
| The Move to Wiesbaden                                   | 95   |
| President Eisenhower's Attitude Toward Overflights.     | 96   |
| First Overflights of Eastern Europe.                    | 100  |
| First U-2 Flights Over the Soviet Union..               | 104  |
| Soviet Protest Note                                     | 109  |
| The End of the Bomber Gap......                         | 111  |
| Tactical Intelligence From U-2s During the Suez Crisis. | 112  |
| Renewed Overflights of the Soviet Union                 | 122  |
| Radar-Deceptive "Dirty Birds"                           | 128  |
| The New Detachment C                                    | 133  |
| Detachment B Flights From Pakistan.                     | 135  |
| The Decline of Detachment A..                           | 139  |
| Cooperation With Norway.                                | 142  |
| Declining Overflight Activity                           | 143  |
| Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U-2   | 147  |
| More Powerful Engines for the U-2.                      | 149  |
| Intervention in Lebanon, 1958                           | 152  |
| British Participation in the U-2 Project.               | 153  |
| The U-2 Project at the Beginning of 1959.               | 157  |

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## → Chapter 5

U-2 Operations After May 1960

# The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance: (cont.)

## → Chapter 5 (cont.)

| U-2 Operations in Latin America.                               | 197   |
|-|-|
| U-2 Support to the Bay of Pigs Invasion...                     | 197   |
| Aerial Refueling Capability for the U-2..                      | 198   |
| U-2 Coverage During the Cuban Missile Crisis.                  | 199   |
| U-2s Over South America                                        | 211   |
| U-2 Operations in Asia                                         | 211   |
| Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958.                | 211   |
| China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958..                       | 215   |
| U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet..                      | 216   |
| U-2Cs for Detachment C                                         | 217   |
| U-2 Crash in Thailand..                                        | 219   |
| End of Detachment C Operations.                                | 219   |
| Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam              | 221   |
| New Detachment on Taiwan                                       | 222   |
| Use of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots.                     | 230   |
| U-2s in India                                                  | 231   |
| Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate Resources in Asia.     | 233   |
| Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H                        | 237   |
| Use of Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants                | 238   |
|                                                                | 240   |
| The End of U-2 Overflights of Mainland China                   | 242   |
| Peripheral Missions by Detachment H.                           | 244   |
| Operation SCOPE SHIELD Over North Vietnam.                     | 246   |
| Improvements in U-2 Technology                                 | .247  |
| Modification of U-2s for Aircraft Carrier Deployment..         | 247   |
| Use of Carrier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site... | 249   |
| A New Version of the U-2.                                      | 251   |
| Replacement of the Original U-2s With U-2Rs.                   | 253   |
| The Final Years of the U-2..                                   | 253   |
| Support to Other Agencies                                      | 254   |
| Overseas Deployment Exercises and Missions.                    | 255   |
| The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities               | 257   |

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# The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance: (cont.)

## -Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

| New Technologies Necessitated By OXCART's High Speed. 279   | New Technologies Necessitated By OXCART's High Speed. 279   |
|-|-|
| Designing the OXCART's Cameras.                             | 281                                                         |
| Choosing Pilots for OXCART.                                 | 283                                                         |
| Selection of a Testing Site for the OXCART.                 | 283                                                         |
| Delivery of the First OXCART                                | 286                                                         |
| Changes in the Project Management.                          | 286                                                         |
| OXCART's First Flights...                                   | 288                                                         |
| Speed-Related Problems.                                     | 290                                                         |
| New Versions of the OXCART                                  | 291                                                         |
| The Question of Surfacing a Version of the OXCART.          | 292                                                         |
| Additional Problems During Final Testing...                 | 295                                                         |
| Discussions on the OXCART's Future Employment.              | 297                                                         |
| First A-12 Deployment: Operation BLACK SHIELD               | 304                                                         |
| The End of the OXCART Program                               | 307                                                         |
| Possible Successors to the OXCART.                          | 312                                                         |
| Summary of the OXCART Program.                              | 313                                                         |

# The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance: (cont.)

## -Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

## Chapter 7
Conclusion

| U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union.                             | 315   |
|-|-|
| Participation of Allies in the U-2 Program..                     | 319   |
| U-2s as Collectors of Tactical Intelligence                      | 319   |
| Advances in Technology.                                          | 320   |
| Cooperation With the Air Force                                   | 321   |
| Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance Program on the CIA........ | 321   |

| Appendix A: Acronyms.                                                           | 325   |
|-|-|
| Appendix B: Key Personnel                                                       | 327   |
| Appendix C: Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2                               | 335   |
| Appendix D: U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union,...<br />4 July 1954-1 May 1960 | 337   |
| Appendix E: Unmanned Reconnaissance Projects.                                   | $339  |
| Bibliography.                                                                   | 347   |
| Index                                                                           | 355   |

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Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL)

National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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# The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance: (cont.)

## FOREWORD

This History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authorita tive history ofthe CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program. which from 1954 to 1974 developed and operated two extraordinary aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It describes not only the program's technological and bureaucratic aspects, but also its politi cal and international context. The manned reconnaissance program, along with other overhead systems that emerged from it, changed the CIA's work and structure i.n ways that were both revolutionary and permanent. The formation of the Directorate of Science and Technology in the I960s, principally to develop and direct reconnais sance programs, is the most obvious legacy of the events recounted in this study.

# The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance: (cont.)

## FOREWORD (cont.)

The authors tell anenigrossing story. The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 OXCART projects reveals how the manned reconnaissance program confronted problems that still beset successor programs today. The U-2 was an enormous technological suc:cess: its first flight over the USSR in July 1956 made it immediately the most important source ofintelligence on the Soviet Union. Using it against the Soviet target it was designed for nevertheless produced a persistent tension between its program· managers and the President. The program managers, eager for cover age, repeatedly urged the President to authorize frequent missions over the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, from the outset doubt ful ofthe prudence and prt0priety ofinvading Soviet airspace, only reluctantly allowed any overflights at all. After the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May 1960, President Eisenhower forbade any further U-2 flights over the USSR. Since the Agency must always assess a covert operation's potential payoff against the diplomatic or military cost ifit fails, this account ofthe U-2's em ployment over the Soviet Union offers insights that go beyond overhead reconnaissance programs.

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reconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, itdoes reveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented techno logical challenges and their implications for intelligence and national policy. For this reason, the program's history provides profitable reading for intelligence professionals and policymakers today.

# -Secret-NOFORN (cont.)

Many people made important contributions to the production of this volume. In the History Staff's preparation of the manuscript, Gerald Haines did the final revision, Diane Marvin again demon- strated her high talent as a copy editor, and _ provided staunch secretarial support throughout. As usual, we are indebted to more members than we can name from the Publications, Design, and Cartography Centers in the Office of Current Production and Analytic Support, whose lively interest in the publication went far beyond the call of duty. Their exceptional professional skill and the masterly work of the Printing and Photography Group combined to create this handsome volume.

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# -Secret-NOFORN (cont.)

## PREFACE

When the Central Intelligence Agency came into existence in 1947, no one foresaw that, in less than a decade, it would undertake a major program of overhead reconnaissance, whose principal purpose would be to fly over the Soviet Union. Traditionally, the military services had been responsible for overhead reconnaissance, and flights deep into unfriendly territory only took place during wartime. By the early I950s, howev,er, the United States had an urgent and growing need for strategic :intelligence on the Soviet Union and its satellite states. At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow-penetration overflights, but these missions were paying a high price in lives lost and increased international tension. Furthermore. many important areasof the Soviet Union lay beyond the range of existing reconnais sance aircraft. The Air Force had therefore begun to develop a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that would be able to conduct deep-penetration reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his civilian scientific advisers feared that the loss ofsuch an aircraft deep in Soviet territory could lead to war and therefore authorized the development of new non military aircraft, first the U-2 and later the A-12 OXCART, to be manned by civilians and operated only under cover and in the greatest secrecy. Primary responsibili ty for this new reconnaissance program was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, but the Air Force provided vital support.

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later, at press conferences in February and July 1.964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence ofthe OXCART-type of aircraft, although only in its military YF- l 2A (interceptor) and SR-7 l (strategic reconnaissance) versions.

# -Secret NOFORN (cont.)

The two CIA reconnaissance aircraft have also been the subject of a number ofbooks, beginning with David Wise's and Thomas B. Ross's The U-2 Affair in 1962 and then Francis Gary Powers' memoirs, Operation Overflight, in 1970. Two recent books give many more details about the U-2 and OXCART air,craft: Michael Beschloss's Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (l 986) and William Burrows's Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security ( 1987). Although well written and generally ac curate, these books suffer from their authors' lack of access to classified official documentation. By drawing upon the considerable amount offonnerly classified data on the U-2 now available to the public, Beschloss has provided an accurate and insightful depiction of the U-2 program in the context of the Eisenhower 21dministration's overall foreign policy, but his book does contain errors and omissions on some aspects of the U-2 program. Burrows's broader work suffers more from the lack ofclassified documentation. particularly in the OXCART/SR-71 section, which concentrates on the Air Force air craft because little information about the Agency's aircraft has been officially declassified and released.

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# -Secret NOFORN (cont.)

Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of the Agency's reconnaissance aircraft provides a wealth oftechnical and operational information on the two projects but does not attempt to place them in their historical context. Without examining the international situation and bureaucratic pressures af fecting the president and other key policymakers, however, it is impossible to understand the decisions that began, carried out, and ended the CIA's reconnaissance aircraft projects.

# -Secret NOFORN (cont.)

In preparing this study of CIA's overhead reconnaissance pro gram, the authors drew on published sources, classified government documents, and interviews with key participants from the CIA, Air Force, contractors, scientific advisory committees, and the Eisenhower administration. The interviews were particularly impor tant for piecing together the story of how the CIA became involved in overhead reconnaissance in the first place because Agency documen tation on the prehistory ofthe U-2 project is very sketchy and there are no accurate published accounts. Research on the period ofactual reconnaissance operations included the records of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Office of Special Activities in the Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Intelligence Community Staff, along with documents from the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, and additional interviews.

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# Searching for a System

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## THE NEED FOR HIGH-ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE

For centuries, soldiers in wartime have sought the highest ground or structure in order to get a better view of the enemy. At first it was tall trees, then church steeples and bell towers. By the time of the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, ob- servers were using hot-air balloons to get up in the sky for a better view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became possible to carry cameras into the sky to record the disposi- tion of enemy troops and emplacements. Indeed, photoreconnaissance proved so valuable during World War I that in 1938 Gen. Werner von Fritsch, Commander in Chief of the German Army, predicted: "The nation with the best aerial reconnaissance facilities will win the next war." 1

By World War II,lenses, films, and cameras had undergone many improvements, as had the airplane, which could fly higher and faster than the primitive craft ofWorld War I. Now it was possible to use photoreconnaissance to obtain information about potential targets be fore a bombing raid and to assess the effectiveness ofthe bombing afteiwarcl

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By 1949 the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe had been effectively curtained off from the outside world, and the Soviet military carried out its planning, production, and deployment activi- ties with the utmost secrecy. All Soviet strategic capabilities— bomber forces, ballistic missiles, submarine forces, and nuclear weap- ons plants-were concealed from outside observation. The Soviet air defense system, a prime consideration in determining US retaliatory policies, was also largely an unknown factor.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## THE NEED FOR HIGH-ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE (cont.)

Tight security along the Soviet Bloc borders severely curtailed the movement of human intelligence sources. In addition, the Soviet Union made its conventional means of communication-telephone, telegraph, and radio-telephone-more secure, thereby greatly reduc- ing the intelligence available from these sources. The stringent secu- rity measures imposed by the Communist Bloc nations effectively blunted traditional methods for gathering intelligence: secret agents using covert means to communicate intelligence, travelers to and from target areas who could be asked to keep their eyes open and re- port their observations later, wiretaps and other eavesdropping meth- ods, and postal intercepts. Indeed, the entire panoply of intelligence tradecraft seemed ineffective against the Soviet Bloc, and no other methods were available.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance

Although at the end of World War II the United States had captured large quantities of German photos and documents on the Soviet Union, this material was rapidly becoming outdated. The main source of current intelligence on the Soviet Union's military installations was interrogation of prisoners of war returning from Soviet captivity. To obtain information about Soviet scientific progress, the intelligence community established several programs to debrief German scientists who had been taken to the Soviet Union after the end of the war but were now being allowed to leave."

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# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance (cont.)

Interrogation ofreturning Germans offered only fragmentary in formation, and this source could not be expected to last much longer. As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to obtain aerial photography of the Soviet Union. The main Air Force effort involved Boeing RB-47 aircraft (the reconnaissance version of the B-47 jet-propelled medium bomber) equipped with cameras and electronic "ferret"equipment that enabled aircrews to detect tracking by Soviet radars. At that time the Soviet Union had not yet com pletely ringed its borders with radars, and much ofthe interior also lacked radar coverage. Thus, when the RB-47s found a gap in the air-warning network, they would dart inland to take photographs of any accessible targets. These ·'penetration photography" flights (called SENSINT-sensitive intelligence-missions) occurred along the northern and Pacific coasts of Russia. One RB-47 aircraft even managed to fly 450 miles inland and photograph the city ofIgarka in Siberia. Such intrusions brought protests from Moscow but no Soviet military response. 3

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance (cont.)

In 1950 there was a major change in Soviet policy. Air defense units became very aggressive in defending their airspace, attacking all aircraft that came near the borders of the Soviet Union. On 8 April 1950, Soviet fighters shot down a US Navy Privateer patrol aircraft over the Baltic Sea. Following the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950, the Soviet Union extended its "severe air defense policy'' to the Far East. In the autumn of1951, Soviet aircraft downed a twin-en gine US Navy Neptune bomber near Vladivostok. An RB-29 lost in the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also a victim of Soviet fighters. The United States was not the only country affected by the new aggressive Soviet air defense policy; Britain and Turkey also reported attacks on their planes. 4

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance (cont.)

' A. L. George. Case Studies of Actual and Alleged Overflights. 1930-1953, Rand Study RM-1349 (Santa Monica: Rand. 1955) (S). Arthur S. Lundahl and Dino Brugioni, inter view by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Washington. DC. 14 December 1983 (TS Codeword). Recordings, transcript5, and notes for the interviews conducted for this study are on file at the DCI History Staff.

' Jeffrey Richelson states on page 121 of American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York: Morrow, 1987) that "the first recorded attack by Soviet air defense forces, in this case fighters. occurred on October 22. 1949." In this incident, however, Soviet fighters did not attempt to hit the US aircrati; they merely fired warning shots. The real change in Soviet policy did not occur until the April 1950 downing of the US Navy Privateer. George, Case Studies, pp. 1-2. 6, 9-16 (S).

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The Soviet Union's air defense policy became even more aggres sive in August I952, when its reconnaissance aircraft began violating Japanese airspace over Hokkaido, the northernmost Japanese home island. Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US RB-29 flying over Hokkaido. Aerial re connaissance ofthe Soviet Union and surrounding areas had become a very dangerous business.

Despite the growing risks associated with aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Bloc, senior US officials strongly believed that such missions were necessary. The lack of information about the Soviet Union, coupled with the perception that it was an aggressive nation determined to expand its borders-aperception that had been greatly strengthened by the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950--increased US determination to obtain informa tion about Soviet intentions and capabilities and thus reduce the dan ger ofbeing surprised by a Soviet attack.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance

While existing Navy and Air Force aircraft were flying their risky re connaissance missions over the Soviet Union, the United States began planning for a more systematic and less dangerous approach using new technology. One of the leading advocates ofthe need for new, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was Richard S. Leghorn, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate and employee of Eastman Kodak who had commanded the Army Air Forces' 67th Reconnaissance Group in Europe during World War IL After the war he returned to Kodak but maintained his interest in photoreconnais sance. Leghorn strongly believed in the need for what he called pre-D-day reconnaissance, that is, reconnaissance of a potential enemy before the outbreak ofactual hostilities, in contrast to combat reconnaissance in wartime. In papers presented in 1946 and 1948, Leghorn argued that the United States needed to develop such a capa bility, which would require high-altitude aircraft and high-resolution cameras. The outbreak ofthe Korean war gave Leghorn an opportu nity to put his ideas into effect. Recalled to active duty by the Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn became the head of the Reconnaissance Systems Branch of the Wright Air Development Command at Dayton, Ohio, in April 1951.5

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In Leghorn's view, altitude was the key to success for overhead reconnaissance. Since the best Soviet interceptor at that time, the MIG-17. had to struggle to reach 45,000 feet,6 Leghorn reasoned that an aircraft that could exceed 60,000 feet would be safe from Sovi et fighters. Recognizing that the fastest way to produce a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was to modify an existing aircraft, he began looking for the highest flying aircraft available in the Free World. This search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomber the Canberra-builtby the English Electric Company. The Canberra had made its first flight in May I949. Its speed of 469 knots (870 ki lometers per hour) and its service ceiling of48,000 feet made the Canberra a natural choice for high-altitude reconnaissance work. The Roy al Air Force quickly developed a reconnaissance version ofthe Canberra, the PR3 (the PR stood for photoreconnaissance). which be gan flying in March 1950.7

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance (cont.)

At Leghorn's insistence, the Wright Air Development Command invited English Electric representatives to Dayton in the summer of 1951 to help find ways to make the Canberra fly even higher. By this time the Air Force had already adopted the bomber version of the Canberra, which the Glenn L. Marrin Aircraft Company was to produce under license as the B-57 medium bomb er. Leghorn and his English Electric colleagues designed a new Canberra configuration with very long high-lift wings, new Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engines, a so li tary pi lot, and an airframe that was stressed to less than the standard military specifications. Leghorn calculated that a Canberra so equipped might reach 63,000 feet early in a long mission and as high as 67,000 feet as the declin ing fuel supply lighten ed the aircraft. He believed that such a modi fied Canberra could penetrate the Soviet Union and China for a radius of800 miles from bases around their periphery and photo graph up to 85 percent ofthe intelligence targets in those countries.

Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not, however, cleared his idea with the Air Research and Development Command, whose reconnaissance

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance (cont.)

• 13.716 meters. To avoid giving a false impression of e:imemely precise measurement.s. original English measuring system figures in round numbers have not been converted to the metric system. To convert feet to meters. multiply by 0.3048. To convert airspeeds in knots (nautical miles per hour) to kilometers per hour. mult ip ly by 1.85.

' Dick van der Aart, Aerial Espionage. Secret Intelligence Flights by Easr and West (Shrewsbury. England: Airlife Publishing, 1985). p. I8.

Richard S. Leghorn

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RAF Canberra Mark-PR3

division in Baltimore, headed by Lt. Col. Joseph J. Pellegrini. had to approve all new reconnaissance aircraft designs. Pellegrini·s unit reviewed Leghorn's design and ordered extensive modifications. According to Leghorn, Pellegrini was not interested in a special-pur pose aircraft that was only suitable for covert peacetime reconnais sance missions, for he believed that all Air Force reconnaissance aircraft should be capable of operating under wartime conditions. Pellegri ni therefore insisted that Leghorn ·s design meet the specifica tions for combat aircraft, which required heavily stressed airframes, armor plate. and other apparatus that made an aircraft too heavy to reach the higher altitudes necessary for safe overflights of the Soviet Bloc. The final result of Leghorn's concept after its alteration by Pellegrini ·s staff was the RB -57D in I955, whose maximum altitude

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was only 64,000 feet. Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in early 1952 to work for Col. Bernard A. Schriever, Assistant for Development Planning to the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development.~

In his new position Leghorn became responsible for planning the Air Force's reconnaissance needs for the next decade. He worked closely with Charles F. (Bud) Wienberg-a colleague who had fol lowed him from Wright Field-and Eugene P. Kiefer, a Notre Dame-educated aeronautical engineer who had designed reconnais sance aircraft at the Wright Air Development Center during World War IL All three of these reconnaissance experts believed that the Air Force should emphasize high-altitude photoreconnaissance.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance (cont.)

Underlying their advocacy of high-altitude photoreconnaissance was the belief that Soviet radars would not be able to track aircraft flying above 65,000 feet. This assumption was based on the fact that the Soviet Union used American-built radar sets that had been sup plied under Lend-Lease during World War II. Although the SCR-584 (Signal Corps Radio) target-tracking radar could track targets up to 90,000 feet. its high power consumption burned out a key component quickly, so this radar was normally not turned on until an early warn ing radar had detected a target. The SCR-270 early warning radar could be left on for much longer periods and had a greater horizontal range (approximately 120 miles) but was limited by the curvature of the earth to a maximum altitude of 40,000 feet. As a result, Leghorn, Kiefer, and Wienberg believed that an aircraft that could ascend to 65,000 feet before entering an area being swept by the early warning radar would go undetected, because the target-tracking radars would not be activated. 9

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## The Air Force Search for a New
Reconnaissance Aircraft

With interest in high-altitude reconnaissance growing, several Air Force agencies began to develop an aircraft to conduct such mis- sions. In September 1952, the Air Research and Development Command gave the Martin Aircraft Company a contract to examine the high-altitude potential of the B-57 by modifying a single aircraft to give it long, high-lift wings and the American version of the new Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engine. These were the modifications that Richard Leghorn had suggested during the previous year." 10

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Air Force Search for a New
Reconnaissance Aircraft (cont.)

At about the same time, another Air Force office, the Wright Air Development Command (WADC) in Dayton, Ohio, was also examin- ing ways to achieve sustained flight at high altitudes. Working with two German aeronautical experts--Woldemar Voigt and Richard Vogt-who had come to the United States after World War II, Air Force Maj. John Seaberg advocated the development of a new aircraft that would combine the high-altitude performance of the latest turbo- jet engines with high-efficiency wings in order to reach ultrahigh alti- tudes. Seaberg, an aeronautical engineer for the Chance Vought Corporation until his recall to active duty during the Korean war, was serving as assistant chief of the New Developments Office of WADC's Bombardment Branch.

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# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Air Force Search for a New
Reconnaissance Aircraft (cont.)

produce a bener aircraft more quickly. In July 1953, the Bell Aircraft Corporation of Buff alo, New York, and the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation ofHagerstown, Maryland, received study con tracts to develop an entirely new high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, the Glenn L. Martin Company ofBaltimore was asked to examine the possibility of improving the already exceptional high-al titude performance ofthe 8-57 Canberra. By January 1954 all three firms had submitted their proposals. Fairchild's entry was a singl.e-en gine plane known as M-195, which had a maximum altitude potc!ntial of67,200 feet; Bell's was a twin-engine craft called the Modd 67 (later the X- 16), which had a maximum altitude of69,500 feet; and Martin's design was a big-wing version of the 8-57called the Model 294, which was to cruise at 64,000 feet. In March 1954, Seaberg and other engineers at Wright Field, having evaluated the three contend ing designs, recommended the adoption ofboth the Martin and Bell proposals. They considered Martin's version of the B-57 an interim project that could be completed and deployed rapidly while the more advanced concept from Bell was still being developed. 11

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Air Force Search for a New
Reconnaissance Aircraft (cont.)

Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod- • ify" the B-57 and was very much interested in the Bell design. But word of the competition for a new reconnaissance airplane had reached another aircraft manufacturer, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, wh ich submitted an unsolicited design.

Lockheed had first become aware ofthe reconnaissance aircraft competition in the fall of 1953. John H. (Jack) Carter, who, had recently retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business and dropped in to see Eugene P. Kiefer, an old friend and colleague from the Air Force 's Office ofDevelopment Planning (more commonly known as AFDAP from its Air Force office symbol). Kiefer told Carter about the competition for a high-flying aircraft and expressed the opinion that the Air Force was going about the search in the wrong way by requiring the new aircraft to be suit able for both strategic and tactical reconnaissance.

Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the top civilian official in the Air Force's Office of Development Planning) that

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Designs for the Air Force
competition for a high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Air Force Search for a New
Reconnaissance Aircraft (cont.)

Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the proposed aircraft would have co reach altitudesof between 65. 000 and 70,000 feet and correctly forecast, "If extreme altitude performance can be realiz:ed in a practical aircraft at speeds in the vicinityofMach 0.8. it should be capable of avoiding virtually all Russian defenses until about 1960." Carter added, ··To achieve these characteristics in an aircraft which willhave a reasonably useful operational life during the period before 1960 will.of course, require very strenuous efforts and extraordinary procedures, as well as nonstandard design philosophy." Some of the "nonstandard" design cnaracteristics suggested by Carter were the elimination oflanding gear, the disregard ofmilitary specifications. and the use of very low load factors. Carter's memorandum closed with a warning that time was of the essence: " In order that this spe cial aircraft can have a reasonably long and useful life, it is obvious that its development must be greatly accelerated beyond that consid ered normal. .. 1 • 1

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# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Air Force Search for a New
Reconnaissance Aircraft (cont.)

gravity (g's) instead of the military specification strength of 5.33 g's. For the power plant he selected the General Electric J73/GE-3 nonaf- terburning turbojet engine with 9,300 pounds of thrust (this was the same engine he had chosen for the F-104, which had been the basis for the U-2 design)." Many of the CL-282's design features were adapted from gliders. Thus, the wings and tail were detachable. Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib for landing-a common sailplane technique and a jettisonable wheeled dolly for takeoff. Other fea- tures included an unpressurized cockpit and a 15-cubic-foot payload area that could accommodate 600 pounds of sensors. The CL-282's maximum altitude would be just over 70,000 feet with a 2,000-mile range. Essentially, Kelly Johnson had designed a jet-propelled glider."

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Air Force Search for a New
Reconnaissance Aircraft (cont.)

Early in March 1954, Kelly Johnson su bmitted the CL-282 de sign to Brig. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever's Office of Development Planning. Eugene Kieferand Bud Wienberg studied the design and recommended it to General Schriever. who then asked Lockheed to sµbmit a specific proposal. In early April, Kelly Johnson _presented a fulldescriptionof the CL-282and a proposal for the construction and maintenanceof 30 aircraft to a group of seniorPentagon officials that included Schriever·s superior. Lt. Gen. DonaldL. Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, and Trevor N. Gardner, Special Assistant for Research and Development to the Secretary of the Air Force. Afterward Kelly Johnson noted that the civi lian officials were very much interested in his design but the generals were not. 16

The CL-282 design was also presented to the commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, in early April by Eugene Kiefer, Bud Wienberg, and Burton Klein from the Office of

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Air Force Search for a New
Reconnaissance Aircraft (cont.)

Kelly Johnson

* Lockheed Corporation, "Strategic Reconnaissance and Intelligence." Development Planning Note #1, 30 November 1953 (U).

15 Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 12. For more details on Kelly Johnson's original proposal. see "Profile of CL-282 High Altitude Aircraft prepared by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 5 March 1954" in Helen H. Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hem, History of the Office of Special Activities, DS&T, Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series OSA-1, 16 vols. (CIA: DS&T, 1969). chap. I. annex 2 (TS Codeword). The 16 volumes of this history contain 20 chapters, each paginated separately. Future references will be shortened to OSA History, followed by the relevant chapter and page numbers.

16 Kelly Johnson Papers. "Log for Project X." April 1954. Lockheed Corporation. Advanced Development Projects Division, Burbank, California.

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The Lockheed CL-282

Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay stood up halfway through the briefing, took his cigar out of his mouth, and told the briefers that, ifhe wan1ted high-altitude photographs, he would put cameras in his B-36 bombers and added that he was not interested in a plane that had no whe:els or guns. The general then left the room, remarking that the whole business was a waste of his time."

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13

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Air Force Search for a New
Reconnaissance Aircraft (cont.)

World War II in multiengine bombers. In addition, aerial photography experts in the late 1940s and early 1950s emphasized focal length as the primary factor in reconnaissance photography and, therefore, pre ferred large aircraft capable of accommodating long focal-length cameras. This preference reached an extreme in the early 1950s with the development ofthe cumbersome 240-inch Boston camera, a de vice so large that the YC-97 Boeing Stratocruiser that carried it had to be partially disassembled before the camera could be installed. Finally, there was the feeling shared by many Air Force officers that two engines are always better than one because, if one fails, there is a spare to get the aircraft back to base. In reality, however, aviation re cords show that single-engine aircraft have always been more reliable than multiengine planes. Furthermore, a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft deep in enemy territory would have little chance ofreturning ifone ofthe engines failed, forcing the aircraft to descend. 19

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Air Force Search for a New
Reconnaissance Aircraft (cont.)

On 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air Force rejecting the CL-282 proposal because it had only one engine and was too unusual and because the Air Force was already commit- ted to the modification of the Martin B-57.w By this time, the Air Force had also selected the Bell X-16; the formal contract calling for 28 aircraft was signed in September. Despite the Air Force's selection ofthe X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the CL-282 and began seeking new sources ofsupport for the aircraft.

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# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA (cont.)

design showed the most promise for reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. This belief was shared by Gardner's special assistant, Frederick Ayer, Jr., and Garrison Norton, an adviser to Secretary Talbott.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA (cont.)

According to Norton, Gardner tried to interest SAC commander LeMay in the Lockheed aircraft because Gardner envisioned it pri- marily as a collector of strategic, rather than tactical, intelligence. But General LeMay had already shown that he was not interested in an unarmed aircraft. Gardner, Ayer, and Norton then decided to seek CIA support for the high-flying aircraft. At that time the Agency's official involvement in overhead reconnaissance was limited to advising the Air Force on the problems of launching large camera-carrying bal- loons for reconnaissance flights over hostile territory (for the details of this program, see chapter 2). The Chief of the Operations Staff in the Office of Scientific Intelligence, Philip G. Strong, however, served on several Air Force advisory boards and kept himself well in- formed on developments in reconnaissance aircraft."

Trevor Gardner

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA (cont.)

Gardner, Norton, and Ayer met with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954, six clays beforethe Wrig ht AirDeve lopment Command began to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal a nd showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeti ng. Strong summarized his impressions of the AirForce·s search for a high-alti tude reconnaissance aircraft:

Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been re ceived in the Air Staff from Lockheed. Fairchild. and Bell . ... The Lockheed proposal is considered to be the best. It has been given the type designation of CL-282 and in many respects is a jet-powered glider based essentially on the Lockheed Day Fighter XF-104. It is primarily subsonic but can attain transonic speeds over the target with a consequent loss of range. With an altitude of 73,000 feet over the target it has a combat radius of 1,400 nautical miles . ... The CL-282 can be manufactured

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mainly with XF-104 jigs and designs.. ... The prototype of this plane can be produced within a year from the date of order. Five planes could be delivered for operations within two years...

The Bell proposal is a more conventional aircrai having nor mallanding gear. As a result, its maximum altiwde over .rarget is 69,500 feet and the speed and range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. :;

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA (cont.)

Richard Bissell had already had an active and varied career be- fore he joined the CIA. A graduate of Groton and Yale, Bissell stud- ied at the London School of Economics for a year and then completed a doctorate at Yale in 1939. He taught economics, first at Yale and then from 1942 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he became a full professor in 1948. During World War II, Bissell had managed American shipping as executive officer of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. After the war, he served as deputy director of the Marshall Plan from 1948 until the end of 1951, when he became a staff member of the Ford Foundation. His first association with the Agency came in late 1953, when he undertook a contract study of possible responses the United

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA (cont.)

Gardner's enthusi asm forthe CL-282 had gi ven Strong the false impression that most Air Force officials supported the Loc khee :d de sign. (n reality, the Ai r Force's uniformed hierarchy was in the pro cess of choosing the modifiedversion of the Martin B-57 and the new Bell X-16to meet future reconnaissance needs.

During their meeting with Strong, Trevor Gardner, Fredlerick Ayer, and Garrison Norton explained that they favored the CL-282 because it gave promise of flying higher than the other designs and because at maximum altitude its smaller radar cross section might make it in vis ible to existing Soviet radars. The three officials :asked S.trong ifthe CIA would be interested in such an aircraf t. Strong promised to talk to the Directorof Central Intelligence's newly hi red Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard M. Bissell. Jr., about possible Agency interest in the CL-282. :"'

Philip Strong

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA (cont.)

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States might use against the Soviet Bloc in the event of another up rising such as the East Berlin riots of June 1953. Bissell quickly concluded that there was not much hope for clandestine operations against Bloc nations. As he remark,ed later: "Iknow I emerged from that exercise feeling that very little could be done." This belief would later make Bissell a leading advocate oftechnical rather than human means ofintelligence collection. 25

Bisselljoined the Agency in late January 1954 andsoon became involved in coordination for the operation aimed a t overthrowing Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbe1nz. He was, therefore very preoc cupied when Philip Strong approached him in mid -May 1954 with the concept of the proposed spyplane from Lockheed. Bissell said that the idea had merit and told Strong to get some topflight scientists to ad viseonthe matter. Afterward he returned to the final planning for the Guatemalan operation and promptly forgot about the CL-282.! 0

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA (cont.)

Meanwhile, Strong went about drumming up support for high-al titude overflight. In May 1954 he persuaded DCI Allen W. Dulles to ask the Air Force to take the initiative in gaining approval for an overflight ofthe Soviet guided-missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Dulles's memorandum did not me,ntion the CL-282 or any of the other proposed high-altitude aircraft. CIAand Air Force officials met on several occasions to explore the ,overflight proposal, which the Air Force finally turned down in October I954. !'

Although Allen Dulleswas willing to support an Air Force over flight of the Soviet Union, he was mot enthusiastic about the CIA un dertaking such a project. Few deta iils about Dulles's precise attitude toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available, but many who knew him believe that he did not want the CIA to be come involved in projects that belonged to the military, and the Lockheed CL-282 had been designed for an Air Force requirement.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA (cont.)

" Thomas P owers .The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms andthe CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1979). p. 79; Beschloss. Mayday. pp. 86-89.

Memorandum for H. Marshall Chadwell, Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence. from Chief, Support Staff, OSI, "Review of OSA Activities Concerned with Scientific and Technical Collection Techniques," 13 May 1955, p. 6, OSI (OSWR) records, job 80R-01424, box 1 (S); Richard M. Bissell, Jr., interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, tape recording. Farmington, Connecticut, 8 November 1984 (S).

Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell, Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination, from Philip G. Strong, Chief, Operations Staff, OSI, "Overflight of Kapustin Yar. 15 October 1954, OSI (OSWR) records, job 80R-01424, box 1 (TS, down- graded to S).

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Moreover, high-altitude reconnaissance of the Soviet Union did not fit well into Allen Dulles's perception of the proper role of an intelli- gence agency. He tended to favor the classical form of espionage, which relied on agents rather than technology."

Atth is point, the summer of1954, Lockheed's CL-282 proposal still lacked official support. Although the design had strong backers among some Air Force civilians and CIA officials, the key decisionmakers at both· AirForce and CIA remained unconvinced. To make KellyJohnson's revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional source of supportwas necessary: prominent scientists serving on gov ernment advisory boards.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## SCIENTISTS AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE

Scientists and engineers from universities and private industry had played a major role in advising the government on technical matters during World War II. Atthe end of the war, most of the sc ientific ad- visory boards were disbanded, but within a few yea rs the growing te_ n_sionsof the Cold War again led governmen t agencies to seek sci- entific advice and assi stance . In 19 47 the Air Force established a Scientific Advisory Board, which met periodically to discuss topics of current interest andadvise the AirForce on the potential usefulne:ss of new technologies. The following year the Office of Defense Mobilization established the Scientific Advisory Committee, bU1t the Truman administration made little use of this new advisory body.=-•

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The BEACON HILL Report

In 1951 the AirForce sought even more assistance from scientists be cau se the Strategic Air Command's requests for information about targets behind the Iron Curtain could not be fltied. To look for new ways of conducting reconnaissance against the Soviet Bloc, the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Maj. Gen. Gordon P. Saville, added 15 reconnaissance experts to an existing project on air

2 Powers, Man Who Kept the Secrets. pp. 103-104; Edwin H. Land, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, tape recording, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 17 and 20 September 1984 (TS Codeword); Robert Amory, Jr., interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W. Pedlow, Washington, DC, 22 April 1987 (S).

For more information on the Air Force's use of scientists see Thomas A. Sturrn. The USAF Scientific Advisory Board: Its First Twenty Years. 1944-1964 (Washington, DC: USAF Historical Office, 1967) (U).

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defense known as Project LINCOLN, then under way at the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology. By the end ofthe year, these experts had assembled in Boston to begin their research. Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the codename for the reconnaissance project. The con sultants were called the BEACON HILL Study Group.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The BEACON HILL Report (cont.)

The study group's chairman was Kodak physicist Carl F. P. Overhage, and its members included James G. Baker and Edward M. Purcell from Harvard; Saville Davis from the Christian Science Monitor; Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory; Peter C. Goldmark from Columbia Broadcasting System Laboratories; Edwin H. Land, founder of the Polaroid Corporation; Stewart E. Miller of Bell Laboratories; Richard S. Perkin of the Perkin-Elmer Company; and Louis N. Ridenour of Ridenour Associates, Inc. The Wright Air Development Command sent Lt. Col. Richard Leghorn to serve as its liaison officer. 30

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The BEACON HILL Report (cont.)

During January and February 1952, the BEACON HILL Study Group traveled every weekend to various airbases, laboratories, and firms for briefings on the latest technology and projects. The panel members were particularly interested in new approaches to aerial re connaissance, such as photography from high-flying aircraft and camera-carrying balloons. One of the more unusual (albeit unsuccess ful) proposals examined by the panel was an "invisible" dirigible. This was to be a giant, almost flat-shaped airship with a blue-tinted, nonreflective coating; it would cruise at an altitude of 90,000 feet along the borders of the Soviet Union at very slow speeds while using a large lens to photograph targets ofinterest. 31

After completing these briefings at the end of February 1952, the BEACON HILL Study Group returned to MIT, where the panel mem bers spent the next three months writing a report detailing their recommendations for ways to improve the amount and quality ofin telligence being gathered on the Soviet Bloc. Published as a classified

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The BEACON HILL Report (cont.)

"' USAF, Project LINCOLN. BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 15 June 1952, pp. v, xi: app. A (S. downgraded to C).

'' Allen F. Donovan. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach. 21 June 1985 (U) : James G. Baker, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington, DC, 24 April 1985 (S}.

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document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches to obtain the information needed for national intel ligence estimates. Its 14 chapters covered radar, radio, and photo graphic surveillance: examined the use of passive infrared and microwave reconnaissance; and discussed the development of ad vanced reconnaissance vehicles. One of the report's key recommenda tions called for the development of high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft:

We have reached a period in history when our peacetime knowl edge of the capabilities, activities and dispositions of a poten tially hostile nation is such as to demand that we supplement it with the maximum amount of information obtainable through aerial reconnaissance. To avoid political involvements, such aerial reconnaissance must be conducted either from vehicles flying in friendly airspace, or-a decision on this point permitting-from vehicles whose performance is such that they can operate in Soviet airspace with greatly reduced chances of detection or interception. 1 J

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack

The Air Force did not begin to implement the ideas ofthe BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this time interest in recon naissance had increased after Dwight D. Eisenhower became President in January 1953 and soon expressed his dissatisfaction with the quality of the intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities and the paucity ofreconnaissance on the Soviet Bloc. 11

To President Eisenhower and many other US political and mili tary leaders, the Soviet Union was a dangerous opponent that ap peared to be moving inexorably toward a position ofmilitary parity with the United States. Particularly alarming was Soviet progress in the area ofnuclear weapons. In the late summer of 1949, the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic bomb nearly three years sooner than US ex.perts had predicted. Then in August 1953-a scant nine months after the first US test ofa hydrogen bomb-the Soviet Union deto nated a hydrogen bomb manufactured from lithium deuteride, a tech nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US

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scientists. Thus, new and extremely powerful weapons were coming into the hands of a government whose actions greatly disturbed the leaders of the West. Only two months before the successful hydrogen bomb test, Soviet troops had crushed an uprising in East Berlin. And, at the United Nations, the Soviet Bloc seemed bent on causing dissen sion between Western Europe and the United States and between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy. combined with advances in nuclear weapons, led officials such as Secretary ofState John Foster Dulles to see the Soviet Union as a menace to peace and world order.

The Soviet Union's growing military strength soon became a threat not just to US forces overseas but to the continental United States itself. In the spring of 1953. a top secret RAND study pointed out the vulnerability of the SAC's US bases to a surprise attack by Soviet long-range bombers.-'•

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack (cont.)

Concern about the danger ofa Soviet attack on the continental United States grew after an American military attache sighted a new Soviet intercontinental bomber at Ramenskoye airfield. south of Moscow, in 1953. The new bomber was the Myasishchev-4, later designated Bison by NATO. Powered by jet engines rather than the turboprops ofRussia's other long-range bombers. the Bison appeared to be the Soviet equivalent of the US B-52. which was only then going into production. Pictures of the Bison taken at the Moscow May Day air show in 1954 had an enormous impact on the US intel ligence community. Unlike several other Soviet postwar aircraft, the Bison was not a derivative of US or British designs but represented a native Soviet design capability that surprised US intelligence ex perts. This new long-range jetbomber, along with the Soviet Union's large numbers ofolder propeller and turboprop bombers, seemed to pose a significant threat to the United States, and, in the summer of 1954, newspapers and magazines began publishing articles highlight ing the growing airpower ofthe Soviet Union. Pictures ofthe Bison bomber featured prominently in such stories. 1 ;

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Soviet Myasishchev-4 bomber
(the Bison)

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel

Even before the publication of photographs of the Bison· raised fears that the Soviet bomber force might eventually surpass that o f the United States, the Air Force had already established a new advisory body to look for ways to implement the main recommendation of the BEACON HILLReport-theconstruction of high-flying aircraft and high-acuity cameras . Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems P anel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILLStudy Group: Land, Overhage, Donovan, and Miller. At the request of the Air Force, the CIA also participated in the panel, represent«!d by Edward L. Allen ofthe Office ofResearch and Reports (ORR) and Phil ipStrong of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI). 31 '

The chairman of the new panel was Dr . James G. Baker. a re search associate at the Harvard College Observatory. Baker had been invol ved in aerial reconnaissance since 1940 , when he first advised the Army AirCorps on ways to improve it s lenses. He then estab lished a full-scale optical laboratory at Harvard-the Hrnrvard University Optical Research Laboratory-to produce high-quality

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lenses. Since the university did not wish to continue manufacturing cameras and lenses after the end of the war, the optical laboratory moved to Boston University, which agreed to sponsor the effort as long as the Air Force would fund it. Baker decided to remain at Harvard, so his assistant, Dr. Duncan E. Macdonald, became the new head of what was now called the Boston University Optical Research Laboratory (8 UORL). Baker's association with the Air Force did not end with the transfer ofthe optical laboratory to Boston University, because he continued to design lenses to be used in photoreconnais sance. 17

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel (cont.)

The [SP first met at Boston University on 3 August 1953. To provide background on the poor state ofUS knowledge ofthe Soviet Union, Philip Strong informed the other panel members that the best intelligence then available on the Soviet Union's interior was photog raphy taken by the German Luftwaffe during World War [l. Since the German photography covered only the Soviet Union west of the Urals, primarily west of the Volga River, many vital regions were not included. The ISP would, therefore, have to look for ways to provide up-to-date photography ofall ofthe Soviet Union. Several Air Force agencies then briefed the panel members on the latest developments and proposed future projects in the area ofaerial reconnaissance, in cluding new cameras, reconnaissance balloons. and even satellites. Among the Air Force reconnaissance projects discussed were multi ple sensors for use in existing aircraft such as the RB-47, RB-52, and RB-58; Project FICON-an acronym for "fighterconversion"-for adapting a giant, I0-engine 8-36 bomber to enable it to launch and retrieve a Republic RF-84F Thunderflash reconnaissance aircraft; re connaissance versions of the Navajo and Snark missiles; the high-alti tude balloon program, which would be ready to go into operation by the summer of 1955; and the search for a new high-altitude reconnais sance aircraft. 3~

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel (cont.)

" Baker interview (S). In 1957. after the Air Force decided to cut back its funding of BGORL. Duncan Macdonald and Richard Leghorn (by then retired from the Air Force) formt:d their own corporation-ltek-an<l purchased the laboratory from Boston University (Leghorn interview [SJ).

18 Memorandum for Robert Amory. Jr., Deputy Director, Intelligence, from Edward L. Allen, Chief, Economic Research, ORR, and Philip G. Strong. Chief. Operations Staff. OSI. "Meeting of the Intelligence Systems Panel of the Scientific Advisory Board, USAF." 26 August 1953; Memorandum for H. Marshall Chadwell, Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence, from Chief, Support Staff, OSI. "Review of OSA Activities Concerned with Scientific and Technical Collection Techniques," 13 May 1955. p. 6, OSI (OSWR) records, job 80R-01424, box 1 (S); Donovan interview. 22 May 1985 (S).

Secret

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The wide variety ofprograms discussed at the conference were all products ofthe Air Force's all-out effort to find a way to collect intelligence on the Communist Bloc. Some ofthe schemes went be yond the existing level of technology; others, like the camera-carrying balloons, were technically feasible but involved dangerous political consequences.

## British Overflight of Kapustin Var

The British were also working on high-altitude reconnaissance air craft. In 1952 the Royal Air Force (RAF) began Project ROBIN, which was designed to modify the Canberra bomber for high-altitude reconnaissance. This project was probably inspired by Richard Leghorn's collaboration with English Electric Company designers in 195I, when they calculated ways to increase the altitude of the Canberra. The RAF equipped the new Canberra PR7 with Rolls Royce Avon-109 engines and gave it long, fuel-filled wings. The range ofthis variant of the Canberra was now 4,300 miles, and, on 29 August 1955, it achieved an altitude of65,880 feet.n

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## British Overflight of Kapustin Var (cont.)

Sometime during the first half of 1953, the RAF employed a high-altitude Canberra on a daring overflight ofthe Soviet Union to photograph the missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Because of ad vanced warning from either radar or agents inside British intelli gence, the overflight did not catch the Soviet Union by surprise. Soviet fighters damaged and nearly shot down the Canberra.") Rumors about this flight reached Washington during the summer of 1953, but official confirmation by the United Kingdom did not come until February 1954. While on a six-week tour of Europe to study aerial reconnaissance problems for the US Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board, James Baker was briefed by RAF intelligence offi cials on the Canberra overflight of the Soviet Union. On 22 and 23 March 1954, he reported on it to the full Scientific Advisory Board at Langley AFB, Virginia.

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Baker also chair ed the next mee ting of the Air Force's Intelligence Systems Panel in late April 1954 but could not tell its members about the British overflight ofKap~stin Yar because they were not cleared for this inform ation. The panel did. however. discuss the modifications for high-alti tude flight being made to the US Canberra, the B-57."

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282

The next Intelligence Systems Panel meeting took place on 24 and 25 May at Boston University and the Polaroid Corporation. Panel mem- ber Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory eval- uated the changes being made to the B-57 by the Martin Aircraft Company. Even without Martin's specifications or drawings, Donovan had been able to estimate what could be done to the B-57 by lengthening the wings and lightening the fuselage. He had determined that alterations to the B-57 airframe would not solve the reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any multiengine aircraft built according to military specifications, including the B-57, would be too heavy to fly above 65,000 feet and hence would be vulnerable to Soviet intercep- tion. To be safe, Donovan explained, penetrating aircraft would need to fly above 70,000 feet for the entire mission.*

Allen F. Donovan

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CL-282 design was essentially a jet-propelled glider capable of attain ing the altitudes that he felt were necessary to carry out reconnais sance ofthe Soviet Union successfully: 1

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282 (cont.)

Upon his return east on 8 August, Donovan got in touch with James Baker and suggested an urgent meeting of the Intelligence Systems Panel. Because of other commitments by the members, how ever, the panel did not meet to hear Donovan's report until 24 September 1954 at the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory. Several members, including Land and Strong, were absent. Those who did at tend were upset to learn that the Air Force had funded a closed com petition for a tactical reconnaissance plane without informing them. But once Donovan began describing Kelly Johnson's rejected design for a jet-powered glider, they quickly forgot their annoyance and lis tened intently.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282 (cont.)

Donovan began by stressing that high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft had to fly above 70,000 feet to be safe from interception. Next, he set out what he considered to be the three essential re quirements for a high-altitude spyplane: a single engine, a sailplane wing, and low structural load factors. Donovan strongly favored single-engine aircraft because they are both lighter and more reli able than multiengine aircraft. Although a twin-engine aircraft could theoretically return to base on only one engine, Donovan explained, it could only do so at a much lower altitude, about 34,000 feet, where it was sure to be shot down.

The second ofDonovan's essential factors, a sailplane wing (in technical terms a high-aspect-ratio, low-induced-drag wing). was needed to take maximum advantage ofthe reduced thrust of a jet en gine operating in the rarefied atmosphere of extreme altitude. Because ofthe thinness ofthe atmosphere above 70,000 feet, engineers esti mated that the power curve ofajetengine would fall offto about 6 percent ofits sea-level thrust.

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wingroot areas to withstand the hi. gh speeds and sharp turns man dated by the standard military airworthiness ru les added too much weight to the airframe, thereby negating the efficiency of the sail plane wing.

In short, it was possible to achieve altitudes in excess of 70, 000 feet, but only by making certain that all parts of the aeronautical equation were in balance: thrust, lift, and weight. The only plane meeting these requirements, Donovan insisted, was Kelly Johnson's CL-282 because it was essentially a sailplane. In Donovan's view, the CL-282 did not have to meet the specifications of a combat aircraft because it could fly safely above Soviet fighters. +

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282 (cont.)

Donovan's arguments convinced the Intelligence Systems Panel of the merits of the CL-282 proposal, but this panel reported to the Air Force, which had already rejected the CL-282. Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September 1954-the members of the Intelligence Systems Panel and high-ranking Air Force civilians such as Trevor Gardner-these back- ers were all connected with the Air Force. They could not offer funds to Lockheed to pursue the CL-282 concept because the Air Force was already committed to the Martin RB-57 and the Bell X-16. Additional support from outside the Air Force was needed to bring the CL-282 project to life, and this support would come from scientists serving on high-level advisory committees.

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# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Technological Capabilities Panel (cont.)

Gardner. the commi ttee members decided to approach President Eisenhower on the matter. On 27 March l 954. the President told them aboutthe discoveryof the Soviet Bison bombers and his concern that these new aircraft might be used in a surprise attack on the United States. Stressing the high priority hegave to reducing the riskof mili tary surprise, the Presidentasked the committee to advise him on this problem.is

T he President's request led Chairman DuBridge to ask one of the most prominent members. MIT President James R. Killian. Jr. , to meet with other Science Advisory Commi ttee members in the Boston area to discuss the feasibility of a comprehensive sci entific assess ment of the nation's defense s. At their meeting at MIT on 15 April 1954,the group called for the recruitment of such a task force if the President endorsed the concept.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## The Technological Capabilities Panel (cont.)

On26 July 1954. President Eisenhower authorized Killianto re cru itand lead a panel of experts to study "' the country's technologi cal capabilities to meet some of its current probl ems." Killian quickly set up shop in offices located in the Old Executive Office B_ u_ilding and organized 42 of the nation's leading scientists into three special project groups investigating US offensive, defensive. and intelligence capabilites. with an additional communications working group (see chart. page 28). The Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) groups began meeting on 13 September 1954. For the next 20 weeks, the members of the various panels met on 307 sepa rate occas ions for briefings. field trips. conferences. and meetings with every major unit ofthe US defense and intelligence establish ments. After receiv in g the most up-to-date informati on available on the nation's defense and intelligence programs, the panel members began drafting their report to the National Security Council.'A

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282

Even before the final Technological Capabilities Panel report was ready, one of the three working groups took actions that would have a major impact on the US reconnaissance program. Project Three had

JamesR. Killian, Jr.

15 Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 73-74: Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee. Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack, 14 February 1955, p. 185 (hereafter cited as TCP Report) (TS/Restricted Data, downgraded to S).

James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1977), p. 68: Beschloss, Mayday. p. 74: TCP Report, pp. 185-186 (S).

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Technological Capabilities Panel

The President of the United States

Director, Office of Defense Mobilization

Executive Staff

David Z. Beckler, ODM
Lt. Col. V. T. Ford, USAF

Administrative Staff

William Brazeal
M. Comerford
C. Klett
L. Wiesner
E. Hockett
D. Lewis
K. Welchold

Project 1

M. G. Holloway, Dir.
E. P. Aurand
R. L. Belzer
S. C. Hight
R. Mettler
E. H. Plesset
W. Stratton
J. West
C. Zimmerman
B. Horton

Project 2

L. J. Haworth, Dir.
E. Barlow
D. Dustin
R. Emberson
A. G. Hill
B. McMillan
R. Rollefson
H. Scoville, Jr.
M. A. Tuve
R. Gilruth
J. L. Morton
J. Mouzon

Consultant for Technical
Personnel
H. D. Chittim

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 (cont.)

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the task of investigating the nation's intelligence capab ili ties. Its chairmanwas Edwin H. (Din) Land, the inventor of the polarizing fil ter and the instant camera. W hen James Killian asked Land to head Project Three, Land had to make a major dec isionabou t his caree: r. At the time, the 45-year-old millionaire was on a leave of absence from Polaroid and was living in Holl ywood, advising Alfred Hitchcock on the technological aspects of making three-dimensional movies. La nd decided to give up his interest in cinema's th ird dimension and return east to Polaroid and the panel appointmem! 1

Land's Project Three was the smallest of the three Technological Capabilities Panel projects, for he preferred what he called "taxicab committees committees small enough to fit into a single taxicab. The Project Three committee consisted of Land; James Baker and Edward Purcell of Harvard; chemist Joseph W. Kennedy of Washington University, St. Louis; mathematician John W. Tukey of Princeton University and Bell Telephone Laboratories; and Allen Latham, Jr., of Arthur D. Little, Inc., an engineer and former treasurer of the Polaroid Corporation.**

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 (cont.)

In mid-August 1954, Land and Baker went to Washington to ar- range for the various intelligence organizations to brief the Project Three study group. As the briefings progressed, the panel members became more and more distressed at the poor state of the nation's in- telligence resources. Land later noted, "We would go in and interview generals and admirals in charge of intelligence and come away wor- ried. Here we were, five or six young men, asking questions that these high-ranking officers couldn't answer." Land added that the Project Three members were also not overly impressed with the Central Intelligence Agency. 49

Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 air craft soon after he arrived in Washington. Philip Strong showed him Kelly Johnson's conceptual drawing of the plane and told him that the: Air Force had rejected it. Although Land had heard Alle n Donovan

Edwin H. Land

James R. Killian, Jr., interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, tape recording. Cambridge. Massachusetts, 2 November 1984 (S); Land interview (TS Codeword).

TCP Report. p. 188 (S).

Land interview (TS Codeword)..

<empty>
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briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the 24-25 May meeting ofBaker's Intelligence Systems Panel, he did not realize that that plane and the one in Strong's drawing were the same. As soon as Land saw Strong's copy of the CL-282 drawing. however, he telephoned Baker to say, ·•Jim, l think l have the plane you are after." 50

A few days later, when Land showed Kelly Johnson's conceptual drawing to Baker and the other Project Three members, they all be came enthusiastic about the aircraft's possibilities. Although Baker had heard Allen Donovan ·s brief mention ofthe Lockheed design in May, he had not yet seen a drawing ofthe aircraft because Donovan did not report to the ISP on his early-August trip to Lockheed until 24 September. After seeing the CL-282 drawing, Baker began designing a camera and lens system that would fit in the Lockheed craft. 51

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 (cont.)

At the end of August, Land discussed the CL-282 with Allen Dulles's Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard Bissell, who came away from the meeting without any definite ideas as to what Land wanted to do with the aircraft. Overhead reconnais sance was not uppermost in Bissell's mind at the time, and it was un clear to him why he had even been contacted. 51 Bissell's outstanding academic credentials, his acquaintanceship with James Killian through his previous teaching experience at MIT, and his direct access to DCI Dulles may have led the Technological Capabilities Panel members to consider him the best CIA point ofcontact.

Although surprised that he had become involved in the CL-282 project, Bissell's interest was piqued, and he set out to learn what he could about reconnaissance systems. In early September 1954, Bissell had Douglas E. Ashford, a young Air Force officer on his staff, put together a general status report on air reconnaissance pro grams. Bissell forwarded the 16-page study to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), Lt. Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, USAF, on 24 September. In a covering memorandum, Bissell called Cabell's

Baker interview (S).

Ibid.

Bissell interview (S).

Seeret

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attention to a section of the report about a "stripped or specialized aircraft" called the Lockheed CL-282. 53

By September 1954, Land's Project Three study group had be come very much interested in the Lockheed CL-282 design. Their in terest grew even stronger when James Baker told them of Allen Donovan's strong case for the CL-282 at the 24-25 September meeting of the ISP. It is not possible to determine exactly when the Land com mittee decided to back the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In view of Land's impulsive nature, he probably seized upon the CL-282 design as being a workable concept and immediately began developing it into a complete reconnaissance system.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 (cont.)

During September and October the Project Three study group met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design and the reconnaissance equipment it would carry. Meetings were small, generally with fewer than IO participants; Garrison Norton was often the only government official in attendance. At times outside experts joined in the proceed ings. When the discussion turned to cameras and film, Land invited -Dr. Henry Yutzy, Eastman Kodak's film expert, and Richard S. Perkin, President of the Perkin-Elmer Company, to participate. For discussions on the 157 engine, the panel members asked Perry W. Pratt, Pratt and Whitney's chief engineer, to attend. Kelly Johnson also met with the panel to review plans for the CL-282 system. 5 ~

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camera with tremendously improved resolution and film capacity, and the Eastman Kodak company was working on new thin, lightweight film. 55

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 (cont.)

By October l 954, the Project Three study group had drafted a complete program for an overhead reconnaissance effort based on the CL-282 aircraft. The one remaining question was who would conduct the overflights. The committee's members, particularly Land, were not in favor ofthe Air Force conducting such missions in peacetime. Firmly believing that military overflights in armed aircraft could pro voke a war, they argued for civilian overflights in unarmed, unmarked aircraft. In their view, the organization most suited for this mission was the Central Intelligence Agency. 56

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 (cont.)

In late October l 954, the Project Three panel discussed the CL-282 system concept with DCI Allen Dulles and the Secretary of the Air Force's Special Assistant for Research and Development, Trevor Gardner. Dulles was reluctant to have the CIA undertake the project. He did not like to involve the CIA with military projects, even ones that the military had rejected, like the CL-282. Furthermore, the DCI strongly believed that the Agency's mission lay in the use of hu man operatives and secret communications. the classic forms ofintel ligence gathering. Land came away from this meeting with the impression that Dulles somehow thought overflights were not fair play. Project Three committee members were nevertheless convinced that technology, particularly in the form ofthe CL-282 and the new camera designs, would solve the nation's intelligence problems. 57

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## A Meeting With the President

Allen Dulles's reluctance to involve the CIA in the CL-282 project did not stop the Project Three committee from pursuing its aims because it was able to go over Dulles's head and appeal directly to the President. Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members had definite ideas on how to improve intelligence collection, ideas that they were deter mined to present to the highest levels ofgovernment. They were able

" Land interview (TS Codeword).

" Land interview (TS Codeword): Baker interview (S).

" Land interview (TS Codeword).

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to do so because the Land committee was part of a panel commis sioned by President Eisenhower to examine the nation's intelligence community and recommend changes. The committee thus had a direct line to the White House through James Killian's contacts there:

Early in November 1954, Land and Killian met with President Eisenhower to discuss high-altitude reconnaissance. Killian's mem oirs contain an account ofthis crucial meeting:

Land described the [CL-282] system using an unarmed plane and recommended that its development be undertaken. After listening to our proposal and asking many hard questions, Eisenhower ap proved the development ofthe system, but he stipulated that it should be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department or troubled by rivalries among the services. 58

The scientists from the advisory committees and the President were thus in agreement that the new reconnaissance program should be controlled by the CIA, not the military.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282

Meanwhile Edwin Land and his Project Three colleagues were work ing to convince Allen Dulles that the CIA should run the proposed overflight program. On 5 November Land wrote to the DCI strongly urging that the CIA undertake the CL-282 project:

Here is the briefreport from our panel telling why we think overflight is urgent and presently feasible. I [Land] am not sure that we have made it clear that wefeel there are many reasons why this activity is appropriate for CIA, always with Air Force assistance. We told you that this seems to us the kind of action and technique that is right for the contemporary version of CIA: a modem and scientific way for an Agency that is always supposed to be looking, to do its looking. Quite strongly, we feel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in scientific techniques for collecting intelligence-and choosing such partners to assist you as may be needed. This present op portunity for aerial photography seems to us a fine place to start. 59

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The letter had two attachments: a two-page summary of a com plete operational plan for organizing, building, and deploying the CL-282 within a period of20 months at a cost of $22 million and a three-page memorandum, entitled "A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence."

Aware of Dulles's preference for classical intelligence work, the Project Three memorandum stressed the superi.ori.ty of the CL-282 program over traditional espionage methods:

We believe that these planes can go where we needto have them go efficiently and safely, and that no amount offragmentary and indirect intelligence can be pieced together to be equivalent to such positive information as can thus be provided. 60

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 (cont.)

The Land committee memorandum also stressed the need for the CIA to undertake such reconnaissance missions rather than the Air Force, noting that "Forthe present it seems rather dangerous for one ofour military arms to engage directly in extensive overflight." The committee members also listed the advantages of using the CL-282 rather than an Air Force aircraft:

The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the reach of present Russian interceptors and high enough to have a good chance of avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light (15,000 pounds), so obviously unarmed and devoid of military usefulness, that it would minimize affront to the Russians even if through some remote mischance it were detected and identi- fied.61

One additional advantage ofthe Lockheed design over the Air Force's proposed high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was a faster completion time. Kelly Johnson had promised the Land committee that his aircraft would be flying by August 1955, just eight months after he proposed to start construction. The Bell X-16 prototype was not scheduled for completion before the spring of 1956.

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# Searching for a System (cont.)

## ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 (cont.)

over DCI Dulles, but a project of this magnitude also required the support ofthe Air Force. Some Air Force officials, however, feared that a decision to build the CL-282 might jeopardize the Air Force's own RB-57 and X-16 projects. Just one month earlier, in October 1954, the Wright Air Development Command had appealed to the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar gued that the Bell X-16 was a better design because it was more air worthy than the CL-282 and could be used throughout the Air Force in different types of missions because it had two engines, wheels, and an armor-plated, pressurized pilot's compartment. If 157 engines were diverted to the CL-282, the appeal to General Putt warned, there would not be enough of these popular powerplants to meet the needs of the X-16 prograrn. 62

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 (cont.)

Having heard ofthe Wright Air Development Command attack on the CL-282, Allen Donovan of the Intelligence Systems Panel met with General Putt on 19 October to argue in favor ofthe Lockheed design. This discussion led General Putt to meet with 15 scientists from the Technological Capabilities Panel on 18 November 1954 to discuss the merits ofthe four proposed reconnaissance aircraft. Also present as a briefer was Maj. John Seaberg from the Wright Air Development Command, who later recalled:

What I did was present the results of my comparative analysis of all four designs. I showed the relative high altitude performance capabilities of all four. I pointed out that aerodynamically the Bell, Fairchild, and Lockheed designs were close. Martin '.s B-57, being a modification, was not quite as capable. I stated that, in my opinion, the 173 [General Electric engine] would not be good enough to do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, I overlaid a curve showing that with the 157 [Pratt & Whitney en gine} installed, it would then be competitive with the Bell and Fairchild designs. 63

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On 19 November, the day after Seaberg's briefing, the final deci sion on the CL-282 came at a luncheon hosted by Air Force Secretary Talbott. The participants-Dulles and Cabell from the CIA; Gardner, Ayer, and General Putt from the Air Force; Kelly Johnson; and Edwin Land-all agreed "that the special item of material described by Lockheed was practical and desirable and would be sought. ... It was agreed that the Project should be a joint Air Force-CIA one but that, regardless of the source of the funds, whether AF or CIA. CIA unvouchered channels would be needed to pass the funds.,,,,.,

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 (cont.)

It is interesting to note that Lockheed, which had originally de veloped the CL-282 on its own and had devoted considerable effort to promoting it, had to be persuaded to undertake the project in November 1954 because the company had become heavily committed to several other civilian and military projects. When Kelly Johnson received a call from Trevor Gardner on l 7 November asking him to come to Washington for conversations on the project, his instructions from Lockheed's senior management were ''to not commit to any program during the visit, but to get the information and return." When he returned to California, Johnson noted in his project log that "I was impressed with the secrecy aspect and was told by Gardner that I was essentially being drafted for the project. It seemed, in fact, that if I did not talk quietly, I might have to take a leave ofabsence from my job at Lockheed to do this special project." 05 Ofcourse, Kelly Johnson did not need to be drafted or persuaded into undertak ing such a bold step forward in aircraft design. He used Gardner's statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the project, which they did after meeting with Johnson when he returned to California on the evening of I9 November.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 (cont.)

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President and received verbal authorization to proceed. Eisenhower told Dulles that the project was to be managed by the Agency and that the Air Force was to provide any assistance needed to get it operational.66

Thus, it was that the CIA entered into the world of high technol ogy primarily because of decisions and actions taken outside the Agency: the Air Force's refusal to build the CL-282 aircraft, President Eisenhower's desire to have a sensitive overflight project conductedby a civilian agency rather than the military, and, above all, the determination by a small group of prominent scientists that the Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais- sance system. 6,

"" Charles Pearre Cabell, Memorandum for the Record. "Meeting at the White House:·

24 November 1954. in OSA History, chap. 2. annex 8 (TS Codeword) ; Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 82-83: Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference with the President, 24 November 1954," White House Office of the Staff Secretary, Alpha Series. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter cited as WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL) (TS. declassified).

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 (cont.)

" Scientists remained active in advising the government on overhead reconnaissance. In February 1955, the Technological Capabilities Panel issued its final report, which strongly urged the use of technology to gather intelligence. President Eisenhower strongly backed the panel's findings and directed government agencies to respond to the recommendations by June. The CIA's most important reaction to the Technological Capabilities Panel report was to create its own Scientific Advisory Board composed of the members ofthe Project Three Study Group with the addition of James Killian and Jerome B. Wiesner, professor of electrical engineering at MIT. Edwin Land served as chairman of the CIA Scientific Advisory Board for the next 10 years, and it soon became known unofficially as the Land Panel. This panel provided important advice to the Agency, particularly in the field of over head reconnaissance.

# Searching for a System (cont.)

## ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 (cont.)

President Eisenhower also acted to increase the amount and quality of scientific advice he was receiving. In January 1956 he established the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (renamed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1961) to oversee the intelligence community and advise him on intelligence mat ters. The board's first chairman was James Killian. In 1957 the President reorganized and upgraded the Office of Defense Mobilization's Science Advisory Committee, which be came the President's Science Advisory Committee. He also named James Killian to be the first Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. In this new position Killian served as the President's scientific advisor and the chairman of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee (Killian stepped down as chairman of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities but remained a member). These actions by the President brought scientists into the White House and gave them considerable influence.

-Secret

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# Developing the U-2

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE U-2 PROJECT

On 26 November 1954, the day after Thanksgiving, Allen Dulles called his special assistant. Richard Bissell, into his office to te:ll him that President Eisenhower had just approved a very secret program and that Dulles wanted Bissell to take charge of it. Saying it was too ?~cret for him to explain, Dulles gave Bissell a packet ofdocuiments and told him he could keep it for several days to acquaint himself with the project. Bisse ll had long known ofthe proposal to build a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraf t, but on ly in the most general terms. Now he learned in detail about the project that proposed send ing aircraft over the Soviet Union.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

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sat down with a group of key Air Force officials that included Trevor Gardner and Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt. The participants spent very lit- tle time delineating Air Force and Agency responsibilities in the pro- ject, taking for granted that the CIA would handle the security matters. Much of the discussion centered on methods for diverting Air Force materiel to the program, particularly the Pratt & Whitney J57 engines, because a separate contract for the engines might jeop- ardize the project's security. The Air Force promised to turn over a number of J57 engines, which were then being produced for B-52s, KC-135s, F-100s, and RB-57s. Eventually Bissell asked who was going to pay for the airframes to be built by Lockheed. His query was greeted with silence. Everyone present had their eyes on him because they all expected the Agency to come up with the funds. Bissell rose from his chair, said he would see what he could do, and the meeting adjourned.'

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

<empty>
James A. Cunningham, Jr.

After the meeting. Bisse ll told Dullesthat the CIA would hav,e to use money from the Contingency Reserve Fund to get the project goi ng . The DC! used this fu nd to pay for covert activities, following approval by the President and the Director of the Budge t. Dulles1told Bissell to draft a memorandum for the President on funding the over flight program and to start putting together a staff for Project AQUATONE. the project's new codename.

At first the new “Project Staff” (renamed the Development Projects Staff in April 1958) consisted of Bissell, Miller, and the small existing staff in Bissell’s Office of the Special Assistant to the DCI. During the months that followed the establishment of the project, its administrative workload increased rapidly, and in May 1955 the project staff added an administrative officer, James A. Cunningham, Jr., a former Marine Corps pilot then working in the Directorate of Support. Cunningham stayed with the U-2 project for the next 10 years. Two other key project officials who began their duties early in 1955 were <empty> the finance officer, and <empty> the contracting officer.⁴

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# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

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The Matomic Building

totalof 357 personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test ing faci lity. and three foreign field bases. C IA employees represented only one-fourth (92) of .the total. The Air Force personnel commit ment was larger, with l09 positions on the 1955 tableof organization (th is total does not include many other Air Force personnel, such as SAC meteorologists. who supported the U-2 project in addition to their other duties). The largest Project AQUATONE category was contract employees, with 156 positions in 1955. This category in cluded maintenance and support personnel from Lockheed (five per aircraft), the pilots, and support personnel from other contractors for items such as photographic equipment. 6

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

The first project headquarters was inCIA 'sAdministration (East) Building at 2430 E Street, NW. Continued growth caused the AQUATONE staff to move several times during its first two years. On l May l955, the project staff moved to the third floor ofa small red brick building (the Briggs School) at 2210 E Street, NW. Then on 3 October. the staff moved to Wings A and C ofQuarters Eye, a World War fI "tempor ary" building on Ohio Drive. NW. in the West Potomac Park area ofWashington. On 25 February l956, the project . staff moved again. this time to the fifth floor of the Matomic Building

• Proj,:ct AQUATONE Table of Organization. 28 April 1955 in OSA History. chap. 3, an neK 15 (TS Codeword).

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at 1717 H Street, NW. Here the staff remained for the next six years until it moved into the new CIA Headquarters building at Langley in March 1 962. The final move came in January 1968, when the project staff (by that time known as the OfficeofSpecial Activities) moved to the Tyler Building inTysons Comer, Virginia. 1

Bissell reported directly to the DCI, although in r eality the DDCI,Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, was much more closely involved in the day-to-day affairs of the overhead reconnaissance project. Cabell's extensive background in Air Force intelligence, particularly in overhead r econnaissance, made himideally qualified to oversee the U-2 project. Cabell frequently attended White House meetings on the U-2 for the DCI.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE

Althou gh Allen Dulles had approved the concept of covert funding forthe reconnaissance projec t, many financial details remained to be settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless. work on the U-2 began as soon as the project was authorized. Between 29 November and 3 December 1954, Kelly Johnson pulled together a t eam of25 engineers, which was not easy because he had to take them off other Lockheed projects without being able to explain why to their former supervisors. T he engi neersimmediatelybega n to work 45 hours a week on the project. The project staff gradually expan ded to a total of81personnel, and the workweek soon increased to 65 hours. 8

Ke lly Johnson's willingness to begin work on the aircraft with out a contract illustrates one of the most important aspectsof this pro gram: the use of unvouchered funds for covert procurement. Lockheed was well acquain ted with the covert procurement process, having previously modified several aircraft for covert use by the CI A.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

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use. Public Law 110, approved by the 81st Congress on 20 June 1949, designates the Director of Central Intelligence as the only government employee who can obligate Federal money without the use ofvouch ers. By using unvouchered funds, it is possible to eliminate competi tive bidding and thereby limit the number of parties who know about a given project. The use of unvouchered funds also speeds up the Federal procurement cycle. A general contractor such as Lockheed can purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed for a project without resorting at each step to the mandated procurement proce dures involving public, competitive bidding. Covert contracting also permits the use of second and third parties, many of them dummy corporations or unwitting suppliers, thus hiding the intended destina tion or use ofthe various purchases.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

In mid-December 1954, President Eisenhower authorized DCI Dulles to use $35 million from the Agency's Contingency Reserve Fund to finance the U-2 project. Then on 22 December 1954, the Agency signed a letter contract with Lockheed, using the codename Project OARFISH. The Agency had proposed to give Lockheed "performance specifications., rather than the standard Air Force "technical specifica tions," which were more rigid and demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot ofmoney. Lockheed's original pro posal to the Air Force in May l 954 had been $28 million for 20 U-2s equipped with GE 173 engines. During negotiations with CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston, Lockheed changed its proposal to $26 million for 20 airframes plus a two-seat trainer model and spares; the Air Force was to furnish the engines. Houston insisted that the Agency could only budget $22.5 million for the airframes because it needed the balance ofthe available $35 million for cameras and life-support gear. The two sides finally agreed on a fixed-price contract with a provision for a re view three-fourths of the way through to determine if the costs were going to exceed the $22.5 million figure. The formal contract, No. SP-1913, was signed on 2 March 1955 and called for the delivery ofthe first U-2 in July 1955 and the last in November 1956. Meanwhile, to keep work moving at Lockheed, Richard Bissell wrote a check for $1,256,000 I

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As it turned out, no review ofthe contract was necessary at the three-fourths point. Lockheed delivered the aircraft not only on time but under budget. During the final contract negotiations in the spring of1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed on a price for the original 20 aircraft of$17,025,542 plus a profit of$1,952,055 for a total of$18,977,597-less than $1 million for each aircraft. Because its design was based on Lockheed's F-104, the U-2 was relatively in expensive even though only a small number ofaircraft had been or dered. Only the wings and tail were unique; Lockheed manufactured the other portions ofthe aircraft using the F-104's jigs and dies.

MAJOR DESIGN FEATURES OF THE U-2

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

Aware of the great need for secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at Burbank, California, known as the Skunk Works. 10 Lockheed had established this highly secure area in 1945 to develop the nation's first jet aircraft, the P-80 Shooting Star. The small Skunk Works staff began making the _detailed drawings for the U-2, which was nicknamed the "Angel" because it was to fly so high.

Kelly Johnson's approach to prototype development was to have his engineers and draftsmen located not more than 50 feet from the aircraft assembly line. Difficulties in construction were immediately brought to the attention of the engineers, who gathered the mechanics around the drafting tables to discuss ways to overcome the difficul ties. As a result, engineers were generally able to fix problems in the design in a matter of hours, not days or weeks. There was no empha sis placed on producing neatly typed memorandums; engineers sim ply made pencil notations on the engineering drawings in order to keep the project moving quickly. 11

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

A little more than a week after he had been authorized to begin the project, Kelly Johnson wrote a 23-page report detailing his most recent ideas on the U-2 proposal. The aircraft, he explained, would be designed to meet load factors of only 2.5 g's, which was the limit for transport aircraft rather than combat planes. The U-2 would have a

'" The Lockheed '"Skunk Works" was named after the Kickapoo Joy Juice factory known as the .. Skonk Works" in Al Capp·s comic strip Li'/ Abner.

11 Ben A. Rich (current head of the "Skunk Works"). interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W. Pedlow, Burbank, California, 26 August 1988.

--Secret

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Skunk Works Design Staff

speed of Mach 0.8 or 460 knots at altitude. Its initial maximum alti- tude would be 70,600 feet and the ultimate maximum altitude would be 73,100 feet. According to these early December 1954 specifica- tions, the new plane would take off at 90 knots, land at 76 knots, and be able to glide 244 nautical miles from an altitude of 70,000 feet. After discussing the reconnaissance bay with James Baker, Johnson had worked out various equipment combinations that would not ex- ceed the weight limit of 450 pounds. Johnson ended his report by promising the first test flight by 2 August 1955 and the completion of four aircraft by 1 December 1955.

Kelly Johnson, "A High-Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft," 9 December 1954, Lockheed Contract Files, OSA Records (S).

-Seerot

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

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In designing the U-2 aircraft, Kelly Johnson was confronted with two major problems-fuelcapacity and weight. To achieve interconti nental range, the aircraft had to carry a large supply offuel, yet, it also had to be light enough to attain the ultrahigh altitudes needed to be safe from interception. Although the final product resembled a typ icaljetaircraft, its construction was unlike any other US military air craft. One unusual design feature was the tail assembly, which-to save weight-was attached to the main body with just three tension bolts. This feature had been adapted from sailplane designs.

The wings were also unique. Unlike conventional aircraft, whose main wing spar passes through the fuselage to give the wings continu ity and strength, the U-2 had two separate wing panels, which were attached to the fuselage sides with tension bolts (again, just as in sail planes). Because the wing spar did not pass through the fuselage, Johnson was able to locate the camera behind the pilot and ahead of the engine, thereby improving the aircraft's center ofgravity and re ducing its weight.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

The wings were the most challenging design feature of the entire airp~ane. Their combination of high-aspect ratio and low-_drag ratio (in other words, the wings were long, narrow, and thin) made them unique in jet aircraft design. The wings were actually integral fuel tanks that carried almost all ofthe U-2's fuel supply.

The fragility of the wings and tail section, which were only bolted to the fuselage, forced Kelly Johnson to look for a way to pro tect the aircraft from gusts of wind at altitudes below 35,000 feet, which otherwise might cause the aircraft to disintegrate. Johnson again borrowed from sailplane designs to devise a "gust control" mechanism that set the ailerons and horizontal stabilizers into a posi tion that kept the aircraft in a slightly nose-up attitude, thereby avoiding sudden stresses caused by wind gusts. Nevertheless, the U-2 remained a very fragile aircraft that required great skill and concen tration from its pilots.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

The final major design feature was the lightweight, bicycle-type landing gear. The entire structure-asingle oleostrut with two light weight wheels toward the front of the aircraft and two small, solid-mount wheels under the tail-weighed only 208 pounds yet could withstand the force of touchdown for this 7-ton aircraft. Because both sets of wheels were located underneath the fuselage, the U-2 was also equipped with detachable pogos (long, curved sticks with two small wheels on them) on each wing to keep the wings level during takeoff. The pilot would drop the pogos immediately after takeoff so

-Secret

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U-2 at testing site before
attachment of wings and
tail assembly

that they could be recovered and reused. The aircraft landed on its frontand back landing gear and then gradually tilted over onto one of the wingtips, which w ere equipped with landing sk ids. 1 )

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAMERA SYSTEM

By December 1954, Kelly Johnson was at work on drawings for the U-2's airframe and Pratt & Whitney was already building the J57 jet

For the design features of the U-2 in early 1955, see R. F. Boehme, Summary Report: Reconnaissance Aircraft, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Report 10420, 28 January 1955. pp. 7-9, OSA Records, job 74-B-645, box 1 (S).

Secr

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

Secret NOFORN
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49

engine, but no firm plans existed for the all-important cameras. Existing cameras were too bulky and lacked sufficient resolution to be used in high-altitude reconnaissance.

U-2 landing gear and pogos

The workhorses of WorldW'ilf IIaerial photography had been the Fairchild K-19 and K -21 framing cameras with lenses of varying focal lengths from 24 to 40 inches. Late in the war, the trimetrogon K-17 .mapping-camera system came into use. This system consis~ed of lhree separate cameras which made three photographs simultaneously: a vertical, an oblique to the left, and an oblique to the rightThe major shortcomingsof t hetrimetrogon system were the large amount of film required and the system's lack ofsharp definition on the obliques.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

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<empty>
James G. Baker

The first success in designing very-high-acuity lenses came in the mid- I940s, when James G. Baker of Harvard and Richard S. Perkinof the Perkin-Elmer (P-E) Company of Norwalk, Connecticut, collaboratedon a design for an ex.perimental camera for the Army Air Force. They developed a 48-inch focal-length scanning camera that was mounted in a modified B-36 bomber. When tested over Fort Worth, Texas, at 34,000 feet, the new camera produced photographs in which two golf balls on a putting green could be distinguished (in reality. however, the "golfballs··· were 3 inches in diamete r) . These photographs demonstrated the high acuity ofBaker's lens, but the camera weighed more than a ton and was much too large to be carried aloft in an aircraft as small as the U-2.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

Realizing that size and weiglht were the major restraining factors in developing a camera for the U --2. James Baker began working on a radically new system in October 1954, even before the CIA adopted the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he would need almost a year to produce a working model of such a com plex camera. Since Kelly Johnson had promised to have a U-2 in the air within eight months, Baker needed to find an existing camera that could be used until the new came:ra was ready. After consulting with his friend and colleague Richard Perkin. Baker decided to adapt for the U-2 an Air Force camera krnown as the K-38. a 24-inch aerial framing camera built by the Hycon Manufacturing Company of Pasadena, California.

Perkin suggested modifying several standard K-38 cameras in order to reduce their weight to the U-2's 450-pound payload limit. At the same time, Baker would ma:ke critical adj ustments to existing K-38 lenses to improve their acuiity. Baker was able to do this in a few weeks, so several modified K-38s, now known as A-1 cameras, were ready when the first "Angel" aircraft took to the air in mid-1955. 15

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A-1 camera

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

hi s research associate duties at Harvard and his service on go,vem ment advisory bodies, Bak er established a small firm known as Spica, Incorporated, on 31 January 1955.

The A-1 camera system consisted of two 24-inch K-38 fra ming cameras. One was mounted vertically and photographed a 17.2° swath beneath the aircraft onto a roll of 9.5-inchfi lm. The second K- 38 was placed in a rocking mount so that it al ternately photographed the left oblique and right oblique out to 36.5° onto separate rolls of9.5-inch fi lm. The film supplies unwound in opposite directions in ordler to minimize their effect on the balance ofthe aircraft. Both cameras used standard Air Force 24-inch focal-length lenses adjusted for max imum acuity by Baker. Thedevelopmentof the special rocking mount by Perkin-Elmer's Dr. Roderic M. Scott was a major factor in neduc ing the size and weight ofthe A- I system, becaus e the mount pro vided broad transverse coverage with a single lens, ending the need for two separate cameras. 16

OSA History, chap. 1. annex 3. pp. 1-3 (TS Codeword).

Secret-

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A-2 camera

U-2s eq uipped with the A- I camera system also carried a Perkin-Elmer tracking camera using 2.75-inch filmand a 3-inch lens. This device made continuous horizon-to-horizon photographs ofthe terrain passing beneath the aircraft. Be cause the A- I syste m was: new, it also included a backup came ra system. a K-17 6-inch three-camera trimetrogon unit using 9-inch film.

While the A-1 system was still being developed, James Baker was already working on the next generation of lenses for high-altitude reconnaissance. Baker was a pioneer in using computers to synthesize optical systems. His software algorithms made it possible to rnodel lens designs and determine in advance the effects that variations in lens curvatures, glass compounds, and lens spacings would have on rays of light passing through a lens. These "ray-tracing" programns re- quired extensive computations, and, for this he turned to the most modern computer available, an IBM CPC (card-programmed callcula- tor) installation at nearby Boston University."

-Secret_

זי Ibid., chap. 1, pp. 7-8 (TS Codeword).

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Baker's new lenses were used in a camera system known as the A-2, which returned to a trimetrogon arrangement because of prob lems with the A-1 system's rocking mount. The A-2 consisted of three separate K-38 framing cameras and 9.5-inch film magazines. One K-38 filmed the right oblique, another the vertical, and a third the left oblique. The A-2 system also included a 3-inch tracking camera. All A-2 cameras were equipped with the new 24-inch f/8.0 Baker-designed lenses. These were the first relatively large photo graphic objective lenses to employ several aspheric surfaces. James Baker personally ground these surfaces and made the final bench tests on each lens before releasing it to the Agency. These lenses were able to resolve 60 lines per millimeter, a 240-percent improvement over existing lenses. 18

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

Once Baker and Scott had redesigned the 24-inch lens for the K-38 devices, they turned their attention to Baker's new camera de sign, known as the B model. It was a totally new concept, a high-reso lution panoramic-type framing camera with a much longer 36-inch f/10.0 aspheric lens. The B camera was a very complex device that used a single lens to obtain photography from one horizon to the other, thereby reducing weight by having two fewer lenses and shutter assemblies than the standard trimetrogon configuration. Because its lens was longer than those used in the A cameras. the B camera achieved even higher resolution-100 lines per millimeter.

The B camera used an 18- by 18-inch format, which was achieved by focusing the image onto two counterrotating but overlap ping 9. 5-inch wide strips offilm. Baker designed this camera so that one film supply was located forward, the other aft. Thus, as the film supplies unwound, they counterbalanced each other and did not dis turb the aircraft's center ofgravity.

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B camera

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# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

Realizing that the 240-inch lens was both too large and too heavy for the camera bay, Baker scaled the lens down to a 200-inch f/16. 0 system. This was still too big. Further reductions followed, re sultingbyJuly 1955 in a 120-inch fl 10.9 lens that met both the weight and space limitations. Later in the year, Baker decided to make the mirrors for the system out of a new, lightweight foamed silica mate rial developed by Pittsburgh-Coming Glass Company. This reduced the weight significantly, and he was able to scale up the lens to a 180-inch f/13.85 reflective system for a 13- by 13-inch format. In the past, the calculations for such a complex camera lens would have taken years to complete, but thanks to Baker's ray-tracing computer program, he was able to accomplish the task in just 16 days.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AQUATONE (cont.)

When a C camera built by Hycon was flight-tested on 31 January l 957, project engineers discovered that its 180-inch focal length, which was five times longer than that of the B camera, made the camera very sensitive to aircraft vibration and led to great difficulty in aiming the C camera from altitudes above 68,000 feet. The engi neers, therefore, decided to shelve the camera. More than five years later, a redesigned C camera was employed during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 0ctober 1962, but the results were not very satisfactory.

The failure ofthe C camera design was not a serious setback to the high-altitude reconnaissance program, because the B camera proved highly successful. Once initial difficulties with the film-trans port system were overcome, the B camera became the workhorse of high-altitude photography. An improved version known as the B-2 is stillin use. Both of the earlier A-model cameras were phased out after September 1958.

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In addition to the camera systems, the U-2 carried one other im portant item of optical equipment, a periscope. Designed by James Baker and built by Walter Baird ofBaird Associates, the optical peri scope helped pilots recognize targets beneath the aircraft and also proved to be a valuable navigational aid. 22

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PREPARATIONS FOR TESTING THE U-2

As work progressed in California on the airframe, in Connecticut on the engines, and in Boston on the camera system, the top officials of the Development Projects Staff flew to California and Nevada to search for a site where the aircraft could be tested safely and secretly. On 12 April 1955 Richard Bissell and Col. Osmund Ritland (the se nior Air Force officer on the project staff) flew over Nevada with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's chief test pilot, Tony Le Vier. They spotted what appeared to be an air strip by a salt flat known as Groom Lake, near the northeast corner of the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Nevada Proving Ground. After debating about landing on the old airstrip, LeVier set the plane down on the lakebed, and all four walked over to examine the strip. The facility had been used during World War II as an aerial gunnery range for Army Air Corps pilots. From the air the strip appeared to be paved, but on closer inspection it turned out to have originally been fashioned from compacted earth that had turned into ankle-deep dust after more than a decade of disuse. If Le Vier had attempted to land on the airstrip, the plane would probably have nosed over when the wheels sank into the loose soil, killing or injuring all ofthe key fig ures in the U-2 project. 23

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# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PREPARATIONS FOR TESTING THE U-2 (cont.)

Area 51, the Ranch

are shown on current unclassified maps as a small rectangular area adjoini ngthe northeastco merof the much larger Nevada Test Site. To make the new facility in the middleof nowhere sound more attractive to his workers. Kelly Johnson called it the Paradise Ranch, which was soon shortened to the Ranch. !•

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PREPARATIONS FOR TESTING THE U-2 (cont.)

Although the dry lakebed could have served as a landing strip. project managers decided that a paved runway was needed so that testing could also take place during the times when rainwater runoff from nearby mountains fi lled the lake (at such timesthe base acquired yet another unofficial name,Wate rtown Strip). By July 1955 the base was ready, and Agency, Air Force, and Lockheed personnel began moving in.

OSA History, chap. 8. pp. 2-6 (TS Codeword); Johnson, "Log for Project X." 25-29 April 1955: Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson with Maggie Smith. Kelly: More Than My Share of It All (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1985), p. 123.

<empty>
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Key entities and locations:
*   **Area 51**: Highlighted in an inset map, which also shows Groom Lake.
*   **Mojave Desert**: The region where Area 51 is located.
*   **AEC Nevada Test Site**: Located within the Mojave Desert.
*   **Yucca Lake**: Also in the Mojave Desert.
*   **Frenchman Flat**: Another feature within the desert region.
*   **Indian Springs**: A location in Nevada.
*   **Las Vegas**: A major city in Nevada.
*   **San Francisco, Los Angeles, Pasadena, Burbank, San Diego**: Cities in California.
*   **Edwards AFB**: An Air Force Base in California.
*   **North Pacific Ocean**: Bordering California.

The map includes scale bars for kilometers and miles and is marked as "Secret NOFORN".

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# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## SECURITY FOR THE U-2 PROJECT

On 29 April 1955, Richard Bissell signed an agreement with the Air Force and the Navy (which at that time was also interested in the U-2) in which the services agreed that the CIA "assumed primary respon sibility for all security" for the overhead reconnaissance project (AQUATONE). From this time on, the CIA has been responsible for the security ofoverhead programs. This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to keep large numbers of contracts untraceable to the Central Intelligence Agency. The Office of Security has also had to determine which contractor employees require security clearances and has had to devise physical security measures for the various manufacturing fa cilities. Keeping the U-2 and subsequent overhead systems secret has been a time-consuming and costly undertaking. 25

The most important aspect ofthe security program for the U-2 project was the creation ofan entire new compartmented system for the product ofU-2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which often limited the ability of _CIA analysts to use the products ofU-2 missions.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## SECURITY FOR THE U-2 PROJECT (cont.)

The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also played a part in maintaining the security ofthe overhead reconnais sance program. To reduce the chances of a security breach, the Agency always referred to its high-altitude aircraft as "articles," with each aircraft having its own "article number." Similarly, the pilots were always called "drivers." In cable traffic the aircraft were known as KWEXTRA-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise air craft; these numbers were not related to the three-digit article num bers assigned by the factory). The pilots were referred to as KWGLITTER-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise pilot). Thus, even if a message or document about overflight activities fell into unfriendly hands, the contents would simply refer to codewords or at worst to "articles" and "drivers," giving no indication ofthe nature ofthe program.- '6

Even the aircraft's onboard equipment required the involvement ofCIA security planners. Thus, when Kelly Johnson ordered altime ters from the Kollman Instrument Company, he specified that the

" OSA History. chap. 7, pp. 4-6 (TS Codeword).

,. lnfonnation supplied by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzenbach (S).

--Secret-

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devices had to be calibrated to 80,000 feet. This immediately raised eyebrows at Kollman because its instruments only went to 45,000 feet. Agency security personnel quickly briefed several Kollman offi cials and produced a cover story that the altimeters were to be used on experimental rocket planes. 27

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## THE CIA - AIR FORCE PARTNERSHIP

At the initial interagency meetings to establish the U-2 program in December 1954, the participants did not work out a clear delineation ofresponsibilities between the CIA and the Air Force. They agreed only that the Air Force would supply the engines and the Agency would pay for the airframes and cameras. With a myriad of details still unsettled, CIA and Air Force representatives began to work on an interagency agreement that would assign specific responsibilities for the program. These negotiations proved difficult. Discussions on this subject between DCI Allen Dulles and Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan Twining began in March 1955. Twining wanted SAC, headed by Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, to run the project once the planes and pilots were ready to fly, but Dulles opposed such an arrangement. The CIA-USAF talks dragged on for several months, with Twining determined that SAC should have full control once the aircraft was deployed. Eventually President Eisenhower settled the dispute. "I want this whole thing to be a civilian operation," the President wrote. "If uni formed personnel ofthe armed services ofthe United States fly over Russia, it is an act of war-legally-and I don't want any part of it."28

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## THE CIA - AIR FORCE PARTNERSHIP (cont.)

project the construction and testing of the aircraft-remained the ex- clusive province of Lockheed."

As a result ofthis agreement, CIA remained in control of the program, but the Air Force played a very important role as wel l. As Richard Bisse ll later remarked about the U-2 project, " Th e Air Force wasn't just in on this as a s up porting element, and to a major degree it wasn't in on it justsupplying about half the government personnel; but the Air Force held, ifyou want to be precise, 49 percent ofthe common stock." 30

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## THE CIA - AIR FORCE PARTNERSHIP (cont.)

One of the first Air Force officers assigned to Project OILSTONE was Col. Osmund J. Ritland. He began coordinating Air Force activi- ties in the U-2 program with Richard Bissell in December 1954. On 27 June 1955, Ritland became Bissell's deputy, although Air Force Chief of Staff Twining did not officially approve this assignment until 4 August, the day after the signing of the CIA-Air Force agreement. In March 1956, Colonel Ritland returned to the Air Force and was fol- lowed as deputy project director by Col. Jack A. Gibbs.

Another Air Force officer, Lt. Col. Leo P. Geary, joined the pro- gram in June 1955 and remained with it until August 1966, longer than any of the other project managers. Using the Air Force Inspector General's office as cover with the title of Project Officer, AFCIG-5, Geary served as the focal point for all Defense Department support to the U-2 and OXCART programs. His 11 years with the overhead reconnaissance projects provided a high degree of Air Force continuity." 31

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Leo  P.  Geary

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

(USAF. Ret.), a vice president ofthe Shell Oil Company who had long been involved in overhead reconnaissance (most recently as a member ofthe Technological Capabilities Panel), arranged for Shell to develop a special low-volatility, low-vapor-pressure kerosene fuel for the craft. The result was a dense mixture, known as LF-1 A, JP-TS (thermally stab le),or JP-7, with a boiling point of 300°F at sea level. Manufacturing this special fuel required petroleum byproducts that Shell normally used to make its "Flit" fly and bug spray. In orderto produce several hundred thousand gallons of LF-1 A for the U-2 pro jectin the spri ng and summer of 1955. Shell had to limit the produc tion of Flit. causin g a nationwide slhortage. Because ofthe new fuel's density, it required special tanks .:11nd modifications to the aircraft's fuel-control and ignition systems.)~

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

Even more important than the problem ofboiling fuel was the problem of boiling blood, namely the pilot's. At altitudes above 65,000 feet, fluids in the human body will vaporize unless the body can be kept under pressure. Furthermore, the reduced atmospheric pressure placed considerable stress on the pilot's cardiovascular sys tem and did not provide adequate oxygenation of the blood. Keeping the pilot alive at the extreme altitudes required for overflights there fore called for a totally different approach to environmental equip ment; it required a system that coul,d maintain pressure over much of the pilot's body. The technology tha ,t enabled U-2 pilots to operate for extended periods in reduced atmospheric pressure would later play a major ro le in the manned space program.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

Advising the Agency on high-•altitude survival were two highly experienced Air Force doctors, Col. Donald D. Flickinger and Col. W. Randolph Lovelace, 11. Dr. Lovelace had begun his research on high-altitude flight before World War II and wa s a coinventor ofthe standard Air Force oxygen maslk. In the early 1950s, he and Flickinger made daring parachute jiumps from B-47 bombers to test pilot-survival gear under extreme conditions. Flickinger served as the medical adv is er to Project AQUATONE for almost a decade.H

Flickinger and Lovelace suggested that the Agency ask the David Clark Company ofWorcester, Massachusetts, manufacturer of environmental suits for Air Force pilots. to submit designs for more

Land interview (TS Codeword); Bissell interview (S); James A. Cunningham, Jr., inter- view by Donald E. Welzenbach, Washington, DC, tape recording, 4 October 1983 (TS Codeword).

3,3
OSA History, chap. 10, pp. 29-34 (TS Codeword).

_ Secret

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MC-2 partial-pressure suit (seen
on pilot Francis Gary Powers)

advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert Joseph Rus•!ckas then developed a complex life-support system, which was the first partially pressurized "spacesuit" for keeping humans alive for lengthy periods at ultrahigh altitudes. The effort to provide a safe en vironment for pilots at high altitudes also involved the Fi1rewel Companyof Buffalo, New York, which pressurized the U-2 cockpit to createan interior environment equivalent to the air pressure at analti tude of28,000 feet. The system was de signed so that, if the interior cockpit pressure fell be low the 28,000-feet level, the pilot's suit would automatically inflate. In either case, he could obtain oxygen only through his he lmet.·~

H
Ibid., chap. 5, p. 19 (TS Codeword).

-Seeret-

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# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

The early models of these MC-2 and MC-3 partial-pressure suits were very uncomfortable for the pilots. To prevent loss of pressure, the heavy coverall had to fit tightly at the wrists and ankles (in the early models ofthese suits, the feet were not included in the pressur ization scheme). The pilot had to wear gloves and a heavy helmet that tended to chafe his neck and shoulders and was prone to fogging. Problems with the pilot life-support system were believed to have been the cause ofseveral early crashes of the U-2.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

Having gotten a pilot into this bulky suit and shoehorned him into his seat in the cockpit, the next problem was how to get him out in an emergency. The U-2 cockpit was very small, and the early mod els did not have an ejection seat. Even after an ejection seat was in stalled, pilots were reluctant to use it because they were afraid they would lose their legs below the knees when they were blown out of the cockpit. To save weight, the first pilot's seat was extremely simple with no height adjustment mechanism. Designed for pilots of above-average height, the seat could be adjusted for shorter pilots by inserting wooden blocks beneath the seat to raise it. In later versions ofthe aircraft, Kelly Johnson added a fully adjustable seat. 35

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

The Air Force undertook bailout experiments at high altitudes from balloons in the autumn of 1955 to determine if the suit designed for the U-2 pilot would also protect him during his parachute descent once he was separated from the life-support mechanisms inside the aircraft. To avoid getting the "bends" during such descents or during the long flights, pilots had to don their pressure suits and begin breathing oxygen at least 90 minutes before takeoff so that their bod ies would have time to dissipate nitrogen. This procedure was known as prebreathing. Once the pilots were in their suits, eating and drink ing became a major problem, as did urination. The first model ofthe pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for uri nation. A subsequent model required the pilot to be catheterized be fore donning his flying suit. This method of permitting urination during flight proved very uncomfortable and, by the autumn of 1955, was replaced with an external bladder arrangement that made the catheter unnecessary. To reduce elimination, pilots ate a low-bulk, high-protein diet on the day before and the morning of each mission.

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Pilot undergoing prebreathing

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

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led Bissell and Cunningham to approach Dr. Alex Batlin of Technical Services Division in the Directorate of Plans for ideas to help "cap- 37 tured" U-2 pilots avoid such suffering. Batlin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermanın Goering, a thin glass ampule containing liquid potassium cyanide. He said a pilot had only to put the ampule in his mouth and bite down on the glass; death would fol- low in 10 to 15 seconds. Project AQUATONE ordered six of the poi- son ampules, called L-pills, and offered one to each pilot just before a mission. It was up to each pilot to decide if he wanted to take an L-pill with him. Some did; most did not.38

DELIVERY OF THE FIRST U-2

On 25 July, less than eight months after the go-ahead call from Trevor Gardner, Kelly Johnson was ready to deliver the first aircraft, known as article 341, to the "Paradise Ranch" site. With its long, slender wings and tail assembly removed, the aircraft was wrapped in tarpaulins, loaded aboard a C-124, and flown to Groom Lake, where Lockheed me- chanics spent the next six days readying the craft for its maiden flight.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

Before "Kelly's Angel" could actually take to t he air, however, it n eeded an Air Force designator. Col. Allman T. Culbertson from the Air Force·s Office of the Director of Resea rch and Development pointed this ou t to Lieutenant Colonel Geary in July 1955, and the two officers then looked through the aircraftdesignator handbook to see what theoptions were. They decided that they could not call the proj ect aircraft a bomber, fighter, or transport plane, and they did not want anyone to know that the new plane was for reco nnaissan ce,so Geary and Culbertson decided that it should come under the uti lity aircraft category. At the time, there were only two utility aircraft on the bo oks, a U- l and a U-3. Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed CL-282 was going to be known officially as the U-2. 39

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Arrival of U-2 prototype at Area 51
(left); Article 341, the U-2
prototype (below)

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power-to-weight ratio of 2.7: I was almost 20 percent less efficient than the preferred P-31 version:"

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

To conduct lengthy missions over hostile territory, the U-2 needed to carry a large amount of fuel. Kelly Johnson used a '·wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was not stored in separate fuel tanks but rather in the wing itself. Each wing was di vided into two leak-proof compartments, and fuel was pumped into all the cavities within these areas; only the outer 6 feet ofthe wings were not used for fuel storage. The U-2 also had a I00-gallon reserve tank in its nose. Later, in 1957, Johnson increased the fuel capacity of the U-2 by adding 100-gallon "slipper" tanks under each wing, pro jecting slightly ahead ofthe leading edge.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

One ofthe most important considerations in the U-2's fuel sys tem was the need to maintain aircraft trim as the fuel was consumed. The aircraft therefore contained a complex system offeed lines and valves draining to a central sump, which made it impossible to pro vide the pilot with an empty/full type offuel gauge. None of the first 50 U-2s had normal fuel gauges. Instead there were mechanical fuel totalizer/counters. Before the start ofa mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total amount of fuel in the wings, and then a flow meter subtracted the gallons offuel actually consumed during the flight. The pilot kept a log ofthe fuel consumption shown by the counters and compared it with estimates made by mission planners for each leg ofthe flight. As a double check. U-2 pilots also kept track of their fuel consumption by monitoring airspeed and time in the air. Most pilots became quite expert at this. Several who did not came up short oftheir home base during the 20 years these planes were flown:'

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followed on August. LeVier accelerated to 70 knots and began to try the ailerons. "It was at this point that I became aware of being air- borne," LeVier noted afterward. "which left me with utter amaze- ment, as I had no intentions whatsoever of flying. I immediately started back toward the ground, but had difficulty determining my height because the lakebed had no markings to judge distance or height. I made contact with the ground in a left bank of approximately 10 degrees." The U-2 bounced back into the air, but LeVier was able to bring it back down for a second landing. He then applied the brakes with little effect, and the aircraft rolled for a long distance before coming to a stop.* 42

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

Bissell, Cunningham. and Johnson saw the aircraft fall and bounce. Leaping into a jeep, they roared offtoward the plane. They signaled to Le Vier to climb out and then used fire extinguishers to put out a fire in the brakes. At a debriefing session that followed. LeYier complained about the poor performance of the brakes and the absence of markings on the runway. Damage to the prototype U-2 was very minor: blown tires, a leaking oleostrut on the undercarriage, and dam aged brakes. This unplanned flight was but a foretaste ofthe airwor thiness ofthe U-2. New pilots all had difficulty in getting the U-2's wheels on the ground because at low speeds it would remain in ground effect and glide effortlessly above the runway for great dis tances.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

Taxi trials continued for one more day and were followed by the first planned flight on 4 August 1955. LeVier was again at the con trols and had been instructed by Kelly Johnson to land the U-2 by making initial contact with the main or forward landing gear and let ting the plane settle back on the rear wheel. LeVier had disagreed with this approach. believing that the U-2 would bounce if he tried to touch down on the forward gear first. After flying the aircraft up to 8,000 feet, Le Vier leveled offand began cycling the landing gear up and down: then he tested the flaps and the plane's stability and control systems. Finally. LeYier made his first landing approach. As the U-2 settled down. the forward landing gear touched the runway and the plane skipped and bounced into the air. Le Vier made a second attempt to land front wheels first. and again the plane bounded into the air.

Transcripts of the test pilots' and observers' comments on the initial U-2 test flights have been published in "Secret First Flight of Article 001," Spyplanes vol. 2. 1988, pp. 64-71.82-85.

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First flight of the U-2,
4 August 1955

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# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

Le Vier made an additional 19 flights in article 341 before mov ing on to other Lockheed flight test programs in early September. This first phase ofU-2 testing explored the craft's stall envelope, took the aircraft to its maximum stress limit (2.5 g's), and explored its speed potential. LeVier soon flew the aircraft at its maximum speed ofMach 0.85. Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained flight. On 16 August LeVier took the aircraft up to 52,000 feet. In preparation for this flight, the 42-year-old test pilot completed the Air Force partial-pressure suit training program, becoming the oldest pilot to do so. Testing at even higher altitudes continued, and on 8 September the U-2 reached its initial design altitude of65,600 feet. 05

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

On 22 September 1955, the U-2 experienced its first flameout at 64,000 feet-more than 12 miles up. After a brief restart, the 157/ P-37 engine again flamed out at 60,000 feet, and the aircraft descended to 35,000 feet before the engine could be relit. Engineers from Pratt & Whitney immediately set to work on this problem. The P-37 model engine had significantly poorer combustion characteris _ti~~ than the preferred but unavailable P-31 version and therefore tended to flame out at high altitudes. Combustion problems usually became apparent as the U-2 began the final part of its climb from 57,000 to 65,000 feet, causing pilots to refer to this area as the "bad lands" or the "chimney." F\ameouts bedeviled the U-2 project until sufficient numbers ofthe more powerful P-31 engines became avail able in the spring of 1956:0

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT (cont.)

Meanwhile, with the airworthiness of the U-2 airframe proven, Lockheed set up a production line in the Skunk Works, but delivery of even the second-choice 157/P-37 engines became a major problem. Pratt & Whitney's full production capacity for these engines for the next year was contracted to the Air Force for use in F-100 fighters and KC-135 tankers. Colonel Geary, with the help ofa colleague in the Air Force Materiel Command, managed to arrange the diversion ofa number ofthese engines from a shipment destined for Boeing's KC-135 production line, making it possible to continue building the U-2s. 47

" OSA Chronology, p. 7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22.

"OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 12-14 (TS Codeword).

47 Geary interview (S).

Seeret

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As the deliveries ofU-2 airframes to the testing site increased, a major logistic problem arose: how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Area 5 l without arousing a great deal ofcuriosity. The project staff decided that the simplest approach would be to fly the essential personnel to the site on Monday morning and return them to Burbank on Friday evening. Frequent flights were also neces sary to bring in supplies and visitors from contractors and headquar ters. Therefore, a regularly scheduled Military Air Transport Service (MATS) flight using a USAF C-54 aircraft began on 3 October 1955. James Cunningham promptly dubbed this activity ·•Bissell's Narrow-Gauge Airline." Less than seven weeks after it started, a MATS aircraft bound for Area SI crashed on 17 November. killing all 14 persons aboard the plane, including the Project Security Officer, CIA's William H. Marr, four members of his staff, and personnel from Lockheed and Hycon. This crash represented the greatest single loss oflife in the entire U-2 program:"

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## U-2s, UFOs, AND OPERATION BLUE BOOK

High-altitude testing of the U-2 soon led to an unexpected side effect-atremendous increase in reports ofunidentified flying objects (UFOs). In the mid- l 950s, most commercial airliners flew at altitudes between 10,000 and 20,000 feet and military aircraft like the B-47s and B-57s operated at altitudes below 40,000 feet. Consequently, once U-2s started flying at altitudes above 60,000 feet, air-traffic con trollers began receiving increasing numbers ofUFO reports.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## U-2s, UFOs, AND OPERATION BLUE BOOK (cont.)

Such reports were most prevalent in the early evening hours from pilots of airliners flying from east to west. When the sun dropped below the horizon of an airliner flying at 20,000 feet, the plane was in darkness. But, if a U-2 was airborne in the vicinity of the airliner at the same time, its horizon from an altitude of60,000 feet was considerably more distant, and, being so high in the sky, its silver wings would catch and reflect the rays of the sun and appear to the airliner pilot, 40,000 feet below. to be fiery objects. Even during day light hours, the silver bodies ofthe high-flying U-2s could catch the sun and cause reflections or glints that could be seen at lower alti tudes and even on the ground. At this time, no one believed manned flight was possible above 60,000 feet, so no one expected to see an object so high in the sky.

**OSA History, chap. 7, pp. 17-19 (TS Codeword).

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Not only did the airline pilots report their sightings to air-traffic controllers, but they and ground-based observers also wrote letters to the Air Force unit at Wright Air Development Command in Dayton charged with investigating such phenomena. This, in turn, led to the Air Force's Operation BLUE BOOK. Based at Wright-Patterson, the operation collected all reports ofUFO sightings. Air Force investiga tors then attempted to explain such sightings by linking them to natu ral phenomena. BLUE BOOK investigators regularly called on the Agency's Project Staff in Washington to check reported UFO sight ings against U-2 flight logs. This enabled the investigators to elimi nate the majority ofthe UFO reports, although they could not reveal to the letter writers the true cause of the UFO sightings. U-2 and later OXCART flights accounted for more than one-half of all UFO reports during the late 1950s and most ofthe I960s!"

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## HIRING U-2 PILOTS

In authorizing the U-2 project, President Eisenhower told DC! Dulles that he wanted the pilots of these planes to be non-US citizens. It was his belief that, should a U-2 come down in hostile territory. it would be much easier for the United States to deny any responsibility for the activity if the pilot was not an American.

The initial effort to find U-2 pilots was assigned to the Directorate of Plans Air/Maritime Division (AMD). The DDP had excellent contacts <empty> AMD operatives <empty> asked that discreet inquiries be made to see if any <empty> fliers were interested in a high-paying covert project. <empty> brought to the United States for training. Meanwhile, AMD hired an <empty> flier residing in England, and he also came to the United States for training.

In theory the use of foreign pilots seemed quite logical; in practice it did not work out. The <empty> and could only fly light aircraft. Language was also a barrier for the <empty> although several were good fliers. Because Lieutenant Colonel Geary had taken a class of <empty> through flying school at Randolph AFB in 1950, he got the job of training the <empty>

" Information suppli.:d by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzcnbach (U).

_ Secret

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recruits in mid-1955. Geary arranged for an Air Force officer of
<empty> to stay with the group during a preliminary training
program at Luke Air Force Base. The plan to use foreign pilots soon
ran into trouble when only <empty> pilots passed the
school and reported to Area 51. They made only a few flights in the
U-2, and by the autumn of 1955 they were out of the program.50

Even before the elimination of  the  I  [ ] lit was clear that there
would not be enough trained foreigrn pilots available in  time for de
ploymen t.  Bissell therefore had to start the search for U-2 pilots all
over again. Lt. Gen. Emmett (Rosy) O' Donnell, the Air Force's
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for Personnel, authorized the use of Air Force
pi  lots and provided considerable assistance in  the search for pilots
who met the high standards established by the Agency and the Air
Force. The search included only SAC  fighter p il o ts  who held reserve
commission s.  The useofregular Air Force pilots was not considered
becauseof the complexities involvedin having them res ign from the
Air Force, a procedure that was necessary in  order to hire them as ci
vilians for the AQUATONE project.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## HIRING U-2 PILOTS (cont.)

SAC pilots interested in the U-2 project had to be willing to re- sign from the Air Force and assume civilian status-a process known as sheep-dipping-in order to conduct the overflights. Although Air Force pilots were attracted by the challenge of flying U-2s over hos- tile territory, they were reluctant to leave the service and give up their seniority. To overcome pilots' reluctance, the Agency offered hand- some salaries, and the Air Force prornised each pilot that, upon satis- factory conclusion of his employment with the Agency, he could return to his unit. In the meantime, he would be considered for pro- motion along with his contemporaries who had continued their Air Force careers." 51

The selection process for Agency U-2 pilots was very rigorous. Because of the strain involved in flying at extreme altitudes for long periods of time, painstaking efforts were made to exclude all pilots who might be nervous or unstable in any way. The physical and psy- chological screening of potential U-2 pilots was conducted by the Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research in Albuquerque, New Mexico, under a contract signed with the CIA on

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28 November 1955. The CIA's insistence on more stringent physical and mental examinations than those used by the Air Force to select pilots for its U-2 fleet resulted in a higher rejection rate of candidates. The Agency's selection criteria remained high throughout its manned overflight program and resulted in a much lower accident rate for CIA U-2 pilots than for their counterparts in the Air Force program. 51

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PILOT TRAINING

Even before the recruiting effort got under way, the Air Force and CIA began to develop a pilot training program. Under the terms of the OILSTONE agreement between the Agency and the Air Force, re sponsibility for pilot training lay with SAC. This essential activity was carried out under the supervision of Col. William F. Yancey. who was assigned to March AFB and flew to nearby Area 51 each day. Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAC pilots who were to be trained by Lockheed test pilots to fly the U-2. Once they became qualified, these SAC pilots would become the trainers for the ··_sheep-dipped" former Reserve SAC pilots. who would fly U-2 mis- sions for the CIA. •

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PILOT TRAINING (cont.)

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and could not survive the stresses ofloops and barrel rolls. Moreover, the original U-2s were placarded, which meant that they could not be flown at sea level faster than 190 knots in smooth air or 150 knots in rough air. At operational altitude, where the air was much less dense, they could not exceed Mach 0.8 (394 knots). Speeds in excess of these limits could cause the wings or tail section to fall off.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PILOT TRAINING (cont.)

Airspeed was a very critical factor for the U-2. At maximum alti tude only 6 knots separated the speeds at which low-speed stall and high-speed buffet occurred. Pilots called this narrow range ofaccept able airspeeds at maximum altitude the .. coffin corner" because at this point the U-2 was always on the brink of falling outof the sky. If the aircraft slowed beyond the low-speed stall limit, it would lose lift and begin to fall, causing stresses that would tear the wings and tail off. A little too much speed would lead to buffeting, which would also cause the loss of the wings or tail. Flying conditions such as these required a U-2 pilot's full attention when he was not using the autopilot. Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle to allow the pilot to make minute alterations to the fuel supply. 50

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PILOT TRAINING (cont.)

Among the unique devices developed for the U-2 was a small sextant for making celestial .. fixes" during the long overflights. Becausecloudcoveroften prevented U-2 pilots from locating naviga tional points onthe earth through the periscope, the sextant turned out to be the pilots' principal navigational instrument during the first three years ofdeployment. When clouds were not a factor, however. the periscope proved highly accurate for navigation. During the final tests before the aircraft became operational. U-2 pilots found they could navigate by dead reckoning with an error of less than I nautical mile over a 1.000-nm course. 5'

FINAL TESTS OF THE U-2

Flight-testing of the U-2 continued throughout the fall and winter of 1955-56 in order to test all the various systems. By mid-January 1956, SAC officials were so impressed that they also wanted to pur- chase a fleet of these planes. On 30 January, DCI Dulles agreed to

Cunningham interview (TS Codeword): John Parangosky, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, tape recording. 6 March 1986 (S): information supplied by James Cherbonneaux to Donald E. Welzenbach (S).

" Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).

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A-2 camera being installed
in U-2

have CIA ace as execu tive agent for this transaction, which the Air Force called Project DRAGON LADY. To maintain secre cy, the Air Force transferred funds to the CIA, which then placed an order wi th Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be determined by the Air Force. The Air Force later bought two more U-2s, for a total of 31. The aircraft purchased for the Air Force were known as the Follow-On Group, which was soon shortened to FOG. 56

Onceenough pilots had been trained, Project AQ UATONEman agers concentrated on checking out the complete U-2 system: planes, pilots, navigation systems, life-support systems, and cameras. From 10 through 14 April 1956, U-2s equipped with A-2 cameras took off from Area 51 and madeeight overflights of the Uni ted States in order to test the various flight and camera systems as part of the standard AirForce Operational Readiness Inspection. Colonel Yancey and his detachment served as observers dur ing th is weeklong exercise.

OSA History, chap. 5. pp. 25-26 (TS Codeword).

<empty>
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U-2 detachment in formation
overNevada

Colonel Yancey's group carefully examined all aspects ofthe U-2 unit from flight crews to camera technicians and mission pro grammers. When the exercise was over, Yancey reported that the de tachment was ready for deployment. He then briefed a high-level Pentagon p anel that included the Secretary ofthe Air Force and the ChiefofAirStaff. These officials concurred with Yancey's detem1i nation that the U-2 was ready for deployment. 57

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PILOT TRAINING (cont.)

During these final tests in the springof1956, the U-2once again demonstrated its unique airworthiiness. On 14 April 1956, James Cunninghamwassittinginhis office in Washington when he received a call from Area 51 informing him that a westward-bound U-2 had experienced a flameout over the Mississippi River at the western bor derof Tennessee. After restarting his engine, the pilot reported a sec ond flameout and engine vibrations so violent that he was unable to get the power plant to start again. Early in the program Bissell and Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation of the AirForce, had arranged for sealled orders to be delivered to every airbase inthe continental United States givinginstruct ions about what to do if a U-2 needed to make an e:mergency landing.

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Koon, call the commander of Kirtland AFB near Albuquerque. General Koon told the base commander about the sealed orders and explained that an unusual aircraft would make a deadstick landing at Kirtland within the next half hour. The general then instructed the base commander to have air police keep everyone away from the craft and get it inside a hanger as quickly as possible.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PILOT TRAINING (cont.)

After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled aircraft was. As he was speaking, the officer saw the U-2 touch down on the runway and remarked, "It'snot a plane, it's a glider!" Even more surprised were the air po lice who surrounded the craft when it came to a halt. As the pilot climbed from the cockpit in his "space" suit, one air policeman re marked that the pilot looked like a man from Mars. The pilot, Jacob Kratt, later reported to Cunningham that, from the beginning of the first flameout until the landing at Albuquerque, the U-2 had covered over 900 miles, including more than 300 by gliding. 58

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PILOT TRAINING (cont.)

Aside from this extraordinary gliding ability, however, the U-2 was a very difficult aircraft to fly. Its very light weight, which enabled it to achieve extreme altitude, also made it very fragile. The aircraft -was also very sleek, and it sliced through the air with little drag. This feature was dangerous, however, because the U-2 was not built to withstand the G-forces of high speed. Pilots had to be extremely care ful to keep the craft in a slightly nose-up attitude when flying at operational altitude. Ifthe nose dropped only a degree or two into the nose-down position, the plane would gain speed at a dramatic rate, exceeding the placarded speed limit in less than a minute, at which point the aircraft would begin to come apart. Pilots, therefore, had to pay close attention to the aircraft's speed indicator because at 65,000 feet there was no physical sensation of speed, without objects close at hand for the eye to use as a reference. 59

THREE FATAL CRASHES IN 1956

The first fatality directly connected with flying the U-2 occurred on 15 May 1956, when test pilot Wilburn S. Rose, flying article 345A, had trouble dropping his pogos, the outrigger wheels that keep the

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wi ngs parallel to the ground duriing takeoff. Once airborne, Rose made a low-level pass over the airstrip and shook loose the lefthand pogo. When he attempted to make a righthand turn to come back over the runway to shake loose the remaining pogo. Rose stalled the U-2 and it plunged to earth, disintegratiing over a wide area. Three months later. on 3 1 August 1956, a second fa tal cras h occurred during a night-flying exercise. Frank G. Grace stalled article 354 at an alti tude of about 50 feet when he tried to climb too steeply at takeoff. The craft fell , cartwheeled on its left wing. and struck a power pole near the runway. More experienced U-2 pilots always cut back abruptly on the throttleas soonas the pogo s ticks fell away in order to avoidsuch s tal Is.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PILOT TRAINING (cont.)

Before the year was out, two more U-2s were destroyed in crashes, one of them fatal. On 17 September 1956, article 346 lost part of its right wing while on its takeoff ascent from Lindsey Air Force Base in Wiesbaden, Germany. The aircraft disintegrated in mid- air. killing pilot Howard Carey. The loss of article 357 on 19 December 1956 resulted from pilot hypoxia. A small leak prema- turely depleted the oxygen supply and impaired Robert J. Ericson's judgment as he flew over Arizona. Because of his inability to act quickly and keep track of his aircraft's speed, the U-2 exceeded the placarded speed of 190 knots and literally disintegrated when it reached 270 knots. Ericson managed to jettison the canopy and was sucked out of the aircraft at 28,000 feet. His chute opened automati- cally at 15,000 feet, and he landed without injury. The aircraft was a total loss.

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and plan missions in viewof priority and feasibility, to maintain the operation on a continuing basis, and to carry out the dissem ination of rhe resulting information in a manner consistent with its special security requirementsY

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PILOT TRAINING (cont.)

When the U-2's development and testing approached comple tion, Land's recommendation was put into effect. Following a mt!et ing with Deputy Secretary ofDefense Donald Quarles and Trevor Gardner (who had been promoted from his special assistant post co become Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development), Richard Bissell establi shed an Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC) on I December 1955. He th en named Jam es Q. Reber to be Intelligence Requ irements Officer for the U-2 project and chairman of the ARC. Reber was already experienced in coordination with other intelligence agencies, for he had headed the Directorate of Intelligence DI Office ofInte lligence Coordination for four years. T he first full-scale ARC meeting took place on I February 1956 with re presentatives from the Army, Navy, and Air Force present. Attending for the CIA were representatives from the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and the Office of Scientific Intelligence .(QS I). The CIA membership later expanded to include the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) and a representative from the Directorate of Plans. In 1957 the Nation al Security Agency (NSA) also began sending a rep resentative. The State Department followed suit in 1960. although it ha dbeen receiving reports from the committee all along.'~

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PILOT TRAINING (cont.)

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ARC gave the top priority target list to the Project Director, and the project staff's operations section then used the list to plan the flightpaths for U-2 missions. Although the requirements committee was not responsible for developing flight plans, it assisted the plan- ners with detailed target information as required. When a flight plan was ready for submission to the President for approval, the committee drew up a detailed justification for the selection of the targets. This paper accompanied the flight plan."

In developing and prioritizing lists of targets, the committee members had to take into account the varying needs and interests of their parent organizations. Thus, the CIA representatives generally emphasized strategic intelligence: aircraft and munitions factories, power-generating complexes, nuclear establishments, roads, bridges, inland waterways. In contrast, the military services usually placed a heavier emphasis on order-of-battle data. The Air Force, in particular, had a strong interest in gathering intelligence on the location of Soviet and East European airfields and radars.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PRODUCT  OF  U-2 MISSIONS (cont.)

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The Steuart Building, home
of the Photo-Intelligence
Division

flood of photographs that the U-2 would bring back, so in May 1955 the Directorate of Support (DS) authorized expanding PID to 44 per- sons. Soon afterward the division moved from its room in M Building to larger quarters in Que Building.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## PRODUCT  OF  U-2 MISSIONS (cont.)

The Photo-Intelligence Division continued to expand in anticipa- tion of large quantities of U-2 photography. Its authorized strength doubled in January 1956 when a new project known as HTAUTOMAT came into existence to exploit U-2 photography. All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys- tem. By the summer of 1956, the PID had moved to larger quarters in the Steuart Building at 5th Street and New York Avenue, NW. PID photointerpreters had already begun to work with U-2 photography following a series of missions in April 1956, when U-2s photo- graphed a number of US installations that were considered analogous to high-priority Soviet installations. As a result of these preparations, PID was ready for the mass of photography that began coming when U-2 operations commenced in the summer of 1956."

"For a more detailed history of photointerpretation in the CIA. see Urban J. Linehan, The National Photographic Interpretation Center, vol. I, Antecedents and Early Years. Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series NPIC-2. December 1972, pp. 171-194 (S).

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Project GENETRIX balloon
launch

## THE IMPACT OF THE AIR FORCE PROJECT
GENETRIX BALLOONS

While the Agency was making its final preparations for U-2 over- flights, the Air Force started a reconnaissance project that would cause considerable protest around the world and threaten the exist- ence of the U-2 overflight program before it even began. Project GENETRIX involved the use of carnera-carrying balloons to obtain high-altitude photography of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and

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# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## THE IMPACT OF THE AIR FORCE PROJECT
GENETRIX BALLOONS (cont.)

the People's Republic of China. This project had its origins in a RAND Corporation study from 1951. By the end of 1955, the Air Force had overcome a number of technical problems in camera design and recovery techniques and had manufactured a large number of bal- loons for use in the project. President Eisenhower gave his approval on 27 December 1955, and two weeks later the launches from bases in Western Europe began. By the end of February 1956, the Air Force had launched a total of 516 balloons."

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## THE IMPACT OF THE AIR FORCE PROJECT
GENETRIX BALLOONS (cont.)

Project GENETRIX was much less successful than its sponsors had hoped. Once launched, the balloons were at the mercy of the pre vailing winds, and many tended to drift toward southern Europe and then across the Black Sea and the desert areas ofChina. These bal loons therefore missed the prime target areas, which lay in the higher latitudes. Large numbers ofballoons did not succeed in crossing the Soviet Union and China, some because they were shot down by hos tile aircraft, others because they prematurely expended their ballast supplies and descended too soon. Only 46 payloads were eventually recovered (one more than a year later and the last not until 1958) from the 5 16 balloons that had been launched. In four ofthese pay- Joadsthe camera had malfunctioned, and in another eight _the photog raphy was ofno intelligence value. Thus, only 34 balloons succeeded in obtaining useful photographs.""

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## THE IMPACT OF THE AIR FORCE PROJECT
GENETRIX BALLOONS (cont.)

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*   SPOIL
*   NUCLEAR STORAGE AREA
*   HEAD FRAME AREA
*   ELECTRIFIED RAIL
*   PROBABLE ORE CRUSHING PLANT
*   YENISEY RIVER

Photograph of Dodonovo Atomic
Energy complex taken by a
Project GENETRIX balloon

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# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## THE IMPACT OF THE AIR FORCE PROJECT
GENETRIX BALLOONS (cont.)

Although the photo intelligence gained from Project GENETRIX was limited in quantity, it was still some ofthe best and most com plete photography obtained of the Soviet Union since World War IL It was referred to as "pioneer" photography because it provided a base line for all future overhead photography. Even innocuous photos of such things as forests and streams proved valuable in later years when U-2 and satellite photography revealed construction activity.

Of still greater importance to the U-2 program, however, was the data that US and NATO radars obtained as they tracked the paths of the balloons-whose average altitude was 45,800 feet-over the Soviet Bloc. This data provided the most accurate record to date of high-altitude wind currents, knowledge that meteorologists were later able to put to use to determine optimum flightpaths for U-2 flights.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## THE IMPACT OF THE AIR FORCE PROJECT
GENETRIX BALLOONS (cont.)

One completely fortuitous development from Project GENETRIX had nothing to do with the cameras but involved a steel bar. This bar served a dual purpose: the rigging of the huge polyethyl ene gasbag was secured to the top ofthe bar and the camera-payload _and automatic-ballasting equipment was attached to the bottom. By sheer chance, the length of the bar-91 centimeters-correspondedto the wavelength ofthe radio frequency used by a Soviet radar known by its NATO designator as TOKEN. This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled intercept. The bar on the GENETRIX balloons resonated when struck by TOKEN radar pulses, making it possible for radar operators at US and NATO installations on the periphery of the Soviet Union to locate a number ofpreviously unknown TOKEN radars.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## THE IMPACT OF THE AIR FORCE PROJECT
GENETRIX BALLOONS (cont.)

These radar findings, coupled with other intercepts made during the balloon flights, provided extensive data on Warsaw Pact radar net works, radar sets, and ground-controlled interception techniques. Analysis of these intercepts revealed the altitude capabilities and tracking accuracy of radars, the methods used by Warsaw Pact nations to notify each other ofthe balloons' passage (handing off), and the altitudes at which Soviet aircraft could intercept the balloons. All of this information could be directly applied to future U-2 missions.'~

'' Final Report. Project l 19L, 1st Air Division (Meteorological Survey) Strategic Air Command. 5 March 1956. D-582, General Summary (TS, declassified 1979).

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These positive results from Project GENETRIX did not outweigh the political liabilities of the international protests. CIA officials be- came concerned that the ill will generated by balloon overflights could sour the Eisenhower administration on all overflights, including those by the U-2, which was just about ready for deployment. Therefore. DDCI Cabell wrote to Air Force Chief of Staff Twining in February 1956 to warn against further balloon flights because of the "additional political pressures being generated against all balloon operations and overflights, thus increasing the difficulties of policy decisions which would permit such operations in the future." 73

In addition to its concern for tl he future of the U-2 program. the Agency feared that President Eisenhower's anger at balloon over flights might result in the curtailment of the balloon program that the Free Europe Committee-a covert A gency operation based in West Germany-used to release propaganda pamphlets over Eastern Europe.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## AQUATONE BRIEFINGS FOR SELECTED
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Although knowledge of the U-2 project was a closely guarded se- cret within both the Agency and the Eisenhower administration, DCI Dulles decided that a few key members of Congress should be told about the project. On 24 February 1956. Dulles met with Senators Leverett Saltonstall and Richard B. Russell, the ranking members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and its subcom- mittee on the CIA. He shared with them the details of Project AQUATONE and then asked their opinion on whether some mem- bers of the House of Representatives should also be informed. As a result of the senators' recommendation that the senior members of the House Appropriations Committee should be briefed, Dulles later met with its ranking members, Representatives John Taber and Clarence Cannon. Official Congressional knowledge of the U-2 pro- ject remained confined to this small group for the next four years. The House Armed Services Committee and its CIA subcommittee did not receive a CIA briefing on the U-2 project until after the loss of Francis Gary Powers's U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960.

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THE  U-2 COVER STORY

In February 1956, while the controversy over balloon flights was still raging and the U-2 was completing its final airworthiness tests, Richard Bissell and his staff began working on a cover story for over seas operations. It was important to have a plausible reason for de ploying such an unusual looking plane, whose glider wings and odd landing gear were certain to arouse curiosity.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## AQUATONE BRIEFINGS FOR SELECTED
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (cont.)

Bissell decided that the best cover for the deployment of the U-2 was an ostensible mission of high-altitude weather research by the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA). Such a cover story, however, needed the approval of all concerned: Air Force intel ligence, the Air Weather Service, the Third Air Force, the Seventh Air Division, the SAC U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr. Hugh Dryden. Moreover, the CIA Scientific Advisory Committee was also consulted about the cover plan.

# Developing the U-2 (cont.)

## AQUATONE BRIEFINGS FOR SELECTED
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (cont.)

Senior CIA officials and the other agencies involved in provid- ing cover for the U-2 approved the final version ofthe overall cover story at the end ofMarch 1956. The project staff then began working on contingency plans for the loss of a U-2 over hostile territory. Bissell advised the project's cover officer to "produce a document which sets forth all actions to be taken ...not only press releases and the public Line to be taken, but also the suspension ofoperations and at least an indication of the diplomatic action .... We should at least make the attempt in this case to be prepared for the worst in a really orderly fashion." The cover officer then prepared emergency proce dures based on the overall weather research cover story, and Bissell approved these plans. There was one final high-level look at the cover story on 21 June 1956, the day after the first U-2 mission over Eastern Europe, when Bissell met with General Goodpaster, James Killian, and Edwin Land to discuss the pending overflights of the Soviet Union, including the proposed emergency procedures. Killian and Land disagreed with Bissell's concept and made a much bolder and more forthright proposal: in the event of the loss of a U-2 over hostile territory, the United States should not try to deny responsibility but should state that overflights were being conducted "to guard against surprise attack." This proposal was put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re mained the basis for statements to be made after a loss. The project staff then went on to prepare a number ofdifferent statements to be

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used in various scenarios, including one in which the pilot was cap tured. Even in such a case, however, the proposed policy was for the United States to stick to the weather research cover story, a course of action that would prove disastrous in May 1960.75

OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 30-35; chap. 11, annex 73 (TS Codeword).

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# U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968

# U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968 (cont.)

By January 1956, everyone working on Project AQUATONE could see that the U-2 was nearing the time for operational deployment. During tests the aircraft had met all the criteria established in late I 954. Its range of 2,950 miles was sufficient to overfly continents, its altitudeof 72,000 feet was beyond the reach of all known antiaircraft weapons and interceptor aircraft, and its camera lenses were the finest available.

Because the main targets for the U-2 l ay behind the Iron Curtain. Bissell and his staff began lo oking for operational bases in Europe. The United Kingdom, America's closest ally, seemed the logical choice for U-2 bases, and, on 10 January 1956, Bissell flew to London to discuss the maner with Royal Air Force (RAF) and MI-6 officials. Their initial response was favorable, but they told Bissell that the proposal needed approval at a much higher leve l.

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## THE DEPLOYMENT OF DETACHMENT A
TO LAKENHEATH

The first Agency U-2 detachment, consisting of four aircraft and pilots, was known publicly as the 1st Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (WRSP-1). The "provisional" designation gave the U-2 detachments greater security because provisional Air Force units did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1, known within the Agency as Detachment A, began deploying to the United Kingdom on 29 April 1956. By 4 May, all ofthe detachment's personnel and equipment, including four aircraft, had arrived at Lakenheath.!

# U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## THE DEPLOYMENT OF DETACHMENT A
TO LAKENHEATH (cont.)

Shortly after deployment, on 7 May, the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) released an unclassified U-2 cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown by the USAF Air Weather Service to study such high-altitude phenom enaas the jetstream, convective clouds, temperature and wind struc tures at jet-stream levels, and cosmic-ray effects up to 55,000 feet. 3

# U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## THE DEPLOYMENT OF DETACHMENT A
TO LAKENHEATH (cont.)

Before overflights could begin from Lakenheath, however, sev eral incidents occurred that dampened Prime Minister Eden ·s interest in having the U-2s on British territory. In mid-April 1956, a Soviet naval squadron brought Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin on an official visit to the United Kingdom. Although the ships were docked in Portsmouth Harbor, a British counterintelli gence operative and underwater expert, retired Royal Navy Commander Lionel Crabb, apparently undertook a mission to exam ine the hulls of these vessels but vanished in the process. His headless body was later found washed up on a beach. This so-called Frogman Incident caused an uproar in Parliament and a protest from Moscow that soured relations between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. To avoid further deterioration of Anglo-Soviet relations, the Prime Minister wrote to President Eisenhower on 16 May asking that overflights be postponed. Only two days later, a U-2 on a training flight from Lakenheath inadvertently penetrated the British radar net work, causing RAF fighters to scramble. Afterward the Air Ministry made a public announcement that a special NACA aircraft was con ducting high-altitude research in the United Kingdom. At about the

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same time, Richard Bissell learned that the State Department had told Prime Minister Eden that only one U-2 was based at Lakenheath, when in reality there were four.'

## THE  MOVE TO WIESBADEN

To avoid arousing further reaction in the United Kingdom and to begin the program of U-2 overflights beyond the Iron Curtain without further delay, Bissell moved Detachment A on 11 June I956 to Wiesbaden, one of the busiest airfields in West Germany, without notifying West German authorities. The detachment commander, Col. Frederick McCoy, was disappointed in his hope that the redeployment ofthe U-2s could be accomplished without drawing undue attention. The strange-looking planes, with bicycle-type wheels and wings so long they touched the ground after landing, aroused considerable in terest. Wiesbaden was to be only a temporary home for Detachment A; the Air Force began preparing Giebelstadt near the East German border for use by the U-2s. Giebelstadt was an old World War II airbase that had been one ofthe launching sites for the GENETRIX balloons.5

# U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## THE  MOVE TO WIESBADEN (cont.)

Soon after the four U-2s arrived in Wiesbaden, they were refitted with the more powerful J57/P-3 l engines. The new engines were bet ter suited for operations behind the Iron Curtain because they were less likely to suffer flameouts than the earlier model. Once the new engines were installed, the aircraft received the designation U-2B. 6

Bissell was anxious to get the overflights started by late June because SAC weather experts had predicted that the best weather for photographing the Soviet Union would be between 20 June and 10 July. Bissell, however, had not yet received final authorization from President Eisenhower to begin overflights of the Soviet Union. On 28 May 1956, when DCI Allen Dulles met with the President to discuss the U-2's readiness for operations, Eisenhower still made no decision on overflights. Three days later Dulles and Air Force Chief ofStaff

' Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (New York. 1986). pp. 495-496; Beschloss, Mayday, p. I 16; OSA History, chap. 11, pp. 18-21 (TS Codeword).

' OSA History, chap. 11, pp. 21-23 (TS Codeword).

Ibid., pp. 23, 26 (TS Codeword).

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Nathan Twining prepared a paper for the President outlining "AQU ATONE Operational Plans." In the meantime, President Eisenhower had entered Walter Reed Hospital for tests for an abdomi nal ailment that turned out to be ileitis, requiring an operation. During his recovery from surgery, Eisenhower would make his final decision on the overflight program. 7

# U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS

The President had mixed feelings about overflights of the Soviet Union. Aware that they could provide extremely valuable intelligence about Soviet capabilities, he, nevertheless, remained deeply con cerned that such flights brought with them the risk ofstarting a war. From the very beginning ofthe U-2 program, President Eisenhower had worked to minimize the possibility that overflights could lead to hostilities. He had always insisted that overflights by military aircraft were too provocative, and in 1954 he had therefore supported the Land committee's proposal for an unarmed civilian aircraft instead of the military reconnaissance planes favored by the Air Force. For the same reason, Eisenhower had resisted attempts by the Air Force to take the U-2 program away from the CIA in 1955.

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# U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS (cont.)

Even though President Eisenhower had approved every stage of the U-2's development, knowing full well that the aircraft was being built to fly over the Soviet Union, the actual decision to authorize such flights was very difficult for him. He remained concerned that overflights could poison relations with the Soviet Union and might even lead to hostilities. One argument that helped overcome the President's reluctance was the CIA's longstanding contention that U-2 flights might actually go undetected because Soviet radars would not be able to track aircraft at such high altitudes. This belief was based on a 1952 study ofSoviet World War II-vintage radars and on 1955 tests using US radars, which-unknownto US officials-werenot as effective as Soviet radars against high-altitude targets. Shortly before U-2 operations began, however, the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) conducted a vulnerability study of the U-2 that was published on 28 May 1956. The study's conclusion was that "Maxi mum Soviet radar detection ranges against the Project aircraft at ele vation in excess of55,000 feet would vary from 20 to 150 miles.... In our opinion, detection can therefore be assumed." The OSI study added, however, "It is doubtful that the Soviets can achieve consis- tent tracking of the Project vehicle." 9 Completed just thr~e weeks be fore the initation ofoverflights, this study seems to have had little impact on the thinking of the top project officials. They continued to believe that the Soviets would not be able to track the U-2 and might even fail to detect it, except for possible vague indications. 10

# U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS (cont.)

Soviet radars were not President Eisenhower's only concern. Also fearing that a malfunction might cause a U-2 to crash inside the Soviet Union, he asked Allen Dulles what the consequences would be. The President's staff secretary, Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster, who was present at virtually all White House meetings on the U-2 project and served as the President's intermediary to the CIA on this issue, later recalled:

Allen '.s approach was that we were unlikely to lose one. If we did lose one, the pilot would not survive. . . . We were told-and it was part of our understanding of the situation-that it was al most certain that the plane would disintegrate and that we could

• OSA Histor;,; chap. 11, p. 31 (TS Codeword). For the belief that the U-2 might go unde tected see the Leghorn interview and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace. 1956-1961 (New York, 1965), p. 41.

"' Richard M. Bissell, Jr., interview by Gregory W. Pedlow, tape recording, Farmington, Connecticut. 28 October I988 (S).

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Colonel Goodpaster with
President Eisenhower

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# U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS (cont.)

Soviet Air Forces. 12 Early in 1956, concern about a possible Soviet advantage in long-range bombers grew as Air Force Chief of Staff Twining informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Soviet Union already had more Bisons than the United States had B-52s and that the Soviets would be able to "maintain this advantage for some time if they keep on the production curve we are now pre dicting." 13 By May 1956, reporting on the growing Soviet air strength was no longer confined to aviation journals; U.S. News and World Report, for example, featured articles headlined "Can Soviets Take the Air Lead?" and "Is U.S. Really Losing in the Air?" 1 "'

# U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS (cont.)

Alongside fear of possible Soviet superiority in long-range bombers came a new potential threat: Soviet progress in guided mis sile research. Trevor Gardner, Air Force Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, warned in September 1955 that "the most complex and baffling technological mystery today is not the Russian capability in aircraft and nuclear weapons but rather what the Soviet progress has been in the field of guided missiles." 15 On 30 January 1956, Time magazine made the guided missile its cover story. The article began by describing a hypothetical crisis set in 1962 in which the United States suffered a humiliating defeat because it had lagged behind the Soviet Union in guided missile development. 16 Just two weeks after this story appeared, the Soviets successfully tested a missile with a range of 900 miles, and President Eisenhower admitted at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in some areas of the missile field. Administration critic Senator Stuart Symington then claimed, "The facts are that our missile development may be ahead in the short-range area, but their mis sile development is ahead in the area that counts by far the most-the

# U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS (cont.)

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long-range area." 17 Fears ofSoviet missile progress increased when Nikita Khrushchev stated on 23 April 1956, "Iam quite sure that we shall have very soon a guided missile with a hydrogen-bomb warhead which could hit any point in the world." 18

Faced with growing Congressional and public anxiety over Soviet offensive capabilties, President Eisenhower approved the pro posed overflight program. Colonel Goodpaster relayed this decision to Bissell, Land, and Killian at a meeting on 21 June. The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days ofoverflights when operations over the Soviet Union were ready to start in early July 1956. 19

# U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS (cont.)

FIRST OVERFLIGHTS OF EASTERN EUROPE

The CIA initiated U-2 flights over hostile territory even before the President granted final approval for overflights ofthe Soviet Union. After consulting with the Commander of US Air Force Europe, Richard Bissell used existing Presidential permission for Air Force overflights ofthe Soviet Union's East European satellites as his au thority to plan a mission over Poland and East Germany. Bissell had informed the President of his intention to conduct such missions in the "AQUATONE Operational Plan" submitted on 31 May.

The first operational use of a U-2 took place on Wednesday, 20 June 1956. Carl K. Overstreet flew a U-2 equipped with an A-2 camera over Poland and East Germany. At the end of the mis- sion, Detachment A immediately rushed the exposed film to the United States for processing. The developed film arrived at the Photo-Intelligence Division (PID) on 22 June 1956. PID personnel considered the pictures obtained by mission 2003 to be of good quality.20

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# U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS (cont.)

Following the success ofthis first mission, Bissell was eager to begin overflights ofthe Soviet Union. But even after the President granted his approval on 21 June, such missions could not yet take place for two reasons. First, President Eisenhower had agreed with a CIA and State Department recommendation that West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer be informed in advance ofUS plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in Germany (in keeping with ex isting policies Adenauer was not informed about overflights of Eastern Europe). Second, Soviet party chief Nikita Khrushchev had invited representatives of the US Air Force to the Moscow Air Show, which opened on 23 June 1956. Led by Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan F. Twining, the delegation would be in the Soviet Union for a week, and General Twining requested that no overflights of the Soviet Union be staged until the Air Force delegation had left. 11

Both of these restrictions on overflights of the Soviet Union were cleared up by the end of June. Accompanied by General Cabell and the Chief ofStation for Germany, Tracy Barnes, Bissell briefed Chancellor Adenauer and his trusted adviser, State Secretary Hans _Globke, on 27 June. Adenauer enthusiastically endorsed the project. 11

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# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

U-2 photography of
Leningrad, 4 July 1956

Fili Airframe Plant,
Moscow, 5 July  1956

724743 (801374) 4-92

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detachment had four aircraft working and could average up to two flights per day, Bissell told the President that the crews were "ready and eager to go in beyond the satellites" and overfly the center of the Soviet Union. 23

Eisenhower replied that he thought it "urgent" to know whether the recent flights had been tracked by hostile radars. The President was obviously concerned that CIA estimates that the U-2 could fly virtually undetected were proving false. One ofthe reasons why he had approved the overflight program was the CIA's assurance that the Soviet Union would remain unaware of the flights or-atthe very worst-receive only occasional, vague indications.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## FIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION

The question ofhow well the Soviets could track U-2 flights had not yet been settled when the first overflights ofthe Soviet Union took place. On Wednesday, 4 July 1956, the U-2 known as Article 347 be gan the first flight over the Soviet Union. Final authorization for mis sion 2013 had come shortly before takeoff. Late on the evening of3 July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building to give the "Go" or "No go" decision. Although the President had ap proved the overflight, the final decision to start a mission depended on a number of factors, especially the weather over the target area and at the takeoff and landing sites. Bissell made the decision justbefore midnight Washington time, which was six o'clock in the morning in Wiesbaden. This pattern of last-minute approvals continued for the duration of the U-2 overflight program. 2 •

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the Soviet Union's submarine construction program. Mission 2013's route also overflew a number ofmajor military airfields to make an inventory of the new Bison jet-engine heavy bomber. 1s

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## FIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION (cont.)

The second overflight, on the following day, continued the search for Bison bombers. Pilot Carmine Vito's route was similar but somewhat to the south of Stockman's and also flew farther east, more than 200 kilometers past Moscow. Although theSoviet capital was al most completely hidden by clouds, the A-2 camera with haze filters took some usable photographs of the city. These turned out to be the only U-2 photographs of Moscowbecause no other mission was sent over the Soviet capital. Among the key targets photographed during mission 2014 were the Filiairframe plant, where the Bison was being built;the bomberarse nal at Ramenskoye. where the Bisonsweire test ed; the Kaliningrad missile plant; and the Khimki rocket-,engine plant.= 0

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## FIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION (cont.)

When Allen Dulles returned to work on Thursday. 5 July 1956. he asked Bissell if any overflights had taken place during the Independence Day holiday. One had been made on the fqurth and an other just that morning, Bissell replied. (Because of the six-hour ti me difference, the 5 July flight was safely back in Wiesbaden by the time Dulles spoke to Bissell.) When Dulles asked the routes ofthese missions. Bissell told him that they had overflown both Moscciw and Leningrad. "Oh my Lord." Dulles exclaimed, "do you thi1:1k that was wise the first time?" "Allen." Bissell replied. "the first is the safest." :,

President Eisenhower also wanted to know the results ofthe 4 and 5 July flights, but his principal concern was whether there had been any indication that either flight had been discovered ortracked by radar. Eisenhower told Colonel Goodpaster "toadvise Mr. Allen

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# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## FIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION (cont.)

Dulles that ifwe obtain any information or warning that any ofthe flights has been discovered or tracked, the operation should be sus pended." Goodpaster called both Dulles and Bissell and was told that reports on tracking or attempted interception of the U-2s would not be available for another 36 hours. Later that day the two CIA officials met with Goodpaster to ask if flights could continue in the meantime. Goodpaster replied that his understanding of the President's directive was that the operation should continue "atthe maximum rate until the first evidence oftracking was received." 1"

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## FIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION (cont.)

Although President Eisenhower had originally spoken of sus pending the overflights if they were ''discovered or tracked," his main concern was to learn if the Soviets could track U-2 missions, meaning that they could follow the flight on their radar screens for most or all ofthe missions and thus have numerous opportunities to attempt interception. Certainly the President hoped that U-2 flights could not even be detected, but reports received on the 20 June over flight of Eastern Europe had already indicated that this goal was unre alistic. The President's emphasis therefore shifted to tracking. If the Soviets could successfully track U-2 missions. he wanted the over flights halted. ! 9 Reports on Soviet radar coverage of the first two overflights ofthe Soviet Union became available on 6 July. These re ports showed that. although the Soviets did detect the aircraft and made several very unsuccessful attempts at interception. they could not track U-2s consistently. Interestingly, the Soviet radar coverage was weakest around the most important targets, Moscow and Leningrad, and the Soviets did not realize that U-2s had overflown these two cities. 30

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shutter ruined much of the photography of one of the flights. The third mission (2023), on the following day, included the Crimean Peinsula. 31

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## FIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION (cont.)

The film from the first overflight (4 July) was flown to the United States immediately after the U-2 landed at Wiesbaden. Several members ofthe Photo Intelligence Division were on hand when the film was developed to check on the results. Also present was James Baker, who had accepted an offer by project officials to get a first hand look at how the new A-2 lenses were working.·'1

The photos from July overflights were generally good, despite occasional problems caused by cloud cover. The huge amount offilm taken by these missions provided more information about the Soviet Union's ability to track and intercept U-2s. Photointerpreters examin ing the films eventually discovered the tiny images of MiG-15s and MiG- l 7s beneath the U-2s in various pursuit and attack attitudes: climbing, flipping over, and falling toward Earth. It was even possible to determine their approximate altitudes. These photographs showed that the Soviet air defense system was able to track U-2s well enough to attempt interception, but they also provided proof that the fighter aircraft available to the Soviet Union in l 956 could not bring down a U-2 at operational altitude. )l

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SOVIET PROTEST NOTE

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## FIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION (cont.)

The 4 and 5 July overflights brought a strong protest from the Soviet Union on 10 July in the form of a note handed to the US Embassy in Moscow. The note said that the overflights had been made by a "twin-engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force" and gave details ofthe routes flown by the first two missions. The note did not mention Moscow or Leningrad, however, because the Soviets had not been able to track these portions of the overflights. The Soviet note stated that the flights could only be evaluated as "inten tional and conducted for the purposes of intelligence .., As soon as the note arrived at the White House on the evening of 10 July 1956, Colonel Goodpaster called Bissell and told him to stop all U-2 over flights until further notice. The next morning Goodpaster met with Bissell to review the U-2 situation. Bissell said three additional flights had taken place since the missions mentioned in the Soviet note but added that no more were planned. 35

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## FIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION (cont.)

__ - Later Eisenhower told Goodpaster that he "didn't like a thing" about the Soviet note and was going to discuss the matter with Secretary of State Dulles. With the strong approval of President Eisenhower, Goodpaster informed DCI Dulles that "there is to be no mention ofthe existence of this project or of operations incident to it, outside the Executive Branch, and no mention within the Executive Branch to others than those who directly need to know ofthe opera tion, as distinguished from output deriving from it." 36

During these initial overflights, the U-2 flew above 69,000 feet and could be seen only fleetingly by pilots ofthe Soviet interceptor aircraft. Thus, it appears that the Soviet claim that the intruder was a twin-engine bomber was probably based on the assumption that this was another overflight by a reconnaissance version of the twin-engine Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in 1953. The US reply, sent to the Soviets on 19 July, truthfully denied that any US "military planes" had overflown the Soviet Union on the days in question. Meanwhile, on 16 July the Polish Ambassador to

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the United States delivered an oral protest concerning overflights of Poland on 20 June and 2 July. This was followed by a protest note from the Czechoslovak Government on 21 July. No formal reply was sent to the two Soviet satellite states. 37

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## FIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION (cont.)

The details of the flightpaths listed in the Soviet and Polish pro tests, along with the subsequent photographic evidence ofSoviet in terception attempts, made it clear that U-2s could not fly undetected over the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe and could even be tracked for extended periods oftime. This news greatly disturbed President Eisenhower. In a meeting with Allen Dulles on 19 July 1956, the President recalled how he had been told that "notover a very minor percentage ofthese (flights) would be picked up." He went on to question "howfar this should now be pushed, knowing that detection is not likely to be avoided." After discussing the possibility of basing U-2s in the Far East, President Eisenhower went on to say that he had "lost enthusiasm" for the U-2 activity. He noted that, if the United States were on the receiving end of a Soviet overflight operation, "the reaction would be drastic." The President was also concerned that the American public might learn of the overflights and be shocked that their country had violated international law. He stated, "Soviet pro be quite ano er. tests were one thing, any loss of confidence by our own people would • th ,, 38

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## FIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION (cont.)

The President's rapid disenchantment with the project was not lost on Richard Bissell. Fearing for the U-2 program's survival, he met with the Land committee in early August 1956 to urge them to help make the U-2 less vulnerable to radar pulses. His goal was to reduce the aircraft's radar cross section so that it would be less sus ceptible to detection. Edward Purcell had some ideas on this and sug gested that he supervise a new project in the Boston area to explore them. At the direction of the Land committee, Bissell set in motion a project known as HTNAMABLE to establish a proprietary firm called the Scientific Engineering Institute (SEI) in Cambridge. Former Air Force Col. Richard S. Leghorn headed the SEI operation for the Agency when it began on 26 November 1956. SEI was staffed by sev eral MIT scholars who conducted studies and experiments into

·" .. Alleged Violations of Soviet Territory: Soviet Note of July I0, 1956 with U.S. Reply," US Department of State Bulletin. 30 July 1956, pp. 191-192; OSA History, chap. 11, pp. 32-33 (TS Codeword).

" Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record. 19 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).

-Secret_

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radar-absorbing materials and techniques proposed by Purcell. The ef fort, known as Project RAINBOW, got under way by the end ofthe year. 39

## THE END OF THE BOMBER GAP

During the three-week period of20 June to 10 July 1956, U-2s had made eight overflights beyond the Iron Curtain, including five over the Soviet Union. PID's photointerpreters were busy until the end of August with their initial evaluation ofthe photography obtained by these flights. Their efforts were complicated by the division's move on 9 July from Que Building to the Steuart Building, but, when the photo interpreters were finished, they were able to write "finis" to the controversy over Soviet bomber strength.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## THE END OF THE BOMBER GAP (cont.)

Although the Air Force had claimed that the Soviet Union pos sessed almost 100 of the new Myasishchev-4 (Bison) heavy bombers, U-2 photography proved this assertion wrong. There were no Bison 6ombers at any of the nine long-range bomber bases photographed by the July missions. DCI Allen Dulles was particularly impressed by the photographs ofthe Soviet bomber bases, which in later years he called "million-dollar" photography. The actual value of the U-2 photos was probably even greater because, on the strength of their ev idence, the White House was able to deny Air Force requests for ad ditional B-52 bombers to "catch up" to the Soviets."0

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## THE END OF THE BOMBER GAP (cont.)

Because of the need to protect the source of the information about Soviet bomber strength, the controversy surrounding this issue did not immediately die down. In November 1956, when the CIA began providing new Bison production figures based on U-2 photog raphy without identifying the source, some members ofCongress unaware ofthe existence ofthe U-2-questioned the motivation be hind the reduced estimates. They suggested that either the earlier es timates ofSoviet bomber strength had been inflated to increase Air Force appropriations or the new estimates had been reduced by White House direction in order to hold down military expenditures.

•• Records of Scientific Engineering Institute (Project HTNAMABLE). OSA records (TS Codeword).

NPIC History, vol. 1, p. 23 (S).

-Seeret-

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No one in the White House, the CIA, or the Air Force could reveal that U-2 photographs had actually provided the primary evidence for this change in the estimates."

The need to keep the existence of the U-2 program secret caused problems even within the CIA itself. The Office ofSecurity sharply restricted the number ofpersons who could be cleared for access to U-2 photography. The special clearance was granted on a "slot" ba sis, and only the person assigned to a particular position or "slot" could have the clearance. The U-2 photographs were kept in a secure room, and only those with special clearances were admitted to the room. In addition, the Office ofSecurity considered U-2 information too sensitive to use in CIA publications. As a result, many analysts did not have access to information that would have greatly aided the production ofintelligence estimates:1

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS

Although U-2s had ceased flying over the Soviet Bloc because of President Eisenhower's standdown order, they could still be used elsewhere in the world. The Middle East would be the next area for U-2 operations. On 26 July 1956, Egyptian President Gama! Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in retaliation for the de cision by the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw fi nancial support for the Aswan Dam project. Nasser's action provoked an international crisis that would have a permanent effect on the U-2 program.

Long before the Suez Crisis developed, the CIA had planned to deploy U-2s in Turkey for use in the Soviet overflight program. On I May 1956, US Charge d' Affaires Foy D. Kohler approached Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on this matter. He told the Prime Minister that the effort was a continuation of the GENETRIX pro gram, during which balloons had been released from Turkey, and in volved aircraft that could fly 10,000 feet higher than any Soviet plane. Menderes gave his approval immediately. At the time ofthe

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

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Suez takeover, however, the second contingent of U-2 aircraft and pi lots was still being trained in Nevada. This unit would not be ready for redeployment before the end of August and would not become es tablished at Incirlik airbase near Adana, Turkey, until early September 1956. The Agency referred to the AQUATONE detachment at Adana as Detachment B, cryptonym KWCORK; the Air Force covername was Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Provisional 2; and the unit's unofficial name was Tuslog Detachment 10-10. By whatever name, the Adana detachment became the mainstay of U-2 activity for the next three and a half years.' 3

The fast-moving events of the Suez Crisis would not wait for Detachment B pilots to complete their training. With tension growing between Egypt and the Suez Canal Company's former owners, the United Kingdom and France, as well as between Egypt and Israel.. US

43 OSA History, chap. 11. pp. 9, 39-40; chap. 12, pp. 5, 12 (TS Codeword).

_Secret

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military and foreign policy planners needed immediate information about developments in the eastern Mediterranean. Detachment A was, therefore, assigned the first Middle East overflights. On 29 August, U-2 missions 1104 and 1105 left Wiesbaden and overflew the eastern Mediterranean littoral, starting with Greece, then Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. Because these target areas were beyond the round trip range ofthe Wiesbaden-based U-2s, the planes landed at Adana for refueling. The next day, the same two planes, with dif ferent pilots, took off from Adana and overflew the same Middle East territory, this time including the Gaza Strip, before returning to Wiesbaden. The film contained evidence oflarge numbers ofBritish troops on Malta and Cyprus and more new French-made aircraft in Israel than had previously been reported."'"'

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

As the situation around Suez grew more tense, the Eisenhower administration decided to release some of the U-2 photos to the British Government. On 7 September, James Reber, chairman of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, and Arthur Lundahl, chief of the Photo Intelligence Division, flew to London, taking with them photos of the eastern Mediterranean area, including the Suez Canal, taken on 30 August. These were the first and the only photos of the Middle East that the President authorized to be given to the British during the 1956 crisis.*

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# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

The Suez Crisjs was a major turning point in the use of the U-2 airplane. Before this crisis, the U-2 had been seen sole ly as a collector ofstrategic intelligence, with high-quality results considered more important than speed. U-2 film had, therefore, been returned to the manufacturer for optimum development and then interpreted in Washington using the most up-to-date devices. Now. because ofthe Middle East crisis, Project AQUATONE was expected to perform like a tactical reconnaissance unit, developing film immediately after landing for instant interpretation or "readout." Photo-Intelligence Division personnel assigned to Project HTAUTOMAT (U-2 film ex ploitation), therefore, had to arrange for forward processing ofthe U-2 film to avoid unacceptable delays in providing intelligence on tactical developments around Suez.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

PID acted quickly to carry out its new assignment. Lundahl and Reber flew from the United Kingdom to US Air Force Europe headquarters in Wiesbaden on 12 September to make arrangements for processing and interpreting U-2 film in West Germany. They had been preceded by <empty> chief of PID’s Special Projects Branch. Following detailed discussions with Air Force photo-intelligence personnel, the CIA representatives arranged to use a portion of a nearby Air Force photo laboratory for developing U-2 film. With the assistance of <empty> chief of the HTAUTOMAT photo laboratory, and Air Force personnel, <empty> had the lab ready for processing on the following day, when the next U-2 mission returned from the Middle East. After quickly developing the film, <empty> and his joint staff of CIA and armed forces personnel studied it for indications of British and French preparations for hostilities and sent their first report to Washington on 15 September.

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October 1956. This unit's timely and accurate information enabled the PARAMOUNTCommittee to predict the joint Israe l i-Bri tish-French attack on Egypt three days before it took place.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

On 11 September, Detachment A pilot Jacob Kratt overflew the French Mediterranean naval base at Toulon. He brought back imagery revealing that France was loading troopships at Toulon. During the rest of the month, Detachment A pilots flew another eight missions over the Middle East. By this time, the new Detachment B in Turkey was ready for operations, and it was better positioned to provide cov- erage of the Middle East. Detachment B began flying missions in September and soon became the primary detachment for Middle East overflights, conducting nine out of the 10 such missions flown in October.

Detachment B's first U-2 flight, on 11 September 1956, made passes over Turkey, Cyprus, and Rhodes. The next flight, more than two weeks later, covered much the same ground but flew as far west as Malta, Sicily, and Crete. Both were "special" mi ssions aimed at maintaining survei lla nce of the British and French fleets and forces as they prepared for the attackon Egypt. Meanwhile, Detachment A pi lots flew four missions in the Western Mediterranean.

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# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

.9f British Canberra bombers at Akrotiri, Cyprus: The Anglo-French military buildup greatly irritated President Eisenhower, who consid ered these activities a violation ofthe 1950 Tripartite Declaration, in which the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had agreed to m~ntain the status quo in armaments and borders in the Middle EastXfo Arthur Lundahl he remarked, "It'sa hell of a note when you have to G-2 your friends." s(

U-2 photography continued to keep the President and other key officials well informed about the progress ofthe crisis. }lights over Israel and Rhodes on 21 October and Cyprus on 25 October revealed heavy military concentrations and an increase in the number oftroop transports and air forces. On the basis ofthis information,: Secretary ofState John Foster Dulles told the President on 28 October that he believed an Israeli attack on Jordan was imminent, adding that he thought the British and French would take advantage of such an at tack to occupy the Suez Canal. 51

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

The 10-day Middle East war began on the afternoon of 29 October 1956 with Israeli paratroop drops in the Sinai peninsula, fol lowed by mobile columns striking deep into Egyptian territory. tfhe next day, 30 October, Francis Gary Powers conducted mission 1314. He overflew Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and finally the Sinai.Jwhere he photographed black puffs ofsmoke from the fighting between Israel and Egypt. Adana-based U-2s were in the air for the next two days filming the Suez Canal area@fld neighboring countrie£f3

The United Kingdom and France entered the fray on the evening of31 October with bombing raids against major Egyptian airfields. The Anglo-French bombing campaign continued for the next 48 hours. Ear)Y on the morning of1 November, an Adana-based U-2, pi loted by LWilliam Hall, took off to gather intelligence on the Anglo-French military activity. After photographing Cyprus, Hal] flew south to the Sinai Desert, where he made several passes to obtain complete coverage of the Israeli-Egyptian fighting there. [He then headed west to Cairipassing directly over the main Egyptian airbase

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# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

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angered by what it depicted: an Anglo-French attack on Egypt. He quickly called for a cease-fire ~and denied the United Kingdom any further U-2 photographs ofthe Middle Eaaj

The l November mission over Cyprus and Egypt also photo graphed Anglo-French preparations to invade Egypt. President Eisenhower was informed ofthis impending invasion on Sunday, 4 November. On the following day, British and French paratroopers dropped near Port Said at the north end of the Suez Canal. This action prompted Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin to send messages to France, Britain, and Israel warning that the Soviet Union was ready to use force to crush the aggressors. 55

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

Early on the morning of election day, 6 November, the Anglo-French invasion armada arrived at Port Said and began landing troops. Back in Washington President Eisenhower met with Allen Dulles to discuss the deepening international crisis. Worried that the Soviet Union might be poised to intervene in the war, the President ordered Dulles to have the Adana-based U-2s fly over Syria to see whether the Soviets were moving planes to Syrian airbases in preparation for a strike against the forces attacking Egypt. The answer to Eisenhower's question came much sooner than expected because on the previous day a U-2 had already overflown Syria before making a run across northern Egypt. The film from this flight had reached Wiesbaden for processing and readout during the night. The results were in the hands ofthe PARAMOUNT Committee by midmorning on 6 November, while the President was motoring to Gettysburg to cast his ballot. By the time the President returned to the White House by helicopter at noon, Colonel Goodpaster was waiting for him with an answer: there were no Soviet aircraft in Syria. Because of the President's concern about possible Soviet moves, Syria was the target of 14 additional U-2 flights between 7 November and 18 December 1956. 56

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

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facilities available, and the filmhad to be flown to Wiesbaden, adding a 10- to 15-hour delay. During the gradual buildup of the c risis, this delay had been tolerated, but, once actual hostilities broke out, US decisionmakers needed a more rapid res ponse. On 29 October, RichardBi ssell ordered Lundahl to establish a film-processing facility at Adana. TwoPlDemployees went to Adana on 13 November to set up the facility, and two photointerpreters moved from Wiesbaden to Adana to help in the effort. Forward processing was, however, ham pered by the location ofthe Adana facility on a tlat, arid plain in southern Turkey, 35 miles from the Mediterraneanat the very end of a long supply line.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

The PIDteamobtainedandoutfitted a trailer for film processing, but many problems had to be overcome. The first major problem was obtaining enough clean water. Detachment B personnel, therefore, purchased large amounts of borax locally for use inpurifying water. In fact, they bought so much borax on the local market that one of them was arrested by the Turkish police. who believed he was using the chemical to make drugs. Itwas also difficult to obtain a constant source of developers and fixers for processing the U-2 film, si nce the large Ai r Force supply facility at Wheelus AFB in Libya refused to provide the needed photographic chemicals. When PIO personnel ac companiedprocessed film from Turkey to the United States, they re turned to Turkey sitting atop cartons of chemicals for the next day's processing. At first, film was developed in improvised tanks using flimsy wooden spools and hand-turned cranks to move the film through the solutions. Later, the Adana facility moved from its trailer to a building and received more up-to -date processing equipment. As was the case with the photo lab in Germany, the Adana lab's person nel came from the Agency and the armed forces. 57

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RENEWED OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

Throughout the fall of 1956, U-2s provided valuable coverage ofthe Middle East crisis, but they were not conducting their original mission of strategic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower had halted all such overflights by his order of 10 July, and, in the months that followed, he remained unconvinced by CIA arguments in favor ofa resumption ofoverflights. On 17 September 1956, DDCI Cabell and Richard Bissell went to the White House to ask President Eisenhower to authorize more flights over the Soviet Union. Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also at tended the meeting. Bissell and Defense Department representatives reviewed the valuable intelligence from the July U-2 flights, and Bissell then informed Eisenhower that many important intelligence re quirements remained unfilled. To fill these requirements, Bissell not ed, would require photography ofapproximately 15 separate areas of the Soviet Union. Pleading for the authority to resume overflights, Bissell stressed that conditions for photography were becoming less favorable as the days grew shorter. While the U-2 was then still safe from interception, he added, it might not be in the future. 5 K

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

President Eisenhower aclrnowledged the value of the U-2 but emphasized that the international political aspects of overflights re mained his overriding concern. He said he would talk further with John Foster Dulles about the matter, noting that the Secretary of State had at first seemed to belittle the political risk but had later found it increasingly worrisome.

A little more than two weeks later, on 3 October, when the President again met with Bissell, Cabell, and Radford, John Foster Dulles was also present. In opening the meeting, Eisenhower said he had become discouraged regarding Project AQUATONE. Although he had been assured that "therewould be a good chance of not being discovered on most, if not all, operations, just the opposite had proved true." The President observed that arguments in favor ofre suming U-2 operations did not take world opinion into consideration. He added that great efforts had been made for many years "to create an opinion in the world that we are not truculent and do not want war," and, if knowledge of the U-2 overflights got out, world opinion would view them as "provocative and unjustified." 59

" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference. 17 September 1956, WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).

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Secretary of State Dulles said that, although he essentially agreed with the President's comments, he thought that "really impor tant results" might beobtained by a seven to 10-day operation. He, nevertheless, questioned the long-term value of the results. DDCI Cabell replied that U-2 photographs would be useful much longer than the Secretary of State had implied because they would establish a reference bank ofgeographic and manmade features. Siding with Cabell, Admiral Radford pointed out the needfor more intelligence to make estimates better.

President Eisenhower was not convinced by these arguments. Although willing to consider extensions ofthe radar-seeking ferret flights he had authorized along the Soviet borders. he remained op posed to penetration flights over the Soviet Union.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

Eventsin Eastern Europe in the fall ofl 956 helped to change the President's mind. In October the Soviet Union backed away fro m a confrontation with nationalist Communist leaders in Poland only to find itself facing a similar situation in Hungary, where mass demon strations led to the formation of a new government under Imr e Nagy •on· 23 October 1956. Soviet troops and tanks temporarily withdrew from Budapest while awaiting reinforcements. By early November, however, the Kremlin leadership decided that events in Hungary were getting out ofhand-particularly when Premier Nagy announced his nation 's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pac t-and ordered Soviet troops to suppress the Hungarian uprising. Although President Eisenhower deplored the Soviet intervention. he turned down CIA re quests for permission to airdrop arms and supplies to the Hungarian rebels. In fact, the President forbid all overflights ofthat nation, in cluding those by U-2 aircraft, and none was made. 60

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# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

surgery).JCS Chairman Adm. Arthur Radford. DCIAllen Dulles, and Richard Bissell, Eisenhower explained why he refused to allow over flights of the Soviet Union: "Everyone in the world says that, in the las t six weeks, the United States has gained a pla ce it hasn't held since World War fl . To make trips now would cost more than we would gain in form of solid information." Hoover agreed and rnoted, "If we lost a plane at this stage, it would be almost catastrophic." Tom between his desire to maintain a "correct and moral" position and his wish to know what the Soviet Union was up to. the Pres.idem finally authorized several overflights of Eastern Europe and the Soviet border, "but notthe deep one," adding that the aircraft should "stayas close to the border as possible." (>I

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

The first of these flights, mission 4016 on 20 November 1956, was the first overflight of Soviet territory since 10 July. This mission left Adana and flew east over Iran, then reversed and flew west along the Soviet-Iranian border to Soviet Armenia, where it crossed into the Soviet Union and photographed Yerevan. An electrical malfunction then forced the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, to return to Adana. Soviet interceptor aircraft made several unsuccessful attempts to reach this U-2, and the Soviet Government sent a secret protest note to Washington."2

On IO December. Bulgaria was the target of two U-2 missions. one (40 I 8) from Detachment B at Adana and another (2029) from Detachment A at Giebelstadt. Bulgarian fighter aircraft made lO dif ferent attempts to intercept the first mission. but the flight proceeded without difficulty. 6 J

The second flight came close to crashing but not through the ef forts of interceptors. The pilot ofmission 2029 was Carmine Vito, who had flown the first U-2 mission over Moscow on 5 July. He was known co his colleagues as the Lemon-Drop Kid because he always carriedthese hard candies in the knee pocketof his flight suit. Despite

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# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

warnings to all pilots about the danger of opening the helmet face- plate at high altitudes, several pilots were known to do so. Some ate candy bars; Vito favored lemon drops. On the morning of 10 December, while Vito was undergoing prebreathing, the Air Force en- listed man who oversaw his preflight regimen placed an L-pill in the righthand knee pocket of Vito's flight suit, unaware that this pocket also contained Vito's supply of lemon drops. After he took off, Vito began indulging in his habit of sucking lemon drops. About midway into the mission, he opened his faceplate and popped into his mouth what he thought was another lemon drop. After closing the faceplate, he began sucking on the object and thought it strange that it had no flavor and was much smoother than the previous lemon drops. Although tempted to bite down, Vito decided instead to reopen his faceplate and see what it was he had in his mouth. Spitting the object into his hand, he saw that he had been sucking on the L-pill with its lethal contents of potassium cyanide. Just a thin layer of glass had stood between him and death. The loss of his aircraft over Bulgaria would have exposed the U-2 program to worldwide publicity and would probably have resulted in an early end to overflights.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

Detachment A's security officer overheard Vito relating the L-pill story to a fellow pilot several days later and promptly reported the conversation to headquarters. When details of Vito's close call reached Washington, James Cunningham immediately ordered L-pills placed in boxes so that there would be no chance of mistaking them for anything else. The L-pill continued to be available for another three years. Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, Col. William Shelton, raised an important question that had never been considered: what would happen if an L-pill with its volatile con- tents accidentally broke inside the cockpit of a U-2? Realizing that such an accident would result in the death of the pilot, James Cunningham ordered the destruction of all L-pills and then turned to the Technical Services Division (TSD) for a better idea. By this time the state of the art in lethal devices was a needle poisoned with algal, an extremely deadly shellfish toxin. The needle was hidden in a tiny hole in a silver dollar supplied by Cunningham. Only one poison-nee- dle coin was made because Cunningham decided that, if any pilot had to use it because of capture, there would probably not be any more overflights." 65

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Although the U-2 overflights of Eastern Europe in late 1956 caused renewed Soviet protests, the sharpest protest came on 15 December 1956, after three specially modified USAF RB-57D bomb ers photographed the city of Vladivostok in a high-speed dash over the Far Eastern coast ofthe Soviet Union (as part ofthe Air Force's Operation BLACK KNIGHT). President Eisenhower had approved the mission after being told by the Air Force that the high-speed RB-57Ds would probably not be detected. 66

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

Reacting strongly to the Soviet protest. the President told Secretaryof State Dulles on 18 December that he was going to "order complete stoppage of this entire business." As for a reply to the Soviet protest, Dulles said, "I think we will have to admit this was done and say we are sorry. We cannot deny it." Dulles noted that "our relations with Russia are pretty tense at the moment." Eisenhower agreed, noting that this was no time to be provocative. He then instructed Colonel Goodpaster to call Secretary of Defense Wilson, Joint Chiefs ofStaff Chairman Radford, and DCI Dulles to order: "Effective immediately, there are to be no flights by US recon naissance aircraft over Iron Curtain countries."67

Flights along the borders of Iron Curtain countries continued, however, and, on 22 December 1956, Detachment B flew the first mission (4019) by a U-2 equipped for electronic intercept. The elec tronic-detection equipment known as the System-V unit (see appendix C) was installed in the bay normally used by the main camera, and the plane flew along the Soviet border from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and on to Afghanistan. The System-V unit worked well. 68

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# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

airspace because ofcompass error compounded by a slight error in the pilot's dead reckoning. Because ofheavy cloud cover, the pilot, James W. Cherbonneaux, did not realize he was over the Soviet Union until he saw Soviet fighters attempting to intercept him. These attempts at interception once again demonstrated the Soviets' ability to track the U-2 and their inability to harm it. 69

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

At this point in early 1957, the U-2 program was in limbo. Although the President would not allow U-2s to fly their primary mis sionofreconnaissanceof the Soviet Union, he did not cancel the pro gram and continued to authorize flights along Soviet borders. The CIA's overhead reconnaissance program also faced a renewed bid by the Air Force, which now had its own growing U-2 fleet, to gain con trol ofthe overflight program in the spring of 1957. The uncertainty surrounding the future of the project made planning and budgeting extremely difficult. In April 1957, Richard Bissell asked the DCI and DDCI to push for a decision on whether the U-2 program was to con tinue in civilian hands and what its scope was to be. In briefing papers prepared for the DCI, Bissell argued for maintaining a nonmilitary overflight capability, which could "maintain greater security, employ deeper cover, use civilian pilots, keep the aircraft outside military control, and, therefore, make possible more plausible denial of US military responsibility in the face ofany Soviet charges." In urging the resumption ofoverflights, Bissell stated that four U-2 missions over border regions ofthe Soviet Union or Eastern Europe had been detected by the Soviets without causing any diplomatic protest. He also noted that the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities had unanimously recommended the resumption ofoverflights. 70

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

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remaining opposed to flights over most of the Soviet Union, Eisenhower finally agreed to permit some flights over peripheral areas such as Kamchatka Peninsula and Lake Baikal, as well as the Soviet Union's atomic testing area at Semipalatinsk. Such overflights could be staged from Pakistan if the Pakistani Government consent ed. The President rejected the Air Force's request to take over the U-2 program, stating that he preferred to have the aircraft manned by civilians "during operations of this kind." 71

The President had once again agreed to allow overflights ofthe Soviet Union, although only over certain areas, because the need to learn more about the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union was too compelling. In particular, the President and top administra tion officials wanted to gather more data on the Soviet Union's mis sile program, a subject for which considerable Soviet boasting-but no hard data-was available.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS (cont.)

Even after he had authorized the resumption of overflights, President Eisenhower maintained tight control over the program. He personally authorized each overflight, which meant that Richard Bissell would bring maps to the White House with the proposed routes marked on them for the President to examine. More than once, accord ing to Bissell, Eisenhower spread the map out on his Oval Office desk for detailed study, usually with his son John (an Army officer serving as a White House aide) and Colonel Goodpaster looking over his shoulder. On occasion, the President would pick up a pencil and elimi nate a flight leg or make some other correction to the flight plan. 71

## RADAR-DECEPTIVE "DIRTY BIRDS"

One additional reason why President Eisenhower had again autho rized overflights ofthe Soviet Union was renewed CIA promises that Soviet detection or tracking of the U-2 was unlikely. At the 6 May 1957 meeting with the President, Richard Bissell reported on the progress that had been made in developing radar camouflage and

" Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum ofConft:rence with the President. 6 May 1957 (TS); "Record ofAction-Meeting ofMay 6. 1957," WHOSS, Alpha. DDEL (TS).

'' Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S); Beschloss. Mayday. p. 140.

-Secret_

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Key entities identified:
*   **Chordwise wire**: Runs across the width of the wings.
*   **Spanwise wire**: Runs along the length of the wings, connecting to the fuselage.
*   **Ferrite beads**: Small components attached along the chordwise wires on the wings.
*   **Fiberglass member**: Located on the tail section of the aircraft.

absorption devices for the U-2. Once these devices_ were in stall,ed on the operational U-2s, he explained, the "majority ofincidents would be undetected." 73

"Trapeze• antiradar attachments
to the U-2

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## RADAR-DECEPTIVE "DIRTY BIRDS" (cont.)

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the aircraft, was a small-gauge wire with precisely spaced ferrite beads. The wire and beads were supposed to capture incoming 70-MHz radar pulses and either trap them in the loop or weaken them so much that they would not register as a valid radar return. This con figuration was called the trapeze and was not very successful.

A second approach, tested in early 1958, involved the use of plastic material containing a printed circuit designed to absorb radar pulses in the 65- to 85-MHz range. Nicknamed "wallpaper," this ma terial was glued to parts of the U-2's fuselage, nose, and tail. Although the "trapeze" and "wallpaper"systems provided protection against some Soviet radars, the systems proved ineffective against ra dars operating below 65-MHz or above 85-MHz. Furthermore, both ofthese additions degraded the U-2's performance. The weight and drag of "trapeze" reduced the aircraft's operating ceiling by 1,500 feet, and "wallpaper" sometimes caused engines to overheat. 74

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## RADAR-DECEPTIVE "DIRTY BIRDS" (cont.)

SEI's research results were tested by another firm known as Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G), which was also composed ofMIT faculty members. Under an Air Force contract to evaluate ra dars, EG&G operated a small testing facility at Indian Springs, Nevada, not far from Area 51. Although Kelly Johnson had been closely involved with the radar deception project since its early days, he cooperated reluctantly because he disliked adding attachments that made his aircraft less airworthy. (Johnson's dislike of the antiradar at tachments was reflected in the unofficial nickname for aircraft that had been so modified-"dirty birds.") After Lockheed mechanics had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a Lockheed test pilot would fly the plane over EG&G's Indian Springs installation. This was little more than a series of radar sets and a trailer containing instrumentation. EG&G technicians could thus re cord and evaluate the U-2's radar returns as it traversed a specified course over their facility. 75

This method of testing radar-deceptive modifications proved both time consuming and dangerous. During a test flight on 2 April 1957, the "wallpaper" modification acted as insulation around the

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## RADAR-DECEPTIVE "DIRTY BIRDS" (cont.)

" Records of the Scientific Engineering Institute (Project HTNAMABLE). OSA records (TS Codeword).

" References to EG&G programs for the U-2 are contained in the later Convair contracts for Projects FISH and KINGFISH. OSA records. job 67-B-415, box I (TS Codeword).

-Secret

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The top image shows a stack of perforated sheets, likely screens or filters, arranged in a fan-like pattern. Some of these sheets have a regular grid of square holes, while others appear to have finer mesh. A ruler is also visible, suggesting measurement or comparison.

The bottom image shows a large, cylindrical object, possibly a drum or a pipe, covered in a fine, dotted pattern. It appears to be part of some industrial machinery, with visible mechanical components and tubing in the foreground and background.

"Wallpaper"

engine of the U-2 known as article 341, causing it to overheat and tlameout. Unab le to restart the power pla nt, Lockheed tesi: pilot Robert Sieker bailed out but was struck and kill ed in midair lby the U-2's tailplane. The aircraft crashed in an area of Nevada so remote that Area 51 search teams n eeded four days to locate the wreoekage. The extensive search attract ed the attention of the pr ess. and a

-Secret

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Wreckage of Article 341,
2 April 1957

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## RADAR-DECEPTIVE "DIRTY BIRDS" (cont.)

12 April 1957 article in the Chicago Daily Tribune was headliined, "Secrecy Veils High-Altitude Research Jet; Lockheed U-2 Ca.lied Super Snooper."76 •

Because of its large wingspan, an out-of-control U-2 tended to enter a classical flat spin before ground contact. This slowed descent and actually lessened the impact. If there was no fire after impact, the remains of crashed U-2s were often salvageable, as was the case with the wreckage of article 341. Kelly Johnson's crew at the Skunk Works used the wreckage, along with spares and salvaged parts of other crashed U-2s, to produce another flyable airframe for about $185,000. The U-2's ability to survive a crash in fairly good condi- 77 tion should have been noted by the Development Projects Staff for consideration in its contingency plans for a loss over hostile territory because the equipment on board the aircraft could easily compromise the weather research cover story.

The lossof one of Lockheed'sbest test pilots. as well as the pro totype " dirty bird" U-2, led KellyJohnson to s ugg est that Lockhee d install a large boom at the Indian Springs radar test fac ility. Using the

* Accident folder, crash of 2 April 1957, OSA records (S).

די
Lockheed contracts, OSA Records (S).

-Secret

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boom, which could lift entire airframes 50 feet in the air, technicians could change the airframe's attitude and run radar tests almost contin uously without having to fuel and fly the plane.n

By the summer of 1957, testing of the radar-deception system was complete, and in July the first "dirty bird" (DB) arrived at Detachment B. The first operational use ofthis aircraft occurred on 21 July l 957 in mission 4030 over Iran, Iraq, and Syria. On 31 July, the same aircraft made a run over the Black Sea. There were a total of nine DB missions over the USSR. The antiradar system did not prove very effective, and its use was curtailed in May 1958.79

## THE  NEW DETACHMENT C

On 8 June 1957, a U-2 took off from Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to conduct the first intentional overflight of the Soviet Union since December 1956. This mission broke new ground in two re spects: it was the first overflight conducted from American soil and •-the first by the new Detachment C.

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# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## THE  NEW DETACHMENT C (cont.)

The search for a new home for Detachment C led the Agency to ask the Air Force in the autumn of 1956 for permission to locate the detachment at Yokota AFB, Japan. Because Yokota was already the base for one covert project (the very secret Air Force Project BLACK KNIGHT using RB-57s), Air Force Chief of Staff Twining did not wish to locate another one there and denied the request. The Agency then turned to the Navy, which granted permission for Detachment C to use the Naval Air Station at Atsugi, Japan. The Japanese Government received no notification of the proposed deployment be- cause at that time it had no control over activities involving US mili- tary bases in Japan. Deployment of Detachment C began in early 1957 but was complicated by a recent decision to permit the families of Project AQUATONE employees to accompany them on overseas tours. As a result, program managers had to find housing facilities on the base or in nearby communities, not an easy task in crowded Japan.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## THE  NEW DETACHMENT C (cont.)

Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after several aircraft and pilots flew to Eielson Air Force Base near Fairbanks, Alaska. Air Force radar order-of-battle reports and NSA studies had revealed that the radar network in the Soviet Far East, with antiquated radar sets and personnel of a lower caliber than those in the western Soviet Union, was relatively ineffective. To take ad- vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the Soviet Far East. The first. on 7/8 June (the air- craft crossed the international date line during the flight), was unable to photograph its target, the ICBM impact area near Klyuchi on the Kamchatka Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph Klyuchi on 19/20 June was marred by a camera malfunction that ruined every third frame of photography. This flight was tracked by Soviet radars, but there was no attempt at interception. After a pause of almost three months during which Detachment C received a dirty-bird U-2, the de- tachment's third mission over Klyuchi on 15/16 September 1957 achieved excellent results. The radar-deception devices proved inef- fective, however, as the U-2 was tracked by Soviet radar and trailed by five fighters." 31

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DETACHMENT B FLIGHTS FROM PAKISTAN

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## THE  NEW DETACHMENT C (cont.)

The most important series of overflights in the summer of 1957 were those that Detachment B staged to gather intelligence on the Soviet Union's guided missile and nuclear programs. President Eisenhower had approved these overflights at the meeting on 6 May 1957, pro- vided that Pakistan allowed the U-2s to operate from its territory (the desired targets were too far away from the U-2 base in Turkey). Richard Bissell's personal assistant, and met with President Iskander Mirza, Prime Minister Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, and Army Commander Gen. Ayub Khan between 3 and 7 June 1957 and received permission to operate from Lahore. The airfield at Peshawar, a more desirable location, was not available because of repair work. Detachment B at Ankara ferried four of its U-2s, two of which were dirty birds, to Lahore. A C-124 brought in eight pilots and ground crews to prepare for missions over the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) beginning on 4 August (Operation SOFT TOUCH). During a 23-day period, these aircraft made nine flights: seven over the USSR and two over the PRC. Although one of the seven flights over the USSR was a failure because the camera - malfunctioned after taking only 125 exposures, the remaining mis- sions over Central Asia were a complete success, producing a bo- nanza of information that kept scores of photointerpreters busy for more than a year."

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## THE  NEW DETACHMENT C (cont.)

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Semipalatinsk Nuclear
Weapons Proving Ground,
22 August 1957

part of the world." The Soviet announcement made the intelligence community want even more information on Tyuratam, and a second U-2 piloted by Edwin K. Jones flew over the area on 28 August 1957, just one week after the Soviet ICBM launch. This mission obtained excellent vertical photographs of the main launch complex, and photointerpreters soon determined that the Soviets had only one. launchpad at Tyuratam. The base was not photographed again until 9 July 1959, at which time it still had only one launch pad, although two more were under construction."

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nuclear device. These photographs also revealed evidence of a recent,
low-yield, above-ground nuclear test <empty>

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## THE  NEW DETACHMENT C (cont.)

On its way to Semipalatinsk, the 21 August mission flew a search pattern over the western end of Lake Balkash looking for an- other Soviet missile-related installation and made the first photo- graphs of what was later determined to be the new missile test center at Saryshagan. This facility was used to test radars against incoming missiles fired from Kapustin Yar, 1,400 miles to the west. Saryshagan later became the center for the development of the Soviet Union's ad- vanced antiballistic missile (ABM) weapon system.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## THE  NEW DETACHMENT C (cont.)

On 23 August 1957, DDCI Cabell, Richard Bisse ll , and Air Fo rce Chief of Staff Twining met with President Eisenhower to re :port on the results of Operation SOFT TOUCH. They showed the Pres ident some of the photographic results of the earlier missions and reported on the effects of the antiradar measures. Although the an ti radar measures had n ot proved successful, the photographic yield from the missions was extremely valuable. Bissell then informed! the ·President that the SOFT TOUCH operation was just about to con clude with the transfer ofthe aircraft back to Adana. He asked per mission for one of the U-2s to make another overflight ofthe Soviet Union on this return trip, but the President deni ed the request. not wishing to conduct any more overflights than were necessary .~'

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in the Far East were less risky than those conducted by Detachment A. Finally, the main target of U-2 photography after the bomberissue r eceded was Soviet missile and nuclear progress. The testing areas for these weapons were located in the vast open spaces ofthe south-cen tral and eastern portions of the Soviet Union, which l ay beyond the range of Detachment A's aircraft.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## THE DECLINE OF DETACHMENT A (cont.)

The decline in importance of Detachment A had begun with the President's standdown or der of IO July I 956. During the next three months, the detachment conducted only 11 missions, all over the Mediterranean region rather than the original target ofthe Soviet Union, and the slow pace of activityand change in mission adversely affected pilot morale. One of the detachment's aircraft was lost in a crash on 17 September, killing pilotHoward Carey andgarnering un wan t ed publicity. Conditions improved when the detachment moved to the newly renovated facility at Giebelstadt in early October 1956, but security now became a problem there. Detachment A personnel discoveredthat a long, black Soviet-Bloc limousine was parked at the end of the Giebelstadt runway whenever the U-2s tookoff.:s,s

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## THE DECLINE OF DETACHMENT A (cont.)

During the next year, Detachment A mounted on ly four over flights. The first two were over Eastern Europe: one over Bulgaria on 10 December 1956 and the other over Albania on 25 April 1957. Then a lo ng period of inactivityfolllowed, ending wit h a third mission on 11 October 1957, which conducted electronic surveillance of Soviet naval maneuvers in the Barents Sea. The final overflight of Detachment A, mission 2040 on l 3 October 1957, flew north over Norway to the BeringSea, turned southeast to overfly Murmansk, and then exited to the north, returni ng to Germany via Norway. 89

Although the final missions of Detachment A achieved excellent results. project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe wasnot a satisfactory lo cation for overflights of the Soviet Union and had notified Detachment A on 20 September 1957 that its operations would cease in November. By 15 November 1957. a ll of the detach ment's personnel and aircraft had returned to the United States. During Detachment A's 17-month period of operations, seven pilots

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## Final Overflight byDetachmentA, 13 October 1957

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had flown a total of 23 missions: six over the Soviet Union, five over Eastern Europe, and most of the remaining 12 missions over the Mediterranean area.')()

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## COOPERATION WITH NORWAY

The final missions of Detachment A had one unforeseen result: the beginning of cooperation between CIA and the Norwegian Intelligence Service on the U-2 program. Norwegian radars tracked the overflights of the Barents Sea and Murmansk in October 1957, and Col. Vilhelm Evang, Chief of the Norwegian Defense Staff Intelligence Service

In March 1958, Colonel

Evang came to Washington and received a briefing from Arthur Lundahl together with sanitized photos that did not reveal the altitude of the aircraft or the focal length of the camera. The Agency provided additional photos to Norway during a visit by a PIO staff member in July.~'

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## COOPERATION WITH NORWAY (cont.)

Later that year Norway agreed to provide an airfield for the United States to conduct U-2 flights that did not violate Soviet airspace. On 15 September 1958, a Detachment B staging party arrived at Bodo Air Force Base this was followed by an ELINT collection flight over international waters (the Kara Sea) on 25 October. On 6 November, the U-2 returned to Adana by conducting a lengthy ELINT collection flight along the borders of the Soviet Union and East Germany. During the initial portion of the mission, when the U-2 flew along the Soviet-Finnish border and then turned east over the Gulf of Finland to come within 60 miles of Leningrad (while remaining over international waters), the aircraft was the target of 23 unsuccessful Soviet intercept attempts.92

OSA History, chap. 11. p. 44; chap. 19, annex 120 (TS Codeword).

Ibid., chap. 11, pp. 44-45 (TS Codeword); NPIC History, vol. 3, pp. 447-8 (S).

Mission folders 1482 (9 October 1958), 4092 (25 October 1958), and 4093 (6) November 1958), OSA records, job 67-B-972, boxes 3 and 10.

Secret

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## DECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY

U-2 at Bodo, Norway

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## DECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY (cont.)

Operation SOFT TOUCH (4-27 August 1957) proved to be the high water mark of U-2 operations against the Soviet Union. Detachment B staged one more overflight on 10 September 1957, when a U-2 pi- loted by William Hall flew from Adana to photograph the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range for the first time since the RAF's overflight in 1953, obtaining photographs of a large medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) on the launchpad. Six days later Detachment C conducted its successful overflight of the ICBM impact site at Klyuchi, and October saw the final two overflights of Detachment A. After these missions, penetration overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during the next 32 months: one, in 1958; two, in 1959; and three, in 1960 (one of which was unsuccessful). During this period, President Eisenhower did authorize a number of flights along Soviet border areas that occasionally penetrated short distances inside the border, but the Chief Executive had become extremely wary of authorizing "deep penetration" overflights, which invariably brought protests from Moscow.

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U-2s flying well within international airspace above the Black Sea, as was the case on 27 October I957, when electronic intelligence equip ment on a U-2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception by Soviet fighters.'n

The sole U-2 overflight of 1958 was conducted by a dirty bird from Detachment C. On I March 1958, mission 6011 overflew the Soviet Far East and photographed the Trans-Siberian Railroad, Sovetskaya Gavan', the Tatar Strait, and a strange installation at Malaya Sazanka, which was eventually determined to be a structure for mating nuclear devices with their detonators. This was the first and only U-2 overflight ofthe Soviet Union staged from Japan. 94

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## DECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY (cont.)

On 5 March 1958, the Soviet Union delivered a vigorous protest concerning this mission, prompting President Eisenhower to tell Colonel Goodpaster on 7 March to inform the CIA that U-2 flights were to be "discontinued, effective at once." 95 This standdown was to last more than 16 months, until July 1959. The Soviets had not been fooled by the antiradar devices carried by mission 601l,as was demonstrated by the detailed information about the mission contained in a Soviet aide-memoire delivered on 21 April I958. It was clear that dirty bird aircraft were not effective and that Soviet radar operators had little difficulty in tracking them. At this point, the Agency aban doned the use of the antiradar devices on the U-2. As a substitute, Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant qualities, but this project also proved unsuccessful.

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# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## DECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY (cont.)

launched to take advantage of a newly discovered change in the west-to-eastjet stream. Normally, this fast-moving air current stayed at an altitude of 55,000 feet, but, during June and July, it turned abruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west ofAlaska, climbed to 110,000 feet, and then reversed direction. One ofthe key arguments that convinced the President to approve the project was Quarles 's claim that the balloons' "chance of being detected is rather small and their identification or shootdown practically nil." 96

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## DECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY (cont.)

Release of the balloons took place from an aircraft carrier in the Bering Sea on 7 July 1958. Nothing was heard about them until 28 July, when Poland sent a note protesting the overflight of a US-made, camera-carrying balloon that had fallen to earth in central Poland. The loss of this balloon was because of human error. Each balloon was equipped with a timing device that would cause it to drop its camera and film payload after crossing the target areas. An Air Force technician aboard the aircraft carrier had calculated that the balloons should cross the Eurasian landmass in about 16 days. Thus, he ad justed regulators aboard the balloons to cause automatic descent after 400 hours aloft. When bad weather delayed the launch for three suc cessive days. however, the technician forgot to reset the timing de vices. As a result, one payload fell into Poland. None of the three WS-461 L balloon payloads was recovered.'n

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## DECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY (cont.)

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Equipment from a WS-461L
balloon on display in Moscow,
11 October 1958

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## DECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY (cont.)

Goodpaster on 29 July 1958 to tell the Air Force that "the project is to be discontinued at once and every cent that has been made avail- able as part of any project involving crossing the Iron Curtain is to be impounded and no further expenditures are to be made." "198

Two days later Eisenhower followed up this order wi th a formal memorandum co Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy telling him that "there is disturbing evidence ofa deterioration in the processes of discipline and responsibility within the armed forces." He cited, in particular, "unauthorized decisions which h ave apparentlyresu lted in certain balloons falling within the territory of the Communist B loc" and overflights over routes "that contravened my standing orders." 99

On 2 September I 958, there was another violation of Soviet ai r spacewhen an unarmedAir Force EC-130 on anelectronic intelligence collection mission crossed from Turkey into Soviet Armenia and was shot down by Soviet fighter aircraft. Six ofthe men on board were killedand the remaining 11 were never heard fromagain,despite State Department attempts to get the Soviet Union to reveal their fate.""'

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# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## DECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY (cont.)

President Eisenhower was disturbed by the increased superpower tension that had resulted from violations of Soviet airspace by US balloons and aircraft because he still hoped to enter into arms limita- tion negotiations with the Soviets. On 8 September 1958, the United States sent a note to the Soviet Union calling for a Soviet answer to US proposals for a "study of the technical aspects of safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack." One week later the Soviets agreed to participate and suggested that the talks begin in Geneva on 10 November 1958. President Eisenhower was also attempting to per- suade the Soviet Union to begin talks aimed at eliminating the atmo- spheric testing of nuclear weapons. These efforts began with a 22 August 1958 offer to suspend US nuclear tests for one year on the condition that the Soviet Union also refrain from further tests and join in negotiations. On 30 August, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev ac- cepted the proposal and agreed to start talks on 31 October 1958 in Geneva. When the talks began, however, the Soviets refused to agree to a test ban and carried out nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk on 1 and 3 November. Nevertheless, during the late summer and early autumn of 1958, President Eisenhower, determined to reduce to a minimurn any aggravation of the Soviets, kept the U-2 overflight program in limbo." 101

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST THE U-2 (cont.)

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shoot down a U-2. Before the program started, Richard Bissell had estimated that the U-2 would be able to fly over the Soviet Union with impunity for only about two years. This period was already over, and the Soviets were working frantically to devise a means to stop U-2 overflights. From the very beginning, Soviet air defense units had not only tracked U-2s with radars, but had also made repeated efforts to shoot them down with antiaircraft weapons and interceptor aircraft. In 1956 such attempted interceptions had involved primarily MiG-15s and MiG- l 7s, which could barely reach 55,000 feet. The advent of MiG- l 9s and MiG-21 s, which could climb even higher, provided a greater threat for U-2 pilots.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST THE U-2 (cont.)

Realistic training for pilots learning to intercept the U-2 became possible after the Soviets developed a new high-altitude aircraft, the Mandrake, which was actually an improved version of the Yakovlev-25 all-weather interceptor. The Mandrake used a high-lift, low-drag wing design similar to that employed by the U-2, but its twin engines made it heavier. The Mandrake's operating altitude was 55,000 to 65,000 feet, and its maximum altitude was 69,000, far less than the 75,000 feet reached by the U-2. Like the U-2, the Mandrake's wings would not tolerate great stresses, so it could not be used as an attack aircraft at the high altitudes at which both planes operated. Between 1957 and 1959, Yakovlev built 15 to 20 ofthese aircraft in two versions: the Mandrake-R or YAK-25RM and the Mandrake-T, sometimes called the YAK-26. These high-altitude air craft were used to overfly the Middle East, India, China, and Pakistan, as well as border regions of NATO nations in Europe during the late 1950s and early I960s. It is not believed that Mandrakes ever attempted to overfly the continental United States."'-'

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST THE U-2 (cont.)

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speed, apply full throttle to the engine, then pull back on the stick and zoom as high as he could. In this manner the Soviet pilot hoped to come up directly beneath the U-2 so he could use his guns and mis siles against the shiny U-2 etched in silver against the dark blue-black of space. Using this maneuver, some MiGs were able to climb as high as the U-2 but seldom got very close. At this height the MiGs were completely out of control; their small, swept-back wings provided in sufficient lift; and their control surfaces were too small to maintain aircraft stability. U-2 pilots often spotted MiGs that reached the apex of their zoom climbs and then fell away toward the earth. The US pi lots' greatest fear was that one of the MiGs would actually collide with a U-2 during a zoom climb. 1().1

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST THE U-2 (cont.)

U-2 pilots complained that they felt like ducks in a shooting gal lery under these circumstances and suggested that the underside of the silvery aircraft be camouflaged in some manner. Kelly Johnson had originally believed the U-2 would fly so high that it would be invisi ble, thus eliminating the need to paint the aircraft and thereby avoid ing the added weight and drag that paint produced. The paint penalty was calculated to be a foot of altitude for every pound of paint. A full c_O;J.t ofpaint cost the U-2 250 feet ofaltitude, substantially less than the L,500-foot penalty paid for the addition of dirty bird-devices.

By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series oftests over Edwards AFB, Lockheed began coating the U-2s with a standard blue-black military specification paint on top and a lighter cloud-blue paint below. Subsequent tests over Nevada revealed that the U-2s were less conspicuous when painted all over with a matte-finish blue-black color, which helped them blend with the dar canopy o space. k f 105

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST THE U-2 (cont.)

MORE POWERFUL ENGINES FOR THE U-2

Less conspicuous paints were not the only answer to the growing threat ofSoviet interceptors. A more powerful engine would increase the U-2's maximum altitude, which was the surest way to protect the aircraft from all Soviet threats. During late 1958 and early 1959, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U-2s originally the Agency had taken delivery of 20 planes and the Air

"u Information supplied by Jacob Kratt and James Cherbonneaux to Donald E. Wt:lz.:nbach, May 1986.

Lockheed contracts, OSA records (S).

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Soviet MiG-21 interceptor (top),

Soviet MiG- 19  interceptor
(middle), Soviet MiG-19
photographedby a U-2,
13October 1957 (bottom)

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YAK-25RD Mandrake on
display at the Gagarin
Military Academy Museum
(top and middle)
U-2 in the new black
paint scheme (left)

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# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST THE U-2 (cont.)

Force of31-withthe more powerful Pratt & Whitney 175-Pl3 jet engine. This new power plant generated 4,200 pounds more thrust while adding only 2,050 pounds more weight. With its greater power, the engine permitted the U-2 to reach operational altitude more quick ly, thereby reducing the telltale contrails that the U-2 produced as it passed through the tropopause at 45,000 to 55,000 feet. With the new engine, U-2 passed through this portion ofthe atmosphere faster and did so before entering hostile airspace, thus reducing the chance of visual detection. The 175 power plant also made it possible for the U-2 to carry a larger payload and gain another 2,500 feet in altitude, permitting it to cruise at 74,600 feet. The new engines were in very short supply because ofthe needs ofthe Air Force's F-105 construc tion program, but Colonel Geary used his Air Force contacts to obtain an initial supply of12 engines. The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10 "

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST THE U-2 (cont.)

Detachment C in Japan received the first of these re-engined air craft, known as U-2Cs, in July 1959, and two more arrived in Turkey for Detachment B in August. All Agency U-2s had the new engines by the summer of1962, but by then only seven CIA U-2s remained in service.

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# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958 (cont.)

Abdel Nasser overthrew the Government ofIraq and assassinated the royal family. Long concerned by the growing influence of Nasser, who had close ties to the Soviet Union and now headed both Egypt and Syria in the new United Arab Republic. President Eisenhower de cided that US intervention was necessary to stabilize the situation in Lebanon and to show Nasser that the United States was willing to use force to defend its vital interests in the region. Before intervening in Lebanon, the United States consulted with the United Kingdom, which also decided to intervene in the Middle East by sending para troopers to assist the Government ofJordan on 17 July.

With US Marines and Army troops deployed in a potentially hostile situation in Lebanon, US military commanders and intelli gence community analysts immediately requested tactical reconnais sance flights to look for threats to the US units and evidence that other Middle Eastern countries or the Soviet Union might be prepar ing to intervene. The U-2s of Detachment B in Turkey carried out these missions.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958 (cont.)

Because tactical reconnaissance required an immediate readout of-the films taken, the Photographic Intelligence Center (the new name for the Photo-Intelligence Division from August 1958) quickly reopened the film-developing unit at Adana and staffed it with lab technicians and photointerpreters. Throughout the summer of 1958. Detachment B U-2s brought back photography ofmilitary camps. air fields, and ports of those Mediterranean countries receiving Soviet arms. The detachment also kept a close watch on Egyptian-based Soviet submarines, which posed a threat to US 6th Fleet ships in the Mediterranean. In addition, U-2s flew occasional electronic intelli gence collection missions along the Soviet border and over the Black Sea without entering Soviet airspace. In late August, as the crisis in the Middle East eased, the United States began withdrawing its 14,300 troops. It was not until 25 October, however, that the last American soldier left Lebanon. 101

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become involved in the U-2 project in September 1956, when the United States supplied them with photography from U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which later merged with the US control system. By 1957 cooperation be tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to include frequent consultation between the requirements and photo interpretation organizations of both countries. James Reber and Arthur Lundahl made periodic trips to the United Kingdom for discussions with Alan Crick's UK Requirements Committee (gener ally known as the Crick Committee, later as the Joint Priorities Committee), the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint Air Recon naissance Intelligence Center, and MI-6. 108

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958 (cont.)

The idea ofusing British pilots in the U-2 program first arose in the spring of 1957, when Richard Bissell-upsetthat his aircraft had not been allowed to fly over the Soviet Union since the December 1956 standdown-wassearching for ways to reduce the political risks of overflights and thus obtain more frequent authorization for mis sions over the Soviet Union. One ofhis proposals was to use non-US pilots-possibly British-to increase the possibility of plausible de nial in the event of a loss. At a meeting with key CIA, Defense Department, and State Department officials on 6 May 1957, President Eisenhower approved the concept of British participation in the U-2 proJect. • IC>'J

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958 (cont.)

During the next six months, Dulles and Bissell met with Sir Dick White, head of MI-6, and Air Vice Marshal William M. L. MacDonald, Assistant Chief ofthe Air Staff for Intelligence, on sev eral occasions to discuss the proposal in general terms. At first the CIA did not push the proposal too hard because at the same meeting in which he approved British participation, President Eisenhower had consented to the resumption ofU-2 missions over the Soviet Union, resulting in 10 overflights during the summer and early fall of 1957. But when flights ceased in October, the thought ofBritish participa tion became more attractive. By early 1958, Bissell was pressing the British to begin training pilots in the U-2 even though no final politi cal decision on their participation had been made. On 7 February 1958, Bissell instructed the Chief of Station in Londonj ~---~__J to ask Air Vice Marshal MacDonald if the RAF was prepared to

'"" See, for ex:ample, the trip reports of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee in the COMIREX records, IC Staff (TS Codeword).

'"' Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum ofConference with the President, 6 May 1957 (TS); idem, "Record of Action-MeetingofMay 6, 1957," WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).

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select a group of pilots for the U-2 project. MacDonald agreed to Bissell's proposal and began recruiting RAF pilots to fly the U-2. 110

In June 1958, representatives from the British Air Ministry came to project headquarters for an orientation and then sat down with CIA officials to work out an agreement on plans and procedures for the joint project. The two sides decided to establish a small RAF contin gent that would be integrated into and supported by Detachment B at Adana. The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots began training in Texas. One ofthese pilots, Squadron Leader Christopher H. Walker, died in a training accident in July 1958. Because of the addition of RAF officers to the program, Project AQUATONE re ceived a new codename, CHALICE. By the end ofNovember 1958, three RAF pilots and a flight surgeon joined Detachment B at Adana with Turkish approval.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958 (cont.)

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to working closely with the British from hi s wartime experience and believed that their involvement in the U-2 program was a natural as pect oftheir alliance with the United States. 113

On the British side, p articipation in U-2 flights was a logical ex te nsionofthe close cooperation that already existed between the two countries on the U-2 program. The direct involvement ofthe British also enabled them to conduct additional flights in areas such as the Middle East that were of more intelligence interest to the United Kingdom than to t he United States. The British also may have rea soned that directparticipation in the program was the best way to en sure that they had a right to share in the U-2's take. Otherwise, the Unit edStates might decide at some: point to cut offthe flow ofU-2 photography, as it had done during the 1956 Suez Crisis.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958 (cont.)

By November 1958, British pilots had joined Detachment B, and arrangements had been made for the title to the aircraft they would be using to be transferred on paper to the British Government. In a final exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan in December, the President summarized the lines of au- thority for the joint program: "British missions are carried out on your authority and are your responsibility just as our activities are au- thorized and controlled here in accordance with the procedures I have established. In this sense, it could be said that we are carrying out two complementary programs rather than a joint one." 1114

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May 1959, and used to fly weather missions on 7 and 8 May before returning to Adana. Two more weather-sampling flights took place over England on 5 and 6 October 1959.

THE U-2 PROJECT AT THE BEGINNING OF 1959

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958 (cont.)

Early 1959 saw Detachment B aircraft active primarily over Middle Eastern countries, with occasional overflights ofAlbania to check for reported Soviet missile installations. Detachment C mainly collected high-altitude weather data, although it also flew two missions over Tibet and Southwest China (see chapter 5). The overflight program against the Soviet Union seemed to be at a standstill, but pressures within the government were building to resume deep-penetration flights to resolve the growing "missile-gap" controversy.

Organizationally, the U-2 project underwent a major change after Richard Bissell became CIA's Deputy Director for Plans on I January 1959. At first glance, Bissell's selection seems unusual because he liad spent most ofhis Agency career heading the U-2 project, but his first major assignment had been coordinating support for the opera tion that overthrew the leftist Government of Guatemala in 1954. Furthermore, Bissell's U-2 project was the major covert collector 0f intelligence against the CIA's primary target, the Soviet Union.

# First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 (cont.)

## INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958 (cont.)

During his years as head of the Development Projects Staff (DPS), Bissell had opposed proposals to bring all Agency air activi ties together into a single office, fearing that he would lose control of the U-2 project. Once he became Deputy Director for Plans, his view point changed; he was now in a position to consolidate all air activi ties under his own control. On 16 February 1959, the DPS became the Development Projects Division (DPD) ofthe Directorate ofPlans (at the time known as the Deputy Directorate/Plans orDDP). Despite the tremendous increase in the scope ofhis duties after assuming control of the DDP, Bissell retained personal control of his previous Development Projects Staff projects: the U-2 program, another pro ject to develop a photosatellite, and a third project to design a fol low-on aircraft for the U-2 (OXCART). Although the amalgamation of all Agency air operations and the transfer of the U-2 project to the DDP made sense, the question remained as to whether one individual could effectively control all these different activities.

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960

THE U-2 AND THE "MISSILE-GAP" DEBATE

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

Despite President Eisenhower's re luc tance to send U-2s over the Soviet Bloc, he once again authorized overflights in the summer of 1959, after a pause of more than ayear. The overriding factor in his decision was the growing '• missile-gap" controversy. which had its •roots in a series of dramatic Soviet announcements during the second half of 1957.The first announcement revealed the successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile in August. Then in October, the Soviets announced the successful orbiting of the world's first artificial earth satellite, Sputnik. One month later the Soviets orbited a second satellite containing a dog and a television camera. To many Americans, including some influential members of Congress, the Soviet Union's space successes seemed to indicate that its missile program was ahead ofthat ofthe United States. By the spring of 1958, after the United Sta t es had successfully launched several satel lit es, fears ofaspace technology gap between the two superpowers had eased. Bythe end of the year, however, new concerns arose that theSoviet Union was producing a missile arsenal that wou ldbe much largerthan thatof the Unit edStates. Thiswas the famous missile gap that received widespread publicity beginning in early 1959. 1

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Launch of Sputnik,
4 October 1957

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

Premier Nikita Khrushchev asserted that the Soviet Union had an ICBM capab le of carrying a 5-megaton nuclear warhead 8,000 miles. These statements seemed all the more ominous because, during this same month of December, the firs:t attempt to launch the new US Titan ICBM failed. In reality, all of the Soviet statements were sheer propaganda; they had encountered difficulties with the SS-6 ICBM, and the program was at a standstill. As a result, there were no ICBM launches from Tyuratam between 29 May 1958 and 17 February 1959, a space ofalmost nine months.:

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

To conceal the difficulties in their missile program. Soviet lead ers continued to praise its alleged successes. At the beginning of February 1959, Khrushchev opened the Soviet Communist Party Congress in Moscow by claiming that "serial production of intercon tinental ballistic rockets has been organized." Several months later Soviet Defense Min ister Rodion Ma linovsky stated that these mi ssiles were capable of hitting "precisely ainy point" and added, "O ur army is equipped with a whole series of intercontinental, continental and other rockets of long, medium and short range." When asked at a press conference to comment on Malinovsky 's statement, President Eisenhower replied, "Theyalso said that they inven ted the fly ing ma chine and the automobile and the tellephone and other things.... Why should you be so respectful of this statement this morning, if you are not so respectful ofthe other three?'" 3 Nevertheless, the Soviet state ments were taken at face value by most Americans, including many members ofthe intelligence community.

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As concern about Soviet missile progress increased, even the in terruption in Soviet ICBM testing was seen as evidence of a Sovi et advantage. Although the CIA correctly reasoned that the Soviets were experiencing difficu lties in deve lop ing an operational ICB M. the Air Force assumed that the Soviets had halted testing because the missile was ready for deployment.'

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

The controversy intensified early in February 1959, when Secretary of Defense Ne il H. McElroy testified before the Senate Preparedness In vestigating Committee on Soviet miss ile capabilities for the next fe w years. McElroy told the Senators that in the early 1960s the Soviet Union might have a 3 to I advantage over the United States in operational IC BMs. M cElroy stressed that the gap would be temporary and that at its end the Un ited States would enjoy a techno logical advantage because it was concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num berof obsolescent liquid-fueled missiles, but it was his mention of a 3 to l mi ssile gap that made the headlines. Administration crit ics such as Senator Stuart Symington quickly charged that the actual gap would eventually be even larger .s

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

Faced with rising publ ic and Congressional concern about the missile gap. Defense Department officials pressed President Eisenhower to authorize renewedoverflights to gather up-to-date in fonnation about the status of the Soviet missile program. Following a National Security Council meeting on 12 February. Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs ofStaffTwining. Secretary of Defense McElroy, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles stayed behind to talk to the President about overflights. They hoped that the need to refute criti cism of the missile gap from Symington and other Democratic Senators would persuade the President to loosen his policy on the use of the U-2. McElroy pointed out that no matter how often Allen Dulles briefed these critics, they would not believe his reassurances aboutthe absence of a missile gap without positive proof such as pho tographs. More overflights would be needed to obtain the kinds of photographs required.

The President was not swayed by these arguments. Noting that the reconnaissance satellite project was ··coming along nicely,,. he stated that U-2 flights should be " held to a mi nimum pending the

Freedman, US Intelligence. p. 70.

"What About the Missile Gap?" Time, 9 February 1959, pp. 11-13.

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availability ofthis new equipment." Quarles objected that the satel lites would not be ready for up to two years, but the President replied that this did not matter because the Soviets would not be able to build a first-strike force ofICBMs in the near future. President Eisenhower finally conceded that "one or two flights might possibly be permissi ble," but he ruled out "an extensive program." In light of the "crisis which is impending over Berlin" he did not want to be provocative. 6

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

As the missile-gap controversy raged, President Eisenhower stuck to his refusal to permit overflights of the Soviet Union, al though the Soviet Union's resumption ofICBM testing almost per suaded him to change his mind. On lO April 1959, the President tentatively approved several overflights, but, on the following day, he called in McE!roy and Bissell to inform them that he was withdraw ing his authorization, explaining that "there seems no hope for the fu ture unless we can make some progress in negotiation." Eisenhower remained worried by "the terrible propaganda impact that would be occasioned if a reconnaissance plane were to fail." Although he agreed that new information was necessary, especially in light ofthe "distortions several senators are making of our military position rela tive to the Soviets," Eisenhower believed that such information would not be worth "the political costs." 7

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

to gather intelligence on the Soviet missile program. Discussions con- tinued the following day with the addition of Secretary of State Herter, who stated in support of the CIA proposal that "the intelli- gence objective outweighs the danger of getting trapped." The strong backing of the proposed overflight by both CIA and the State Department finally convinced President Eisenhower to approve the mission."

On 9July 1959, more than 16 months af ter th e previous over flight ofthe Soviet Union, a U-2 equipped with a B camera left P eshawar, Pakistan, flew over the Urals, and then crossed the missile test range at Tyuratam. This mission, known as Operation TOUCHDOWN, produced excellent results. Its photography revealed that the Soviets were expanding the launch facilities at Tyuratam. Whi le this overflight was under way, another U-2 flew a diversionary mission along the Soviet -Iranian border.' 0

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

Despite its success, this overflight remained an isolated incident. President Eisenhower was unwilling to authorize additional over- flights of the Soviet Union, in part because he did not wish to increase tension before Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States sched- uled for 15-27 September 1959. Nevertheless, the President still wanted as much intelligence on the Soviet missile program as possi- ble. Because the Soviets were conducting an extensive program of missile tests in mid-1959, Eisenhower authorized a steady stream of the less provocative electronic intelligence (ELINT)-gathering mis- sions (14 in all) along the Soviet border during the remainder of the year.'

Within the United States, concern about the Soviet missile pro gram continued to grow. On 12 September 1959 the Soviets scored another space success when their Luna 2 rocket reached the moon, and Khrush chev stressed th is success when he arrived in the United States three days later. He also boasted of Soviet mi ssile progress in private conversations with President Eise nhower. wh ile making no

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mention ofoverflights by the United States. After the trip was over, Khrushchev and other leading Soviet officials continued to make ex aggerated claims about the extent of their missile force, adding to the confusion and concern within the US intelligence community. Thus in November 1959, Soviet Premier Khrushchev told a conference of journalists, "Nowwe have such a stock of rockets, such an amount of atomic and hydrogen weapons, that if they attack us, we could wipe our potential enemies off the face ofthe earth." He then added that "in one year, 250 rockets with hydrogen warheads came off the as sembly line in the factory we visited." 11 Because the Soviet Union had been launching at least one missile per week since early fall, US policymakers placed great weight on his remarks.

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

Despite the intelligence community's intense interest in the Soviet Union's nuclear and missile programs, President Eisenhower did not authorize any more overflights of the Soviet Union during the remainder ofthe year. On the other hand, he raised no objections to (and probably welcomed) the first British overflight of the Soviet Union in December 1959. For almost a year, the RAF pilots of Detachment B had been ready to fly over the Soviet Union, but Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had not previously authorized any such missions because of his own visit to the Soviet Union, several interna tional meetings, and other state visits. As a result, British U-2 mis sions had been confined to the Middle East. Now that the Prime Minister's approval had been obtained, Detachment B conducted Operation HIGH WIRE with an RAF pilot. Squadron leader Robert Robinson left Peshawar on 6 December and overflew Kuybyshev, Saratov Engels Airfield, and the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range before landing at Adana. The mission photography was excellent, but it did not provide intelligence on Soviet ICBMs, which were tested at Tyuratam, not Kapustin Yar. 13

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

**Key Entities and Information:**

Staff Nathan Twining each gave different figures for the number of deployed Soviet missiles. Although the CIA figures were based on evidence gained from overflights, Dulles could not reveal this fact to the Senate and, therefore, faced very sharp questioning. 14

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

President"s Board ofConsultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. At a meeting of the board on 2 February 1960, Gen. James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights ofthe Soviet Union to the maximum degree possible. The President's response, as summarized in General Goodpaster's notes ofthe meeting, showed thatthe upcoming summit meeting was already an important factor in his attitude toward U-2 flights: "The President said that he has one tremendous asset in a summit meeting, as regards effect in the free world.Thatis his reputation for honesty. If oneof these aircraft were lost when we are engaged in apparently sincere deliberations, it could be put on display in Moscow and ruin the President's effectiveness." 15

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

A few days later, another U-2 took to the sky on a mission over the Soviet Union. As in December, the pilot was British, and the mis- sion had been ordered by Prime Minister Macmillan. On 5 February 1960, a Detachment B U-2C with squadron leader John MacArthur at the controls left Peshawar, Pakistan, to conduct Operation KNIFE EDGE. The plane overflew the Tyuratam Missile Test Range, headed northwest to Kazan', and then turned south, photographing long stretches of the Soviet rail network. The excellent photography from this mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts did dis- cover a new Soviet bomber, dubbed the BACKFIN, at Kazan'."

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

Despite the outcome of this mission, the missile-gap debate con tinued. The Air Force still insisted that the Soviets had deployed as many as 100 missiles. The Army, Navy, and CIA, however, doubted that any had been deployed, because none could be found. Additional i U-2 photography was needed to settle the debate. In mid-February, President Eisenhower reviewed plans for four additional U-2 mis sions. The success of the two British missions, along with the absence ofSovi et protests, made the President more willing to consideir a re sumption ofUS overflights, and he agreed to allow onemissiorn to be flown during the month ofMarch. The President's continued riestric tions upon the use of the U-2 disturbed DCI Dulles, who sent a memo randum to the National Security Council on I March 1960 ass,erting that the cardinal objective of obtaining information on Sovi etmissile deployment could be better achieved if the U-2 were given freer rein."

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

In authorizing another overflight ofthe Soviet Union, President Eisenhower directed that it be conducted before 30 March. Because of complications in getting permission from Pakistan to use the airfield at Peshawar, however, the mission could not be staged in March, and the President agreed to extend his dleadline until l 0 April 1960. One day before the expiration of this cle .adline, a U-2 equipped with a B-camera took off from Peshawar on the last successful overflight of the Soviet Union, Operation SQUARE DEAL. As had been the case during the previous two overflights, a second U-2 flew a diversionary mission along the Soviet-Iranian border. After leaving Peshawar, mis sion 4155 headed first for Saryshagan, where it obtained the first pic turesoftwo new Soviet radars, the HEN HOUSE and HEN ROOST installations. The U-2 then flew to the nuclear testing site at Semipalatinsk. Returning to the Saryshagan area, it crisscrossed the railroad network there and then proceeded to Tyuratam. where it pho tographed a new two-pad, road-served launch area that suggested a new Soviet missile was in the offing. 18

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

In his memoirs Nikita Khrushchev remarked that this U-2 should have been shot down. "butour antiaircraft batteries were caught nap ping and didn't open fire soon enough." Khrushchev explained that Soviet missile designers had developed a high-altitude antiaircraft missile and batteries ofthi s missile had been deployed near known targets ofthe U-2. 19

The CIA already had strong indications ofimprovements in the Soviet air defense system, and early in 1960 the Development Projects Division had asked Air force experts at the Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC) for a frank assessment of Soviet capabili ties against the U-2. On 14 March ll960, Col. William Burke, acting chief of the DPD, relayed the ATIC assessment to Richard Bissell:

The greatest threat to the U-2 is the Soviet SAM. Although the ATIC analysis concedes a remote possibility that the SAM may be less effective than estimated, their present evaluation is that the SAM (Guideline) has a high probability of successful inter- cept at 70,000 feet providing that detection is made in sufficient time to alert the site.

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

,. Mission folder 4155. 9 April 1960. OSA records. job 67-8 -328. box 6 (TS Codeword).

•• Nikita S. Khrushchev. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little. Brown. & Co.. 1974). pp. 443-444.

30 Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell, Deputy Director (Plans), from Col. William Burke, Acting Chief, DPD, "Evaluation of Proposed CHALICE Operations," 14 March 1960, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-T-123A, box 10, "CHALICE (General)" (TS Codeword).

Secret

[page 182]
Key locations on the map include:
*   **USSR:** Tyuratam, Dzhezkazgan, Kyzyl-espe, Saryshagan, Semipalatinsk, Lake Balkhash, Uzbek S.S.R., Turkmen S.S.R., Tadzhik S.S.R., Kirgiz S.S.R., Kazakhstan S.S.R.
*   **Other Countries:** Iran (Zahedan), Afghanistan (Kabul), Pakistan (Peshawar, Rawalpindi), India (New Delhi), Nepal.
*   **Bodies of Water:** Aral Sea, Amu Darya river, Indus river, Ganges river, Lake Alakol.

The map also indicates "JAMMU AND KASHMIR (status in dispute)" and is marked "Secret NOFORN". A scale for kilometers and miles is provided.

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

Oneof the reasons why Operation SQUARE DEAL had been se lected for the 9 April flight was that mission planners believed that penetration from the Pakistan/Afghanistan area offered the greatest chance of escaping detection by the Soviet air defense system. Colonel Burke's 14 March letter recommending SQUARE DEAL as the preferred route for the next overflight had stated, "There is a rea sonable chance of completing this operation without detection." Escaping detection had become important because, if the Soviet SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major threat to the U-2.

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

CIA hopes that flights from Pakistan or Afghanistan might go undetected proved false. On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet tracking at a very early stage of the mission. Although the Soviets failed to intercept the U-2, their success at tracking it should have served as a warning against future overflights from Pakistan ( or anywhere else, for that matter). On 26 April 1960, Colonel Burke informed Richard Bissell that "experience gained as a result of Operation SQUARE DEAL indicates that penetration without detection from the Pakistan/ Afghanistan area may not be as easy in the future as heretofor." 11 Unfortunately, neither Colonel Burke nor Richard Bissell took the logical step of recommending the cessation of overflights now that the risks had increased substantially. The lure of the prospective intel ligence gain from each mission was too strong, and the Soviets' lack ofsuccess at interception to date had probably made the project staff overconfident. Furthermore, both DCI Allen Dulles and the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities were pressing for more photos ofthe Soviet Union in order to settle the missile-gap debate raging in the intelligence community and Congress.

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SA-2 surface-to-air missile

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

deployed SS-6 site because it could provide exemplars for photointerpreters to use in searching subsequent overhead photogra phy for similar installations. 13

The two proposed overflights that would cover the northern rail road lines received the strongest consideration. Both plans contained new features. Operation TIME STEP called for a U-2 to take off from the USAF base at Thule, Greenland, which would be the first over flight staged from this base. The aircraft would then fly over Novaya Zemlya on its way to cover the railroad lines from the Polyamyy Ural Mountains to Kotlas. The return flight would be over Murmansk with the landing to take place at either Bodo or Andoya on Norway's northeast coast. The other proposed overflight, Operation GRAND SLAM, was the first U-2 mission planned to transit the Soviet Union; all previous missions had penetrated not more than halfway and then left in the general direction from which they came. GRAND SLAM proposed to fly across the Soviet Union from south to north, departing from Peshawar, Pakistan, and landing at Bodo, Norway. The mission would overfly Tyuratam, Sverdlovsk, Kirov, Kotlas, Severodvinsk, and Murmansk.

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

of Soviet ICBM sites. The other proposed overflight, Operation TIME STEP out of Greenland, was more likely to run into bad weather (which would affect both navigation and photography) because the flightpath would remain above 60° north latitude during the entire mission. Furthermore, mission planners opposed this route because of its greater risk. In his letter to Richard Bis sell on 14 March 1960, Colonel Burke stated:

Operation "TIME STEP" is our last choice because we can as sume, with a 90 percent probability of being correct, that we will be detected on entr_,; tracked accurately throughout the period in denied territory (approximately four hours), and will evoke a strong PVO [Soviet Air Defense} reaction. This flight plan would permit alerting ofSAM sites, and pre-positioning ofmissile equipped fighters in the Murmansk area (point ofexit) thus enhancing the possibility of successful intercept. In addition, we must assume that even were the Soviets unable to physically in terfere with such an incursion, sufficient evidence will be avail able to permit them todocument a diplomatic protest should they desire to do so. 15

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

The concerns raised by Colonel Burke about TIME STEP should also have been raised about Operation GRAND SLAM, which would be the most adventuresome overflight to date because it proposed covering so much ofthe Soviet Union. If the Soviets could track the U-2 early in the mission, they would have plenty of time to prepare to intercept the aircraft.

The pilot selected for Operation GRAND SLAM was Francis Gary Powers, the most experienced U-2 pilot in the program. Powers had joined the project in May 1956 and had flown 27 operational mis sions in the U-2. including one each over the Soviet Union and China as well as six along the Soviet border.

To prevent the U-2 from being seen at Peshawar, project manag ers decided to ferry the aircraft from Adana to Pakistan the night be fore the scheduled flight. Once the plane was refueled and its camera was loaded, it would take off at daybreak, with little if any exposure to local residents because of darkness and its short stay-lessthan six

" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Deputy Director (Plans). from Col. William Burke. Acting Chic:f. DPD, "Evaluation ofProposed CHALICE Operations," 14 March 1960, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-T-123A. box 10, "CHALICE(General)" (TS Codeword).

-Secret

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hours on the ground. Originally scheduled for Thursday, 28 April, GRAND SLAM was canceled because ofbad weather over the north ern Soviet Union. This had been the case for the past several weeks. When this flight was canceled, the U-2 returned to Adana before sun rise. That evening the U-2 flew back to Peshawar for another attempt to stage the mission early on the 29th, but bad weather again forced cancellation ofthe mission, and the U-2 returned to Adana. Because of continued bad weather over the target areas, no mission was planned for Saturday, 30 April. 20

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

Meanwhile, the plane ferried to Peshawar on 27 and 28 April had accumulated so many hours of flight time that it had to be removed from service for periodic maintenance. A different aircraft was, therefore, ferried to Peshawar on Saturday night, 30 April. This aircraft, article 360, had made a crash landing in Japan during the pre vious September (see chapter 5). Although it had been refurbished by Lockheed and now had the more powerful 175 engine that would give it greater altitude, pilots did not completely trust this aircraft and con sidered it a "hangar queen." As Powers noted in his memoirs, .. Its current idiosyncrasy was one ofthe fuel tanks, which wouldn't feed all its fuel." 27 The aircraft was equipped with a B-model camera. a System-YI electronic intelligence unit, and a System-lXB device, which generated false-angle information in response to the radar pulses used by some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems.

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

code letters JGOHB, JGOHB as they tuned from one prearranged fre quency to the other. Then one ofthe Peshawar operators decided to tune in the guard frequency where the Morse transmission was stron gest. He was able to discern a break in the letters, making the mes sage read "HBJGO HBJGO." The Peshawar operators realized this stood for "HBJARGON Go." The detachment chief, Col. William Shelton, who had been waiting anxiously inside the radio van for a "Go" or "No Go" message, leaped from the van and ran across the field to give the signal for takeoff to Powers, who was sitting in the U-2C at the end ofthe runway. 28

Powers started his takeoff roll at O l 59Z on l May 1960. Once airborne, Powers guided his aircraft toward Afghanistan. Following standard operating procedure, Powers clicked his radio switch when he reached penetration altitude of 66,000 feet, which signaled the op erations unit at Peshawar that everything aboard the aircraft was working and the mission would proceed as planned. Aside from this simple signal, Powers and all U-2 pilots maintained strict radio si lence during penetration missions.

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

Powers' first target was- the Tyuratam Missile Test Range after which he headed for Chelyabinsk, just south of Sverdlovsk. The planned route would take him over Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk, northwest to Kirov. north over Yur'ya and Plesetsk, then to Severodvinsk. north west to Kandalaksha, north to Murmansk, and, finally, west to Bodo, Norway.

May Day turned out to be a bad time to overfly the Soviet Union. On this major holiday, there was much less Soviet military air traffic than usual, so Soviet radars could easily identify and track Powers' U-2. In addition, the Soviets responded to the intrusion by ordering a ban on civilian air traffic in a large portion ofthe Soviet Union. Soviet radar began tracking the U-2 when it was still 15 miles south ofthe Soviet-Afghan border and continued to do so as the air craft flew across the Central Asian republics. When Powers reached the Tashkent area, as many as 13 Soviet interceptor aircraft scrambled in an unsuccessful attempt to intercept his plane.

Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA-2 surface-to-air missile detonated close to andjust behind his aircraft and disabled it 70,500 feet above the Sverdlovsk

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

area. The plane began spiraling down toward the ground and Powers looked for a way out. Unable to use the ejection seat because centrifu gal force had thrown him against the canopy, he released the canopy and prepared to bail out, waiting to arm the destruction device at the last minute, so that it would not go offwhile he was still in the plane. When he released his seatbelt, however, he was immediately sucked outof the aircraft and found himself dangling by his oxygen hose, un able to reach the destruction switches. Finally, the hose broke and he tlew away from the falling aircraft. After he fell several thousand feet, his parachute opened automatically, and he drifted to earth where he was quickly surrounded by farmers and then by Soviet officials. 29 His aircraft had not been destroyed by the crash, and the Soviets were able to identify much ofits equipment when they put it on display 10 days later. Even if Powers had been able to activate the destruction device, however, it would not have destroyed the aircraft. The small explosive charge was only designed to wreck the camera.

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

How had the Soviets succeeded in downing the U-2? Although some CIA project officials initially wondered if Powers had been fly i_ng too low through an error or mechanical malfunction, he main tained that he had been flying at his assigned altitude and had been brought down by a near miss ofa Soviet surface-to-air missile. This turned out to be the case, for in March 1963, the US air attache in Moscow learned that the Sverdlovsk SA-2 battery had fired a three-missile salvo that, in addition to disabling Powers' plane, also scored a direct hit on a Soviet fighter aircraft sent aloft to intercept the U-2.'0 Mission planners had not known about this SAM site be fore the mission because they always laid out flight plans to avoid known SAM sites.

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that the Soviets had discontinued radar tracking of the flight 's pro gress two hours earlier (0529Z), southwest of Sverdlovsk. Although there was no word from the Soviet Union concerning the mi:ssing U-2. key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with theexception of Bissell. who was outof town and did not arrive until 1530) to analyze the latest informationanddiscuss courses of action. They quickly established a new project. known as Operation MUDLARK.co gather and evaluate all available informa tion about the downed U-2."

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

Bissell and the other project officials did not know wh,ether Powers was dead or if the plane and camera had been destroyed', but they believed chat there was no way that a pilot could survive a crash from an altitude above 70,000 feet. They. therefore, decided to stick with the standard cover story for U-2 fl ights: that they were we:acher flights staged by the National Aeronautics and Space Administr:ation (NASA)-originally the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.renamed in 1958.Thi s cover story had been approve:d by the President in 1956.

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

By the end of the day, the Operation MUDLARK officials had prepared a statement based on the standard cover story but modified to fie the available information on Powers· flight and to show Adana as theaircraft'sbase in order to conceal Pakistan's role inthe mission. This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent with it, was sent to the field commander at Adana, co Air Force Europe headquarters. and co the Chief of Station at Ankara to replace the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first announcement of the new cover story came, late on 2Mayby the Adanabasecommander, but it did not appearin print until the following day. On Tuesday, 3 Ma y, NASA released a state ment about a high-altitude weather plane thatwas missi ngon a flight inside Turkey. The statement ha dbeen designed to provide an e>epla nation for the presence of wreckage inside the Soviet Union by noting that "thepilot reported over the emergency frequency that he was ex periencing oxygen difficulties.,. .,: Thus. if the Soviets protested and pointed to wreckage inside their borders, NASAcould claim that the pilot had lost consciousness and the aircraft had then flown into the Soviet Union before crashing.

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

This statement had been prepared for a "bestcase·· scenario, that is to say, one in which neither the pilot nor the plane and film sur vived. However, pilots had bailed out from extremely high altitudes and survived, and there was even evidence from previous U-2 crashes that much ofthe aircraft itself could be salvaged. The small destruc tive charge aboard the U-2 was not sufficient to destroy much more than the camera. The tightly rolled film, which could reveal the exact purpose of the mission even if the pilot and aircraft did not survive, was very hard to destroy. Kelly Johnson later conducted an experi ment that revealed film taken out ofa completely burned-out aircraft could still provide usable imagery. 33 After almost four years of suc cessful U-2 missions, Richard Bissell and the rest of the Development Projects Division had become overconfident and were not prepared for the ··worst case" scenario that actually occurred in May I960. This failure played directly into the hands ofSoviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who shrewdly decided to release information about the downed U-2 a little at a time, thereby encouraging the United States to stick with its vulnerable cover story too long. As he later wrote, "Our intention here was to confuse the government circles of the United States. As long as the Americans thought the pilot was dead, they would keep putting out the story that perhaps the plane had acci dentally strayed off course and been shot down in the mountains on the Soviet side of the border."'" The first word from the Soviet Union came on Thursday, 5 May, when Premier Khrushchev announced to a meeting of the Supreme Soviet that a US "spyplane" had been downed near Sverdlovsk. He made no mention of the fate ofits pilot.

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Khrushchev and the U-2
wreckage

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

This revelation completely demolished the US cover story., and sen ior administration officials then debated what the appropriate course of action should be . Allen Dulles offered to take responsibility for the overflightand resign. but President Eisenhower did no t want to give the world the impression that he was notincontrol of his ad ministration. On Wednesday, 11 May, the President read a statement to the press in which he assumed full responsibility for the U-2 mis sion but left open the question of future overflights, even though four days earlier he had approved the recommendation of his key foireign policy advisers to terminate all provocative intelligence operations against the Soviet Union: '~

The U-2 affair had its greatest consequences when the long-awaited summit meeting in Paris began less than aweek latc:r on 16 May. Soviet Premier Khrushchev insisted on being the first speaker and read a long protest about the overflight, ending with :a de mand for an apo logy from President Eisenhower. In his reply

1 * OSA History, chap. 14, pp. 14-16 (TS Codeword); Beschloss, Mayday. pp. 43-66. 243-258.

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Eisenhower stated that overflights had been suspended and would not be resumed, but he refused to make a formal apology. At that point the summit ended, as did all hopes for a visit to the Soviet Union by President Eisenhower.

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## THE WITHDRAWAL OF  THE
OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS

The loss ofPowers' U-2 ultimately resulted in the end ofDetachment B in Turkey. As soon as the Development Projects Division learned that Powers was alive in Soviet hands, it immediately evacuated the British pilots from Adana to protect the secret of their involvement in the project. Project officials hoped that tlights might eventually re sume from Adana, but President Eisenhower's order ending over flights of the Soviet Union made this very unlikely. Less than four weeks later. a coup ousted the government of Turkish Premier Adnan Menderes on the night of 27 May 1960. Because the new government had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to al l_Qw any U-2 tlights from Adana, even those necessary for maintain ing the aircraft's airworthiness. As a result, no more U-2s flew out of Adana. Instead of being ferried home, three of the four remaining U-2s were disassembled and loaded aboard C-124 cargo planes for the return trip to the United States."'

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## THE WITHDRAWAL OF  THE
OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS (cont.)

Japanese Government, faced with growing anti-American sentiment and complaints in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to remove the U-2s. The very next day the CIA closed Detachment C; its U-2s were disman tled and returned to the United States aboard C-124s. 37

[n the midst ofthe furor in Japan. on l July 1960, justsix weeks after the Paris Summit, Soviet fighter aircraft shot down an Air Force RB-47 on an electronic intelligence collection mission over interna tional waters near the Soviet Union's Kola Peninsula. Two survivors were captured. The Soviet Union claimed that the aircraft had vio lated its airspace, while the United States denounced the Soviets for downing the plane over international waters. The acrimony exacer bated an already tense international atmosphere. 3 "

One additional blow to the U-2 program came in the summerof I960. NASA, concerned about the damage to its reputation from its involvement in the U-2 affair and hoping to obtain international coop eration for its space program. decided to end its support ofthe cover story that U-2s were conducting weather research under its auspices.'''

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## THE WITHDRAWAL OF  THE
OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS (cont.)

These developments resulted in a complete halt to all U-2 opera tions from overseas bases for more than six months. Pilots and air craft from Detachments B and C were consolidated into Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base, California. the unit formed after the C[A had vacated the Nevada testing site in 1957 as a result of AEC nuclear testing. Detachment G now comprised eight pilots from Detachment B and three pilots from Detachment C. Because Powers' capture had compromised Project CHALICE, the Agency assigned a new cryptonym to the U-2 effort; henceforth, it was called Project IDEALIST.""

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THE FATE OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## THE WITHDRAWAL OF  THE
OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS (cont.)

Downed U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers underwent extensive interro gation at the hands ofthe Soviets. His instructions from the CIA on what to do in the event of capture were meager, and he had been told that he might as well tell the Soviets whatever they wanted to know because they could get the information from his aircraft anyway. Nevertheless, Powers tried to conceal as much classified information as possible while giving the appearance ofcooperating with his cap tors. To extract the maximum propaganda value from the U-2 Affair, the Soviets prepared an elaborate show trial for Powers, which began on 17 August 1960. Powers continued to conceal as much information as possible, but, on the advice ofhis Soviet defense counsel, he stated that he was sorry for his actions. The Soviet court sentenced him to IO years' "deprivation ofliberty," with the first three to be spent in pnson. • 01

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## THE WITHDRAWAL OF  THE
OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS (cont.)

During the next 18 months, confidential negotiations to obtain the release of Powers took place as the United States explored the possibility oftrading convicted Soviet master spy Rudolf Abel for _Powers. These negotiations were conducted by Abel ·s court-ap pointed defense counsel, former OSS lawyer James Donovan. in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI Pearre Cabell wrote to Secretary of State Dean Rusk supporting such a trade, and on l 0 February 1962 the actual exchange took place in the middle of the Glienecke Bridge connecting East and West Berlin. As part of the deal, American graduate student Frederick Pryor, who had been jailed in East Germany for espionage, was released at another location.

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## THE WITHDRAWAL OF  THE
OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS (cont.)

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Trial of Francis Gary Powers

with Powers' behavior. After reading the debriefing reports, Allen 42 Dulles expressed support of Powers' actions and told Powers, "We are proud of what you have done," but Dulles had already resigned as DCI in November 1961. The new DCI, John A. McCone, demanded 4.3 a closer look at Powers actions and set up a Board of Inquiry headed by retired Federal Judge E. Barrett Prettyman. After eight days of hearings and deliberation, the board reported on 27 February that Powers had acted in accordance with his instructions and had "com- plied with his obligations as an American citizen during this period." The board, therefore, recommended that he receive his back pay.

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## THE WITHDRAWAL OF  THE
OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS (cont.)

The Prettyman Board's finding was based on a large body of evi dence indicating that Powers was telling the truth about the events of I May 1960: the testimony ofthe experts who had debriefed Powers after his return; a thorough investigation of Powers' background with testimony by doctors, psychiatrists, former Air Force colleagues, and his commander at Adana; Powers' own testimony before the board; the results of a polygraph examination that he had volunteered to un dergo; and the evidence provided by photographs ofthe wreckage of his aircraft, which Kelly Johnson had analyzed and found consistent with Powers' story. Nevertheless, DCI McCone remained skeptical. He asked the Air Force to convene its own panel of experts to check Johnson's assessment ofthe photographs ofthe U-2. The Air Force quickly complied, and the panel supported Johnson's findings. McCone then seized upon the one piece of evidence that contradicted Powers' testimony-areport by the National Security Agency (NSA) that suggested that Powers may have descended to a lower altitude and turned back in a broad curve toward Sverdlovsk before being downed-andordered the Prettyman Board to reconvene on I March for another look at this evidence. The board remained unconvinced by NSA's thin evidence and stuck to its original findings. A few days lat er, on 6 March 1962, Powers appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee, which commended his actions. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also held brief hearings on the U-2 Affair, with DCI McCone representing the CIA.-'-'

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## THE WITHDRAWAL OF  THE
OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS (cont.)

Although all of these inquiries found Powers to have acted prop erly, they did not release many oftheir favorable findings to the pub lic, which had received a very negative image of Powers' behavior from sensational press reports and statements by public figures who were not aware of (or chose to ignore) the truth about Powers· actions while in captivity. One member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator John J. Williams, expressed concern about the impact of this silence on Powers' reputation in a question to DCI McCone on 6 March 1962: "Don'tyou think he is being left with just a little bit of a cloud hanging over him? If he did everything he is supposed to do, why leave it hanging?" ,s Doubts about Powers did remain in the public mind because he received no public recognition for his efforts to withhold information from the Soviets. He was also

"' Beschloss. Mayday. p. 352-35-k Thomas Powers. Man Wlzo Kept the Secrets. p. 328; Prettyman Board. DCI records (S).

" United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. £recutive Sessions of tlze Sencae Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series). vol. 12. 86th Congre.~s. Second Session ... Report on the U-2 Incident." 6 March 1962. p. 265 (declassified 1982).

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snubbed by President Kennedy, who one year earlier had warmly wel comed two Air Force RB -47 fliers released by the Sovi et Union. McCone remained hostile to Powers. and in April 1963 he awarded the Intelligen ceStar to all of the U-2 pilots except Powers. Finally on 25 April 1965, just two days before McCon e'sresignation became ef fective, Powers received the Star (which was dated 1963 on the back) from DDCI Marshall S. Carter: 6

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## THE WITHDRAWAL OF  THE
OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS (cont.)

Powers' return from cap ti vity raised the question of what his fu ture emp loyment should be. This issue had already b ee n discussed one year earlier by John N. McMahon, executive officer of the DPD. who noted that he and Col. Leo P. Geary (the Air Force project offi cer) were concerned about a major dilemma fo r the CIA and the US Government: " On the one hand we have gone to considerable lengths to prove that the U-2 program was a civilian undertaking and not mil itary aggression; on the other hand there is on file a document that assures Francis Gary Powers that if he so desires he may be reinstated into the USA F. ''On 21 March 1961 McMahon wrote:

If we grant him [Powers/ the right that is now his, namely rein statement in the Air Force, then we would be subjecting our selves to probable adverse propaganda by the USSR. Admitting little appreciation for the finer points of political and psycholog ical warfare, should Francis Gary Powers return to the USAF I suspect that the Soviets would have a "PP" field day illustrating our big lie. The question then. si nce we cannot permit Powers to return to the USAF. is what do we do with him."

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## THE WITHDRAWAL OF  THE
OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS (cont.)

Despite this negative recommendation, the Air Force agreed on 4 April I962 to reinstate Powers effective I July, a decision that was approved by the Agency, State Dep•artment, and White House. Then Powers· divorce proceedings began. and the Air Force, concerned about adverse publicity, postponed reinstatement until the end ofthe proceedings. In the meantime Pow 1ers began w orki ng for Lockheed as a U-2 pilot. In March 1963, he met with Col onel Geary to discuss his future plans and decided to stay with Lockheed."11 Powers re mained at Lockheed until U-2 testing ceased in September 1969. Earlier in the year, he had published an account of his experiences on

OSA History, chap. 14, p. 54 (TS Codeword): Beschloss, Mayday, p. 397.

47 John N. McMahon to Chief, Cover Staff, DPD, 21 March 1961, Operation MUDLARK files, OSA records, job 74-B-605, box 6 (S).

" OSA History. chap. 14, p. 52 (TS Codeword).

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the U-2 project under the title Operation Overflight. Later he flew a light plane as a traffic reporter for a Los Angeles radio station and then a helicopter for a television station. On l August 1977, he and a cameraman from the station died when his helicopter crashed on the way to an assignment. • -19

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER  MAY 1960

Oneof the most important changes in the overflight program after the loss ofFrancis Gary Powers' U-2 was the institution ofmore formal procedures for the approval of U-2 missions. During the first four years ofU-2 activity, very few members ofthe Eisenhower adminis tration had been involved in making decisions concerning the over flight program. The President personally authorized all flights over the Soviet Union and was consulted by Richard Bissell and either the DCI or the DDCI about each such proposed mission. In addition to CIA officials, the President's discussions ofindividual U-2 missions orof the program as a whole generally included the Secretary of State orhis Under Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs_of Staff, the Secretary of Defense or his deputy. and the President's secretary. Colonel (later General) Goodpaster.

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER  MAY 1960 (cont.)

The approval process under President Eisenhower was thus very unstructured. There was no formal approval body charged with re viewing overflight proposals; the President kept this authority in his hands and simply consulted with selected cabinet officials and advis ers before reaching a decision. In 1959 the U-2 program had gained a second approval authority when British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan became the approval authority for missions conducted by the RAF pilots in Detachment 8.

The loss of Powers' U-2 in May 1960 led to major changes in the approval process. For all practical purposes, Prime Minister Macmillan ceased to be a source of approval because the RAF pilots who remained in the U-2 program did not conduct any more operational missions (although the use of British pilots was consid ered on several occasions). In the United States the approval process

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became more formal as the National Security Council became involved. Henceforth, proposed missions had to be submitted to the National Security Council (NSC) Special Group for approval. In the early 1960s, the Sptcial Group consisted of the DCI, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary ofState, and the Military Adviser to the President. After the Military Adviser, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff in 1962, his place on the Special Group was taken by McGeorge Bundy, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. 50

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER  MAY 1960 (cont.)

Before requesting permission from the Special Group for a U-2 mission over denied territory, the CIA prepared a detailed submission giving justification for the proposed mission and maps showing the targets to be photographed. flight times, and emergency landing sites. Such submissions came to be known as "black books" because they were placed in black. looseleaf binders. The decision of the Special Group was generally final, although on occasion controversial issues were presented to the President for his decision.

This approval process did not come into play immediately after May 1960 because there was a long pause in U-2 operations as the detachments returned from overseas. It was not until late October 1960 that the next U-2 operation occurred. this time over Cuba. By this time the full approval procedure had been established, and the Special Group approved the mission (sec chapter 5).

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER  MAY 1960 (cont.)

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denied areas, whether by photographic, ELINT, COMINT, infrared, RADINT, or other means." The only exception to COMOR's area of responsibility was "reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct support of actively combatant forces." 15 51

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER  MAY 1960 (cont.)

By this time the Air Force had developed a large overhead re- connaissance program of its own, including a fleet of U-2s, and, occa- sionally, there were conflicts between the areas of responsibility of COMOR and the military services for collection requirements. The Air Force had already won a major victory in 1958, when it claimed that the White House had given responsibility for peripheral recon- naissance of the Soviet Union to the military. DCI Dulles, who was always reluctant to become involved in matters that seemed to lie in the military's area of responsibility, did not resist this claim, and the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee stopped preparing requirements for peripheral flights. This ended a major requirements committee study, which sought to estimate what could be gained from U-2 oblique pho- tography along the entire border of the Soviet Union." The last CIA U-2 mission along the Soviet Union's coasts occurred on 22 June 1958; thereafter, the only peripheral missions conducted by the CIA were those along the Soviet Union's southern border with Iran and Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan and Turkey under covert arrange- ments with the host governments.

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER  MAY 1960 (cont.)

Most military reconnaissance missions were approved or disap proved at the JCS level, but the most sensitive missions were submit ted through the Secretary of Defense to the Special Group for approval. In addition to this Department of Defense approval path, the military services could also submit requirements through the DCI us ing their representatives on COMOR. As a result, the military ser vices had two channels for submitting reconnaissance missions to the Special Group. The Agency had only one-COMOR. 51

The main conflicts between the requirements committee and the military services arose over missions in the Far East. In the early I960s, North Vietnam had not been designated a denied area by the US Intelligence Board (USIB), so the military services could plan missions there without consulting COMOR. Such missions. however, came very close to China. which was a denied area and, therefore, came under COM OR ·s area of responsibility. Once the war in Southeast Asia escalated in 1964, the military services received re sponsibility for the entire area (see chapter 5).

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER  MAY 1960 (cont.)

To reduce the number ofdisputes between the competing CIA and Air Force reconnaissance programs and to manage the growing satellite program, the two agencies worked out an agreement to pro vide overall coordination for reconnaissance activities at the national level. The first such interagency agreement came in the fall of 1961, and it was followed by three additional agreements during the next four years. 50

Interestin coordinating the reconnaissance efforts of the military services and the CIA also affected the field ofphotographic interpre tation. In the wake of the loss ofFrancis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May 1960, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PFIAB) had urged the establishment of an interagency group to study ways to improve the entire US intelligence community. Formed on 6 May 1960, the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities met for the next seven months under the lead ership of Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA Inspector General. One of the study group's key recommendations in the report it issued in December 1960 was the creation of a national photointerpretation

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center that would bring together photointerpreters from the Agency and the military services. The report further recommended that the CIA be placed in charge ofthe new center. Ignoring Air Force claims that it should head such a center, President Eisenhower approved the report's recommendation, and, on 18 January 1961, National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 8 established the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). Henceforth, the director ofNPIC would be designated by the DCI and approved by the Secretary ofDefense, and the deputy director would come from one of the military services. The first director ofNPIC was Arthur S. Lundahl, head ofthe CIA's Photo-Intelligence Division. 55

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER  MAY 1960 (cont.)

One additional major change in the U-2 program in the years im mediately following the May Day incident-althoughnot directly re lated to the loss of Powers' U-2-was the departure of Richard Bissell from the CIA and the subsequent reorganization of the Agency's reconnaissance and scientific activities. The roots of Bissell's downfall went back to 1 January 1959, when he became Deputy Director for Plans and decided to place all Agency air assets in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U-2 and its two proposed successors, the OXCART aircraft and the reconnaissance satellite). The previously independent Development Projects Staff became the Development Projects Division (DPD) ofthe DDP and now controlled all Agency air operations, including air support for covert operations. As a result, U-2s were occasionally employed for gathering intelligence to sup port DDP operations in addition to their primary mission of gathering strategic and tactical intelligence.

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER  MAY 1960 (cont.)

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months as the Deputy Director for Plans, Bissell found himself in volved in a major struggle with Killian and Land, who were serving on President Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (succes sor to the Eisenhower administration's President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities). These two influential Presidential advisers strongly advocated removing the Agency's over head reconnaissance programs from the DDP and placing them in a new, science-oriented directorate. but Bissell resisted this proposal. With his position in the Agency becoming increasingly untenable, Bissell resigned on 17 February 1962, after turning down an offer from the new DCI, John A. McCone, to become the CIA's first Deputy Director for Research. 56

Two days after Bissell's departure, the new Directorate came into existence, and it absorbed all of the Development Projects Division's special reconnaissance projects. Only conventional air sup port for the Clandestine Services remained with the DDP in the new Special Operations Division. The U-2 program was no longer con nected with covert operations.

# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER  MAY 1960 (cont.)

The first half of 1962 was a confusing period for the Development Projects Division. After losing the individual who had created and supervised it for seven years, the DPD also lost its feeling of autonomy when it was transferred from its own building to the new CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward. Col. Stanley W. Beerli, who had headed the DPD since 1960, returned to the Air Force. Then on 30 July 1962, the overhead reconnaissance projects underwent a major reorganization with the formation ofthe new Office ofSpecial Activities (OSA) to replace the DPD. The original organization of OSA with IO division or staff heads reporting directly to the director ofthe office (at that time known as the Assistant Director for Special Activities) proved too cumbersome, and, on 30 September 1962, a re organization divided most of these offices between two major subordinates, the Deputy for Technology and the Deputy for Field Activities (see chart, page 193). The Office of Special Activities (OSA) continued to control reconnaissance activities and related re search and development after the Directorate of Research was en larged and renamed the Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology (DDS&T) on 5 August 1963 (along with the other

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# The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960 (cont.)

## CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER  MAY 1960 (cont.)

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Blank

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# U-2 Operations After
May 1960

# U-2 Operations After
May 1960 (cont.)

The loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 over the Soviet Union on 1 May 1960 marked the end of the aircraft's use over the Soviet Bloc. Soon after the May Day incident, President Eisenhower ordered an end to overflights. Similarly, his successor, John F. Kennedy, told a 25 January 1961 press conference, "I have ordered that the flights not be resumed, which is a continuation of the order given by President Eisenhower in May of last year." This was not a binding pledge, as John A. McCone (who became DCI in November 1961) pointed out to President Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, on 15 January 1964 in response to the new President's request for information on U-2 overflight policies:

Contrary to popular assumption, President Kennedy did not make any pledge or give an assurance, at least publicly. that there would be no further overflights. He limited his response to a statement that he had ordered that the flights not be r, ':?sumed. An order, obviously, is valid only until countermanded.'

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overflightsof the Soviet Union during the Berlin Crisis in the summer and fall of 1961. On 14 September 1961, Kelly Johnson noted in his project log:

Have had request from Mr. Bissell to propose ways and means for increasing safety of the U-2 on probable overflights . ... It seems that President Kennedy, who publicly stated that no U-2'.s would ever be over Russia while he was president, has requested additional flights. Some poetic justice in this. 2

# U-2 Operations After
May 1960 (cont.)

One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to up grade six older U-2s into U-2Cs with the more powerful engines on a priority basis, even if it meant taking people off the work on the suc cessor aircraft in order to speed up the conversions.

Shortly thereafter, the resumption ofoverflights became a major topic of discussion within the intelligence community. On 25 September 1961, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance pre pared a detailed "Justification for U-2 Photography over the USSR," which argued in favor of U-2 missions over selected, high-priority targets such as ICBM complexes. The COMOR paper stated that sat ellite photography did not provide sufficient detail to answer many critical questions about the Soviet ICBM program. To back up this contention, the report placed U-2 and satellite photography of the same Soviet targets side by side, clearly demonstrating the far supe rior resolution of the U-2's cameras. Not all members ofCOMOR supported the resumption of overflights, however. When COMOR formally recommended this course of action to the USIB on 1 October 1961, the State Department and CIA members dissented, having found "insufficient justification for resuming U-2 overflights ofthe USSR at this time." 3

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# U-2 Operations After
May 1960 (cont.)

Nothing came of the proposal to resume overflights in the fall of 1961, as both the USIB and the Special Group came out against it, but, as long as U-2 photography remained clearly superior to satellite photography, the thought of obtaining U-2 coverage of the Soviet Union remained tempting. In February 1962, the USIB seriously con sidered a COMOR proposal to send a U-2 over Kamchatka to photo graph Soviet antiballistic-missile facilities but finally decided to wait for the results of an Air Force peripheral mission. The board later ac cepted DCI McCone's recommendation to seek satellite rather than U-2 coverage ofthe area.4

# U-2 Operations After
May 1960 (cont.)

With both the CIA and the State Department strongly opposed to sending the highly vulnerable U-2 over the Soviet Union, prospects for resuming flights remained slight unless the international situation worsened to such a degree that overflights would be worth the risks involved. Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the last CIA overflight ofthe Soviet Bloc. Yet, the U-2 remained useful, for it could operate successfully in other areas with less developed radar and air defense systems. After May 1960, the main focus ofU-2 activity shifted to two new areas: Latin America, where U-2s would play an extremely important role during the early 1960s, and the Far East, where CIA U-2s were active from 1958 until 1974, when the Agency's involvement in manned re connaissance finally ended.

U-2 OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

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# U-2 Operations After
May 1960 (cont.)

## U-2 Support to the Bay of Pigs Invasion (cont.)

Special Group to approve U-2 overflights of Cuba. Known as Operation KICK OFF, these flights were designed to obtain intelli gence on Cuban air and ground order of battle and to provide geo graphic data for choosing an invasion site.

To allay fears that mechanical problems could lead to the loss of a U-2 over Cuba, the submission to the Special Group for overflights emphasized that, if a U-2 had a flameout anywhere over Cuba, it could still glide back and make a safe landing in Florida. The Special Group approved Operation KICK OFF but stipulated that only two overflights could be made. Detachment G staged the Cuban missions from Laughlin AFB near Del Rio, Texas, a base used by SAC U-2 aircraft. Agency photointerpreters went to Del Rio to read out the photography after these missions. The two flights, on 26 and 27 October 1960, were very long missions, covering 3,500 miles and lasting over nine hours. Because of cloud cover over Cuba, the results of both missions were poor. The Agency, therefore, asked the Special Group to approve additional missions. After receiving authorization, Detachment G conducted three missions (Operation GREEN EYES) on 27 November and 5 and 11 December 1960 with good results.

# U-2 Operations After
May 1960 (cont.)

## Aerial Refueling Capability for the U-2 (cont.)

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Aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion, 20 April 1961

# U-2 Operations After
May 1960 (cont.)

## Aerial Refueling Capability for the U-2 (cont.)

Refueling a U-2 in flight was a very delicate task. When fully loaded with fuel, KC-135 tankers found it difficult to reduce airspeed •w-200 knots, the safest speed for refueling a U-2. As for the U-2s, they were in a very vulnerable position when approaching a tanker at 200 knots because their frail wings could not stand much stress. As a result, U-2 pi lots had to approach the KC -135 tankers very carefully in order to avoid the vonexes from the wingtips of the tanker and the turbulence caused by the four large jet engines. During the first few years of refueling operations, two U-2s crashed after their wings broke offas they crossed into the turbulent area behind the tai11kers; one of the pilots was killed."

The in-flight re fueling capability was a useful modificati. on to the U-2, but it could not dramatically extend mission length. The main limiting factor remained pilot fatigue, which prevented missions from lasting longer th an approximately 10 hou rs.

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In-flight refueling of a U-Z

# U-2 Operations After
May 1960 (cont.)

## U-2 Coverage During the Cuban Missile Crisis (cont.)

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of the nature of the Soviet buildup in Cuba. Two days after the mis sion, the CIAreported in the President '.s Intelligence Checklist that there were at least eight surface-to-air missile (SA -2) sites in the western half of Cuba. 8 (The map on page 202 shows the routes taken by the two August overflights.)

On 5 September the next U-2 overflight (mission 3089) provided more evidence of the Soviet buildup. The mi ss ion's photography showed three moreSAMsites and also revealed a MiG-2 I, one of the newes t Soviet fighter aircraft. at the Santa Clara airfield.

# U-2 Operations After
May 1960 (cont.)

## U-2 Coverage During the Cuban Missile Crisis (cont.)

The discovery of SAMs in Cuba had a twofold effect on the US reconnaissance effort over Cuba. First, it adde d substance to DCI McCone·s fears that Cuba might become a base for Soviet medi um-range ballistic missiles (he argued that SAMsites would only be set up to protect high-priority facilities such as missile bases). Al this time. however. McCone's suspicions were not shared by other offi cialsinthe Agency or the administration. The seco nd and most signif icant effect ofthe discovery of SAMs in Cuba was to make the administration far more cautious in its use of U-2s for reconnaissance . o_f_the island. As the loss of Francis Gary Powers· U-2 in May 1960 had demonstrated, the U-2 was very vulnerabk to the SA -2 missile.

# U-2 Operations After
May 1960 (cont.)

## U-2 Coverage During the Cuban Missile Crisis (cont.)

Within the administration. concern mounted about the U-2's vul nerabilityto SAMs in Cuba and the possibility that a loss could cause a major diplomatic crisis. Such fears increased as the result of two incidents in other parts of the world. On 30 August 1962, a SAC U-2 on a peripheral reconnaissance mission overflew Sakhalin Island in the Far East, prompting a Soviet protest on 4 September. The United States apologized for the intrusion. Then on 8 September. a U-2 with a Nationalist Chinese pi lot was shot down over the People's Republic of China (this CIAreconnai ssance program is discussed later in th is chapter in the section on Asian operations). Increasing concern about U-2vulnerability led to animpromptu meeting on lO September 1962 of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, and DDCIMarshall S. Carter (in place of the DCI, who was on his honeymoon in France). The Secretary ofState ob jectedto the CIA's plans for two extended overflights covering the re maining areas of Cuba not covered by the last two missions. Rusk wanted peripheral flights over international waters kept separate from

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# U-2 Overflights of Cuba, August - October 1962

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724752 (R00425) 4-92

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*   **United States**
*   **Mexico**
*   **Cuba** (with cities like Havana and San Cristobal, and areas like the Bay of Pigs)
*   **Bahamas** (U.K.)
*   **Isle of Pines**
*   **Cayman Islands** (U.K.)
*   **Jamaica**
*   **U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay**
*   **Haiti**
*   **Dominican Republic**

The map includes a scale for kilometers and miles.

-Secret NOFORN-

724753 (R00426) 4-92

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# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962

| Location (approximate) | Symbol |
|---|---|
| West of Havana | Missile Launcher |
| East of Havana | Missile Launcher |
| Near La Coloma | Missile Launcher |
| Near San Julian | Missile Launcher |
| U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay | Present |

San Julian Airfield

La Coloma

-Secret NOFORN

724754 (R00429) 482

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overflightsof Cuban territory. He argued that the loss of an aircraft on a mission that combined both types offlights would make it difficult for the United States to stand on its rights to fly over international wa ters. Bundy and Carter therefore agreed to split the proposed recon naissance program into four missions: two overflights and two peripheral flights, all planned for maximum safety. The overflights were thus designed to be quick "in-and-out" operations across the narrow width of the island instead offlights along the entire length of Cuba, as had been the case previously. (As the map on page 202 illus trates, the 5 September mission was the last one to fly along the length of the island.) As an additional precaution, flightpaths would be laid out to avoid known SAM sites. Although these changes greatly reduced the danger to the U-2, they slowed the gathering of information on the Soviet buildup by reducing each mission's coverage. 9

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

To ensure that the photographs taken by these missions were of the highest quality, the CIA decided to conduct flights only when the weather along the flight routes was less than 25 percent overcast. Weather proved to be a major problem during the month of Se.ptember. Unfavorable forecasts (along with a brief standdown of U-2 overflights after the loss of the Nationalist Chinese U-2) pre vented the launching ofany missions from 6 through 16 September. Moreover, when mission 3091 finally flew on 17 September, the fa vorable weather forecast proved inaccurate and heavy clouds pre vented the mission from obtaining usable photography. Bad weather continued to rule out missions until 26 September, when mission 3093 covered eastern Cuba and found three additional SAM sites. Three days later mission 3095 flew over the Isle ofPines and Bay of Pigs area, finding one more SAM site and a coastal-defense cruise missile site. 10

The cautious series ofU-2 flights in September had turned up many more SAM sites but no concrete evidence of the presence of surface-to-surface missiles. Growing impatient with the restrictions

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

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that had been placed on U-2 overflights ofCuba, DCI McCone told the Special Group on 4 October 1962 that their policy of avoiding SAM sites had restricted the Agency to using the U-2 only in Cuba's southeastern quadrant. He questioned "whether this was a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly since the SAM's were almost cer tainly not operational." 11 The Special Group then requested the preparation of an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba in time for its next meeting on 9 October.

In the meantime, C[A U-2s continued the reconnaissance pro gram that the Special Group had approved in September. In early October two peripheral missions-3098 along the southeastern coast on 5 October and 3100 along the northern coast on 7 October (see map on page 203)-discovered an additional five SAM sites. This brought the total to 19, but there was still no evidence of sur face-to-surface missiles.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

Evidence was mounting that the portion of Cuba that the September and early October missions had avoided was the most likely location for Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). On 6 October 1962, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance rec ommended frequent and regular coverage of Cuba, pointing in partic ular to the need for renewed coverage ofwestern Cuba:

The absence of coverage ofthe western end since August 29, coupled with the rate of construction we have observed, means that there may well be many more sites now being built of which we are una;vare. Ground observers have in several recent in stances reported sightings ofwhat they believe to be the SS-4 (SHYSTER) MRBM in Cuba. These reports must be confirmed or denied hy photo coverage.,: Attached to this memorandum was a list of targets, ~vith the area around San Cristobal at the top.

On 9 October the Special Group met to discuss COMOR's rec ommendations, the most important of which was a U-2 flight over the .. suspect MRBM site as soon as weather permits." This mission was also designed to pass over one ofthe SA-2 sites that was thought to be most nearly operational in order to determine the status of SA-2

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defenses of Cuba. If this overflight did not provoke an SA-2 reaction. the study recommended "maximum coverage ofthe western end of the island by multiple U-2s simultaneously." u Because the danger posed by the SA-2 sites was one of the major topics at the Special Group meeting, DCI McCone brought along Col. Jack C. Ledford (USAF), head of the Office of Special Activities, who presented a vulnerability analysis that estimated the odds of losing a U-2 over Cuba at I in 6. The Special Group approved the recommended flight over San Cristobal.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

As the Special Group meeting was breaking up, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Air Force repre sentative questioned the adequacy ofthe Agency's cover story, which was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico. The Air Force and DOD representatives argued that it would be betterto use Air Force pilots and state in the event of a mis hap that the overflight was a routine Air Force peripheral surveillance mission that had gone off course. McCone then asked Colonel Ledford"s opinion of the proposed change. Ledford agreed that the .DODcover story was better but pointed out that the SAC U-2s were much more vulnerable than those ofthe Agency, which had superior electronic countermeasures and a higher maximum altitude. Ledford then suggested that Air Force pilots use Agency aircraft after receiv ing familiarization training. After leaving the Special Group meeting. McCone and Gilpatric met with President Kennedy, who approved the San Cristobal mission and the use ofAir Force pilots.'"

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

Two days later (11 October), Air Force and CIA representatives met to discuss the change in cover stories. Herbert Scoville, CIA Deputy Director for Research, agreed that in the long run the Air Force cover story was best but emphasized that an Air Force pilot should not be used until he had received adequate training. The con versation then turned to the issue ofwho would run the next mission, the CIA or the Air Force. Strongly favoring Air Force control ofthe U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called DCI McCone and obtained his consent. Shortly thereafter, McCone left

13
Ibid., p. 31 (TS Codeword).

" Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford, USAF Ret., interview by Gregory W. Pedlow. Washington. DC. 20 February I 987 (S); Memorandum for DCI McCone from Herbert Scoville. Jr .. Deputy Director (Research). "The Chronology of Evt:nts Leading to tht: Trans forof Cuban Overflight Responsibility," 28 February I 963, DC! rt:cords, job 80-B-1676R. bo~ 17. folder 18 (S).

-Seoret

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DDCI Marshall S. Carter

Washington for California and did not return until 14 October. Air Force control of the Cuban overflights became official on 12 October, when President Kennedy transferred "responsibility, to include com- mand and control and operational decisions, with regard to U-2 re- connaissance overflights of Cuba" from the CIA to the Department of Defense. The Air Force then asked to borrow two of CIA'S U-2Cs. 15

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

The Acting DCI, Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, US Army, reacted strongly to the Air Force takeover of a major CIA operation. At one point he remarked, "I think it's a hell of a way to run a railroad. It's perfectly obviously a geared operation to get SAC in the act." " In a series of conversations with high-ranking Air Force and administra- tion officials, Carter argued against changing command and control of the flights at such a crucial time. The Agency operation, Carter pointed out, was already in place and working well, whereas the Air Force lacked experience in controlling U-2 overflights, particularly with the U-2C, which was not in the Air Force inventory. Carter also emphasized that Air Force pilots lacked experience with the more powerful J75 engines in the U-2C. He told Roswell Gilpatric. "To put in a brand new green pilot just because he happens to have on a blue suit and to completely disrupt the command and control and commu- nication and ground support system on 72 hours' notice to me doesn't make a God damn bit of sense, Mr. Secretary." DDCI Carter admit- 17 ted that the Air Force's cover story was probably better than the CIA's but suggested at one point, "Let's take one of my boys and put him in a blue suit." * Realizing, however, that the pilot would probably have to come from the Air Force, Carter concentrated his efforts on trying to convince DOD and administration officials to conduct an orderly transition by allowing the CIA to continue its operation for a few weeks using an Air Force pilot, and the Air Force gradually taking over command and control. Carter's efforts were in vain. The Air Force insisted on immediate control of the operation, and administra- tion officials were unwilling to become involved in what they

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perceived as a jurisdictional dispute. Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy told DDCI Carter that "the whole thing looks to me like two quarreling children." 19 Furthermore, no one wanted to speak out against a decision that the President had already made.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

Once the decision was clearly irrevocable, the Agency gave its complete support to the Air Force in preparing for the upcoming overflight. A SAC U-2 pilot had already arrived unannounced at the CIA's U-2 Detachment at Edwards Air Force Base on 11 October, and the CIA U-2 detachment put him through a hasty training program to familiarize him with the U-2C. By Sunday, 14 October 1962, the weather over Cuba had cleared, and the first SAC overflight of the island took place.

When the U-2 returned, its film was rushed to the National Photographic Interpretation Center. By the evening of 15 October, photointerpreters had found evidence of the presence ofMRBMs in the San Cristobal area. NPIC Director Arthur Lundahl immediately notified DD[ Ray Cline, who in turn notified DDCI Carter (DCI McCone had again left town). As the readout progressed and the evi dence became firmer, the DOI notified National Security Adviser Bundy and Roger Hilsman of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, who informed Secretary of State Dean Rusk. On the following morning, 16 October, DDCI Carter briefed the President on the results ofthe 14 October mission." 0

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

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Soviet MRBM site in Cuba,
1 October 1962

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

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other means. Although by late 1962 photographic satellites had be come an integral part of the overhead collection program, only U-2s could provide the highly detailed photography that photointerpreters needed to spot theearlystages of workon missi le si tes. Attempts had been made to photograph Cuba with satellites, but to no availbecause the satellites' normal orbits placed them over Cuba at the wrong time of day, after clouds had formed.

U-2s Over South America

Agency U-2s again conducted operations inthe Western Hemisphere in December 1963. Th e Directorate ofPlans had requested photo graphic coverage of Venezuela and neighboring British Guianm be cause ofguerrilla acti vities conducted by a pro-Castro movement inside Venezuela. Supplies for this movement appeared to be coming across the border from Bri tish Guiana. On 30 November 1963, the NSC Special Group approved overflights ofthe British Guiana Venezuela border to determine the scope and rate of buildupof guer rilla forces. The Special Group stipulated that the entire effort w:as to be conducted without the knowledge ofeither the British or the Venezuelans.

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# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958 (cont.)

Long unhappy with President Achmed Sukarno's perceived sym pathy to Communism and his institution of "guided democracy" in Indonesia, the CIA, after consultation with the State Department, be gan in early l 957 to supply financial assistance to a group of dissident Indonesian Army officers on the island of Sumatra. By 25 September 1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the course ofevents in Indonesia and on its recommendation President Eisenhower authorized the Agency to "employ all feasible covert means" to support the dissidents. Planning for increased aid of all types began immediately, and in January 1958 a US arms shipment for the dissidents arrived in Sumatra. Then on 10 February, the situa tion came to a head. While Sukarno was out ofthe country on a state visit to Japan, the dissident army colonels, without consulting CIA, organized a Revolutionary Council in Padang, West Sumatra, and de manded the abolition of President Sukarno's "guided democracy." Five days later, this council proclaimed itself the new "Revolutionary Government" of Indonesia. President Sukarno's armed forces re sponded swiftly to this threat. In late February the Indonesian Air Force began bombing dissident strongholds, and by mid-March gov ernment forces were conducting an all-out air-sea-land drive against the rebel-held areas in central Sumatra. Although the Sumatran rebels were falling back, additional unrest broke out over 1,800 miles away in the islands of Celebes (Sulawesi), and CIA quickly began supply ing weapons to these dissidents, too. 11

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# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958 (cont.)

The first U-2 mission over Indonesia took place on 28 March 1958. By 12 June, when the operation was phased out, Detachment C U-2s had flown 30 missions over the major islands of Indonesia. Sanitized photos from these missions were used to brief members of the DDP's Covert Action Staff (CAS), who were in charge of a small force ofWorld War II-vintage aircraft such as P-5 ls and B-26s used to support the rebel troops. The CIA's proprietary, Civil Air Transport, supplied the aircraft, which were based on the Indonesian islandofMorotai and flown by mercenary pilots. Desperately short of pilots, the CAS asked if some ofthe U-2 pilots with experience in World War II aircraft could be detailed to the Morotai effort. Although such a request represented an improper use of the highly trained U-2 pilots and posed a potential threat to the entire U-2 pro gram if one of them were captured, Richard Bissell agreed to send pi lots James Cherbonneaux and Carmine Vito to help. Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels' fighter aircraft, the P-51 Mustang. After arriving on Morotai, Cherbonneaux explained to Vito how to fly the fast and powerful Mustang while the two were sitting at a makeshift bar on the edge of the airfield.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958 (cont.)

Several days later, when Cherbonneaux was off the island on an other mission, a flight of Indonesian twin-engine bombers of Czechoslovak manufacture was spotted making its way toward the is land. Exclaiming, "I'm not going to sit around and wait to be bombed," Vito had a Filipino mechanic start up a P-51 sitting on the tarmac. In his first and only flight in a P-51, Vito managed to get the plane off the ground. Once he was airborne and turned in the direction ofthe lumbering bombers, they all took flight in as many directions as there were aircraft. After firing a few . SO-caliber rounds in the di rection of the closest bomber, Vito circled the field and landed the air craft safely. 1"

Agency efforts in support ofthe rebel government proved fruit less. By early May, Central Government forces had taken most of the remaining rebel strongholds, and the Sumatran rebellion was deterio rating into small-scale guerrilla activity. Then on 18 May, an American mercenary pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, was shot down on a bombing mission over Ambon Island. Pope's capture ended Allen Dulles's enthusiasm for the effort, and President Eisenhower also

" Information supplied by Carmine Vito and James Cherbonneaux to Donald E. Welienbach, May 1986.

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wanted no more part ofit. The US Government rapidly withdrew its support, and the remaining remnants of the rebellion collapsed. Four years later, the Indonesians freed Pope after Attorney General Robert Kennedy personally appealed to President Sukarno.

When the revolt ended, the U-2s returned to Atsugi. On the way back, one of the planes, which was equipped with a System-Y elec tronic intelligence unit, flew along the coast ofChina to gather data on Communist Chinese radars. ' 5

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958

During the summer of l 958, tension between the People's Republic of China and Nationalist China (Taiwan) increased to such an extent that on 18 June Detachment C mounted a U-2 mission to film the Chinese mainland coast and adjacent island areas. On 11 August, People's Liberation Army (PLA) artillery began bombarding the offshore islands ofQuemoy and Little Quemoy, where the Nationalists had stationed large numbers of troops to ward off any invasion. On 23 ~!,!gust the Communists increased the shelling. After five days of intense bombardment, which made resupply of the islands from Taiwan impossible, the PLA commander ordered the Nationalist garrisons to surrender, intimating that an invasion was imminent. The Nationalists refused to surrender and received support from the United States in the form ofwarships from the 7th Fleet, which began escorting Nationalist ships carrying supplies to the beleaguered garrisons.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958 (cont.)

During this period, Detachment C U-2s flew four missions over the mainland, searching for troop movements that would indicate that the PRC was planning to invade the islands. Photos from these mis sions showed no evidence ofa PRC buildup, but the atmosphere in the region remained tense. Detachment C U-2s flew two more mis sions (9 September and 22 October) to monitor PRC troop move ments and again found no indications ofpreparations for an invasion. The Offshore Islands Crisis receded in late October 1958 after the PRC learned that it would not receive support from the Soviet Union if the crisis escalated into a confrontation with the United States. " 6

" Mission folder 1773, (10 June 1958), OSA n:cords, job 67-B-328, box 7 (TS Codeword): OSA History, chap. 15, pp. 25-26 (TS Codeword).

OSA History, chap. 15, p. 27 (TS Codeword).

-Secret_

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While the Offshore Islands Crisis was still in progress, Detachment C began conducting flights in support ofits weather re connaissance cover story. On 14, 15, and 16 July 1958, U-2s flew high above Typhoon Winnie, which was causing great damage on Taiwan. These missions provided the first photography ever obtained ofsuch a massive storm system. Photographs ofthe storm were the subject ofarticles in the magazine Weatherwise and the 21 July edi tion ofAviation Week. In September, Detachment C aircraft photo graphed two more typhoons.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet

The consolidation of all Agency air activities under the DDP in l 959 led to increased involvement of the U-2 program with clandestine ef forts against Communist governments. One important area of DDP activity during this period was Tibet. In March l 959, the PLA suppressed an uprising against the Chinese occupation ofTibet, and several thousand Tibetans fled the country along with their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. Afterward, Agency operatives from the DDP's Far East Division began training some ofthese Tibetan refu gees for paramilitary operations inside Tibet. Once the Tibetans com pleted their training, FE Division planned to parachute them back into Tibet. Such missions, however, required detailed maps and aerial pho tographs of the areas of operation. Richard Bissell, therefore, obtained permission from the President to use Detachment C U-2s to provide the necessary photography.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet (cont.)

Operation MILL TOWN, as the reconnaissance missions over Tibet were known, consisted oftwo missions staged from Cubi Point Naval Air Station on 12 and 14 May 1959. The photography revealed that Communist China had built new roads with supply and defense points. Agency photointerpreters also discovered two large new air fields at elevations above 13,000 feet. Later in the year, the Far East Division needed photographs and maps ofanother area ofTibet. To conceal the target of this new operation, which was codenamed SOUTH GATE, the Development Projects Division planned and flew a total of six missions coverinf. much of Southeast Asia-Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia! as well as the desired area in Tibet. Only four ofthe m1ss1ons involved the area ofoperational interest. Five ofthe flights took place between 29 August and 9 September, and one additional flight (Operation QUICK KICK) followed on 4 November. All of these missions were "Fast Move" operations in which necessary supplies and personnel flew to a remote staging area in a C-130, where they rendezvoused with a U-2 that had been ferried

-Secret

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in. The staging base in this case was Ta Khli, Thailand. These flights did not go unnoticed; on 13 September 1959, Hong Kon g's China Po st published a story headlined "U-2ofUSAF Said Reconnoit,e ring Red China at Unreachable Altitude."~

U-2 photography of Typhoon
Winnie, July 1958

## U-2Cs for Detachment C

Late in l 958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U-2s with the more powerful Pratt & Whitney J75/P-13 jet eng ine. The first ofthese U-2Cs arrived at Detachment C in the summer of 1959. During a test flight of this aircraft (article 360) on 24 September 1959, the pilot decided to set a new altitude re,:ord.

" Ibid.. chap. 18. pp. 6-7, 12; chap. 15. p. 29 (TS Codeword).

-Secret-

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Lhasa, Tibet, November  1959

A l tho ugh the plane was equipped with a camera. it carri ed no film an d did n ot have a full load of fuel, which made it considerably lighter than an operational U-2C. As a result, the plane reached 76.400 feet-thehighest altitude achieved by any of the original U-2 aircraft. In the process. however, the aircraft consumed more fuel than was called for in the test flight plan, causing the engine to fl ame out during the return to base. The pi lot then made an emergency wheels-up landing at a glider-club strip near Fujisawa. south of Atsugi.

The crash did not cause any injuries or seriousdamage10the air craft, but it did bring unwanted publicity to the U-2 program. Much of the publicity resulted from the actions of Detachment C's security unit. whose conspicuous Hawaian shirts and lar ge pistols drew the

Secret

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attention ofJapanese reporters. One reporter even flew over the area in a helicopter, taking pictures of the U-2. These photographs ap peared in many Japanese newspapers and magazines. 18

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## U-2 Crash in  Thailand

Flights by Detachment C U-2s over Tibet and western China contin ued during the first half of 1960 under Operation TOPPER. The first mission on 30 March was very successful. The second mission on 5 April took good photographs but encountered mechanical problems. At the start of the mission, the landing-gear doors failed to close com pletely, resulting in increased drag and higher fuel consumption. With no fuel gauge to warn the pilot ofthe critical fuel situation, the air craft ran out offuel far short ofTa Khli, forcing the pilot to make a crash landing in a rice paddy. The area was inaccessible to large vehi cles, and the plane, article 349, had to be cut into pieces in order to remove it. With the help of local villagers, the retrieval team dissassembled the aircraft for transport to the base, where the pieces were loaded onto a C-124 under cover ofdarkness. The crash and subsequent recovery of the U-2 did not attract the attention of the p~e.ss; there was only one report in a local Thai newspaper, which simply referred to the crash of ajetplane. In appreciation for the as sistance provided by the villagers, the Agency's Thailand Station gave the headman funds to build a new school. 19

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## End of Detachment C Operations

The loss of two aircraft in slightly more than six months left Detachment C with just two aircraft. Fortunately, the level ofmission activity remained low because Detachment C was no longer conduct ing overflights ofthe Soviet Union.

One important remaining mission was high-altitude air sampling (HASP), in which specially equipped U-2s gathered upper-altitude air samples to look for evidence ofSoviet nuclear testing. The direction ofthe prevailing winds made Detachment C ideally situated for this activity, which began in the fall of 1958 and continued in 1959. In late April 1960, Detachment C was preparing to stage to the Philippines to conduct additional air-sampling missions, when the loss ofPowers' U-2 temporarily halted all U-2 activities.

" Ibid.. chap. 15, p. 30 (TS Codeword).

Ibid.. chap. 15, pp. 32-33 (TS Codeword).

_Secret

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Recovery of Article 349,
April 1960

The publicity generated by the U-2 incident stirred considerable controversy in Japan, and there were soon demonstrations against the continuing presence of U-2s in Japan. On 6 June 1960, project head- quarters decided on a phased-out withdrawal of Detachment C between 15 July and 1 September, but this timetable had to be accel- erated when the Japanese Government formally requested the re- moval of the U-2s on 8 July." 30

Secret

Ibid., chap. 15, pp. 33-36 (TS Codeword).

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## Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam

In the aftermath ofthe Powers loss, both ofthe overseas U-2 detach ments returned to the United States and their aircraft and personnel were incorporated into Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base in California. This detachment was now responsible for providing cover age in Asia, and its first mission came in Laos. After the neutralist Laotian Government of Souvanna Phouma collapsed in early December 1960, reports began circulating that leftist antigovernment forces were using Soviet arms. Then on 30 December, a new Laotian Government appealed for UN aid against what it said was an invasion from North Vietnam and possibly Communist China. Alarmed over the possibility ofthe civil war expanding because ofthe introduction offoreign troops, the Eisenhower administration ordered Detachment G to gather more information on the events in Southeast Asia.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam (cont.)

Five Detachment G pilots and planes were ferried to Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the Philippines to conduct an operation known as POLECAT. During the period 3 to 18 January 1961, these U-2s made s~yen flights over Laos and North Vietnam. To search for the reported foreign troops, these missions concentrated on the lines of communi cations leading into Laos from North Vietnam and China. In addition, the U-2s scanned North Vietnamese airfields for Soviet aircraft to determine the magnitude of the airdrop operation allegedly supporting the Pathet Lao troops. NPIC sent photointerpreters to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines to obtain an immediate readout ofthe results ofeach mission. The photography did not substantiate the Laotian claims, and on 26 January the Laotian Government retracted its charges of a foreign invasion. Detachment G's U-2s returned to California in early February l 96 I. 31

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landing at the Scranton-Wilkes-Bame Airport. the pilot reported the incident to Headquarters. The Office of Security immediately con tacted the Pennsylvania State Police, who sealed off the wooded area. , Agency security officers soon arrived to search for the boxes. They recovered all 43 containers; not one had broken. 32

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam (cont.)

Detachment G'sonly other activity during the summer of 196 l was a so li tary overflight of North Vietnam, known as Operation EBONY. In preparation for this mission, a U-2 deployed to Cubi Point on 13 August l 96 l.Two days later it successfully conducted the overflight and subsequently returned to the United States.JJ

New Detachment on Taiwan

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam (cont.)

Long before the Nationalist Chinese became involved in the U-2 pro gram, they were flying covert reconnaissance missions for the CIA. In 1952 the CIA began recruiting Nationalist Chinese crews to replace US personnel from the proprietary ti.rm Civ il Air Transport, who had _been flying Agency aircraft todrop leaflets. agents, and supplies over the Chinese mainland. This •project (BGMARQUE) aJso provided photographic coverage ofthe rail li.ne from Shanghai to the border with French Indochina. CIA-sponsored aerial reconnaissance over the mainland increased substantially in 1955 with the establishment of Project STPOLLY. which used Agency aircraft with Nationalist Chinese crews to gather Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and conduct psychological warfare against the Pe,ople's Republic of China. Atfirst the SIGlNT equipment was installed in World War II-vintage aircraft such as PB-4Ys and B-17s, but in 1958 the project received a new aircraft procured covertly by the Agency from Lockheed, the P2V7, with an extremely sophisticated airborne SIGINT system. STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIAterminated the project, STPOLLY conducted 399 overflights ofthe People's Republic of China, losing a total of eight aircraft and crews.

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# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam (cont.)

wanted the Nationalists to be allowed to begin operations, reluctantly agreed to wait until conditions were favorable.'"' The situation changed radically in May 1960 after the loss of Powers' U-2 de stroyed the existing cover story for U-2 operations. Now there was no longer any reason not to use the Nationalist pilots. In addition, the Agency soon found itself in need ofa base ofoperations in the Far East after Detachment C had to leave Japan.

During discussions with Nationalist officials on 6 May 1960, the CIA's Chief ofStation in Taipei, Ray Cline, raised the possibility of assigning U-2s to the Chinese Air Force. Two weeks later, Gen. Chiang Ching-kuo, head ofthe National Security Bureau, approached Cline informally to propose that the U-2 aircraft based in Japan be moved to Taiwan. This was followed three days later by an official offer on behalf of General Chiang's father, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. President Eisenhower learned of Nationalist China's pro posal on 18 June. Several weeks later, Richard Bissell suggested that two U-2s be turned over to the Nationalists for use in overflying the mainland. The project would be conducted along the lines ofProject STPOLLY. 35

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam (cont.)

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Detachment H U-2 atT'ao-yuan
Airfield

Taiwan on 14 December. Within the Agency the Nationalist pilots and aircraft were known as Detachment H, and they were based a1t the Nationalist Chinese Air Force Base at T'ao-yuan. One of the U-2s was painted with the Nationalist Chinese insignia, and the other was left unmarked so that it could also be used by Agency pilots as need ed. The planes were maintained by Lockheed mechanics under con tract to the CIA. The Agency attempted to maintain at least two U-2s in Detachment H, so lost or damaged aircraft were replaced from the ·Agency's inventory.

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# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam (cont.)

1961 PFIAB recommended the initiation of a limited number ofU-2 photographic missions over the Chinese mainland. The President ap proved the board's recommendation.

Because the US-Nationalist Chinese overflight program (Project TACKLE) was a joint effort, both countries participated in the ap proval process and also shared in the results of the missions. The USlB COMOR established the requirements for Detachment H's overflights, which had to be approved by the NSC's Special Group (5412 Committee) and the President. The Nationalist Chinese Government also approved all missions flown by its pilots. Under the terms of an agreement reached with the Nationalist Chinese Government, film from the overflights ofthe mainland would be pro cessed in the United States, with a duplicate positive copy returned to Nationalist China within IO days. NPIC was responsible for the initial reporting on these missions.'"

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam (cont.)

Project TACKLE overflights began early in 1962. Following a 5 January Special Group decision to approve three missions, a Detachment H U-2 with a Nationalist Chinese pilot flew its first mis sion over the PRC's missile-testing range at Shuangchengzi on 12 January 1962. Unfortunately, because of faulty navigation or faulty maps, the aircraft was poorly positioned and obtained only oblique, rather than vertical, photography ofthe range. En route to and from Shuangchengzi, the U-2 overflew Fukien and Chekiang Provinces looking for suspected deployed missiles, but none could be found in the mission photography. 39

The second Project TACKLE mission took place on 23 February 1962, when a U-2 overflew the PRC's nuclear weapons establishment at Lan-chou. Photography from this mission revealed that the installa tion was at least two years away from operational capacity. Two more missions on 13 and26March flew over K'un-ming and central China covering numerous airfields that had been discovered in satellite pho tography. The U-2 photographs showed more detail than the satellite pictures, thereby, providing additional intelligence data, particularly

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# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam (cont.)

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Lan-chou, PRC, 23 February 1962

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam (cont.)

for air order of battle. In addition to the primary targets already de- scribed, the initial series of Project TACKLE missions obtained pho- tography of the submarine construction facilities at Shanghai and Wu-ch'ang, which showed a low level of activity. Other photographs revealed tremendous expansion of the industrial complexes at Nanking and Ch'ang-sha and the presence of a previously unknown industrial area at Chiang-yu."

Encouraged by the s uccess of the first TACKLE missions, COMOR recommended in May 1962 that Detachment H cover as many as possible of the highest priority industrial and airfield targets in northeast China and the missile! test range s in north China. COMOR noted that, with the exception ofthe areas around Peiping and the Shuangchengzi missile test range, the chances of a U-2 being downed were low. The USIB concu rred with COMOR's recommen dations, and Detachment H therefore conducted three more over flights of the PRC during the month of June:'

"OSA History, chap. 17, p. 45 (TS Codeword): Mission folders GRC102 (23 February 1962), GRC104 (13 March 1962), and GRC106 (26 March 1962). OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 19 (TS Codeword).

" Lay, "USIB History." vol. 2. pp. 385-386 (T:S Codeword).

-Secret_

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Before the month was over, however, another confrontation be tween Nationalist China and the PRC over the Formosa Strait erupted. The Nationalist Government reported a massive buildup of PRC troops and aircraft in Fukien Province opposite the Nationalist-held Quemoy and Ma-tsu Islands. Secretary ofDefense Robert McNamara immediately ordered U-2 coverage of the Strait area to determine the extent ofthe PRC buildup. In response, Detachment H flew six mis sions over the Strait between 25 June and 28 July 1962. To speed up the readout ofthis photography, the films were processed at the Asian Photographic Interpretation Center (ASPIC) at Yokota, Japan, a joint military-CIA endeavor. The U-2 coverage ended in late July when it became apparent that the PRC did not intend to mount an invasion of the offshore islands:~

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam (cont.)

The pace of Detachment H missions slowed considerably in August 1962; the sole Project TACKLE overflight covered Peiping and Manchuria. The following month the detachment mounted two missions, one over south China on the eighth and the second over Kiangsu Province on the ninth. Unfortunately, mechanical difficulties led to the loss of the latter aircraft near Lu-shan. A flameout forced the U-2 down to an altitude where PRC interceptors were able to hit the U-2 with an air-to-air rocket. The Nationalist Chinese pilot para- chuted and was captured. At this point, President Kennedy ordered a standdown of overflights of the PRC.**

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam (cont.)

Following the capture of the Nationalist Chinese U-2 pilot, the People ·s Republic of China accused the United States of masterminding the overflights, but the State Department denied any involvement. Nationalist China then revealed that the United States had granted it a license to purchase two U-2 aircraft. In a l 3 September 1962 response to the Chinese protest, President Kennedy denied any responsibility for the sale ofthe U-2s to Taiwan. noting that the sale had occurred under the previous administration. He stated that there were no current plans to sell any more U-2s to Nationalist China. Eight months later, however, the President ap proved an export license for the delivery ofanother U-2 to Taiwan. Such licenses were needed only for cover purposes. The Agency con tinued to maintain two U-2s on Taiwan, bringing new ones in to replace aircraft lost in training or on missions.

'' OSA History, chap. 17, p. 46 (TS Codeword).

Ibid., pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword); Mission folders GRC125 (11 August 1962). GRC126 (8 September 1962), and GRC127 (9 September 1962), OSA records, job 67-B-972, boxes 20 and 21 (TS Codeword).

-Secret-

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Detachment H resumed overflights of mainland China in December 1962, but its missions now concentrated on the southern portion where there were fewer radars and SAM sites. During December l 962 and January 1963., the detachment conducted two successful overflights of Sichuan, but a mission over south China had to be aborted prematurely. The results ofDetachment H's continuing coverageof the People's Republic of China remained of considerable interest to the United States. On 17 December 1962, the Special Group approved plans for fiscal year 1963/64 that included require ments for photo coverage ofmainland China and for maintaining at least two operational U-2 aircraft in Detachment H . ....

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Use of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots

Detachment H's importance did not lie solely in the missions carried out by its Nationalist Chinese pilots against targets in mainland China; the detachment also provided! aircraft for use by American pi lots flying missions in other parts ofAsia. Indochina was an area of particular interest as American involvement there began growing dur ing the early 1960s. Beginning in February 1962, Detachment G pi lots went to Tao-yuan to use the unmarked Project TACKLE U-2 for overflights of North Vietnam. During the first half of 1962, Detachment G pilots made seven overflights ofNorth Vietnam from the Tao Yuan base. Thereafter, Detachment G pilots could use their own aircraft because the unit began staging teams and aircraft from Edwards AFB to Ta Khli AFB in Thailand.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Use of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots (cont.)

Between 1962 and 1964, Agency U-2s staged a total of 36 pho tographic missions over North and South Vietnam. By April 1964, however, photographic requirements were changing from strategic re connaissance to tactical support as the Viet Cong became more active, taking advantage ofthe weakness ofthe South Vietnamese central government following the coup tha1t overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 and subsequent coups by disgruntled army officers. During this period the South Vietnamese "strategic hamlet" concept began breaking down, and the Viet Cong forces stepped up the pace of their attacks. As a result of the: increasing level of combat in Indochina, the USIB gave responsibility for aerial reconnaissance of the areas where fighting was taking; place to the SAC. Henceforth, SAC U-2s would be used over South Vietnam. parts of Cambodia

"OSA History, chap. 17, pp. 48-49 (TS Codeword); Mission folders GRC134 (25 December 1962), GRC136 (28 December 1962), and GRC138 (20 January 1963), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 21, and job 66-B-664, box 1 (TS Codeword).

-Secret

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within 30 miles ofSouth Vietnam, all ofLaos south ofPaksane, and all ofNorth Vietnam within 30 miles ofSouth Vietnam or the coast. The remaining portions ofIndochina remained the responsibility of the Agency's U-2s. Then in August 1964, following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Air Force assumed responsibility for all of Indochina:5

## U-2s in India

In October 1962, the People's Republic of China launched a series of massive surprise attacks against India's frontier forces in the western provinces of Jammu and Kashmir and in the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA). The Chinese overran all Indian fortifications north ofthe Brahmaputra Valley before halting their operations.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## U-2s in India (cont.)

The Indian Government appealed to the United States for mili tary aid. In the negotiations that followed, it became apparent that Indian claims concerning the extent ofthe Chinese incursions could not be reliably evaluated. US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith, therefore, suggested to the Indian Government that US aerial recon _naissance of the disputed areas would provide both governments with a more accurate picture ofthe Communist Chinese incursions. On 11 November 1962, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru consented to the proposed operation and gave the United States permission to refuel the reconnaissance aircraft (U-2s) in Indian airspace:6

In late November, Detachment G deployed to Ta Khli, Thailand, to carry out the overflights ofthe Sino-Indian border area. Since the U-2s were not authorized to overfly Burma, they had to reach the tar get area via the Bay of Bengal and eastern India and, therefore, re quired midair refueling.

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Detachment G U-2s made four more overflights of the Sino-Indian border areas in January 1963, which led to a PRC protest to India. Photography from these missions was used in January and again in March 1963 to brief Prime Minister Nehru, who then in formed the Indian Parliament about Communist Chinese troop move ments along the border. Although Nehru did not reveal the source of his intelligence, a UPI wire story surmised that the information had been obtained by U-2s.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## U-2s in India (cont.)

The United States had provided photographic coverage of the border area to India for two reasons. First of all, US policymakers wanted a clear picture of the area under dispute. In addition, the intel ligence community wanted to establish a precedent for overflights from India, which could lead to obtaining a permanent staging base in India for electronic reconnaissance missions against the Soviet ABM site at Saryshagan and photographic missions against those portions ofwestern China that were out ofrange of Detachment H. In April 1963, Ambassador Galbraith and the Chief ofStation at New Delhi made the first official request to India for a base. The following month, President Kennedy agreed to DCI McCone's suggestion to raise the question of a U-2 base in India when he met with India's President Savepalli Radhakrishnan on 3 June. This meeting resulted in an Indian offer ofan abandoned World War II base at Charbatia. south ofCalcutta.48

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## U-2s in India (cont.)

The Charbatia base was in poor condition and needed consider able renovation before it could be used for U-2 operations. Work on the base by the Indians took much longer than expected, so Detachment G continued to use Ta Khli when it staged four sorties over Tibet from 29 September to l O November 1963. In addition to the coverage of the Sino-Indian border during this series of flights, the U-2s also photographed all of Thailand to produce a photomap of the border regions as a quid pro quo for the Thai Government. During one ofthese photomapping missions, a U-2 pilot conducted the lon gest mission ever recorded in this aircraft- I I hours and 45 minutes. At the end of this flight on IO November 1963, the pilot was in such poor physical condition that project managers prohibited the schedul ing offuture missions longer than IO hours.'''

OSA History, chap. 16, p. 30 (TS Codeword).

"Mission folder 3238 (10 November 1963), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 29 (TS Codeword).

-Secret

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Charbatia was still not ready in early 1964, so on 31 March 1964 Detachment G staged another mission from Ta Khli. The first mission out ofCharbatia did not take place until 24 May 1964. Three days later Prime Minister Nehru died, and further operations were post poned. The pilots and aircraft left Charbatia, but other equipment re mained in place to save staging costs. In December 1964, when Sino-Indian tensions increased along the border, Detachment G re turned to Charbatia and conducted three highly successful missions, satisfying all ofCOMOR's requirements for the Sino-Indian border region. By this time, however, Ta Khli had become the main base for Detachment G's Asian operations, and Charbatia served merely as a forward staging base. Charbatia was closed out in July 1967. 50

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate
Resources in Asia

The main focus ofAgency U-2 activity in Asia remained the U-2s of Detachment H on Taiwan. In March and April 1963, the USIB met to consider COMOR proposals for aerial reconnaissance ofLaos, North __Vietnam, North Korea, and the People's Republic ofChina. All of COMOR's intelligence requirements could best be met by the U-2 be cause heavy cloud cover made it difficult to obtain satellite photogra phy of the region. At the 28 May 1963 meeting ofthe Special Group, DCI McCone requested authorization for a series of overflights to meet these requirements and stressed the need for additional intelli gence on the atomic energy facilities ofthe PRC. The Special Group then established a "bank" of four authorizations for overflights of the PRC, subject to monthly review by the Group. 51

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# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate
Resources in Asia (cont.)

The increased level of U-2 activity in the Far East during the springof1963 exposed a serious weakness in Projects IDEALIST and TACKLE, a shortage ofaircraft. The Agency only had seven flyable U-2s when the TACKLE overflights of the PRC began in January 1962, and one ofthese aircraft had already been lost during an over flight in September 1962. To deal with this shortage, DCI McCone asked Defense Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs ofStaff on IO June 1963 to transfer two U-2s from the Air Force to the CIA. The Defense Department quickly approved this request. Before the two Air Force aircraft were placed in service, however, the Agency had them upgraded with J75/P- l 3A engines and various electronic de vices, a process that took more than four months. 52

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate
Resources in Asia (cont.)

As overflights over the PRC increased, so did concern about the growing number of Chinese surface-to-air missile sites. The Office of Special Activities, therefore, got permission from the Defense Department to equip Project TACKLE aircraft with System-XII SAM-warning units. These devices alerted the pilot that his aircraft was being tracked by the FAN SONG acquisition radar, part ofthe SA-2's electronic targeting system. The System-XII units also re corded each radar-tracking sequence. Analysis of these recordings re vealed changes in the FAN SONG radar's characteristics, information that proved useful in designing electronic-countermeasure (ECM) de vices for US aircraft operating over Vietnam during the late l 960s. 51

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# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate
Resources in Asia (cont.)

The danger posed by the growing number of SA-2 sites in the PRC was clearly demonstrated on 1 November 1963, when a second Project TACKLE U-2 was lost near the Kiangsi-Chekiang border on its way back from photographing the PRC's Shuangchengzi missile test range. As was the case after the first operational loss over China in September 1961, President Kennedy ordered a standdown of over flights ofmainland China. This standdown lasted almost five months.

As a result of this second loss over the PRC, the Office of Special Activities began installing a new 30-channel telemetry system aboard Detachment H U-2s to monitor various aircraft functions. Known as BIRDWATCHER, this unit periodically broadcast a burst of data to the airbase that launched the U-2. This data burst contained a status report on all the major systems aboard the plane, such as air speed, altitude, exhaust temperature, fuel supply, film supply, and ox ygen supply. BIRDWATCHER provided project managers with a benchmarkofaircraft performance that could be used to determine if a lost plane had been shot down at altitude or had suffered mechanical failure. 54

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate
Resources in Asia (cont.)

BIRDWATCHER's first operational use came on 16 March 1964, when overflights resumed with a mission over southern China. The PRC was now a high-priority target for the U-2 because more data were needed to prepare National Intelligence Estimates due in the autumn. Of particular concern was the PRC's nuclear program. Despite the high priority of its missions, Detachment H's resources remained scarce. It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s or six qualified Nationalist Chinese pilots at any one time. By the spring of 1964, crashes during training and the two losses over the mainland had reduced Detachment H to only two qual ified pilots, one of whom suffered from ulcers and a nervous disorder. Indeed, this pilot had every reason to be nervous; he flew three ofthe next four Detachment H overflights and became the third Nationalist Chinese pilot to be shot down over the mainland.

This loss came on 7 July 1964. The Nationalist Chinese pilot's last transmission was that his System-XII unit had alerted him that he was being tracked by the FAN SONG radar. BIRDWATCHER data revealed that the aircraft was at penetration altitude and all systems

Ibid., p. 51, 53 (TS Codeword).

_Secret

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were normal when the pilot made this report. Project managers pre sumed that the U-2 was downed by a direct hit or near miss by an SA-2 missile. 55

President Johnson ordered a standdown of overflights of the PRC. This standdown was welcomed by the Nationalist Chinese Government, which told the Taiwan Chief of Station that it wanted ··to let some time go by" before more overflights were scheduled. The Nationalists pointed out that the only remaining qualified U-2 pi lot had "disqualified" himself because of nervous tension. No new pilots could be qualified for U-2 flights before mid-August.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate
Resources in Asia (cont.)

The Nationalists then demanded faster and higher flying aircraft as well as better antimissile equipment for the planes. This request led some CIA personnel to suspect that Nationalist China had learned about Project OXCART, the successor to the U-2 that was still under going testing. Despite the Nationalists' request for better ECM equip ment, the Defense Department remained reluctant to authorize the use of the System-XIII false-angle radar jammer on Project TACKLE U-2s. The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with its highly advanced traveling-wave tube (TWT) would enable Communist Bloc technicians to devise countermeasures and also learn how to produce the highly efficient TWT themselves. As an in centive for the Nationalist Chinese to agree to more overflights. the CIA agreed to permit them to process the U-2 film on Taiwan and to use their own photointerpreters to exploit the film along with US photointerpreters.

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# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H

Demand for overhead photography of the PRC continued to grow, spurredin part by the results of earlier U-2 missions that revealed the presenceofSoviet-made MiG-2ls in the PRC. In addition, there were indications that Communist China might be producing its own SAMs. Furthermore, satellite photography revealed that preparations for the first Chinese nuclear test were almost complete at the Lop Nor test site.

The need for photographs of the Lop Nor site was considered so urgent that the Defense Department finally relented and permitted the System-XIII false-angle device jammer to be installed in Project TACKLE aircraft, with the proviso that it not be turned on until after the pilot had been alerted by System-XII that he was being tracked by FAN SONG radars. Photographing Lop Nor, however, was not a sim ple task. Located more than 2,000 miles west-northwest ofTaiwan, Lop Nor lay beyond the round trip range of T'ao-yuan-based U-2s and in-flight refueling was not possible. Lop Nor was closer to Ta Khli, Thailand, only 1,650 miles northwest ofthat base, and much closer to Charbatia, India, which lay only 1,200 miles south ofthe testing site.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H (cont.)

After refusing DCI McCone's suggestion to stage a Lop Nor overflight from Charbatia using a CIA civilian pilot, President Johnson approved a proposal to send a Project TACKLE unit to Ta Khli for the mission to Lop Nor. A Detachment H U-2 with a Nationalist Chinese pilot deployed to Ta Khli in mid-October to pre pare for the overflight. Before mission preparations could be complet ed, however, the Chinese detonated their first nuclear weapon on 16 October 1964, and the mission was canceled. 57

The first overflight ofCommunist China since the 7 July 1964 loss was a 31 October mission over Lan-chou. By mid-November, three more overflights had taken place, one over North Korea and northern China and two over southern and central China. An over flight ofManchuria on 9 December 1964 brought back photos of a G-class ballistic-missile submarine. By this time, the mass of data be ing provided by Project TACKLE overflights was overwhelming the analysts of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR). An ORR memorandum from 11 January 1965 reported that analysis of the "large backlog of unexploited photography on Chinese Communist

''Lay, "USIB History," vol. 6, pp. 751. 753-755.

_Secret

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ground force installations .. .would require about two man-years work, backed up by a larger expansion of photointerpretation ef fort.,, S3

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## UseofInfrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants

Photographic missions were not the only method used by the Agency to gather information on the PRC's progress in developing nuclear weapons. In fact, standard overhead photography was of little value in determining whether or not various nuclear-related facilities were producing weapon-grade materials. Such information could only be obtained from agent reports or infrared imaging of the targets, which would reveal the heat associated with nuclear-refining activity. Early in 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to develop a high-resolution infrared scanner for the U-2 in order to ascertain the operational status of Chinese nuclear reactors. After this request was turned down, the Agency decided to fund the development of such a scanner itself. In the spring of 1963, the Office of Research and Development (ORD) signed a contract with the Texas Instruments Corporation for the production of an infrared scanner that would operate <empty> To conceal the intended purpose of the scanner, the devices were called forest fire detectors and assigned model numbers such as "FFD-1."

Tests conducted in September 1963 proved that model FFD-2

was capable of revealing activity

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## UseofInfrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants (cont.)

Further im-

provements followed, and on 26 October 1964 ORUcleclarecl the infrared unit operational. In re porting the successful result s of the in frared testing to DCI McCone. ORD Director Robert Chapman men tioned that there was only one su ch unit in existence. McCone immediately told Chapman to order more, and the Agency then pur chased several for Project TACKLE and a stereo-configured FFD-4 for Project OXCART .

DCI McCone reviewed these infrared detection developments with Defense Secretary McNamara and his new deputy, Cyrus Vance, on 30 October, being careful to point out that the new device was a product of Agency-sponsored R&D because the Pentagon had refused to fund it.

<empty>
Secret

ORR, Memorandum for the Record. 11 January 1965, OSA records (TS Codeword).

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The FFD-2 unit was installed in a U-2C
No more U-2 flights over China used the infrared scanner.

The loss of yet another U-2 and its pilot made Nationalist Chinese officials reluctant to resume overflights of the mainland. They insisted that their U-2 pilots be given permission to turn on the System-XIII false-angle device during the entire time they were over hostile territory, not just after they had been alerted by the System-XII radar-detection device. The Defense Department acceded to these de- mands in order to keep the TACKLE flights going. In addition, the Project TACKLE U-2s began receiving even more advanced ECM equipment. 60

•• Mission folders C284C (22 November 1964), C304C (25 November 1964), C344C (19 December 1964), and C0l5C (8 January 1965), OSA records, job 66-B-664, box 8, job 69-B-404, bait 2, and job 66-8-597, bait I; USIB History, vol. 6, p. 758 (TS Codeword).

Ibid., chap. 17, pp. 59-61 (TS Codeword).

-Seeret

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# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## UseofInfrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants (cont.)

With their demands met, Nationalist Chinese officials again con sented to overflights by Detachment H, and operations resumed in February 1965 with three missions over the mainland. By this time US interest in the People's Republic of China was very high because ofthe PRC's development ofnuclear weapons. The Special Group, therefore, approved an extensive reconnaissance program directed against the PRC. By the end of the year, Detachment H had flown 30 missions, the highest annual total during the entire program.

The level of activity declined during 1966, with only IO missions flown over the mainland. Detachment H also suffered the loss of two more aircraft and pilots in crashes during training missions in 1966. In the fall ofthat year, joint US-Nationalist Chinese relations in the field ofoverhead reconnaissance were further strained by the unilat eral US decision to kill the longstanding program of low-altitude nighttime overflights ofthe mainland (STPOLLY). 61

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## UseofInfrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants (cont.)

Important considerations:
* Make sure that for all key-value pairs, you have "key:value" format. Ensure that each value is associated with the correct key.
* Make sure your reading order is correct. Sometimes, the options are numbered, and you should follow the order of the numbers instead of going horizontally.
* In general, circled options or tick marks, or x marks next to the text are checked options. Mark them with [x].
* Also, for checkbox field, we tend to do [x] $value$ and [ ] $value$, basically having the checkbox before the text. Follow this pattern when we don't have an explicit colon between the value and the checkbox in the image.
* We also tend to add a newline between checkbox fields that are grouped together on the same row. So instead of having '[ ] $value 1$ [x] $value 2$', we will have '[ ] $value 1$
[x] $value 2$'.
* Your performance on checkboxes should be perfect. Take time to double check yourself.
* Do not output Markdown formatting. Always output things in key-value format. So for columns, you will have
$Row 1 Name$:
$Column 1$: $Value 1$
$Column 2$: $Value 2$
$Row 2$:
$Column 1$: $Value 1$
$Column 2$: $Value 2$
* Do not output HTML formatting, let's remain with text.
* Do not maintain extra spaces to be faithful to the image. Instead, add a newline.
* Do not drop any information, especially headers or text hanging around.
* Conversely, do not create any new keys that are not present in the image. Even if you understand the context, do not create the keys, just write the values as they are.
* Do not fix typos or grammatical errors. Just write the text as it is.
* You should use Latex formatting for mathematical symbols.

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<empty>

-Secret-

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The next mission mounted by Project TACKLE

The next mission mounted by Project TACKLE took place on 8 September 1967. The U-2C air-

craft overflew central China and fell victim to a SAM in the vicinity of Shanghai; the fate of the pilot was unknown. This loss reduced the number of U-2s in the Agency's inventory to five."

The entire U-2 overflight program was temporarily halted in early November l 967 after an Air Force U-2 in Vietnam was discov ered to have cracks in its wing. All Air Force and CIA U-2s were or dered back to Lockheed for ultrasonic inspection of the wings and other stress points to check on metal fatigue. Upon completion of this inspection, both the Air Force and the Agency resumed their over flight activity.(,.!

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# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## The End of U-2 Overflights of Mainland China (cont.)

week later the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese launched their Tet of fensive in South Vietnam. The 303 Committee (the new name for the Special Group after 1964) decided on l February 1968 to suspend a group of overflights scheduled for February and called for mis sion-by-mission approval "during this period oftension." The com mittee approved one additional overflight of southern China, which was flown by Detachment H on 16 March 1968, and two overflights of Cambodia, carried out on 27 March and 3 April 1968 by Detachment G in its first operations since early 1966. These three missions turned out to be the last overflights by U-2s in the Far East. By this time U-2 flights over the PRC had become so dangerous that the State Department opposed further overflights, and on l O April 1968 the 303 Committee decided not to approve any mission that would fly closer than 20 miles from the coast ofChina.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## The End of U-2 Overflights of Mainland China (cont.)

One reason why Detachment H's overflights were stopped was the steady increase in the PRC's ability to track and engage U-2s, as evidenced by its success in downing five U-2s. By 1968 PRC radars along the coast opposite Taiwan were keeping a close watch on U-2 activity from the T'ao-yuan base and actively tracked U-2s as soon as they became airborne. The U-2s then had to face a growing PRC air defense system that not only consisted ofSA-2 missiles but also the fast and high~flying MiG-21. The PRC's MiG-21 pilots had become adept at the power-zoom technique and were threatening almost every U-2 mission. The risks to U-2s now seemed too great. 65

The decision to end Asian overflights was also rooted in the Johnson administration's change in its whole approach to the war in Indochina in the spring of 1968. On 31 March 1968, the President limited the bombing of North Vietnam in order to improve the chances for peace talks. The end offlights over the People's Republic ofChina was viewed as another way to improve the peace process.

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Overflights by Project TACKLE

Fiscal Year: Total
Overflights: 104

Fiscal Year: 1962
Overflights: 18

Fiscal Year: 1963
Overflights: 17

Fiscal Year: 1964
Overflights: 13

Fiscal Year: 1965
Overflights: 30

Fiscal Year: 1966
Overflights: 10

Fiscal Year: 1967
Overflights: 14

Fiscal Year: 1968
Overflights: 2

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Peripheral Missions by Detachment H

Detachment H did not cease its activities following the termination of overflights of mainland China. Its next U-2 mission took place on 18 May 1968. This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac- cordance with the new guidelines, never came closer than 20 miles to the Chinese coast. All future Detachment H missions against the PRC also conformed with this restriction but were still the target of interception attempts by PRC MiG-21s or hastily erected SAM sites on offshore islands. The use of peripheral missions prevented any further losses, although one aircraft crashed into the sea from un- known causes shortly after taking off to start a mission on 5 January 1969. Another pilot was killed on 24 November 1970 in a crash dur- ing a routine training mission."

The level of activity gradually increased during the remaining years ofProject TACKLE, as can be seen in the table on page 245.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Peripheral Missions by Detachment H (cont.)

The U-2s flying these missions were generally equipped with the B or the newly designed 48-inch H cameras to obtain oblique pho tography and with various signal-intelligence-gathering systems. Beginning in May 1971, Project TACKLE began using a new com munications-intelligence collection package known as LONG SHAFT. This system was used on 32 occasions through 12 December 1973, when the LONG SHAFTcollection program ended.

"" ·•oftice of Special Activities History. April 1969 to Phase-Out." (draft: hereafter cited as "OSA History-2") (CIA: DS&T, 1974). chap. 3. pp. 36-41 (TS Codeword).

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Project TACKLE Peripheral Missions, 1969-1974

Displayof downeddetachment
H U-2s in Peiping

| Fiscal Year   | Missions    |
|-|-|
| 1969          | 9           |
| 1970          | 14          |
| 1971          | 19          |
| 1972          | 23          |
| 1973          | 31          |
| 1974          | 17          |

Once the United States began seeking a rapprochement with the People's Repub lic ofChina. Detachment H U-2s came under more and more restrictions. Soon after the impending visit of President Richard M. Nixon to the PRC was announced, U-2 mi ss ions were ordered to stay even farther away from the mainland: 25 nautical miles i nstead of the previous 20. During the months ofFebruary and

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Nationalist Chinese U-2R

March 1972. when the Pr esi dent's: visit took place, Detachment H ceased all operational missions.~'

In March 1973, the TACKLE agreement with the Nationalist Chinese was renegotiated. Although no end date was set, the a gree ment contained a termination c lause that would becomeeffective three months af ter notification by either party. This clause provided more flexibility to the United States, which could now end the Nationalist Chinese U-2 program whenever US foreign policy considerations made such astep desirable.

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Vietnam inJanuary 1973, US military flights in the area were forbid den. The Ni xon administration, therefore, tasked the CIA with moni toring North Vietnam's co mpliance with the cease-fire accords.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Operation SCOPE SHIELD OvmNorth Vietnam (cont.)

The Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan under the cover ofLockheed employees working on a government contract to check weather conditions. Their highly sensitive missions had to remain at le ast 15 nau tical miles away from the North Vietnamese coast, and they initially flew at low altitude in a deceptive direction in order to avoid PRC radars. These constrai nts made the missions diffic ultbecause at low altitude the U-2 consumed more fuel and encoun tered more turbulence and the pilocs· pressure suits tended to overheat.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Operation SCOPE SHIELD OvmNorth Vietnam (cont.)

The first mission on 30 March 1973 was only marginally suc cessful because of cloud cover and haze, which prevented it from photographi ng most of its targets. A second mission on the following day had somewhat better luck with the weather. but problems with t he film processing reduced the mission ·s coverage. Afterward, the mon soon season prevented any further missions until 21 July 1973. This ·mission ob tained usable photography of SAM sites and North Vietnamese supply operations, although the resolution was not as high as itshould have been because the H camera l ens had not been properly focused. The last SCOPE SHIELD mission, on 6 January 197 4. finally succeeded in obtaining high-quality photography. The mission provided complete coverage of shipping in Haiphong Harbor. SAMdefenses, and North Vietnamese naval order of battle.M

IMPROVEMENTS  IN  U-2 TECHNOLOGY

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U-2 on the USS KittyHawk,

5August 1963

involved in seeking permission to bw;e U-::!s in other nations. Kelly Johnson began working on changes to the aircraft. and Offi ce of Special Activities Deputy Director James A. Cunningham, Jr .. a for mer Marine Corps aviator. asked the Navy for assistance.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Modification of U-2s for Aircraft Carrier Deployment (cont.)

The first test of the U-2's capability for carrier operations took place in August 1963 from the USS Kitty Hawk operating in the Pacific Ocean off San Diego, California. A U-2C, which had been loaded aboard the carrier at North Island Naval Base, took off from the flight deck with a full load of fuel and was airborne within 321 feet. No assistance from catapults was necessary. Although the takeoff was very successful, the attempted landing was not. The air- craft bounced, hit hard on one wing tip, and then just barely managed to become airborne again before reaching the end of the deck. Kelly Johnson realized that the airframe would have to be al- tered in order to make carrier landings possible. These alterations in- volved strengthening the landing gear, installing an arresting hook at the rear of the fuselage, and fitting "spoilers" on the wings to cancel the aerodynamic lift once the aircraft was over the flight deck. Aircraft thus modified were designated U-2G. While several aircraft

-Seeret

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underwent these modifications. De tachment G pilots began undergo ing training in landing on aircraft carriers. The first successful carrier landing took place on 2 March l 964. 69

U-2 on the USS Kitty Hawk,
5 August 1963

## Use of Carrier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site

Within a few months after thecompletionof carrier testing. one of the carrier-modified U-2s conducted an operation in the Paciti c. Its mis sion was to gather informati on on the activities of an al ly. In

"U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operations: Project "WHALE TALE. Operation FISH HAWK." DS&T, 1964. pp. 1-13 (TS Codeword): Johnson, "Log for Project X." 5 August 1963 and 2 March 1964.

Seeret

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# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Use of Carrier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site (cont.)

December 1963, France had announced its intention to detonate a hy drogen device over Mururoa Atoll in the Tuamotu Archipelago area ofFrench Polynesia but had given no specific date for the event. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance had been following French nuclear developments since September 1963, when it had apprised the USIB of the need for overflights of this South Pacific area. At that time the USIB decided against recommending such overflights be cause ofState Department concern about potential political difficul ties with France in the event the mission was discovered.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Use of Carrier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site (cont.)

Following reports of a buildup of French troops and technical personnel in neighboring Tahiti, the Special Group on 24 April 1964 approved a mission to overfly the atoll to check for activity. This re quired photography with a resolution better than the 3 to 5 feet possi ble with the standard B-model camera that had been in use since October 1956. Work on a very-high-resolution camera had begun in early 1963, when the Agency contracted with the Itek Corporation to modify for placement in the U-2 a camera that had been developed for the satellite program. Known as the Delta-II, orthe 112A, this de vice could photograph a 28-kilometer swath with 26° convergent ste reoscopic lenses, resulting in a 70° lateral coverage and a ground resolution of 10 inches. This camera was installed in a Detachment H U-2 and used on two missions conducted over Indochina in late December 1963. Resolution was not as high as had been expected, and the unit was returned to Itek for modifications. By early 1964, the 112A had been reworked and was now known as the 112B. In tests it had proved capable ofproviding photography with resolution in the I0- to 12-inch range.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Use of Carrier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site (cont.)

Detachment G conducted Operation FISH HAWK in May 1964 by sending two pilots, an NPIC photointerpreter. and a U-2G equipped with the Itek 112B camera to make the first operational U-2 flights from an aircraft carrier. On 19 May the U-2 took offfrom the USS Ranger and overflew the French atomic test area. As soon as the aircraft returned to the Ranger, the film was developed in the carrier's photo lab, and the NPIC photointerpreter then read out the film to see if the photography met the requirements for resolution and quality. A second U-2 flight carried out a similar mission on 22 May. The pho tography provided all the detail needed to identify the preparations for the nuclear test that occurred later that year. 111

"' "U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operations: Project 'WHALE TALE,' Operation FISH HAWK,'. DS&T. 1964, pp. 17-25.

-Secret-

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There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an aircraft carrier. Although the idea ofusing a floating airbase to avoid political sensitivity proved feasible, the cost did not. Aircraft carriers are enor mously expensive to operate and require an entire flotilla of vessels to protect and service them. The movement of large numbers of big ships is difficult to conceal and cannot be hastily accomplished, while the deployment ofa solitary U-2 to a remote airfield can take place overnight.

## A New Version of the U-2

By the summer of 1966, the number of flyable Agency U-2s had dwindled to six-two at Detachment H in Taiwan and four at Detachment G in California-with three more at Lockheed undergo ing repair. The Agency had originally ordered 20 U-2s in 1954-55 (the Air Force had purchased another 31 ofthese planes), and Kelly Johnson's crew at the Skunk Works had managed to assemble four additional craft for the Agency from leftover spare parts and usable sectionsof crashed aircraft. This brought the total number of U-2s ac quired by the Agency to 24, for an average cost of$812.500 each.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## A New Version of the U-2 (cont.)

At this point, the DCI and the Secretary ofDefense on I August 1966 decided to place an order with Lockheed for eight more aircraft to be used in the Agency and Air Force U-2 programs-acompletely new version of the aircraft. Kelly Johnson had been working on ways to improve the performance ofthe U-2 since early I965 because he was concerned that all the modifications and additions to the aircraft over the years had made it so heavy that it had lost almost half of its range and several thousand feet in cruising altitude. 11 The new model, known as the U-2R, had a longer fuselage and a wider wingspan than the original U-2. The U-2R's wings were 103 feet long with 1,000 square feet oflifting surface, in contrast to the U-2C's 80-foot wings with only 600 square feet. The longer fuselage ofthe U-2R made it possible to provide two pressurized bays with an additional 2.2 cubic meters ofequipment space and also achieve a better weight distribu tion. The net result of all these improvements was a much better per forming aircraft. No longer did the U-2 pilot have to worry about keeping the aircraft's speed at altitude within a 6-knot window in the stall/buffet corner ofthe flight envelope. The envelope was now ex tended to 20 knots, which greatly improved flyability.

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U-2C and U-2R

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## A New Version of the U-2 (cont.)

The U-2R used the upgraded Pratt & Whitney J75/P-13B engine and was able to fly higher-in excess of 74,000 feet-and faster- Mach 0.72 (410 knots), which is 12 knots faster than the U-2C. When flying at the higher altitude, however, the U-2R's range was less than the U-2C's. The restart capability of the P-13B engine was signifi- cantly better than the P-13A power plant. As a result, the U-2R could be restarted at 54,000 feet, which was 10,000 feet higher than the U-2C. Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who checked out this new aircraft when it first took to the air on 28 August 1967. The last of the U-2Rs was delivered on 11 December 1968.

The increased performance of the U-2R did not come cheaply. At $7.1 million per aircraft, the new models cost almost 10 times as much as the original U-2s. Much of the increased cost was due to inflation, but some was the result of technological advances. The ini- tial order for eight of the new version of the U-2 was followed on 23 November 1966 by an order from the DCI and the Secretary of Defense for four more. This brought the total number of U-2Rs pur- chased by the CIA and the Air Force to 12.' 72

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## A New Version of the U-2 (cont.)

In addition to a new aircraft, the U-2 program received a new camera. Agency managers felt that, because the B camera was now 10 years old, the U-2R needed a camera that incorporated the many im- portant advances that had occurred in recent years. The 112B--the modified version of the satellite program's stereo camera that had been used in the U-2G-had not proved totally successful. Despite its stereo capability, this camera's shorter focal length could not provide

"OSA History, chap. 5. pp. 34-36 (TS Codeword): "OSA History-2." chap. 5, pp. 1-2 (TS Codeword).

-Secret_

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the scale of imagery needed to obtain the highly technical data de sired by analysts. As a result, the Office ofSpecial Activities asked the Hycon Manufacturing Company ofPasadena, California, to adapt its successful high-resolution 48-inch 9- by 9-inch format camera de veloped for the OXCART aircraft for use in the U-2R. This camera was actually a very advanced version ofthe original B camera with a new lens designed by James Baker. The new camera was designed to resolve objects smaller than 4 inches.

Hycon began work on the HR-333 camera in 1966. Unlike the OXCART camera, the new unit was to use the split 18- by 18-inch format of the B camera, so the lens had to be redesigned. James Baker's contribution to this effort was a 48-inch f/5.6 system that pro vided remarkably sharp imagery. Hycon completed the camera in time for it to be installed in the first U-2Rs delivered to the Agency in 1968; it is known as the H camera. 71

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Replacement of the Original U-2s With U-2Rs

As the new U-2Rs began coming off the production line at Lockheed _in-the autumn of 1968, CIA and the_Department of Defense had to decide who would get the new aircraft. At a meeting on 13 November, DCI Richard Helms and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara agreed that the Air Force and the Agency would each get six U-2Rs. The six older U-2s remaining from the original 1954-55 production were to be kept in flyable condition and be used as re placements if newer models were lost.

Despite the greatly increased capabilities of the new model of the U-2, the eraofoverflights of hostile territory was over. The U-2R would have six years ofuseful service with the Agency, but its mis sions did not include penetration flights over hostile territory.

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pilots were still flying missions targeted against the People's Republic ofChina, these missions did not overfly PRC territory. Increasingly, Agency U-2s flew missions that did not involve intelligence collec tion requirements.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Support to Other Agencies

Beginning in 1964, the Agency conducted a program known as RED DOT for the Department of Defense. RED DOT involved the devel opment and testing of various color, black and white, and infrared films. emulsions. and processing techniques for use in manned and unmanned high-altitude reconnaissance systems. From 1968 until 1974. Detachment G U-2s photographed areas within the United States that were analagous to portions ofthe Soviet Union in orderto test films and techniques for spotting certain targets. This analogous filming was particularly valuable in connection with agricultural areas and nuclear test sites.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Support to Other Agencies (cont.)

Some U-2 missions supported agencies outside the intelligence community. In I968and 1969, Detachment G U-2s flew high-altitude photographic missions in conjunction with the Apollo VII and IX spaceflights in response to a NASA request. These flights provided photography ofthe western United States for comparison with the photography taken by the Apollo crews. The Department of the Interior also requested U-2 support in early 1969 to help determine the extent of damage caused by a leak in an offshore oil well in California's Santa Barbara Channel. After preliminary assessment of the film at NPIC, the mission photography was given to the US Geological Survey for further study.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Support to Other Agencies (cont.)

Also in early 1969, Detachment G began providing coverage of the western United States at the request of the Department of Commerce. U-2s filmed the Sierra snowfield to aid hydrologists in forecasting snowmelt and nooding potentials. Later that year, Detachment G supported the Office of Emergency Preparedness by photographing 6 l .000 square miles ofthe southern United States as partof a Hurricane Baseline Survey. These photographs could be used for future damage assessment following a major hurricane. A subse quent mission in fiscal year 1971 continued the Hurricane Baseline Survey by photographing the Gulf Coast. When a major earthquake struck the Los Angeles area on 9 February 1971, Detachment G U-2s flew four sorties to obtain damage-assessment photos. 70

Ibid., chap. 3. pp. 3-29 (TS Codeword).

_ Secret-

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Subsequent missions in support ofFederal agencies included COMPASS TRIP in fiscal year 1973, when Agency U-2s photo graphed poppy fiel ds that had been planted by the Bureau of Narcotics in order to provide a standar d for comparison with sate:lli te imagery. In the following year, U-2s assisted the Corps of Engirneers in conducting a geological survey.

Earthquake damage, San
Fernando Valley, 1971

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U-2 in flight to its destination. The C-141 carried support equipment
to the <empty> In October 1969, the third of these
exercises took place at a different location. <empty>

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Overseas Deployment Exercises and Missions (cont.)

No overse asdeployment exercise was necessary in 1970, for ele mentsof Detachment G actually deployed overseas to provide photog raphy ofthe Middle East. At the time. Presi dent Nixon's National Security Adviser. Henry A. Kissinger, was mediating between the Arabs and lsraelis in order to obtain a cease-fire along the Suez Canal. where a virtual undeclared war was takingplace . Once agreement was reached in August, Kissinger promised both sides that the United States would monitor th e agreed upon 32-mile pullback from the wa terway. Originally, K issinger intended for photosatellites to do the monitoring. One satellite was tasked to photograph the Suez Canal area on 10 August, but the quality of its imagery lacked the detail needed to discover such small targets as gun emplacementsand jeeps.

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## Overseas Deployment Exercises and Missions (cont.)

In early August, Kissinger asked the Air Force to provide U-2s to overfly the Canal, but the Air Force demurred, saying it would take several weeks to move a U-2 detachment from Del Rio, Texas, to the Middle East. At this point, DCI Helms told an NSC meeting that the Agency's Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base could deploy aircraft to <empty> and begin filming the Suez area within the week, and it did. In fact, the first U-2 arrived in <empty> only 71 hours after receiving notification to deploy. Between 9 August and 10 November 1970, Agency U-2s flew 29 missions over the cease-fire zone as part of Project EVEN STEVEN. Most flights used the B camera, but 12 were equipped with the new, high-resolution H camera. The EVEN STEVEN U-2s also employed a dozen electronic-intelligence-collection packages, from System-X to System-XXIV. After 10 November 1970, Air Force SR-71s took over the task of photographing the cease-fire zone.76

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lead to the overseas deployment of Detachment G U-2s in 1974, when the CIA was tasked to monitor the Israeli-Egyptian and lateir the Israeli-Syrian disengagement areas. On 21 April l974, a Detachment G U-2 with appropriate support elements arrived at Akrotiri, Cyprus, to conduct Operation OLIVE HARVEST. Between l2 May and 28 July, the detachment conducted six overfli ghts oft he disengagement areas. During these missions the electronic warning systems ofthe U-2 registered numerous radar lockons, but no surface-to-airmi s:siles were fired. On l August 1974, responsibility for the OUYE HARVEST missions as well as the aircraft itself came into the hands ofthe Air Force as part ofthe transferof the entire Agency U-2 pro gram at that time. 77

# SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 (cont.)

## The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities

The Agency's U-2 program had been under review since the autumn of l 969 to detennine if it should be continued along with the larger Air Force U-2 program. In December 1969, President Nixon decided to keep the Agency's program in existence through l971 and asked for a formal review by the 40 Committee (the new name for the 303 ·Committee/Special Group). ln August 1970, the committee recom mended continuing the program through fiscal year 1972. On 12 August 1972, the 40 Committee again favored continuation of the CIA U-2 program. This recommendation was motivated primarily by a desire not to alienate the Nationalist Chinese Government by el.imi nating Project TACKLE. In June 1973, however, DCI Jame:s R. Schlesinger informed the 40 Committee that this project could be ter minated without causing major difficulties with the Nationalist Chinese. On 30August 1973, the 40Committee approved the C:IA's plans to tenninate the U-2 program effective I August 1974. The: Air Force would assume funding responsibility for the four U-2R airicraft assigned to the Agency and would take physical possession ofthem then or shortly thereafter. On l April l 974, Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy informed the Nationalist Chinese Government of the US intention to end the U-2 project, and the two countries then worked out a schedule for phasing out Project TACKLE. 73

[page 271]
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Blank

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# The U-2's Intended Successor:
Project OXCART,
1956-1968

Before the U-2 became operational in June 1956, CIA project offi cials had estimated that its life expectancy for flying safely over the Soviet Uni on would be between 18 months and two years. After overflights began and the Soviets demonstrated the capability of tracking and attempting to intercept the U-2. this estimate seemed too optimistic. By August 1956, Richard Bissell was so concerned ·a6out the U-2's vulnerability that he despaired ofits ability to avoid destruction for six months, let alone two years.

# The U-2's Intended Successor:
Project OXCART,
1956-1968 (cont.)

To extend the U-2's useful operational life, project officials first attempted to reduce the aircraft's vulnerability to detection by Soviet radars. Project RAINBOW's efforts 10 mask the radar image of the U-2 not only proved ineffective, but actually made the aircraft more vu lnerable by adding extra weight that reduced its maximum altitude. Because Soviet radar operators continued to find and track U-2s equipped with antiradar systems, the CIA canceled Project RAINBOW in May 1958.

Long before the failure of Project RAINBOW, Richard Bissell and his Air Force assistant. Col. Jack A. Gibbs, ha d begun to look for a more radical solut ion to the problem of Soviet radar detection-an entirely new aircraft. {n the late summer of 1956, the two officials visited a number ofairframe contractors in a search for new idea s. Among the more unusual was Northrop Aviation's proposal for a gi gantic aircraft with a very-high-lift wing. Because it would not be made ofmetal, the wing would require a type of bridge truss on its upper side to give it rigidity. The proposed aircraft would achieve

-Seeret-

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altitudes of80,000 to 90,000 feet but only at subsonic speeds, just enough to keep it airborne. 1

The slow-flying Northrop design did not solve the problem of radar detection, and in 1957 the emphasis switched to supersonic de signs. In August 1957, the Scientific Engineering Institute (SEI), a CIA proprietary firm that had been working on ways to reduce the U-2's vulnerability to radar, began to investigate the possibility of designing an aircraft with a very small radar cross section. SEI soon discovered that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances ofde tection by radar. 1 From this point on, the CIA's attention focused in creasingly on the possibility of building an aircraft that could fly at both extremely high speeds and high altitudes while incorporating the best ideas in radar-absorbing or radar-deflecting techniques.

# The U-2's Intended Successor:
Project OXCART,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## THE EVALUATION OF DESIGNS FOR A SUCCESSOR TO THE U-2

By the autumn of 1957, Bissell and Gibbs had collected so many ideas for a successor to the U-2 that Bissell asked DCI Dulles for per mission to establish an advisory committee to assist in the selection process. Bissell also felt that the support of a committee of prominent scientists and engineers would prove useful when it came time to ask for funding for such an expensive project. Edwin Land became the chairman ofthe new committee, which included some ofthe scien tists and engineers who had served on previous advisory bodies for overhead reconnaissance: Edward Purcell, Allen F. Donovan, H. Guyford Stever, and Eugene P. Kiefer. The Air Force's chief scientist, Courtland D. Perkins, was also a member. The committee first met in November 1957 and held six more meetings between July 1958 and the late summer of 1959. The meetings usually took place in Land's Boston office and almost always included the Air Force's Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, Dr. Joseph V. Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air craft manufacturers also attended some ofthe meetings. 3

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The top sketch, dated April 23, 1958, shows a front view and a side view of a jet aircraft with delta wings. Handwritten notes indicate "variable position Hor. & vert.".

The bottom sketch, dated June 26, 1958, presents a more detailed side view of the aircraft, including internal sections. Labels indicate "Fuel 7100 gal" in one section, and "BLANK BOMB" and "MILGS 3 WRS" in another.

Johnson's first drawi ngof the "U-3" (A-1); revised version of the A-1

-Seeret-

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# The U-2's Intended Successor:
Project OXCART,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## THE EVALUATION OF DESIGNS FOR A SUCCESSOR TO THE U-2 (cont.)

The two most prominent firms involved in the search for a new aircraft were Lockheed, which had designed the successful U-2, and Convair, which was building the supersonic 8-58 "Hustler" bomber for the Air Force and also working on an even faster model known as the B-588 "Super Hustler." Early in 1958, Richard Bissell asked of ficials from both finns to submit designs for a high-speed reconnais sance aircraft. During the spring and summer of 1958, both fiirms worked ondesign concepts without government contracts or funds.

# The U-2's Intended Successor:
Project OXCART,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## THE EVALUATION OF DESIGNS FOR A SUCCESSOR TO THE U-2 (cont.)

Following extended discussions with Bissell on the subject ofa supersonic successor to the U-2, Lockheed's Kelly Johnson bega ni de signing an aircraft that would cruise at Mach 3.0 at altitudes above 90,000 feet. On 23 July 1958, Johnson presented his new high-speed concept to Land'sadvisory committee, which expressed interest in the approach he was taking. At the same meeting. Navy representatives present ed a concept for a high-altitude reconnaissance vehicle that ex amined the possibility of developing a ramjet-powered, inflatatble, rubber vehicle that would be lifted to altitude by a balloon and 1then •be propelled by a rocket to a speed where the ramjets could produce thrust. Richard Bissell asked Johnson to evaluate this concept, and three weeks later, after receiving more details from Navy repre sentatives. Kelly Johnson made some quick calculations that showed that the design was impractical because the balloon would have tobe a mile in diameter to lift the vehicle, which in tum would need a wing surface area greater than one-seventh of an acre to carry the payload:

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# The U-2's Intended Successor:
Project OXCART,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## THE EVALUATION OF DESIGNS FOR A SUCCESSOR TO THE U-2 (cont.)

Lockheed design for a hydrogen-powered aircraft (the CL-400). The committee examined two other Kelly Johnson designs at this meeting-atailless subsonic aircraft with a very-low-radar cross sec tion (the G2A) and a new supersonic design (the A-2)-and did not accept either one, the former because of its slow speed and the latter because of its dependence on exotic fuels for its ramjets and its over all high cost. The committee approved the continuation ofConvair's work on a ramjet-powered Mach 4.0 "parasite" aircraft that would be launched from a specially configured version ofthe B-58B bomber. The design was termed a parasite because it could not take off on its own but needed a larger aircraft to carry it aloft and accelerate it to the speed required to start the ramjet engine. The Convair design was called the FISH. 5

# The U-2's Intended Successor:
Project OXCART,
1956-1968 (cont.)

## THE EVALUATION OF DESIGNS FOR A SUCCESSOR TO THE U-2 (cont.)

Two months later, after reviewing the Convair proposal and yet another Lockheed design for a high-speed reconnaissance aircraft (the A-3), the Land committee concluded in late November 1958 that it would indeed be feasible to build an aircraft whose speed and altitude would make radar tracking difficult or impossible. The committee, therefore, recommended that DCI Dulles ask President Eisenhower to approve further pursuit ofthe project and to provide funds for addi tional studies and tests. 6

On 17 December 1958, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell briefed the President on the progress toward a successor to the U-2. Also present were Land and Purcell from the advisory committee, Presidential Science Adviser James Killian, and Air Force Secretary Donald Quarles. DCI Dulles reviewed the results of the U-2 missions to date and stated his belief that a successor to the U-2 could be used all over the world and "would have a much greater invulnerability to detection."

[page 277]
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Convair FISH

-Secret

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

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Kelly Johnson's A-2 Design

Prepared: Sept 20, 88
DATE: <empty>
LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORP.
CALIFORNIA DIVISION
Page: <empty>
TEARD: <empty>
PERK: 11

Checked: CW
TITLE: Fix a Bore job.
Model: <empty>

Approved: <empty>
Report No.: <empty>

The 10,000# airplane at 135,000

Toy to eliminate fuselage except for
cockpit & equip bay
17/0 610 to 5.5

Wing @ 1.32 2200°
Tail (m) 600
Engines - 20800 € 1600
Sear (required now) 400
Instruments 60
Surface controls. 300
supply
Electronics 150
Air Cond 250
16.700 Oxygen 50
Subtotal = 5811
75 love. "Cockpit & Bay 2001
Eject rest & fum ✓ 15
Payload 500
Subtotal 7760
Freel System - tanks 500
7460
[ ] Fuel lood = 2000
[ ] [ ]
Ranga 575x 6.0x 3.0 & Loge 10,000
[ ] 2.10 8000
[ ] [ ]

[page 279]
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Kelly Johnson's A-3 Design

|    | Sept. 29'50   |    |                |
|-|-|-|-|
|    | 32            |    | Design of A-3. |
|    |               |    |                |

previous work - a basic design

of the

(AAL trip -s page)

Area - 500 A

.-

17, oto

#

Hot. at 100,000 - 13, 200

2- A. B. JT-124

2- 30"

Ram jets.

300 #

payload.

M= 3.0 @ 100,000' (3.2?)

Basic concept - reluce radar c.s.

Data

given

to SP on

Thurs.- Sept. 25,59

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

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Although President Eisenhower supported the purchase of this type of aircraft, he questioned the plan to procure any before they had been tested. Promising that more thought would be given to the mat ter before such an order was placed, Secretary Quarles noted that CIA, the Defense Department, and the Bureau of the Budget were working on a funding plan for the project. The President suggested that the Air Force "couldsupport the project by transferring some re connaissance money." At the close of the meeting, Eisenhower asked the group to return after completing the next work phase to discuss further stages ofthe project with him. 7

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR

With funding for the proposed new type of aircraft now available, Richard Bissell asked Lockheed and Convair to submit detailed pro posals. During the first half of 1959, both Lockheed and Convair worked to reduce the radar cross section oftheir designs, with assis tance from Franklin Rodgers of the Scientific Engineering Institute. lri pursuing his antiradar studies, Rodgers had discovered a phenome non that he believed could be used to advantage by the new recon naissance aircraft. Known as the Blip/Scan Ratio but also referred to as the Rodgers' Effect, this phenomenon involved three elements: the strength ofa radar return, the altitude ofthe object being illuminated by the radar, and the persistence of the radar return on the radar screen (Pulse-Position Indicator display).

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR (cont.)

Rodgers determined that a high-altitude object moving two to three times as fast as a normal aircraft would produce such a small blip with so little persistence that the radar operator would have great difficulty tracking it, if indeed he could even see it. Rodgers esti mated that for an aircraft to take advantage o!· this Blip/Scan Ratio phenomenon it must fly at altitudes approaching 90,000 feet and have a radar cross section of less than 10 square meters, preferably not much over 5 square meters. However, for a Mach 3.0 aircraft to achieve such a small radar cross section, its designers would have to make many concessions in its structural design and aerodynamics.•

By the summer of 1959, both firms had completed their propos als. In early June, Lockheed submitted a design for a ground-launched aircraft known as the A-11. It would have a speed of Mach 3.2, a range of 3,200 miles, an altitude of 90,000 feet, and a completion date of January 1961. Kelly Johnson had refused to reduce the aerodynam ics of his design in order to achieve a greater antiradar capability, and the A-11 's radar cross section, although not great, was substantially larger than that ofthe much smaller parasite aircraft being designed by Convair."

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR (cont.)

The Convair proposal called for a small, manned, ramjet-pow ered, reconnaissance vehicle to be air launched from one oftwo spe cially configured Convair B-58B Super Hustlers. The FISH vehicle, a radical lifting body with a very-small-radar cross section, would fly at Mach 4.2 at 90.000 feet and have a range of 3,900 miles. Two Marquardt ramjets would power its Mach 4.2 dash over the target area. Once the FISH decelerated, two Pratt & Whitney JT-12 turbojets would bring it back to base. The ramjet exit nozzles and wing edges would be constructed of Pyroceram, a ceramic material that could withstand the high temperatures ofvery high speeds and would ab sorb radiofrequency energy from radar pulses. Convair stated that the FISH could be ready by January I961."'

Convair's proposal depended on two uncertain factors. First and foremost was the unproven technology of ramjet engines. At the time, no aircraft in existence could carry a large, ramjet-powered craft into the sky and then accelerate to sufficient speed for the ramjet engines

'Unnumbered Convair document on the Blip/Scan Ratio or Rodgers· Effect (TS).

"Johnson, "Archangel log," December 1958-July 1959.

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Lockheed A-11

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR (cont.)

tobe igni ted . Since ramjet engines had on lybeen tested in wind tun nels, there was no available data to prove that these engines would work in the application proposed by Convair. The second uncertain factor was the B-58B bomber that was supposed to achieve Mach 2.2 before launching the FISH above 35 ,000 feet. This version of the B-58 was still inthe design stage.

Convair's proposal suffered a major setback inJune 1959, when the AirForce canceled the 8-58B project. Conversion ofthe older, slower B-58A into a supersonic launching platform for the FISH was ruled out by the high cost and technical difficulties invol ved. Moreover,the AirForce was unwilling to part with two aircraft from thesmall inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-588 program not been canceled, however,the FISH proposal would proba blynot have been feasible. Convair engineers had calculated that the added weight of the FISH would prevent the B-588 from achieving the speed required to ignite the parasite aircraft's ramjet engines.

The Convair proposal was therefore unusable, but the Lockheed design with its high radar cross section was also unacceptable to the Land committee. On 14 July 1959, the committee rejected both

-Secret

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designs and continued the competition. Lockheed continued to work on developing a design that would be less vulnerable to detection, and Convair received a new C[A contract to design an air-breathing twin-engine aircraft that would meet the general specifications being followed by Lockhee . d 11

Following recommendations by the Land committee, both Lockheed and Convair incorporated the Pratt & Whitney 158 power plant into their designs. This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the Glenn L. Martin Company's P6M Seamaster, and was the most powerful engine available. [n 1958 the Navy had canceled the Seamaster program, which had left Pratt & Whitney without a buyer for the powerful 158 engine. • I~

Although the Land committee had not yet found an acceptable design, it informed President Eisenhower on 20 July 1959 that the search was making good progress. Concerned about the U-2's vulner ability to detection and possible interception and aware that the photosatellite project was encountering significant problems, the President gave his final approval to the high-speed reconnaissance aircraft project. 13

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR (cont.)

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**Dimensions:**
*   **Wingspan:** 60'0"
*   **Length:** 73'7"
*   **Height:** 18'4"

The drawings highlight the aircraft's sleek, delta-wing design with twin vertical stabilizers.

important design features that contributed to a small radar return were fiberglass engine inlets and wings whose leading edges were made of Pyroceram." 14

Convair KINGFISH

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR (cont.)

Lockheed's new entry was much like its first, but with several modi fications and a new designator, A-12. It, too, would employ two of the powerful J58 engines. Lockheed's major innovation in reducing radar return was a cesium additive in the fuel, which decreased the radar cross section ofthe afterburner plume. This improvement had been proposed by Edward Purce ll of the Land committee. Desiring to save weight, Ke lly Johnson had decided not to construct the A- 12 out of steel. Traditi onal lightweight metals such as aluminum were out of t he question because they could not stand the heat that would be gen erated as the A-12 flew at Mach 3.2, so Johnson chose a titanium alloy.

On20August 1959, Lockheed and Co nvair submitted their pro posals to a joint Department of Defense, Air Force, andCIA selection panel. As the table shows, the two ai rcraft were simil ar in performance

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Wind tunnel test of A-12 model

Secret

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1

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR (cont.)

characteristics, although the Lockheed design's specifications were slightly better in each category. The Lockheed design was also prefer able in terms of overall cost. In the vital area of vulnerability to radar detection, however, the Convair design was superior. Its smaller size and internally mounted engines gave it a smaller radar cross section than the Lockheed A-12. 15

Comparison  ofLockheed and
Convair Designs

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR (cont.)

|                                                      | Lockheed A-12     | Convair KINGFISH   |
|-|-|-|
| Speed                                                | Mach 3.2          | Mach 3.2           |
| Range (total)                                        | 4,120  nm         | 3,400  nm          |
| Range (at altitude)                                  | 3,800 nm          | 3,400  nm          |
| Cruising Altitude                                    | Cruising Altitude | Cruising Altitude  |
| Start                                                | 84,500  ft.       | 85.000  ft.        |
| Midrange                                             | 91.000  ft.       | 88.000  ft.        |
| End                                                  | 97,600  ft.       | 94,000  ft.        |
| Cost summary (for 12 <br />aircraft without engines) | $96.6 million     | $  I21.6 million   |

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR (cont.)

Some of the CIA representatives initially favored the Convair KINGFISH design because of its smaller radar cross section, but they were eventually convinced to support the Lockheed design by the Air Force members ofthe panel, who believed that Convair's cost over runs and production delays on the B-58 project might be repeated in this new project. In contrast, Lockheed had produced the U-2 under budget and on time. Another factor favoring the A-12 was security. Lockheed had experience in running a highly secure facility (the Skunk Works) in which all of the key employees were already cleared by the Agency.

Despite its vote in favor ofthe Lockheed proposal, the selection panel remained concerned about the A-12 's vulnerability to radar de tection and therefore required Lockheed to prove its concept for reducing the A-l2's radar cross section by l January 1960. On 14 September 1959, the CIA awarded a four-month contract to Lockheed

15 OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 18-19 (TS Codeword).

-Secret

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to proceed with antiradar studies, aerodynamic structural tests, and en gineering designs. This research and all later work on the A-12 took place under a new codename. Project OXCART. established at the end of August 1959 to replace its more widely known predecessor, Project GUSTO.'" The CfA's project manager for OXCART was John Parangosky, who had long been associated with the U-2 program.

## EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE A-12'S
RADAR CROSS SECTION

During the spring of 1959, Kelly Johnson's Skunk Works crew which then numbered only 50-had begun building a full-scale mockup ofthe proposed aircraft. The mockup was to be tested for its radar cross section by Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G) in cooperation with the Scientific Engineering Institute at a small testing facility at Indian Springs. Nevada. Lockheed objected to this site be cause its pylon would not support the full-scale mockup and because the facilities were in full view of a nearby highway. On IO September 1959, EG&G agreed to move its radar test facility to the former U-2 testing site at Area 51 of the Atomic Energy Commission's Nevada Proving Grounds. 11

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE A-12'S
RADAR CROSS SECTION (cont.)

When the new radar test facility with its larger pylon was ready. Johnson put the A-12 mockup on a specially designed trailer truck that carried it from Burbank to Area 5 I. By 18 November 1959, the mockup was in place atop the pylon. and radar testing could begin. These tests soon proved that Lockheed's concept ofshape. fuel addi tive, and nonmetallic parts was workable, but it would take more than 18 months oftesting and adjustment before the OXCART achieved a satisfactory radar cross section.

It was in the course of this radar testing that the OXCART received its characteristic cobra-like appearance. Edward Purcell and Franklin Rodgers had come up with a theory that a continuously curving airframe would be difficult to track with a radar pulse be cause it would present few corner reflectors or sharp angles from which pulses could bounce in the direction of the radar. To achieve the continuously curving airframe, Kelly Johnson added thin. curved extensions to the engine housings and leading edges of the wings and

'"Parangosky interview (S): OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 19-21 (TS Codeword).

,· OSA History, chap. 20. p. 22 (TS Codeword).

Secret

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Radar testing of A-12 mockup

-Seeret

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**Key Components:**

<empty>
Antiradar features of the A-12
<empty>
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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE A-12'S
RADAR CROSS SECTION (cont.)

eventually to the fuselage itself, creating what is known as a chine on each side. Atfirst Johnson was concerned that these additions might impair the airworthiness of the plane, but wind tunnel testing deter mined that the chines actually imparted a useful aerodynamic I ift to the vehicle. Because titanium was very brittle and therefore difficult to bend, Johnson achieved the necessary curvature by combining tri angular-shaped pieces oftitanium called fillets. T hese fillets were glued to the framework ofthe chines with a special adhesive, epoxy resin .

On later OXCART modds the fillets were made from electri cally resistive honeycomb plastic with a glass-fiber surface that would not melt at highspeed. When struck by a radar pulse, the com posi te chines tended to absorb the pulse rather than reflect it. A simi lar approach was used for the leading edges of the wings. Again electrically resistive honeycomb material was fabricated into tn.J1ngu lar shapes, known as wing teeth, and fitted into the titanium wings. Both the metal andco mposite fillets and teeth were held in place with the newly developed epoxy cements.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE A-12'S
RADAR CROSS SECTION (cont.)

The greatest remaining area of concern in the A-12's radar cross section was the two vertical stabilizers. To reduce radar reflections, Kelly Johnson canted the stabilizers inward 15° and fabricated them out of resin-impregnated nonmetallic materials. Once these changes were completed, the only metal in each vertical stabilizer was a stain- less steel pivot. The Air Force, which later ordered several versions of the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers." 18

THE OXCART CONTRACT

By mid-January 1960, Lockheed had demonstrated that i ts conceptof shape, fuel additive, and nonmetallic parts would reduce the OXCART's radar cross section substantially. Richard Bissell, howev er. was very upset to learn that the changes had led to a reduction in the aircraft's performance. which meant itwould not be able toaiuain the penetration altitude he had promised to President Eisenhower. Kelly Johnson then proposed to red ucethe aircraft's weight by 1,000 pounds and increase the fuel load by 2.000pounds, making it possible

"Johnson, "Development of Lockheed SR-71, pp. 6-7; OSA History, chap. 20, p. 35 (TS Codeword).

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to achieve the desired target altitude of 91,000 feet. Afterward. he noted in the project log: ··we have no performance margins left; so this project. instead of being 10 times as hard as anything we have done, is 12 times as hard. This matches the design number and is ob viously right." ,,,

These changes satisfied Bissell, who notified Johnson on 26 January that the CIA was authorizing the construction of 12 of the new aircraft. The actual contract was signed on 11 February l 960. Lockheed's original quotation for the project was $96.6 million for l 2 aircraft, but technological difficulties eventually made this price im possible to meet. Recognizing that fabricating an aircraft from tita nium might involve unforeseen difficulties, the CIA included a clause in the contract that allowed costs to be reevaluated. During the next five years. this clause had to be invoked on a number of occasions as the A-12's costs soared to more than double the original estimate."'

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## NEW TECHNOLOGIES NECESSITATED
BY  OXCART'S HIGH SPEED

According to the specifications. the OXCART aircraft was to achieve a speed of Mach 3.2 (2.064 knots or 0.57 miles per second. which would make it as fast as a rifle bullet). have a range of 4.120 nautical miles. and reach altitudes of84.500 to 97,600 feet. The new aircraft would thus be more than five times as fast as the U-2 and would go almost 3 miles higher.

One major disadvantage ofthe OXCART's great speed was high temperatures. Flying through the earth's atmosphere at Mach 3.2 heated portions ofthe aircraft's skin to almost 900°F. An aircraft op erating at these high speeds and high temperatures required fuels. lu bricants, and hydraulic fluids that had not yet been invented. The OXCART's fuel requirement called for a low-vapor-pressure fuel with a low volume at operating temperatures; the fuel would also be used as a heat sink to cool various parts of the aircraft. The 158 en gines required lubricants that did not break down at the very high op erating temperatures ofMach 3.2 speeds. This requirement led to the

"Johnson, "Archangel log." 21 January 1960).

"OSA History, chap. 20. pp. 27-29, 33-34, 36 (TS Codeword).

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OXCART production facilities

invention of synthetic lubricants. Lockheed also had to search long and hard for a hydraulic fluid that would not vaporize at high speed but would still be usable at low altitudes. Finding a suitable hydraulic pump was just as difficult. Kelly Johnson finally modified a pump that was being developed for North American's B-70 bomber project."

Some ofthe greatest problems re lat ed to the high speeds and high temperatures at which the OXCART operated resu l ted from working with the material chosen for the airframe-titanium. After evaluating many materials. Johnson had chosen an alloy oftitanium

Johnson. "Development of Lockheed SR-71," pp. 11-12.

Secret_

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## NEW TECHNOLOGIES NECESSITATED
BY  OXCART'S HIGH SPEED (cont.)

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OXCART pilot suit

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## NEW TECHNOLOGIES NECESSITATED
BY  OXCART'S HIGH SPEED (cont.)

(B-120) characterized by great strength, relatively light weight, and good resistance to high temperatures, but high in cost. As strong as stainless steel, titanium weighed slightly more than half as much. Obtaining sufficient quantities of titanium of a quality suitable for fabricating aircraft components proved very difficult because methods for maintaining good quality control during the milling of titanium were not fully developed. Up to 80 percent of the early deliveries from Titanium Metals Corporation had to be rejected. It was not until 1961, when company officials were informed of the objectives and high priority of the OXCART program, that problems with the tita- nium supply ended. Even after sufficient high-quality titanium was received, Lockheed's difficulties with the metal were not over. Titanium was so hard that tools normally used in aircraft fabrication broke; new ones therefore had to be devised. Assembly line produc- tion was not possible, and the cost of the program mounted well above original estimates."

T he high temperatures that the OXCA RT would encounter al so necessitated planning for the pilot's safety and comfort becaus,e the inside ofthe aircraft would be like a moderately hot oven. To save

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weight, Kelly Johnson did not attempt to insulate the interior of the aircraft. The pilot would therefore have to wear a type ofspace suit with its own cooling, pressure control. oxygen supply, and other necessities for survival.

## DESIGNING  THE  OXCART'S CAMERAS

Providing cameras for the A-12 posed a number ofunique problems. In late 1959, OXCART managers asked Perkin-Elmer, Eastman Kodak, and Hycon to develop three different photographic systems for the new aircraft. These cameras would provide a range of photog raphy from high-ground-resolution stereo to extremely-high-resolu tion spotting data.

The Perkin-Elmer (P-E) entry. known as the Type-I camera. was a high-ground-resolution general stereo camera using an f/4.0 18-inch lens and 6.6-inch film. It produced pairs of photographs covering a . s~ath71 miles wide with an approximately 30-percent stereo overlap. The system had a 5,000-foot film supply and was able to ·resolve 140 lines per millimeter and provide a ground resolution of 12 inches.

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DESIGNING  THE  OXCART'S CAMERAS (cont.)

The Hycon entry. designed by James Baker and known as the Type-IV camera, was a spotting camera with extremely-high-ground resolution. In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the original U-2 program. It used a 48-inch Baker-designed f/5.6 lens to focus images onto 9.5-inch tilm. Like the B camera it could provide seven frames of photography covering a swath 41 miles wide with stereo overlap on 19 miles of the swath. The Hycon camera carried the largest film supply of the three cameras, 12,000 feet. It was able to resolve 100 lines per millimeter and provide a ground resolution of 8 inches. A version of this 48-inch Hycon camera. known as the H camera, later saw service in u-2R air craft.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DESIGNING  THE  OXCART'S CAMERAS (cont.)

Each of the three camera systems had unique capabilities and advantages, so all three were purchased for the OXCART. Before they could be effectively employed in the aircraft, however, new types of camera windows were needed. The OXCART's camera win dows had to be completely free from optical distortion. Achieving this goal was difficult in a window whose exterior would be sub jected to temperatures of550"F whik the interior surface would be only IscrF. After three years and the expenditure of 52 million in re search and development, the Corning Glass Works, which had joined this effort as a Perkin-Elmer subcontractor, solved the problem of producing a camera window that could withstand tremendous heat differentials. Its quartz glass window was fused to the metal frame by an unprecedented process involving high-frequency sound ~. waves.

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CHOOSING PILOTS FOR  OXCART

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DESIGNING  THE  OXCART'S CAMERAS (cont.)

Just as in the U-2 program, the Air Force provided considerable sup port to Project OXCART, including training, fuel storage, and weather service. One of the most important areas of support was the provision of pilots; all of the OXCART pilots came from the Air Force. Prospective pilots had to be qualified in the most advanced fighters and be emotionally stable and well motivated. In contrast to 1955, when cover considerations had limited the U-2 pilot selection process to individuals with reserve commissions, the Air Force was able to devise personnel and cover procedures that enabled both regular and reserve officers to volunteer to become OXCART pilots. Because of the limited size of the A-12 cockpit, they had to be under six feet tall and weigh less than 175 pounds. Following extensive physical and psychological screening, 16 potential nominees were selected for in tensive security and medical screening by the Agency. By the end of this screening in November l 961. only five individuals had been ap proved and had accepted the Agency's offer of employment on a highly classified project involving a very advanced aircraft. A second search and screening raised the number ofpilots for the OXCART to eleven. The thorough screening process produced an elite group of pi- •tots; all but one ofthese 11 officers eventually became generals. The new pilots transferred from military to civilian status and received compensation and insurance arrangements somewhat better than those ofthe U-2 pilots. 15

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DESIGNING  THE  OXCART'S CAMERAS (cont.)

storage capacity, and runway lelllgth were insufficient for the OXCARTprogram. the site's remot,e location would greatly ease the task of maintaining the program's security, and a moderate construc tion program could provide adequate facilities. Constructi on began in September 1960; a C-47 shuttle s,ervice ferried work crews from Burbank to Las Vegas and from Las Vegas to the site.

The new 8,500-foot runway was completed by 15 November 1960. Ke lly Johnson had been reluctant to have a standard AirForce runway with expansion joints every 25 feet because he feared the joints wou ld set up undesirable vibirations in the speedy aircraft At his suggestion a 150-foot wide runway was therefore constructed of six 25-foot-wide longitudinal sections, each 150 feet long but stag gered. This layout put most of the expansionjoi nts parallel to the di rection of airer-aft roll and reduced the frequency of the joints.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DESIGNING  THE  OXCART'S CAMERAS (cont.)

Additional improvements included the resurfacing of 18 miles of highway leading to the base so that heavy fuel trucks could bring in the necessary fuel. The need for additional buildings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus Navy hangars were dismantled, moved, and reassembled on the north side of the base, and more than 100 surplus Navy housing buildings were also transported to Area 51. All essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery date of the first A-12 on August 1961.

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DESIGNING  THE  OXCART'S CAMERAS (cont.)

to reduce expenditures. After much refiguring, project officials de cided to decrease the number of deliverable aircraft. Amendment No. 11 to the contract reduced from 12 to IO the number ofA- l 2s, for a total cost of$16 l.2 million. 21

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DESIGNING  THE  OXCART'S CAMERAS (cont.)

The cancellation of these two A- l 2s was offset by an Air Force order for the development ofa supersonic interceptor variant ofthe A-12 to serve as a replacement for the North American F-l08ARapier interceptor project, which had been canceled in late 1960. With the assistanceof the Agency's west coast contracting office, the Air Force entered into an agreement with Lockheed to produce three AF-12 air craft, based on the A- I2 design but modified to carry a second crew man and three air-to-air missiles. This effort was called Project KEDLOCK. The AF-12 (later redesignated the YF- l 2A) was de signed to intercept enemy bombers long before they reached the United States, and initial Air Force plans envisioned a force ofup to I00 of these supersonic interceptors. In fact, only three of these planes were built and delivered during the 1963-64 time frame because Secretary ofDefense McNamara canceled the program as a cost-cut ting measure. The Air Force bore all of the costs ofthe YF-12A pro jecf; CIA was only involved in helping to write "black" contracts. 2 ~

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DESIGNING  THE  OXCART'S CAMERAS (cont.)

Lockheed was not the only OXCART contractor having trouble containing costs; Pratt & Whitney was fighting an even bigger battle. In mid-1961, Pratt & Whitney overruns threatened to halt the entire OXCART project. At the suggestion of Cdr. William Holcomb in the office ofthe Chief ofNaval Materiel, Richard Bissell asked the Navy to assist in funding the 158's development. After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy air craft, VAdm. William A. Schoech, Chief of the Navy Materiel Command that had originally financed the 158 engine, authorized the transferof $38 million in end-of-year funds to the project, thus keep ing the OXCARTs head above water.~9 As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft.

"OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 46-47, 51-55 (TS Codeword); Minnich. "OXCARTStory... p. 10 (S).

"OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword).

,,Parangosky interview (S): OSA History. chap. 20. p. 55 (TS Codeword). During this period. Kelly Johnson was very disappointed with Pratt & Whitney·s work on the 158. particularly when they shocked him in September 1961 with the news that the engine would be overweight. underpowered. and late. Johnson, "Archangel log.'' 11 September 1961.

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DELIVERY OF THE FIRST OXCART

The first A- l 2, known as article 121, was assembled and tested at Burbank during January and February 1962. Since it could not be flown to the Nevada site, the aircraft had to be partially disassembled and put on a specially designed trailer that cost nearly S 100,000. The entire fuselage, without the wings, was crated and covered, creating a load 35 feet wide and 105 feet long. To transport this huge load safely over the hundreds ofmiles to the site. obstructing road signs were re moved, trees were trimmed, and some roadbanks had to be leveled. The plane left Burbank on 26 February 1962 and arrived at Area 51 two days later.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DESIGNING  THE  OXCART'S CAMERAS (cont.)

After the fuselage arrived in Nevada, its wings were attached and the 175 engines were installed. but the aircraft was still not ready to be tested. This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved completely. Because the A- I 2's high speeds heat the titanium airframe to more than 500°F. Lockheed designers had to make allowances for expansion. When the metal was cold, the expansion joints were at their widest. In the fuel tanks. these gaps were filled by pliable sealants. but the fuel for the A-12's engines acted as a strong reducing agent that softened the sealants. causing leaks. Thus. when fuel was first poured into the aircraft, 68 leaks developed. Lockheed technicians then stripped and replaced all the sealant, a tedious and time consuming procedure because the sealant required four curing cycles, each at a different temperature over a period of 30 to 54 hours. Theengineers were never able to discover a sealant compound that was completely impervious to the jetfuel while remaining elastic enough to expand and contract sufficiently. The A- I 2'stanks continued to leak, so when it was fueled, it only received enough fuel to get airborne. The plane would then rendezvous with a tanker, top offits tanks, and immediately climb to operating altitude. causing the metal to expand and the leaks to stop. 10

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DESIGNING  THE  OXCART'S CAMERAS (cont.)

CHANGES IN THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Richard Bissell, whose concern for the viability ofthe U-2 in 1956 had led to the establishment of Project OXCART and who had di rected its growth all along, was no longer in charge when the first

"OSA History, chap. 20, p. 62 (TS Codeword); Minnich, "OXCART Story," p. 11 (S).

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Delivery of OXCART aircraft to
Area 51

OXCARTaircraft took to the air. He resigned from the Agency in February 1962, and his departure brought a major reorganization of the reconnaissance program. The Development Projects Division of the Directorate ofPlans. with its two aircraft (OXCARTand U-2) and its satellite project. were transferred to the new Directorate of Research headed by Herbert (Pe te) Scoville. The following year Scoville resigned and this Directorate was reo rganized and its name changed to the Directorate ofScience and Technology, with A lbert (Bud) Wheelon. Jr. as its first head. The overhead reconnaissance

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In-flight refueling of the OXCART

projects belonged to the Office of Special Activities, headed by Col. Jack C. Ledford, who now had the title of Assistant Director for Special Activit ies. These project management changes in the ClA had no immediate impact on the OXCART project becau se the a ir craft was s till in the development stage, handled mainly by the con tractors. Moreover, a good deal of continuity was provided by officers who had served for a numbe:r of years with the U-2 program and we re now involved with OXCART: James Cunningham, the Deputy Assistant Director for Special Activities: Col. Leo Geary, the A irForce's project officer for the twoaircraft;and John Parangosky, who oversaw the day-to-day affairs ,o f the OXCART project.

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fillets, which had been secured to the airframe with epoxy resin. had to be recovered and rea ffixed to the aircraft, a process that took the next four days.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## OXCART'S FIRST FLIGHTS (cont.)

Once the fillets were in place, the OXCART's official first flight took place on 30 April 1962, witnessed by a number of Agency per- sonnel including DDR Scoville. Richard Bissell was also present, and Kelly Johnson noted in the project log, "I was very happy to have Dick see this flight, with all that he has contributed to the pro- gram. This official first flight was also the first flight with the wheels up. Piloted again by Schalk, the OXCART took off at 170 knots and climbed to 30,000 feet. During the 59-minute flight, the A-12 achieved a top speed of 340 knots. Kelly Johnson declared it to be the smoothest first test flight of any aircraft he had designed or tested. On 2 May 1962, during the second test flight, the OXCART broke the sound barrier, achieving a speed of Mach 1.1.

Four more aircraft, including a two-seat trainer, arrived at the testing site before the end of the year. During the second delivery on 26. June 1962, the extra-wide vehicle carrying the aircraft accidentally struck a Greyhound bus traveling in the opposite direction. Project managers quickly authorized payment of $4,890 for the damage done to the bus in order to avoid having to explain in court why the OXCART delivery vehicle was so wide.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## OXCART'S FIRST FLIGHTS (cont.)

One of the biggest problems connected with flight testing the A-12 was keeping its existence secret. Realizing that the nation's air traffic controllers would be among the first unwitting people to learn about the plane, the Deputy Assistant Director for Special Activities, James Cunningham, had called on Federal Aviation Administrator Najeeb E. Halaby in early 1962 to brief him about the craft's existence and ask his assistance in keeping it secret. Halaby cooperated fully with the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how to handle reports of unusually fast, high-flying aircraft. Air controllers were warned not to mention the craft on the radio but to submit written reports of sightings or radar trackings. The Air Force gave sirnilar briefings to NORAD, the North American Air Defense Command."

<empty>
John Parangosky

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## OXCART'S FIRST FLIGHTS (cont.)

Johnson, "Archangel log." 30 April 1962.

"OSA History, chap. 20. p. 63 (TS Codeword); Minnich. "OXCART Story," pp. 11-12 (S).

"Minnich. "OXCART Story," pp. 10-11 (S); OSA History, chap. 20, p. 60 (TS Codeword).

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First flight of  the A-12,
30April 1962

Initial testing could not explore the A-12's maximum potential, since the J58 engine was still not ready. Developing this power plant to OXCART specifications was proving much more difficult than had been expected because the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine, while operating under ex- tremely difficult environmental conditions. To simulate the stress that the J58 would undergo during maximum power output (Mach 3.2 at 97,000 feet), the power plant was tested in the exhaust stream of a J75 engine. In the course of this extremely severe testing, the J58's problems were gradually overcome. By January 1963, Pratt & Whitney had delivered 10 J58 engines to the Nevada testing site. The first flight of an A-12 with two J58 engines took place on 15 January 1963." 34

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that ultimately required a complete redesign of the air-inlet system that controlled the amount of air admitted to the engine. In the new, adjustable inlet the cone-shaped projection at the front-known as a spike-was designed to move in or out as much as three feet in order to capture and contain the shock wave produced by the aircraft at high speeds, thus preventing the shock wave from blowing out the fire in- side the engine."

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## SPEED-RELATED PROBLEMS (cont.)

Another 158 engine problem in early 1963 was foreign object damage. Small objects such as pens, pencils, screws, bolts, nuts, and metal shavings that fell into the engine nacelles during assembly at Burbank were sucked into the power plant during initial engine testing at Area 5 1 and damaged impeller and compressor vanes. To control the problem Lockheed instituted a program that included X-rays, shaking of the nacelles, installing screens over various air inlets to the engine, and even having workers wear coveralls without breast pockets. Another source offoreign object damage was trash on the runways. The giant 158 engines acted like immense vacuum cleaners, sucking in anything lying loose on the paving as they propelled the A-12 down the runway for takeoff. To prevent engine damage, Area 51 personnel h~~ to sweep and vacuum the runway before aircraft takeoff. 10

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## SPEED-RELATED PROBLEMS (cont.)

NEW VERSIONS OF THE OXCART

In 1962 the Agency and the Air Force ordered two more versions of the OXCART (in addition to the A-12 and the YF-12A). One was a modification of the A-12 to carry and launch ramjet-powered, 43-feet-long drones capable of reaching Mach 3.3 The two-seater mothership received the designation M-12; the drone was called the D-21. This project was known as TAGBOARD. The original develop- ment of the drones and mothership was sponsored by the CIA, but in June 1963 the project was turned over to the Air Force, which had overall responsibility for unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. Development of the M-12/D-21 combination continued until 1966, when an unsuccessful D-21 launch caused the loss of its mothership and the death of one of the crew members. Afterward the Air Force turned to B-52 bombers to carry the drones." 37

"OSA History, chap. 20. p. 67 (TS Codeword).

Johnson, "Development of Lockheed SR-71," p. 12.

"OSA History, chap. 20. p. 71; Jay Miller, Lockheed SR-71 (A/2/YF/2/D-2//, Aerofax. Minigraph I (Arlington. Texas: Aerofax. Inc .. 1985), p. 3.

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The second new version of the OXCART was another recon naissance aircraft. In December 1962 the Air Force ordered six "reconnaissance/strike" aircraft, which were designed to conduct high-speed, high-altitude reconnaissance ofenemy territory after a nuclear strike. This new aircraft differed from other A-12 versions in that it was longer, had a full-blown two-seat cockpit, and carried a large variety ofphotographic and electronic sensors. The additional weight ofall this equipment gave the Air Force craft a slower maxi mum speed and a lower operating ceiling than the Agency's A-12. In August 1963, the Air Force added 25 more aircraft to this contract, for a total of31. 3 '

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## THE QUESTION OF SURFACING
A VERSION OF THE OXCART

As the funds being spent on Air Force versions ofthe OXCART in creased dramatically, the Defense Department became concerned that it could not offer any public explanation for these expenditures. At the same time, Agency and Defense Department officials recognized the growing danger that a crash orsightings of test flights could com promise the program. This led the Defense Department in late 1962 and early 1963 to consider surfacing the Air Force's interceptor ver sion of the A-12 to provide a cover for OXCART sightings orcrashes and an explanation for the rise in Air Force spending. Some journal ists had also become aware of the aircraft's existence, raising concern that the secret would eventually come out in the press. Agency offi cials remained reluctant to reveal the existence ofany version ofthe A-12, and the issue soon came to the attention ofthe PFIAB. James Killian and Edwin Land strongly opposed disclosing OXCART's ex istence, and in January 1963 they presented their views to President Kennedy at a meeting attended by DCI McCone and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. Killian, Land, and McCone succeeded in persuading the President and Secretary of Defense to keep the OXCART's existence a secret for the time being.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## THE QUESTION OF SURFACING
A VERSION OF THE OXCART (cont.)

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M-12 carrying D-21 Drone

OXCART. This technology would be invaluable for Air For ce pro jec!s such as the 8-70 bomber and for the civilian supersonic trans .po . rt (SST) then being discussed in Congress. [n the fall of 1963, several Presidential advisers expressed their concern to DCIMcCone that Lockheed had received a $700 million headstart in the develop ment of supersonic tech nology, giving the firm a tremendous ad.van tage over other aerospace companies working on a supersonic transport. McCone passed these concerns on to President Kennedy on 12November 1963,just 10 days before the fateful trip to Dallas. The President instructed CIA and the Defense Department to develop a plan for surfacing the OXCARTbut to await further discussions with him before taking any action. 30

President Lyndon B. Johnson received a detailed briefing on the OXCART program from McCone, McNamara, Bundy, and Rus:k on 29 November, after just one week in office. McNamara strongly ad vocated surfacing a version of the OXCART . McCone was more cau tious, calling for the preparation ofa statement that could be 1USed when surfacingbecame necessary but arguing that such a step was not

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yet needed. Agreeing with McCone's position, President Johnson said the issue should be reviewed again in February."'

One additional argument in favor ofsurfacing the OXCART was the realization that the aircraft could not be used to fly undetected over the Soviet Union. By 1962 the United States had become aware ofthe effectiveness of a new Soviet radar system, codenamed TALL KING. The introduction of this computer-controlled radar undercut one of the basic premises ofthe OXCART program, the assumption that radar operators would not be able to track high-flying supersonic targets visually because of their small, nonpersistent radar returns. By coupling a computer to a radar, the Soviets could now weight the in dividual radar returns and identify those produced by high-flying, very fast objects.·'

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## THE QUESTION OF SURFACING
A VERSION OF THE OXCART (cont.)

By February 1964 DCI McCone had become convinced that sur facing was necessary. Soviet development ofthe TALL KING radar system had eliminated his hope that OXCART would eventually be able to carry out its original intended purpose-overflights of the USSR. The final decision on the issue of surfacing the OXCART came at a National Security Council meeting on 29 February 1964, at which all of the participants supported the decision to surface. That same day President Johnson held a news conference at which he an nounced the successful development of an .. advanced experimental jetaircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet.".~

President Johnson had spoken of the A- I I rather than the Agency's A-12, and the aircraft that was actually revealed to the pub lic was the Air Force's YF- l 2A interceptor. a project that had already been canceled. ➔' Following the President's announcement. two of

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## THE QUESTION OF SURFACING
A VERSION OF THE OXCART (cont.)

these aircraft were hastily flown to Edwards Air Force Base. From this point on, the Air Force versions ofthe OXCART were based at Edwards and provided a diversion so that the faster and higher flying A- l 2s at the Nevada site could continue testing out of the public eye.

The President's announcement did not mention the CIA's in volvement in the project, which remained classified, but keeping the Agency's extensive role in the OXCART a secret was not an easy task. The first step had been to separate the Air Force's versions of the A-12 from the Agency's by moving the Air Force aircraft to California. Next, those firms that were to be given the new technology had to be briefed on the program and agree to abide by the same secrecy agree ments then in force with Lockheed. Moreover, everyone witting of OXCART (including those no longer associated with the program, such as Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, and General Cabell) had been briefed about the impending Presidential announcement, so that they would not think that the need for secrecy about OXCART had ended.....

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS DURING FINAL TESTING (cont.)

Two more A- l 2s were lost in later testing. On 9 July 1964, arti cle 133 crashed while landing when a pitch-control servo device froze, rolling the plane into a wing-down position. Ejecting from an altitude of 120 feet, the pilot was blown sideways out of the craft. Although he was not very high off the ground, his parachute did open and he landed during the parachute's first swing. Fortunately he was unhurt, and no news of the accident filtered out ofthe base. Eighteen months later, on 28 December 1965, article 126 crashed immediately after takeoff because of an improperly wired stability augmentation system. As in the previous crash, the pilot ejected safely. and there was no publicity connected with the crash. An investigation ordered by DCI McCone determined that the wiring error had resulted from negligence, not sabotage.'6

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS DURING FINAL TESTING (cont.)

The A-12 made its first long-range, high-speed flight on 27 January 1965. The flight lasted I00 minutes. 75 minutes of which were flown at speeds greater than Mach 3.1. and the aircraft covered 2.580 miles at altitudes between 75,600 and 80,000 feet. By this time. the OXCART was performing well. The engine inlet, camera, hydrau lic, navigation, and flight-control systems all demonstrated acceptable reliability.

Nevertheless, as the OXCART began flying longer, faster, and higher, new problems arose. The most serious ofthese problems in volved the aircraft's wiring. Continuing malfunctions of the inlet con trols, communications equipment, ECM systems, and cockpit instruments were often attributable to wiring failures. Wiring connec tors and components had to withstand temperatures above 800'F, structural flexing, vibration, and shock. Such demands were more than the materials could stand. Not all of the OXCART's problems could be traced to materiel failures, however, and Agency officials believed that careless maintenance by Lockheed employees also con tributed to malfunctions."

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS DURING FINAL TESTING (cont.)

decided to go to Nevada and take charge ofthe OXCART's develop ment himself. His presence made a big difference, as can be seen in his notes in the project log:

I uncovered many items of a managerial, materiel and design na- ture.... I had meetings with vendors to improve their opera- tion .... Changed supervision and had daily talks with them, going over in detail all problems on the aircraft ....Increased the supervision in the electrical group by 500% ....We tightened up the inspection procedures a great deal andmade inspection stick.

It appears that the problems are one-third due to bum engineer ing....The addition of so many systems to the A-12 has greatly complicated the problems, but we did solve the overall problem."''

These improvements in on-site management got the project back on schedule.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS DURING FINAL TESTING (cont.)

By 20 November 1965, the final validation flights for OXCART deployment were finished. During these tests, the OXCART achieved a maximum speed of Mach 3.29, an altitude of 90,000 feet, and sus- tained flight time above Mach 3.2 of 74 minutes. The maximum -endurance test lasted six hours and 20 minutes. On 22 November, Kelly Johnson wrote to Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford, head of the Office of Special Activities, stating, "The time has come when the bird should leave its nest." 49

Three years and seven months after its first flight in April 1962. the OXCART was ready for operational use. It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built.

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A-12s at Area 51

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

Although overflights ofthe Soviet Union appeared to be out of the question, the OXCART's eventual employment elsewhere in the world remained a strong possibility, particularly after the Cuban Missile Crisis ofOctober 1962 demonstrated the continuing need for manned strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Since satellites had not been able to supply the kinds of coverage needed, U-2s had carried out nu merous overflights of Cuba. Nevertheless, the U-2 remained vulnera ble to surface-to-air missiles (as had once again been demonstrated by the downing of a SAC U-2 during the Missile Crisis), and project headquarters had even briefly considered sending the A-12 over Cuba in October 1962, even though the aircraft still lacked the required 158 engines and would have had to use much less powerful ones.'' After the Missile Crisis ended, Air Force U-2s continued to photograph Cuba under a tacit superpower understanding that such monitoring of the withdrawal of the missiles would proceed without interference. But the possibility offuture Soviet or Cuban action against the U-2s remained, raising the dismaying prospect that the United States would not be able to tell if the Soviet Union was reintroducing ballistic mis siles into Cuba.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

- Such fears became acute in the summer of 1964 after Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev told foreign visitors such as columnist Drew Pearson, former Senator William Benton, and Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag that, once the US elections had been held in November, U-2s flying over Cuba would be shot down. Project head quarters therefore began preparing contingency plans (Project SKYLARK) for the possible employment of OXCART over Cuba, even though the new aircraft was not yet ready for operations. On 5 August 1964, the Acting DCI, Gen. Marshall S. Carter, ordered the project staff to achieve emergency operational readiness of the OXCART by 5 November 1964, in case Premier Khrushchev actually carried out his threat to shoot down U-2s. 5 z

To meet this deadline, the Office ofSpecial Activities organized a detachment of five pilots and ground crews to conduct flights to val idate camera performance and qualify pilots for Mach 2.8 operations. Simulating Cuban missions during training flights, the detachment

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demonstrated its ability to conduct overflights of Cuba by the 5 November deadline, which passed without any hostile action by the Soviets orCubans. The detachment then worked to develop the capa bility for sustained operations with its five aircraft. All these preparations were valuable training for the OXCART program, even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to satisfy collection requirements for Cuba, the A- l 2s were reserved for more critical situations.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

When the Agency declared that OXCART had achieved emer gency operational status on 5 November 196-+. the aircraft was still not prepared for electronic warfare, as only one of the several planned electronic countermeasure devices had been installed. Nevertheless. a senior government panel decided that the OXCART could conduct initial overflights ofCuba without a full complement ofwarning and jamming devices, should the need for such missions arise.

One reason for the delay in completing OXCART's electronic warfare preparations was the Air Force's concern that OXCART use of existing ECM devices c_ould, in the event of the loss of an OXCART over hostile territory, compromise the ECM equipment used by Air Force bombers and fighters. Even if OXCART's ECM devices were merely similar to military ECM systems, the Air Force still worried that their use would give the Soviets an opportunity to work out countermeasures.

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

growing hazards confronting aerial reconnaissance of the People's Republic of China. In three years the Agency had lost four U-2s over China, and the Air Force had lost numerous reconnaissance drones. The three men agreed to go ahead with all the preparatory steps needed for the OXCART to operate over China so that it would be ready in case the President decided to authorize such missions.

Project BLACK SHIELD, the plan for Far East operations. called for OXCART aircraft to be based at Kadena airbase on Okinawa. In the first phase, three planes would be flown to Okinawa for 60-day periods, twice a year, an operation which would involve about 225 personnel. Later there would be a permanent detachment at Kadena. In preparation for the possibility of such operations, the Defense Department spent $3.7 million to provide support facilities and real-time secure communications on the island by early autumn I965. 5 "

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

In the summerof 1965, after the United States had begun intro ducing large numbers of troops into South Vietnam. Southeast Asia beca!Ue another possible target for the OXCART. Because the contin ued use of U-2s for reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam was threatened by the deployment ofSoviet-made surface-to-air missiles. McNamara asked the CIA on 3 June 1965 whether it would be possi ble to substitute OXCART aircraft for U-2s. The new DCI, Adm. William F. Raborn, replied that the OXCART could operate over Vietnam as soon as it had passed its final operational readiness tests. 55

Formal consideration of proposed OXCART missions involved the same approval process that was used for U-2 overflights. In late November 1965, after the OXCART had passed its final validation tests, the 303 Committee met to consider a proposal to deploy the OXCART to Okinawa to overfly Southeast Asia and China. Although the committee did not approve deployment, it ordered the develop ment and maintenance of a quick-reaction capability, ready to deploy to Okinawa within 21 days after notification.

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sufficient support. The JCS and the PFIAB supported the CIA's advo cacyofOXCART deployment. Top State and Defense Department of ficials, however, thought that the political risks ofbasing the aircraft in Okinawa-which would almost certainly disclose it to the Japanese-outweighedany gains from the intelligence the OXCART might gather. On 12 August I966, the divergent views were presented to President Johnson, who upheld the 303 Committee's majority opin ion against deployment for the time being. 5'

The CIA then proposed an OXCART overflight of Cuba in order to test the aircraft's ECM systems in a hostile environment. On 15 September the 303 Committee considered and rejected this idea on the grounds that sending OXCART over Cuba "woulddisturb the ex isting calm prevailing in that area ofour foreign affairs." 57

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

With operational missions still ruled out, proficiency training re mained the main order ofbusiness. This led to improvements in mis sion plans and flight tactics that enabled the detachment to reduce the time requi~ed to deploy to Okinawa from 21 days to 15. Records con tinued to fall to the OXCART. On 21 December 1966, a Lockheed test pilot tlew an A-12 for 16,408 kilometers over the continental United States in slightly more than six hours, for an average speed of 2,670 kilometers per hour (which included in-flight refueling at speeds as low as 970 kilometers per hour). This flight set a record for speed and distance unapproachable by any other aircraft. 58

Two weeks later, on 5 January 1967, an A-12 crashed after a fuel gauge malfunctioned and the aircraft ran out offuel short ofthe run way. Pilot Walter Ray ejected but was killed when he could not become separated from the ejection seat. To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an SR-71 was missing and presumed down in Nevada. This loss, like the three preceding crashes, did not result from difficulties caused by high-speed, high-temperature flight but from traditional problems in herent in any new aircraft.

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Soviet missile system. As early as 1962, the intelligence community began to be concerned about the actual purpose of new missile instal lations that first appeared near Tallinn, Estonia, and soon spread along the northwestern quadrant of the Soviet Union. Attempts to photo graph the sites using reconnaissance satellites had been frustrated by the prevailing cloud cover in the region. Because ofthe lack ofaccu rate information about the missile sites, there was a wide divergence of views within the intelligence community about their purpose. These views ranged from the CIA's belief that the installations con tained long-range, surface-to-air missiles designed to counter strate gic bombers, to the Air Force's contention that Tallinn sites represented a deployed antiballistic missile system.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

Photointerpreters insisted that imagery with a resolution of 12 to 18 inches was necessary to determine missile size, antenna pattern, and configuration of the engagement radars associated with the sys tem. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) analysts also needed data about the Tallinn radars, but there were no collection sites that could moni tor the Tallinn emanations when the radars were being tested. Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that prevented analysts from knowing the fre quencies or any other performance characteristics ofthe radar.

To settle the question ofthe purpose ofthe Tallinn installations. Office ofSpecial Activities planners proposed a mission that would use the high resolution of the OXCART's camera along with the U-2's sophisticated ELINT-collection equipment. This project's un classified name was Project SCOPE LOGIC; its classified title was Operation UPWIND.

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

hoped that the A-12 's passage would provoke Soviet air defense per sonnel to activate the Tallinn system radars in order to track the swift OXCART aircraft. As the A-12 made its dash down the Baltic, its Type-I camera would be filming the entire south coast. If Agency an alysts were correct in their assumption that the Tallinn system was de signed to counter high-altitude aircraft at long ranges, then the OXCART would be in jeopardy during this dash down the Baltic. Nevertheless, Agency weapons experts believed that the A-12 air craft's speed and suite ofelectronic countermeasures would keep it safe from the standard Soviet surface-to-air missile installations.

While the A-12 was conducting its high-speed dash along the Baltic coast ofEastern Europe, the U-2 would be flying farther out to sea, safely beyond the range ofall Soviet SAMs. The U-2 would be able to collect the Tallinn radar installation's ELINT emanations.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

Agency and Defense Department officials supported the pro posed mission, but Secretary ofState Dean Rusk strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5 " The Tallinn radar installation remained ofgreat interest to the intelligence community, and in the late 1960s the CIA attempted to develop a small, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft that could pho tograph Tallinn and other coastal areas. The project (AQUILINE) was abandoned in 1971 (see appendix E).

FIRST A-12 DEPLOYMENT: OPERATION BLACK SHIELD

Although the Tallinn mission was still being considered in May 1967, another possible employment for the OXCART came under discus sion. This time the proposal was for OXCART to collect tactical rather than strategic intelligence. The cause was apprehension in Washington about the possible undetected introduction of sur face-to-surface missiles into North Vietnam. When President Johnson asked for a proposal on the matter, the CIA suggested that the OXCART be used. While the State and Defense Departments were still examining the proposal's political risks, DCI Richard Helms

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raised the issue at President Johnson's "Tuesday lunch .. on 16 ~lay. Helms got the President's approval, and the CIA put the BLACK SHIELD plan to deploy the OXCART to the Far East into effect later that same day.''0

The airlift of personnel and equipment to Kadena began on 17 May 1967, and on 22 May the first A-12 flew nonstop from Area 51 to Kadena in six hours and six minutes. A second aircraft arrived on 24 May. The third A-12 left on 26 May, but the pilot had trouble with the inertial navigation system and communications near Wake Island. He made a precautionary landing at Wake. where a pre-positioned emergency recovery team was located. The problem was corrected and the aircraft continued its flight to Kadena on the following day.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

Before the start of the operation, the CIA briefed a number of key US and Allied officials on the operation. Included were the US Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station in the Philippines, Formosa, Thailand, South Vietnam, the High Commissioner and Chief of Station on Okinawa; the Prime Minister of Thailand; the President and Defense Minister of the Republic of China; and the Air Force chiefs of Thailand and the Republic of China. All of these officials favored the operation.

By 29 May 1967, 13 days after President Johnson's approval, BLACK SHIELD was ready to fly an operational mission. On 30 May, the detachment was alerted for a mission on the following day. As the takeoff time approached, Kadena was being deluged by rain. but, since weather over the target area was clear, flight preparations continued. The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off.

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During the next six weeks, there were alerts for 15 BLACK SHIELD missions, seven of which were actually flown. Only four de tected hostile radar signals. By mid-July 1967, the BLACK SHIELD missions had provided sufficient evidence for analysts to conclude that no surface-to-surface missiles had been deployed in North Vietnam. 61

Project Headquarters in Langley planned and directed all
operational BLACK SHIELD missions. To ensure secure communica-
tions between Headquarters and Kadena.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

A typical mission over North Vietnam required refueling south of Okinawa, shortly after takeoff. After the planned photographic pas ses, the aircraft withdrew for a second aerial refueling in the Thailand area before returning to Kadena. So great was the plane's speed that it spent only 12.5 minutes over Vietnam during a "single-pass" mis sion, and 21.5 minutes during a "two-pass" mission. Because ofits wide 86-mile turning radius, the plane occasionally crossed into Chinese airspace when getting into position for a second pass.

After the aircraft landed, the camera film was removed and sent by special plane to processing facilities in the United States. By late summer, however, an Air Force photo laboratory in Japan began do ing the processing in order to place the photointelligence in the hands of US commanders in Vietnam within 24 hours ofa mission's com pletion.

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

The only time the enemy came close to downing an OXCART was on 30 October 1967. During his first pass over North Vietnam, pilot Dennis Sullivan detected radar tracking. Two SAM sites pre pared to launch missiles but neither did. During Sullivan's second pass the North Vietnamese fired at least six missiles at the OXCART, each confirmed by vapor trails on mission photography. The pilot saw these vapor trails and witnessed three missile detonations near but be hind the A-12, which was traveling at Mach 3. l at about 84,000 feet. Postflight inspection of the aircraft revealed that a piece ofmetal had penetrated the underside ofthe right wing, passed through three lay ers of titanium, and lodged against a support structure of the wing tank. The fragment was not a warhead pellet but probably debris from one ofthe missile detonations that the pilot observed. 61

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

BLACK SHIELD missions continued during the first three months of1968, with four missions flown over North Vietnam out of 14 alerts. The last OXCART overflight of Vietnam took place on 8 March 1968. During this same three-month period, the OXCART made its first overflight of North Korea after the USS Pueblo was seized on 23 January 1968. The goal ofthis mission was to discover wh_ether the North Koreans were preparing any large-scale hostile •move in the wake ofthis incident. When NPIC photointerpreters ex amined OXCART photography taken onf26 January, they found the missing USS Pueblo in Wonsan harbor.

Secretary ofState Dean Rusk was reluctant to endorse a second mission over North Korea for fear of diplomatic repercussions should the aircraft come down in hostile territory. The Secretary was assured that the plane could transit North Korea in seven minutes and was un likely to land in either North Korea or China. The 303 Committee then endorsed a second mission over North Korea, which was flown on 19 February. A third and final overflight ofNorth Korea on 8 May 1968 proved to be the last operational deployment of the OXCART aircraft. 6 ·'

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Panel 1 shows a body of water with some landmasses on the left side. The text "USS PUEBLO" and an oval shape representing a ship are visible in the water.

Panel 2 shows a coastline and landmass with the text "MUNCHON NAVAL BASE" labeled near the top. The land appears rugged.

USS Pueblo in Wonsan Harbor

advanced aircraft ever .built was to be put out to pasture. The aban donmentof the OXCART did not result from any shortcomingsof the aircraft; the causes lay in fi scal pn:ssures and competiti on between the reconnaissance programs of the CIA and the Air Force.

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

models. The Secretary ofDefense rejected this recommendation. pre sumably because the SR-7 l would not be operational by September 1966.""'

In July 1966, at the Bureau ofthe Budget's suggestion, a study group was established to look for ways to reduce the cost of the OXCART and SR-7 l programs. The study group consisted of C. W. Fischer from the Bureau ofthe Budget, Herbert Bennington from the Department of Defense, and John Parangosky from CIA. The study group listed three possible courses of action: maintain both fleets, mothball the A-12s but share the SR-7ls between CIA and the Air Force, or mothball the A- l 2s and assign all missions to Air Force SR- 71s. On 12 December 1966, four high-level officials met to con sider these alternatives. Over the objections ofDCI Helms, the other three officials-Deputy Secretary ofDefense Cyrus Vance, Bureau of the Budget Director Charles L. Schultze, and Presidential Scientific Adviser Donald F. Hornig-decided to terminate the OXCART fleet. Concerned that this recommendation would strip the CIA of its super sonic reconnaissance capability, Helms then asked that the SR-71 fleet be shared between CIA and the Air Force.''

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

Four days later. Schultze handed Helms a draft memorandum for the President requesting a decision either to share the SR- 71 t1cet be tween CIA and the Air Force or to terminate the CIA capability en tirely. Having just received new information indicating that the SR- 71·s performance was inferior to that ofthe A-12. Helms asked for another meeting to review this data. His concern was that the SR-71 could not match the photographic coverage that the A-12 could provide. Only one ofthe SR-71 's three camera systems was working anywhere near the original specifications, and that was its Operational Objective system which could only photograph a swath 28 miles wide with a resolution of28 to 30 inches. The A-12's Type-I P-E camera could photograph a swath 72 miles wide with a nadir resolution of 12 to 18 inches and oblique resolution of 54 inches. Thus, the A-l2's camera covered three times as much territory as the SR-71 's camera and did so with better resolution. In addition. the A-12 could fly 2.000 to 5.000 feet hig:her than the SR-71 and was also faster, with a maximum speed ofM';ch 3.1 compared with the SR-71 's Mach 3.0.""

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In spiteofHelms's request and the strength ofhis arguments, the Bureau of the Budget memorandum was submitted to President Johnson. On 28 December 1966, the President approved the termina tion ofthe OXCART program by I January l968.

This decision meant that CIA had to develop a schedule for an orderly phaseout of the A-l 2. This activity was known as Project SCOPE COTTON. Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense Secretary Vance on lO January I967 that the A- l 2s would gradually be placed in storage, with the process to be completed by the end of January 1968. In May 1967, Vance directed that SR-7ls would as sume responsibility for Cuban overflights by I July 1967 and would add responsibility for overflights ofSoutheast Asia by I December 1967. Until these capabilities were developed, OXCART was to re main able to conduct assignments on a 15-day notice for Southeast Asia and a seven-day notice for Cuba. 67

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

All these arrangements were made before the OXCART had con ducted a single operational mission, which did not occur until 3 l May I967. In the months that followed the initiation of operations in Asia. the OXCART demonstrated its exceptional technical capabilities. Soon some high-level Presidential advisers and Congressional leaders began to question the decision to phase out OXCART. and the issue was reopened.

The CIA contended that the A- l 2 was the better craft because it flew higher, faster, and had superior cameras. The Air Force main tained that its two-seat SR-71 had a better suite of sensors, with three different cameras (area search, spotting, and mapping), infrared de tectors, side-looking aerial radar, and ELINT-collection gear. In an ef fort to resolve this argument, the two aircraft were pitted against each other in a flyoff codenamed NICE GIRL. On 3 November 1967, an A-12 and an SR-71 flew identical flight paths, separated in time by one hour, from north to south roughly above the Mississippi River. The data collected during these missions were evaluated by repre sentatives of the CIA, DIA, and other Defense Department intelli gence organizations.

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3,300-foot film supply. On the other hand, the SR- 71's infrared, side-looking aerial radar, and ELINT/COMINT equipment provided some unique intelligence not available from the A-12. Air Force plan ners admitted, however, that some of this equipment would have to be sacrificed in order to provide the SR-71 with ECM gear. 68

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

Although the flyoff had not settled the question of which aircraft was superior, the OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep both fleets for the time being, particularly because the OXCART was actu ally flying missions over North Vietnam. With expenditures for the Vietnam war rising steadily, the question of reducing the costs of competing reconnaissance programs was bound to surface again. In the spring of 1968, there was yet another study ofthe OXCART and SR-71 programs. On 16 May 1968, the new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, reaffirmed the original decision to terminate the OXCART program and store the aircraft. President Johnson con firmed this decision on 21 May." 9

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

- -- Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968 as the earliest possi ble date for phasing out all OXCART aircraft. Those A-12s already at the Nevada site were placed in storage, and the aircraft on Okinawa were scheduled to return by 8 June. Unfortunately, tragedy struck before this redeployment took place. On 4 June 1968 during a test flight from Kadena to check out a new engine, an A-12 disap peared 520 miles east of Manila. Search and rescue missions found no trace ofthe plane or its pilot, Jack W. Weeks. Several days later the remaining two A- l 2s left Okinawa to join the other eight OXCART aircraft in storage at Palmdale, California. Because the A-12s were smaller than either ofthe Air Force's versions, the only parts that could be salvaged for Air Force use were the J58 engines. The OXCART's outstanding Perkin-Elmer camera cannot be used in the SR-71 because the two-seater Air Force aircraft has a smaller camera compartment than that ofthe A-12. Constructed from one of the most durable metals known to man but unable to fly for want of engines, the OXCART aircraft are fated to remain inactive at Palmdale for many, many years.

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Initial storage arrangements for
A-12s at Palmdale

POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO lrHE OXCART

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

The OXCART was the last high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft pro duced for the CIA. although the Office of Special Activities did briefly consider severa l possible successors to the OXCART during the mid- I960s. The first of these. known as Project ISINGLASS. was prepared by General Dynamics to utilize technology developed for its Convair Division's earlier FISH proposal and its new F-I I I fighter in order to create an aircraft capable of Mach ~-5 at I 00,000 feet. General Dynamics completed its feasibility study in the fall of1964, and OSA took no further action because the proposed aircraft would stillbe vulnerable to existing Soviet , counte rmeasures. In l 965 a more ambitious design from McDonnell Aircraft came under consideration as Project RHEINBERRY (although some of the workseems to have come under the ISINGLASS designation as well). This proposal fea tured a rocket-powered aircraft that would be launched from a B-52 mother ship and ultimatelyreach spe:eds as high as Mach 20 and alti tudes of up to 200,000 feet. Because building this aircraft would have involved tremendous technical chall.enges and correspondingly high costs ,the Agency was not will i ng to embark on such a program at a time when the main emphasis in overhead reconnaissance had shifted from aircraft to satellit es . As a resuilt. when the OXCART program ended in the su mmerof1968, no mcire advanced successor was wait ing in the wings-on ly the veteran U-2.

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SUMMARY OF THE OXCART PROGRAM

fntended to replace the U-2 as a collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCARTwas never used for this purpose. Its briefdeployment was strictly for obtaining tactical intelligence and its photographic product contributed very little to the Agency's strategic intelligence mission. By the time OXCART became operational, photosatellite systems had filled the role originally conceived for it. The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever used operatwna y. • 11 70

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

The OXCART did not even outlast the U-2. the aircraft it was supposed to replace. The OXCART lacked the quick-response capa bility of the smaller craft: a U-2 unit could be activated overnight. and within a week it could deploy abroad. fly sorties. and return to home base. The OXCARTplanes required precise logistic planning for fuel and emergency landing fields, and their inertial guidance systems needed several days for programming and stabilization. Aerial tankers had to be deployed in advance along an OXCART's flight route and b_e _p.rovisioned with the highly specialized fuel used by the J58 en gines. All of this required a great deal of time and the effort ·or several hundred people. A U-2 mission could be planned and flown with a third fewer personnel.

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U-2 OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION

Before the firs t U-2 overflights in the summ erof 1956, project man .agers believed that their aircraft could fly virtually undetected over the Soviet Union. They did not expect this advantage to last very long, however, because they also expected the Soviets to develolP ef fective countermeasures against the U-2 within 12 to 18 rrionths. Recognizing that time was against them, the U-2 project manage rs planned a large number ofmissions to obtain complete coverage of the Soviet Union as qu ickly as possible. At this time, the U-2 program focused solely on the collection ofstrategic intelligen ce.

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

The low level of overflight activity did not prevent the U-2 from accomplishing a lot in the four years it flew over the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Twenty-four U-2 missions made deep penetra tion overflights of the Soviet Union: six by Detachment A from Germany, three by Detachment C from the Far East and Alaska, and 15 by Detachment B from Turkey and Pakistan, including the unsuc cessful Powers mission.

The amount ofinformation these missions gathered was impres sive. By the summer of 1960, the U-2 project had developed more than 1, 285,000 feet offilm-astrip almost 250 miles long. The U-2s covered more than 1,300,000 square miles of the Soviet Union, ap proximately 15 percent of its total area. [nformation from U-2 photo graphs was used to prepare 5,425 separate photoanalytical reports. 1

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

Numbers alone cannot describe the importance ofthe U-2 over flight project. [n a 28 May 1960 memorandum, after Powers was shot down, DCI Allen W. Dulles described the program's accomplish ments: '"Five years ago, before the beginning ofthe U-2 program, ... half knowledge ofthe Soviet Union and uncertainty ofits true power position posed tremendous problems for the United States. We were faced with the constant risk of exposing ourselves to enemy attack or ofneedlessly expending a great deal of money and effort on misdi rected military preparations of ourown." Dulles went on to describe the U-2's contribution in gathering information on four critical as pects of the Soviet Union's power position: its bomber force, its mis sile force, its atomic energy program, and its air defense system. 1

The first major contribution of intelligence collected from U-2 overflights was the exposure of the "bomber gap" as a myth. Contrary to the US Air Force's claims, the Soviet Union was not building a large force of long-range bombers. Armed with information from U-2 overflights, President Eisenhower was able to resist pressure to build a large US bomber fleet to meet a nonexistent Soviet threat.

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

The ·'bomber-gap" controversy was soon followed by a "mis sile-gap" controversy, provoked by an extensive Soviet propaganda campaign that claimed a substantial Soviet lead in developing and deploying ICBMs. U-2 missions searched huge stretches of the Soviet Union along the rail network, looking for ICBMs deployed outside the known missile testing facilities. These missions enabled the CIA to conclude, as Dulles explained to Congress in May 1960, that "the Soviet ICBM program has not been and is not now a crash program; instead, it is an orderly, well-planned, high-priority program aimed at achieving an early ICBM operational capability." 3 As with the controversy over Soviet bomber strength, information from U-2 photography enabled President Eisenhower to resist pressure to ac celerate the US missile deployment program by building obsolescent liquid-fueled missiles rather than waiting to complete the develop ment ofmore reliable solid-fueled missiles.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

- U-2 missions also gathered considerable data on the Soviet Union's atomic energy program, including the production offission able materials, weapons development and testing activities, and the location and size ofnuclear weapons stockpile sites. Such. U-2 pho tography also revealed no evidence that the Soviet Union had violated the nuclear testing moratorium.

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

The U-2 program not only provided information on individual Soviet weapons systems, but also helped analysts assess basic Soviet intentions, particularly during crisis situations, as Dulles wrote in May 1960:

Whenever the international situation becomes tense because of a problem in some particular area, we are concerned whether the situation might get beyond control-that someone on the other side might suddenly and irrationally unleash big war. ... Our knowledge of Soviet military preparations, however, result ing from the overflight program. has given us an ability to dis count or call the bluffs of the Soviets with confidence. We have been able to conclude that Soviet statements were more rhetori cal than threatening and that our courses of action could be carried through without serious risk of war and without Soviet interference. 4

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

Dulles closed his report on the U-2's accomplishments by put ting the program in perspective as part ofthe entire national intelli gence effort, noting that "in terms of reliability, of precision, of access to otherwise inaccessible installations, its contribution has been unique. And in the opinion ofthe military, ofthe scientists and of the senior officials responsible for our national security it has been, to put it simply. invaluable."

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PARTICIPATION OF ALLIES IN THE U-2 PROGRAM

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

From the very beginning of the overflight project, US Allies provided valuable support. Bases in Germany, Turkey, Norway, and Pakistan played a major role in overflights of the Soviet Union. Bases in India, Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines greatly assisted operations in Asia. Two Allies-theUnited Kingdom and Nationalist China-made an even greater contribution to the U-2 program by providing pilots and conducting overflights. British pilots began flying in late 1958 and conducted two important overflights ofthe Soviet Union in late 1959 and early 1960. After the end of such missions in May 1960, the need for British participation lessened. RAF pilots henceforth flew only training or ferry missions, although their use for operational mis sions was considered on several occasions.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

The end ofoverflights ofthe Soviet Union reduced the impor tance of British participation but resulted in the addition ofa new source of pilots when the focus ofinterest for the U-2 in its strategic intelligence-gathering role shifted to the People's Republic ofChina. The United States and Nationalist China had been conducting joint r~<;onnaissance projects over the Chinese mainland since the mid- l 950s, and in 1961 the CIA equipped the Nationalist Chinese with the latest in reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2. For the next 12 years, Agency U-2s with Nationalist Chinese pilots brought back large quantities of information on the development of Communist China's armed forces, nuclear technology, and economy. Such information was extremely important to US policymakers. Nationalist China paid a high price in lives for its participation in the U-2 program: seven pilots died (five in training accidents and two on overflights), and another three were captured.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DISCUSSIONS ON THE  OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

U-2s AS COLLECTORS OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

The low level ofmission activity over the project's original target the Soviet Union-wasinitially very frustrating for CIA project man agers, but the U-2 soon found new missions not originally envisioned for the program. With its strategic-intelligence-collection role often on hold, the U-2 became highly useful as a collector of tactical intelli gence during crisis situations.

Beginning with the Suez Crisis of 1956 and continuing with sub sequent Middle Eastern wars, a rebellion in Indonesia, Sino-Indian border fighting, and culminating in support to the growing US

Seeret

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involvement in fndochina, U-2 photography provided accurate and up-to-date intelligence to US policymakers and tield commanders, as sisting them in crisis management and the planning ofmilitary opera tions. Agency U-2s also assisted in monitoring cease-fire agreements in the Middle East, with operations occurring after an undeclared war in 1970 and the 1973 Middle East war.

By the time the OXCART became fully operational, manned strategic reconnaissance ofthe Soviet Union was no longer seriously considered. The political risks were too high. especially since the quality of intelligence from reconnaissance satellites was increasing steadily. Thus, the OXCARTsonly operational use was for collecting tactical intelligence in the Far East. Like the U-2, the OXCART gath ered valuable intelligence during crisis situations. Thus. in January 1968. OXCART photography revealed the location of the USS Pueblo and showed that the North Koreans were not preparing any large-scale military activity in conjunction with the ship's seizure.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY

One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance program was the many advances in technology that it generated. Thanks to simplified covert procurement arrangements and the lack ofdetailed and restricting specifications, creative designers such as Kelly Johnson produced state-of-the-art aircraft in record time. The U-2, designed to carry out reconnaissance missions for two years at best, proved so successful that, even after its original area ofactivity became too dangerous for overflights at the end offour years, the air craft served the CIA well for another 14 years and still is in service with other government agencies.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY (cont.)

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government could not afford to maintain two such similar reconnais sance programs. The elimination of the Agency's OXCART program did not, however, spell the end of the usefulness ofthe world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR-71, is still in service.

In addition to the aircraft themselves, many other items associ ated with the reconnaissance program have represented important ad vances in technology. The flight suits and life-support systems ofthe U-2 and OXCART pilots were the forerunners ofthe equipment used in the space program. Camera resolution improved dramatically as the result of cameras and lenses produced for the CIA's reconnaissance program.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY (cont.)

COOPERATION WITH THE AIR FORCE

In this history, which concentrates on the CIA's involvement in over head reconnaissance, it is easy to overlook the important role that the US Air Force played in the U-2 and OXCART programs. From the v_ery beginnings of the U-2 program in 1954, the Agency and the Air Force were partners in advancing the state ofthe art in overhead re connaissance. Air Force personnel served at all levels ofthe recon naissance program, from project headquarters to the testing site and field detachments. The Air Force supplied the U-2's engines, at times diverting them from other high-priority production lines. Perhaps most important of all, the Air Force provided pilots for the U-2s after the Agency's original attempt to recruit a sufficient number of skilled foreign pilots proved unsuccessful. Finally, the day-to-day operations ofthe U-2s could not have been conducted without the help of Air Force mission planners, weather forecasters, and support personnel in the field detachments. The cooperation between the Agency and the Air Force that began with the U-2 and continued with Project OXCART remains a major feature in US reconnaissance programs today.

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technical means ofcollection. As soon as the U-2 began flying over the Soviet Union, its photographs became the most important source of intelligence available. The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of the Agency's photointerpretation capabilities, which finally resulted in the creation ofthe National Photographic Interpretation Center to serve the entire intelligence community.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## IMPACT  OF  THE OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE
PROGRAM ON THE  CIA (cont.)

The U-2's tremendous success as an intelligence-gathering sys tem led the Agency to search for follow-on systems that could con tinue to obtain highly reliable information in large quantities. Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft-the OXCART-and also pioneered research into photo satellites. Less than a decade after the U-2 program began, the Agency's new emphasis on technical means of collection had brought about the creation of a new science-oriented directorate, which would ultimately rival in manpower and budget the Agency's other three directorates combined.

The negative aspect of this new emphasis on technology is exploding costs. The Agency's first strategic reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2, cost less than $1 million apiece. With the U-2's successor, the OXCART, each aircraft cost more than $20 million, and the cost explosion has continued with each new generation ofreconnaissance satellites.

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-Blank

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Blank

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## APPENDIX A

| Acronyms    | Acronyms                                                                                                                    |
|-|-|
| AEC         | Atomic Energy Commission                                                                                                    |
| AFB         | Air Force Base                                                                                                              |
| AFDAP       | Air Force office symbol for the Assistant for<br />Development Planning under the Deputy Chief<br />ofStaff for Development |
| AMO         | Air/Maritime Division                                                                                                       |
| ARC         | Ad Hoc Requirements Committee                                                                                               |
| ARDC        | Air Research and Development Command<br />(USAF)                                                                            |
| ASPIC       | Asian Photographic Interpretation Center                                                                                    |
| ATIC        | Air Technical Intelligence Center (USAF)                                                                                    |
| BSAP        | Boston Scientific Advisory Panel                                                                                            |
| BUORL       | Boston University Optical Research Laboratory                                                                               |
| COMINT      | Communications Intelligence                                                                                                 |
| COMIREX     | Committee on Imagery Requirements and<br />Exploitation                                                                     |
| COMOR       | Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance                                                                                        |
| DB          | "Dirty Bird"                                                                                                                |
| DCI         | Director  ofCentral Intelligence                                                                                            |
| DCID        | Director  ofCentral Intelligence Directive                                                                                  |
| DDCI        | Deputy Director ofCentral Intelligence                                                                                      |
| DOI         | Deputy Director for Intelligence                                                                                            |
| DDP         | Deputy Director (or Directorate) for Plans                                                                                  |
| DDS&T       | Deputy Director for Science and Technology                                                                                  |
| DPD         | Development Projects Division                                                                                               |
| DPS         | Development Projects Staff                                                                                                  |
| ECM         | Electronic Countermeasures                                                                                                  |
| EG&G        | Edgerton, Germeshausen &  Grier, Incorporated                                                                               |
| ELINT       | Electronic Intelligence                                                                                                     |
| FCRC        | Federally Controlled Research Center                                                                                        |
| HASP        | High-Altitude Air Sampling Program                                                                                          |
| IAC         | Intelligence Advisory Committee                                                                                             |
| IAS         | Indicated air speed                                                                                                         |
| IC          | Intelligence community                                                                                                      |
| ICBM        | Intercontinental ballistic missile                                                                                          |
| IR          | Infrared                                                                                                                    |
| ISP         | Intelligence Systems Panel (USAF)                                                                                           |
| JRC         | Joint Reconnaissance Center                                                                                                 |
| MATS        | Military Air Transport Service (USAF)                                                                                       |

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# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## APPENDIX A (cont.)

| MRBM      | Medium-range ballistic missile                                          |
|-|-|
| NACA      | National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics                             |
| NAS       | Naval air station                                                       |
| NASA      | National Aeronautics and Space<br />Administration                      |
| NIE       | National Intelligence Estimate                                          |
| NPIC      | National Photographic Interpretation Center                             |
| NSA       | National Security Agency                                                |
| NSC       | National Security Council                                               |
| NSCID     | National Security Council Intelligence<br />Directive                   |
| ODM       | Office  ofDefense Mobilization                                          |
| ORR       | Office  ofResearch and Reports                                          |
| OSA       | Office  ofSpecial Activities                                            |
| OSI       | Office  ofScientific Intelligence                                       |
| PBCFIA    | President's Board ofConsultants on Foreign<br />Intelligence Activities |
| P-E       | Perkin-Elmer Company                                                    |
| PFIAB     | President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory<br />Board                    |
| PI        | Photointerpreter                                                        |
| PIC       | Photographic Intelligence Center                                        |
| PID       | Photo-Intelligence Division                                             |
| PSAC      | President's Science Advisory Committee                                  |
| RAF       | Royal Air Force                                                         |
| RFP       | Request for proposal                                                    |
| SAB       | Scientific Advisory Board (USAF)                                        |
| SAC       | Science Advisory Committee                                              |
| SAC       | Strategic Air Command                                                   |
| SA/PC/DCI | Special Assistant to the DCI for Planning and<br />Coordination         |
| SAM       | Surface-to-air missile                                                  |
| SEI       | Scientific Engineering Institute                                        |
| SENSINT   | Sensitive intelligence (USAF)                                           |
| SLAR      | Side-looking aerial radar                                               |
| TAS       | True air speed                                                          |
| TCP       | Technological Capabilities Panel                                        |
| USIB      | United States Intelligence Board                                        |
| WADC      | Wright Air Development Command (USAF)                                   |
| WRSP      | Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional                            |

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## APPENDIX B

## Key  Personnel

## AYER, Frederick, Jr.

Special assistant to Trevor Gardner in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Ayer was a strong advocate of overhead reconnaissance by balloons and an early supporter of Lockheed's CL-282 design.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## BAKER, James G.

Harvard astronomer and lens designer, Baker was a leading designer of high-acuity aerial lenses during World War II and continued this work after the war. He also headed the Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel and served on the Technological Capabilities Panel's Project Three committee that urged the development of the U-2 aircraft. Baker designed the lenses for the U-2's cameras.

BISSELL, Richard M., Jr.

Head ofall CIA overhead reconnaissance programs from 1954 until 1962, a former economics professor at MIT and high official of the Marshall Plan, Bissell became Allen W. Dulles's Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination in January 1954 and received responsibil ity for the new U-2 project at the end of that year. Later he also headed the first photosatellite project and oversaw the development of the OXCART. In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control. He resigned from the CIA in February 1962.

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the Air Force in January 1959. Five months later he moved up to Assistant Secretary ofthe Air Force for Research and Development, and the following y~ar he became Under Secretary ofthe Air Force. In these positions he was involved in coordination with the CIA on both the U-2 and OXCART projects. In 1963 Charyk left government to become the first chairman of the Communications Satellite Corporation.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## CUNNINGHAM, James A., Jr.

An ex-Marine Corps pilot, he became the administrative officer for the U-2 project in April 1955. Cunningham handled the day-to-day managementof the U-2 program and brought only the more complex problems to Richard Bissell's attention. Later he served as the Deputy Directorof the Office of Special Activities and then Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Science and Technology.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## DONOVAN, Allen F.

An aeronautical engineer who had helped to design the P-40 fighter while working at the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Donovan was one ofthe founders ofthe Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory after World War IL He served on several Air Force advisory panels and was a strong advocate ofthe proposed Lockheed CL-282 aircraft. Later he became vice president ofthe Aerospace Corporation.

DOOLITTLE, James H.

A vice president ofShell Oil Company and an Army Air Force re serve general, Doolittle headed General Eisenhower's Air Staff dur ing World War II. After the war Doolittle served on many Air Force advisory panels, and in 1954 he chaired a special panel investigating the CIA's covert activities. Doolittle also served on the Technological Capabilities Panel and the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

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program when he saw how much intelligence it could gather on the Soviet Union. Because his own interests lay more in the area of hu man intelligence, he left the management ofthe reconnaissance pro gram in the hands of DDCI Cabell and project director Richard Bissell.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## GARDNER, Trevor

During World War II, Gardner worked on the Manhattan Project, and later he headed the General Tire and Rubber Company before starting his own research and development firm, the Hycon Company, which built aerial cameras. Gardner served as the Secretary of the Air Force's Special Assistant for Research and Development and then as the Assistant Secretary for Research and Development during Eisenhower's first term of office. Gardner's concern about the danger of a surprise attack helped lead to the establishment of the Technological Capabilities Panel. Gardner also urged the building of Lockheed's CL-282 aircraft.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## GARDNER, Trevor (cont.)

GEARY, Leo P.

Air Force colonel (later brigadier general) who was James Cunningham's Air Force counterpart in the U-2 program. He was in strumental in diverting engines from other Air Force projects for use in the U-2, and his 10 years with the U-2 project provided a high de gree ofcontinuity.

GOODPASTER, Andrew J.

An Army colonel who served as President Eisenhower's Staff Secretary from 1954 to 196 l. During this period, he was the CIA's point ofcontact in the White House for arranging meetings with the President on the subject ofoverhead reconnaissance. Goodpaster's later career included service as the supreme commander of NATO and then commandant ofthe US Military Academy at West Point.

HELMS, Richard M.

DCI from 1966 to 1973. During his tenure as DCI, the CIA's manned reconnaissance program came under heavy pressure because ofcom petition from the Air Force's reconnaissance program.

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## KIEFER, Eugene P.

An Air Force officer with a degree in  aeronautical engineering who in
1953 informed a friend at Lockheed ofthe Air Force's search for a
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, thus, leading to the initial de
sign  of  the CL-282. After leaving the Air Force, Kiefer became
Richard  Bissell's  technical  adviser  for  the  OXCART and
photosatellite programs.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## KILLIAN, James R., Jr.

President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Killian headed a high-level and very secret study of the nation's ability to withstand a surprise attack. While this project was still under way, he and Edwin Land persuaded President Eisenhower to support the de velopment ofa high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2. Later, Killian headed Eisenhower's Board of Consultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities, served as his Cabinet-level science adviser, and chaired the President's Science Advisory Board. Killian was also chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board un der John F. Kennedy.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## LAND, Edwin H.

An extremely talented inventor famous for the development ofpolar izing filters and the instant-film camera. Land also devoted consider able time and energy to voluntary government service. During World War II, Land worked for the Radiation Laboratories, and after the war he served on numerous Air Force advisory panels. As the head of the Technological Capabilitites Panel's study group investigating US in telligence-gathering capabilities, Land became a strong advocate of the development of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft (the CL-282) under civilian rather than Air Force control. Land and James Killian persuaded President Eisenhower to approve the U-2 project and later the first photosatellite project. Land also served on the President's Board ofConsultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities.

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Engineering Institute, an Agency proprietary working on ways to re duce the U-2's vulnerability to radar detection. In 1957 he founded Itek Corporation.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## LUNDAHL, Arthur E.

A Navy photointerpreter during World War II and afterward. Lundahl became the chief ofthe Photo-Intelligence Division in I953. To sup port the U-2 project, he established a separate photointerpretation center under Project HTAUTOMAT. Under his leadership the Photo Intelligence Division grew rapidly and achieved office status as the Photographic Intelligence Center in 1958. In 1961 Lundahl became the first head of the National Photograhic Interpretation Center, which combined the photointerpretation efforts ofthe CIA and the military services.

## McCONE, John A.

DCI from 1961 to 1965. A strong supporter ofthe CIA's manned re connaissance program, McCone presided over the OXCART's main periodof development and pushed for a greater role for the CIA in its joint reconnaissance programs with the Department ofDefense.

## MILLER, Herbert I.

Miller worked in the Office of Scientific Intelligence's nuclear branch and became Richard Bissell's first deputy for the U-2 project. He later left the Agency to work for the Scientific Engineering Institute.

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## PERKIN, Richard S.

President ofthe Perkin-Elmer Corporation, Perkin was a close friend ofJames Baker and was also a member of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to use in the first U-2 aircraft.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## POWERS, Francis Gary

An Air Force Reserve Officer who became a CIA U-2 pilot in 1956, Powers flew 27 successful missions before being shot down over the Soviet Union on l May 1960. After his return to the United States in exchange for Soviet spymaster Rudolf Abel in 1962, Powers was cleared of all allegations of misconduct in his mission, capture, trial, and captivity. He became a test pilot for Lockheed and later piloted light aircraft and helicopters for radio and television stations. He died in a helicopter crash on l August 1977.

## PURCELL, Edward M.

A physicist who won a Nobel prize in 1954 for his work in nuclear resonance, Purcell served on a number ofadvisory bodies, including the USAF Scientific Advisory Committee and Edwin Land's Technological Capabilities Panel study group. It was Purcell's ideas for reducing the radar cross section of the U-2 that led to the OXCART program. Purcell also contributed to the satellite pro grams.

## RABORN, William F.,  Jr.

DCI from 1965 to 1966, Raborn pushed for the deployment of OXCART to the Far East but failed to sway the top officials ofthe Johnson administration.

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## SCHLESINGER, James R.

DCI from February to July 1973, Schlesinger supported the Nixon ad ministration's proposal to terminate the Agency's U-2 program.

## SCOTT, Roderic M.

An engineer with Perkin-Elmer who worked with James Baker in de signing the first cameras for use in the U-2. Scott helped design the 30001 camera for the OXCART.

# Secret NOFORN (cont.)

## SCOVILLE, Herbert, Jr.

In February 1962 Scoville became the first Deputy Director for Research, which took over control ofthe Agency's reconnaissance programs from the Deputy Director for Plans. Frustrated by the lack of support from the DCI and the other directorates, he resigned in June 1963.

## SEABERG, John

An aeronautical engineer who was recalled to active duty with the Air Force during the Korean war, Seaberg drafted the first specifications fo~ _a high-flyingjet reconnaissance aircraft in 1953.

## STEVER, H. Guyford

A professor ofaeronautical engineering at MIT, Stever served on nu merous Air Force advisory panels and later became the Air Force's chief scientist.

## STRONG, Philip G.

Chief of collection in the Office of Scientific Intelligence, Strong kept himself well informed on developments in overhead reconnaissance and attended many Air Force advisory panel meetings as an observer. In 1954 he learned about the Lockheed CL-282 design and passed the information on to Edwin Land's study group investigating US intelli gence-gathering capabilities.

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Blank

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335

APPENDIX C

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2

From the beginning the U-2 was envisioned as more than a camera platform. In fact, the U-2 would ultimately carry only five types of photographic equipment but more than 20 different types of electronic devices, some for collecting electronic intelligence (ELINT), others ("ferret" equipment) for gathering intelligence on foreign radars, and a few for self-protection--electronic countermeasures to defeat en emy missile-control radars.

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

The various electronic, countermeasures and intelligence-gather ing systems designed for the U-2 received designations using Roman numerals-Systems I through XXII. The first seven devices were built by the Ramo-Wooldridge firm, now part of the TRW Corporation. System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air defense signals. Weighing only 7. 7 kilograms, this system was aboard all U-2s from I955 through 1959. System-IL a communications and navigation system. never worked properly and was canceled. System-III. a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to the Navy in 1958. System-IV, a ferret device that recorded electromagnetic energy in the 150- to 4,000-MHz range was used on 16 missions between 1957 and 1959, when it was given to the Air Force. System-V was similar to System-I but covered nine wave bands. The device was so heav·y that U-2s using it could not carry a camera system. System-V was used on only three missions and was replaced by the lighter weight System-VI that covered the P-, L-, S-, and X-band frequencies and could be used with either the A or B camera. System- VI was used from 1959 through 1966.

[page 349]
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336

unit was manufactured by the Granger Company. One of these de vices was aboard Gary Powers' U-2 when he was shot down.

System-X was a modification of the HRB's System-VII that was specially built in 1962 for a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM devices used by U-2s overflying China and North Vietnam during the Vietnam war. System-XVI was a passive ELINT collector.

[page 350]
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Appendix D
337

## APPENDIX D

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union, 4 July 1954-1 May 1960

| Date             | Mission   | Pilot        | Airfield    | Unit    | Payload   | Route                                                                                    |
|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|
| 4 July 1956      | 2013      | Stockman     | Wiesbaden   | A       | A-2       | East Germany, Poland, Minsk,<br />Leningrad, Estonia, Latvia, Poland                     |
| 5 July 1956      | 2014      | Vito         | Wiesbaden   | A       | A-2       | East Germany, Warsaw, Minsk,<br />Moscow, Estonia, Latvia,<br />Lithuania, Poland        |
| 9 July 1956      | 2020      | Knutson      | Wiesbaden   | A       | A-2       | East Germany, Poland, Minsk,<br />Poland                                                 |
| 9 July 1956      | 2021      | Overstreet   | Wiesbaden   | A       | A-2       | Czechoslovakia, Vienna, Hungary,<br />L'vov, Kiev, Minsk, Poland                         |
| •10-July 1956    | 2024      | Dunaway      | Wiesbaden   | A       | A-2       | Poland, Kishinev, Kerch •. <br />Sevastopol', Simferopol'. Odessa.<br />Romania. Hungary |
| 20 November 1956 | 4016      | Powers       | Adana       | B       | A-2       | Iran, Yerevan, Baku. Astara,<br />Caucasus                                               |
| 18  March 1957   | 4020      | Cherbonneaux | Adana       | B       | Sys-V     | Soviet border to  Afghanistan, <br />Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia                        |
| 20 June 1957     | 6005      | Rand         | Eielson     | C       | B         | Khaylyulya. Ust'-Kamchatsk,<br />Kozyrevsk, Karaganskiy-Ostrov                           |
| 5 August 1957    | 4035      | Edens        | Lahore      | B       | B         | Afghanistan, Tashkent, Tyuratam,<br />Kazalinsk, Aral Sea                                |
| 11  August 1957  | 4039      | McMurray     | Lahore      | B       | B         | Alma-Ata. Ust' -Kamenogorsk,<br />Sinkiang                                               |
| 21  August 1957  | 4045      | Snider       | Lahore      | B       | A-2       | Novokuznetsk,  Tomsk                                                                     |
| 21  August 1957  | 4048      | Jones        | Lahore      | B       | A-2       | Lake  Balkhash,  Karaganda,  Omsk. <br />Alma-Ata                                        |

[page 351]
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Appendix D
338

## APPENDIX D

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union, 4 July 1954-1 May 1960 (continued)

| Date               | Mission    | Pilot         | Airfield    | Unit    | Payload   | Route                                                                                            |
|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|
| 22 August l 957    | 4049       | Birkhead      | Lahore      | B       | A-2       | Merket Bazar, Kuldja, Abakan,<br />Krasnoyarsk, Kansk, Sinkiang                                  |
| 22 August l 957    | 4050       | Cherbonneaux: | Lahore      | B       | A-2       | Lake Balkhash, Semipalatinsk,<br />Barnaul, Prokop'yevsk,<br />Novokuznetsk, Leninogorsk         |
| 28 August 1957     | 4058       | Jones         | Lahore      | B       | A-2       | Dushanbe, Tashkent, Tyuratam,<br />Kazalinsk, Aral Sea                                           |
| 10  September 1957 | 4059       | Hall          | Adana       | B       | A-2       | Krasnovodsk, Gur'yev,<br />Astrakhan', Tbilisi                                                   |
| 16  September 1957 | 6008       | Baker         | Eielson     | C       | A-2       | Kamchatka Peninsula, Milkovo                                                                     |
| 13  October 1957   | 2040       | Stockman      | Giebelstadt | A       | A-2       | Norway, Finland, Murmansk,<br />Kandalaksha                                                      |
| I March 1958       | 601l       | Crull         | Atsugi      | C       | A-2       | Dal' nerechensk, Khabarovsk,<br />Blagoveshchensk, Belagorsk,<br />Komsomolsk, Sovetskaya Gavan' |
| 9 July 1959        | 4125       | Knutson       | Peshawar    | B       | B         | Tyuratam for suspected Sputnik<br />launch                                                       |
| 6 December 1959    | 8005       | Robinson•     | Peshawar    | B       | B         | Kuybyshev, Kapustin Yar, <br />Caucasus                                                          |
| 5 February l 960   | 8009       | MacArthur•    | Peshawar    | B       | B         | Tyuratam, Kazan                                                                                  |
| 9 April 1960       | 4155       | Erickson      | Peshawar    | B       | B         | Lake Balkhash, Semipalatinsk,<br />Kyzylespe, Dzhezhkazgan,<br />Tyuratarn                       |
| I May 1960         | 4154       | Powers        | Peshawar    | B       | B         | Tyuratam, Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk;<br />downed  by  SAM                                              |

[page 352]
Secret NOFORN
Appendix E
339

## APPENDIX E

## Unmanned Reconnaissance Projects

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## AQUILINE

In the early l 960s, there were many problems in obtaining coverage of hostile territory. The U-2 was too vulnerable to Soviet sur face-to-air missiles, as had been demonstrated by losses over the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the People's Republic of China. The OXCART was still under development and even when completed might prove vulnerable to Soviet radars and missiles. Although safe from interception, the newly developed photosatellites could not pro vide coverage ofa desired target on short notice. Because several of the intelligence community's primary targets such as Cuba and the new Soviet radar installation at Tallinn (Estonia) were not located deep in hostile territory, CIA scientists and engineers began to con sider the possibility of using small, unmanned aircraft for aerial reconnaissance. They believed that recent advances in the minia turization of electronic technology would make possible the development of a reconnaissance vehicle with a very-low-radar cross section and small visual and acoustical signatures. Such a vehicle could reconnoiter an area ofinterest without the hostile country real izing that it had been overflown.

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## AQUILINE (cont.)

In mid-1965, David L. Christ, chief ofthe Office of Research and Development's Applied Physics Division, and Frank Briglia of the same office began working on the concept of a small, inexpensive aircraft that would be about the size ofa large bird and could carry various payloads for photography, nuclear sensing, and ELINT collec tion. ORD soon formed a Special Projects Group to develop the air craft with Briglia as the project manager. Only one firm-the Douglas Aircraft Company-responded favorably to a request for proposal to study the feasibility ofa low-altitude reconnaissance system. On 15 November 1965, Douglas received a study contract. This was followed by two Agency contracts on 21 November 1966 for the development of an operational low-altitude intelligence-gathering system. Further contracts followed in 1968 and 1969.

The AQUILINE prototype developed by Douglas Aircraft (which became part ofMcDonnell-Douglas in 1969 as the result ofa merger) was essentially a powered glider with an 8.5-foot wingspan. The aircraft weighed only 105 pounds. AQUILINE's tail-mounted en gine drove a two-bladed propeller. Powered by a small 3.5-horse power two-cycle engine originally developed by the McCullough

_ Secret

[page 353]
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Appendix E
340

Project AQUILINE

Corporation for chainsaws. the aircraft's designed speed was 60 knots at an altitude of 1.000 feet with a 15-pound payload. The air•::raft could fly at this speed for up to 30 hours, thanks to the engine's ex tremely high fuel efficiency: 480 nautical mil es per gallon of fuel.

In 1968 tests on an AQUILINE prototype at Randsburg Wash on the US Navy's Naval Ordnance Test Station at China Lake, California, showed that the aircraft was extremely difficult to see. To assist pilots of chase aircraft in keeping AQUILINE in sight, its entire upper surface was painted bright orange; even so, sighting remained difficult.

The 1esting process was very hard on AQU ILI NEbecause it was recovered by flying itinto a net close to the ground. which almos:t al ways caused some damage to the wings or propeller. As a result, one

-Secret-

[page 354]
Secret NOFORN
Appendix E
341

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## AQUILINE (cont.)

or more of the aircraft was always being repaired, and eventually three ofthe five AQUILINE prototypes were destroyed in testing.

Although AQUILINE's visual and accoustic signatures were very small, its radar cross section continued to cause problems. The radar cross section at low frequencies was less than one-tenth of a square meter, giving it a radar signature smaller than that of an eagle, but there were flares in the VHF region that increased the likelihood ofdetection.

Studies indicated that the radar cross section problems could eventually be reduced to acceptable levels, but the greatest weakness of the AQUILINE project was its navigational system. AQUILINE did not have a programmable autopilot; it had to be flown by remote control from the ground. Once the aircraft flew over the horizon. all navigational commands had to be relayed to it by high-flying aircraft. A DC-6 loitering at 25,000 feet would give AQUILINE a range of 250 nautical miles: use of a U-2 at 70,000 feet could increase this to 350 nautical miles.

- -Such a range was suitable for the targets originally conceived for AQUILINE, but the need for intelligence on targets located much dee er in the Soviet Union and the Peo le's Re ublic ofChina

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## AQUILINE (cont.)

and the development time and costs for AQUILINE began to soar. By 1971 ORD had spent six years and $33 million on AQUILINE but still had many important problems to re- solve.

At this point the project was turned over to the Office of Special Activities for operational testing at Area 51 in Nevada. Flight tests showed the aircraft to be successful by the standards originally set for the project in l967, as it flew l 30 miles and obtained very high reso lution photography of a target before returning successfully to the original launchsite. However, improving AQUILINE sufficiently to make it a practical long-range reconnaissance system was estimated to cost another $35 million and take two to three years. On the recom mendation of DDS&T Carl Duckett on I November l 971, Project AQUILINE was canceled. The project's aircraft and equipment were eventually transferred to the US Army for use in a battlefield manage ment system known as AQUILA, which has yet to be deployed be cause of continuing developmental problems.

-Secret

[page 355]
Secret NOFORN
Appendix E
342

Project AXILLARY

AXILLARY

While Project AQUILINE was still under development, its chief aero dynamicist, Charles N. Adkins, left the program because he believed that its escalating costs would prev,ent it from ever producing a de pl oyable aircraft. He wanted to build a small. inexpensive re mote-controlled aircraft to te st a low-cost lightweight autopilot currently being developed by · oRD. Under a $5,000 time-and-materi als contract with Melpar. Incorporatt:d. Adkins hired a local model aircraft builder to assemble and modify a standard Hawk-750 glider kit and power it with a rear-mounted engine and pusher propeller. Following a series ofsuccessful test flights. Adkins installed a small cameraand took a number of aerial photographs.

[page 356]
Secret NOFORN
Appendix E
343

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## AQUILINE (cont.)

Defense Research and Engineering, John Foster, liked the concept and provided DOD funding for ORD to develop two versions of AXILLARY, one with a radar-homer and one with a television recon naissance package. The radar homing system proved successful as AXILLARY sought out and destroyed a radar during testing at China Lake Naval Air Station. However, the end of US involvement in Vietnam in early 1973 led to the cancellation of further DOD funding, and AXILLARY was placed on the shelf. Melpar, Inc., continued to work on the radar-homing version and eventually sold some AXILLARY-type aircraft to [srael, which used them to destroy Syrian radars in Lebanon in 1982.

PINE RIDGE

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## AQUILINE (cont.)

While work was still in progress on low-altitude, short-range recon naissance systems like AQUILINE and AXILLARY, CIA scientists and engineers were also working on a high-altitude recoverable un manned reconnaissance vehicle with an extremely-low-radar cross section that would enable it to fly undetected over hostile territory. During the 1960s there had been a study conducted by the Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical Company ofSan Diego on the construction ofan .unaetectable drone known as SANDY HOOK. This 44-foot long drone would operate at 120,000 feet at Mach 0.9, with a range of 5,000 nautical miles. Its radar cross section 07zwould be 0.0 I square meters. Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical risks led to its cancellation in December I969.

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## AQUILINE (cont.)

Someof the concepts in SANDY HOOK were carried over into a new project known as PINE RIDGE, which was a proposal for an un manned reconnaissance vehicle with an even lower radar cross sec tion (0.001 square meter). Research on SANDY HOOK had indicated that a radar cross section this low was attainable and would prevent detection and tracking by existing radar defense systems. The PINE RIDGE proposal called for a delta-shaped vehicle, approximately 17 feet long with a 21-foot wingspan. Two vertical stabilizers would give the vehicle an overall height ofthree to four feet. An existing Teledyne J- lO0-CA-100 Turbojet engine could have been used to power the vehicle at Mach 0.9 at the operating altitude of65,000 to 75,000 feet. Range was estimated at 3,300 nautical miles.

Despite interest within the CIA and the Air Force for an unde tectable reconnaissance vehicle, PINE RIDGE was never funded. In January 1971 high-level representatives from DOD and CIA rejected a proposal for a feasibility study to be conducted by Ryan Aircraft.

_Secret-

[page 357]
Secret NOFORN
Appendix E
344

The following year, the Director ofthe Office ofSpecial Activities, Brig. Gen. Harold F. Knowles, wrote a memorandum to the DCI pro posing that the ClA develop a clandestine low-radar-cross-section vehicle like PINE RIDGE. but this proposal also failed to attract sup port. With all the improvements in satellite reconnaissance that had taken place during the previous decade, neither CIA no r the Air Force was willing to investsubstantial funding in a project to send aircraft. manned or unmanned, over the .Sovii etUnion.

Secret

[page 358]
345

Blank

[page 359]
346

-Blank

[page 360]
Secret NOFORN-

Bibliography

347

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## Published Works Cited

- Aart, Dick van der. Aerial Espionage, Secret Intelligence Flights by East and West. Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing, 1985 .

.. AF Cites Red Bomber Progress." Aviation Week, 24 May 1954, p. 14.

"'Alleged Overflight of Soviet Area by American Planes." US Department of State Bulletin, vol. 36, 28 January 1957, p. 135 .

.. Alleged Violations of Soviet Territory: Soviet Note of July 10, 1956 with U.S. Reply." US Department of State Bulletin, 30 July 1956, pp. 191-192.

[page 361]
## -Seeret NOFORN-

Bibliography
348

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## -Seeret NOFORN- (cont.)

- Coughlin, William. "Gardner Defends Greater R&D Spending." Aviation Week, 26 September 1955, p. 14.

- Eastman, Ford. "Defense Officials Concede Missile Lag." Aviation Week, 9 February 1959, pp. 26-27.

- Edwards, Philip K. "The President's Board: 1956-60." Studies in Intelligence 13 (Summer 1969): p. 118 (Secret).

- Eisenhower, Dwight D. Waging Peace, 1956-1961. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965.

- Freedman, Lawrence. US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, I986.

- George, A. L. Case Studies of Actual and Alleged Overflights, 1930-/953. Rand Study RM-1349. Santa Monica: Rand, 1955 (Secret).

The Defector Reception
Center Germany, 1951 to 1967. Clandestine Service Historical
Series CSHP-41. CIA: History Staff, 1972 (Secret).

[page 362]
Secret NOFORN
Bibliography
349

- Johnson, Clarence L. "Development of the Lockheed SR- 71 Blackbird.., Studies in Intelligence 26 (Summer 1982): p. 4 (Un classified).

- Johnson, Clarence L. with Maggie Smith. Kelly: More Than My Share of It All. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute Press, l985.

- Khrushchev. Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., l974.

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## -Seeret NOFORN- (cont.)

- Killian, James R., Jr. Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir ofthe First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Cambridge: M[T Press, l 977.

- Kistiakowsky. George B. A Scientist atthe White House. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, l 976.

- Kleyla, Helen H., and Robert D. O'Hern. History of the Office of Special Activities, DS& T I6 vols. Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series OSA-1. CIA: DS&T, 1969 (Top -Secret Codeword).

- Lay, James S. "The United States Intelligence Board, 1958-1965. •• CIA History Staff MS-2 (draft), 1974 (Top Secret Codeword).

- Licklider, Roy E. "The Missile Gap Controversy." Political Science Quarterly 85 (1970): pp. 600-615.

- Linehan, Urban J. The National Photographic Interpretation Center. Vol. l, Antecedents and Early Years. Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series NPIC-2. CIA: NPIC, 1972 (Secret). ---. National Photographic Interpretation Center: The Years of Project HTAUTOMAT, 1956-1958. 6 vols. Directorate ofScience and Technology Historical Series NPIC-3. CIA: NPIC, 1974 (Secret).

[page 363]
Secret NOFORN
Bibliography
350

"Mystery ofthe RB-47." Newsweek. 25 July 1960. pp. 36-37.

"Nikita and the RB-47.'' Time, 25 July 1960, pp. 30-3 I.

"Office of Special Activities History, April 1969 to Phase-Out." (draft) (CIA: DS&T, 1974), chap. 3, pp. 36-42 (Top Secret Codeword).

- Pero. Richard K. "Message Received-Unfortunately." Studies in Intelligence 27 (Winter 1983): p. 29 (Secret).

- Pocock, Chris. Dragon lady: The Histor_v of the U-2 Spyplane. Shrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1989.

[page 364]
Secret NOFORN
Bibliography
351

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## -Seeret NOFORN- (cont.)

- Sturm, Thomas A. The USAF Scientific Advisory Board: Its First Twenty Years, 1944-1964. Washington, DC: USAF Historical Office, 1967.

- Twining, Nathan F. Neither Liberty nor Safety. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966.

- United States Air Force. Project LINCOLN. BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June 1952 (Secret, downgraded to Confidential).

- United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. Executive Sessions ofthe Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. 12, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, "Report on the U-2 Incident," 6 March 1962 (declassified 1982).

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## -Seeret NOFORN- (cont.)

- United States Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Foreign and Military Intelligence. Book l. Washington. DC: US • Government Printing Office, 1976.

- United States Office of Defense Mobilization. Science Advisory Committee. Technological Capabilities Panel. Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack, 14 February 1955. (Top Secret/Restricted Data, downgraded to Secret).

"US Representations to the Soviet Government on C-130 Transport Shot Down by Soviet Fighter Aircraft." US Department of State Bulletin, 23 February 1959, pp. 262-27 l.

- Weber, Karl H. The Office of Scientific Intelligence, 1949-68. Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series OSI-l. CIA: DS&T, 1972 (Top Secret Codeword).

- Welzenbach, Donald E.  "Observation Balloons and Weather
Satellites."  Studies  in  Intelligence  30 (Spring 1986): pp. 21-28
(Secret).

- White, James J. "Francis Gary Powers-The Unmaking ofa Hero, 1960-1965." (draft) CIA: History Staff, 1974 (Secret).

- Wise, David and Thomas B. Ross. The U-2 Affair. New York: Random House, 1962.

_Secret

[page 365]
Secret NOFORN
Bibliography
352

Witze, Claude. "Russians Outpacing US in Air Quality, Twining Warns Congress," Aviation Week, 27 February 1956, pp. 26-28.

"Yakovlev Yak-25RM Mandrake," Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 3, no. 7, 16 February 85.

## Interviews and Speeches

- Interview with Robert Amory, Jr., by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W. Pedlow, Washington, DC, 22 April 1987 (Secret).

- Interview with James G. Baker by Donald E. Welzenbach, Washington, DC, 24 April 1985 (Secret).

- Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (Top Secret Codeword).

- Interview with Joseph V. Charyk by Donald E. Welzenbach, Washington, DC, 5 December 1984 (Top Secret Codeword).

- Interview with fonner U-2 pilots James Cherbonneaux, Cannine Vito, and Hervey Stockman, by Donald E. Welzenbach, Washington, DC, May 1986 (Secret).

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## Interviews and Speeches (cont.)

- Interview with James A. Cunningham, Jr., by Donald E. Welzenbach, Washington, DC, 4 October 1983 (Top Secret Codeword).

- Interview with Allen F. Donovan by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona de! Mar, California, 20 May 1985 (Secret).

- Interview with Brig. Gen. Leo A. Geary, USAF (Ret.), by Donald E. Welzenbach, 3 April 1986 (Secret).

- Interview with Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W. Pedlow, Washington, DC, 8 July 1987 (Secret).

- Speech by Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Halloran (fonner Air Force U-2 pilot) at the National Air & Space Museum, 24 April 1986 (Unclassified).

- Interview with James R. Killian, Jr. by Donald E. Welzenbach, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2 November 1984 (Secret).

- Interview with Edwin H. Land by Donald E. Welzenbach, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 17 and 20 September 1984 (Top Secret Codeword).

_ Secret

[page 366]
Secret NOFORN
Bibliography
353

- Interview with Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford. USAF (Ret.), by Gr ,egory W. Pedlow, Washington, DC, 20 February 1987 (Secret).

- Interview with Richard S. Leghorn by Donald E. We lzenbach, Washington. DC, 19 August 1985 (Secret).

- Interview with Arthur S. Lundahl and Dino Brugioni by Don2tld E. Welzenbach, Washington. DC, 14 December 1983 (Top Secret Codeword).

- Interview with Garrison Norton by Donald E. Welzenbach, Washington, DC, 23 May 1983 (Secret).

- Interview with John Parangosky by Donald E. Welzenbach. 6 March 1986 (Secret).

- Interview with James Q. R eber by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W. Pedlow. Washington. DC. 21 May 1987 (Secret). .

- J1_1terview with Carmine Vito by Don~ld E. Welzenbach, Washington, DC, 7 May 1986 (Secret).

- Interview with John S. Warner, Office ofthe General Counsel, by Donald E. Welzenbach, Washington. DC, 5 August 1983 (Top Secret Codeword).

-Secret-

[page 367]
354

Blank

[page 368]
Secret NOFORN
Index
355

A

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## Interviews and Speeches (cont.)

|                                                                            |
|-|
| A-I camera                                                                 |
| 50                                                                         |
| A-2 aircraft                                                               |
| 262-263                                                                    |
| A-2 camera                                                                 |
| 53, 77. 100,  104-105.  108                                                |
| A-3  aircraft                                                              |
| 263                                                                        |
| A-II                                                                       |
| 268. 294                                                                   |
| A-12                                                                       |
| 271, 273-274, 277-278. 28I,                                                |
| 283-286. 289-292. 294-297, 299.                                            |
| 302-305. 307-311, 329                                                      |
| Abel. Rudolf                                                               |
|                                                                            |
| 183,  332 <br />Ad Hoc Requirements Committee<br />81.  114,  188-189, 332 |
|                                                                            |
| Adana. Turkey                                                              |
| 113                                                                        |
| Ade11auer.  Konrad                                                         |
| - 101                                                                      |
| Adkins. Charles N.                                                         |
| 342                                                                        |
| Administration (East) Building                                             |
| 42                                                                         |
| advanced antiballistic-missile (ABM)                                       |
| 139                                                                        |
| aerial cameras                                                             |
| 13,  31. 49. 329                                                           |
| aerial lenses                                                              |
| 327                                                                        |
| aerial photography                                                         |
| 3.  13,  33. 49, 96, 119                                                   |
| aerial tankers                                                             |
| 313                                                                        |
| aerodynamic lift                                                           |
| 248. 277                                                                   |
| aerodynamic  structural  tests                                             |
| 274                                                                        |
| aerodynamicist                                                             |
| 342                                                                        |
| Aerospace Corporation                                                      |
| 328                                                                        |

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## Interviews and Speeches (cont.)

| Afghanistan                                                     |
|-|
| 126.  170.  176.  189                                           |
| afterburner plume                                               |
| 271                                                             |
| ailerons                                                        |
| 47, 69                                                          |
| Air Research and                                                |
| Development Command                                             |
| 5.  8                                                           |
| Air Staff for Intelligence                                      |
| 154                                                             |
| Air Weather Service                                             |
| 89. 94                                                          |
| air-cooled reactor                                              |
| 239                                                             |
| air-inlet system                                                |
| 291                                                             |
| air-to-air missiles                                             |
| 285,336                                                         |
| air-traffic controllers                                         |
| 72-73. 289                                                      |
| Air/Maritime Division (AMO)                                     |
| 73                                                              |
| aircraft carrier                                                |
| 145, 247, 250                                                   |
| airfields                                                       |
| 82, 95-96, 105.  117.  153.  216,                               |
|                                                                 |
| 221,226,317 <br />airframe <br />5, 8. 10.  24, 26. 48. 56, 71, |
|                                                                 |
| 105. 132-133, 248. 259. 274, 279.                               |
|                                                                 |
| 286. 289<br />airframe contractors<br />259                     |
|                                                                 |
| airspace <br />3-4,  19.  127.  134. 142. 144-147.              |
|                                                                 |
| 152-153.  182.  231.  239,241,                                  |
| 303. 306. 318. 322                                              |
| airspeed                                                        |
| I  16  ?35  .,.,                                                |
| 6&  Igg                                                         |
|                                                                 |
|                                                                 |
| Alaska <br />133-134.  145.  316                                |

[page 369]
## _Secret NOFORN-

Index
356

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## _Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

| Albania                                    |
|-|
| 140,  157                                  |
| Albuquerque, New Mexico                    |
| 74, 78-79                                  |
| Allen, Edward L.                           |
| 21                                         |
| Almaza Airbase, Egypt                      |
| 119                                        |
| altimeters                                 |
| 59-60                                      |
| altitude                                   |
| I,4-6, 7,  8-11,  12,  13-19, 22-26,       |
| 33-35, 39, 46-47, 49, 52, 54-55, 59,       |
| 61-64, 71-72, 74, 76, 79-80, 84, 87,       |
| 89. 93-94, 97, 101, 108, 125, 132,         |
| 142,  145,  148-149,  152,  156-157,  168, |
| 175-179, 185,207, 217-219, 229. 235,       |
| 240-241, 246-247, 251, 254, 259-260,       |
| 262, 263, 267, 268, 273, 277, 278-279,     |
| 284,286,288,292,294,  296-297, 304,        |
| 312-313, 320, 330, 339, 340, 343           |
| aluminum                                   |
| 271                                        |
| Ambon Island                               |
| 214                                        |
| American Civil War                         |
| I                                          |
| Amory, Robert                              |
| 114                                        |
| Anderson, Rudolph                          |
| 210                                        |
| Andaya, Norway                             |
| 172                                        |
| "Angel",                                   |
| 45, 50, 66,262                             |
| Anglo-French bombing campaign              |
| 117                                        |
| Anglo-Soviet relations                     |
| 94                                         |
| Ankara, Turkey                             |
| 135,  178                                  |
| antiaircraft missile                       |
| 168                                        |
| antiaircraft weapons                       |
| 93,  148                                   |
| antiballistic missile system               |
| 298,303                                    |
| antiradar studies                          |
| 267,274                                    |

[page 370]
Secret NOFORN
Index
357

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## _Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

| article 345A                      |
|-|
| 79                                |
| article 346                       |
| 80                                |
| article 347                       |
| 104                               |
| article 349                       |
| 219                               |
| article 354                       |
| 80                                |
| article 357                       |
| 80                                |
| article 360                       |
| 175,217                           |
| article number                    |
| 59                                |
| articles                          |
| 20,  59,  99,216                  |
| Ashford, Douglas E.               |
| 30                                |
| Asia                              |
| 135,  190,198,211,216,221,        |
| 230,233, 300-301, 310,319         |
| Asian Photographic Interpretation |
|                                   |
| 229 <br />aspheric lens<br />53   |
|                                   |
| ASPIC                             |
| 229                               |
| Aswan  Dam                        |
| 112                               |
| atmosphere                        |
| 278,  25,  152,  182,215          |
| atmospheric testing               |
|                                   |
| 147 <br />atomic bomb<br />19     |
|                                   |
| Atomic Energy Commission          |
| 56,  133,  182, 241-242, 274      |
| atomic energy facilities          |
| 233                               |
| ATR  (Air  Transport Rating)      |
| 187                               |
| Atsugi, Japan                     |
| 134,  215, 218                    |
| autopilot                         |
| 76, 341-342                       |
| Aviation Week                     |
| 216                               |

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## _Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

AXILLARY
342
Ayer,  Frederick,  Jr.
14-15,  36,327

B

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## _Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

| B model camera<br />53                                    |
|-|
|                                                           |
| B-17 bomber                                               |
| 222                                                       |
| B-26 bomber                                               |
| 214                                                       |
| B-36 bomber                                               |
| 22, 50                                                    |
| B-47 bomber                                               |
| 72                                                        |
| B-52 bomber                                               |
| 20,  111,  291, 3 12                                      |
| B-57 bomber                                               |
| 5, 8-9, 13, 15, 24, 35, 72                                |
| B-58 bomber                                               |
| 262, 269-270, 273                                         |
| B-58 "Hustler" bomber                                     |
| 262                                                       |
| B-58A bomber                                              |
| 269                                                       |
| B-588 "Super Hustler"                                     |
| 262                                                       |
| B-58B bomber                                              |
|                                                           |
| 263. 269<br />B-70 bomber<br />279.  293                  |
|                                                           |
| BACKFIN                                                   |
| 167                                                       |
| "badlands"                                                |
| 71                                                        |
| Baikal, Lake                                              |
| 128                                                       |
| Baird. Walter                                             |
| 56                                                        |
| Baird Associates                                          |
| 56                                                        |
| Baker, James G.                                           |
| 18,  21-25, 29-31. 46, 50-56,                             |
| 108,253,282.327,332-333                                   |
| Balkhash, Lake                                            |
|                                                           |
| 138,  139 <br />ballistic missiles<br />2,201,206,299,318 |
|                                                           |

[page 371]
## -Secret NOFORN

Index
358

BalticSea
3, 303
Ba lticstates
104
Baltimore; Maryland
6,  9

Barents  Sea
140, 142, 172
Bamesi~ rcv
barrelroll,.._ s ___ _,
76
Batlin, Alex
66
Bay  of  Bengal
231
Bayof Pigs
191.  197-199,  205
Baykonur. Soviet Union
137
Beacon  Hill
17-19. 21. 24, 31-32. 331-33'.!
BEACON  HILLReport
17.  19.  21. 24
BEACONHILLStudy Group
18,  21
Beechcraft
56.  187
Beerli. Stanley W.
I 9'.?.  196
Beijing, China (see  Peiping. China)
228-229
Bell Aircraft Corporation
9
Bell Laboratories
18
BellTelephone Laboratories
29
"bends"
64
Bennington. Herbert
309
Benton,  William
299
Berezovskiy. Soviet Union
138
Berlin, Gennany
16. 20. 127, 147, 162. 183. 196
Berlin crisis
147,  196

[page 372]
Secret NOFORN
Index
359

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## -Secret NOFORN (cont.)

borax
121
Boston, Massachusetts
13, 18, 22, 24, 27, 52, 56.
110. 260
Boston camera
13
Boston University
22, 24, 52
Bowles, Chester
225
Brahmaputra Valley
231
bridges
82
Briggs School
42
Briglia, Frank
339
British and French fleets
116
British Guiana
211
British Guiana-Venezuela border
211
British overflight of the Soviet Union
23-24. 164
British Parliament
94. 232
British radar network
94
Brugioni, Dino
135. 137
Budapest, Hungary
123
Budget. Bureau of the
267, 308-310
Budget, Director of the
40
Buffalo, New York
9.63
Bulganin. Nikolai
94, 120
Bulgaria
101, 124-125. 140
Bundy, McGeorge
188. 201, 205, 209. 236, 293
BUORL
22
Burbank, California
45

[page 373]
Secret NOFORN
Index
360

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## -Secret NOFORN (cont.)

| Carey, Howard                                               |
|-|
| 80,  140                                                    |
| Carter, John H.  (Jack)                                     |
| 9-10                                                        |
| Carter, Marshall S.                                         |
| 186,  201, 205, 208-209, 299, 327                           |
| Caspian Sea                                                 |
| 126                                                         |
| catheterized                                                |
| 64                                                          |
| cathode-ray tube                                            |
| 267                                                         |
| Caucasus Mountains                                          |
| 179                                                         |
| celestial "fixes"                                           |
| 76                                                          |
| Central Asia                                                |
| 135                                                         |
| Central Asian republics                                     |
|                                                             |
| 176 <br />Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)<br />29, 32, 59 |
|                                                             |
| Air Force competition                                       |
| 308                                                         |
| air operations                                              |
| 157,  191                                                   |
| General Counsel                                             |
| 44                                                          |
| Inspector General                                           |
| 190                                                         |
| proprietary                                                 |
| 260,  129                                                   |
| proprietary firm                                            |
| 110,  129,  222, 260                                        |
| U-2 program                                                 |
| 257,  181                                                   |
| centrifugal force                                           |
| 177                                                         |
| CHALICE                                                     |
| 155, 170, 182                                               |
| Chamoun. Camille                                            |
| 152                                                         |
| Chance Vought Corporation                                   |
| 8                                                           |
| Ch'ang-sha, China                                           |
| 228                                                         |
| Chapman, Robert                                             |
| 238                                                         |
| Charbatia. India                                            |
| 232-233, 237, 239                                           |
| Charyk,  Joseph  V.                                         |
| 260, 327-328                                                |

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## -Secret NOFORN (cont.)

|                                           |
|-|
| Chekiang Province                         |
| 235                                       |
| Chelyabinsk, Soviet Union<br />176        |
| Cherbonneaux, James<br />127,  138,  214  |
| Chiang Ching-kuo<br />224                 |
| Chiang Kai-shek<br />224                  |
| Chiang-yu. China                          |
| 228                                       |
| Chicago Daily Tribune                     |
| 132                                       |
| ChiefofStation for Germany                |
| IOI                                       |
| ChiefofStation in  Taipei                 |
| 224                                       |
| Chiefofthe German General Staff           |
| I                                         |
| "chimney"                                 |
| 71                                        |
| China                                     |
| 5, 85, 135,  148,  157,  174,  190,  201, |
| 211,  215-217, 219. 221-222. 224-226.     |
| 228-233. 235-237, 239-240, 242-243,       |
| 245, 247, 253. 282. 301. 305, 307, 319.   |
| 336. 339-341. 343.                        |
| See also Nationalist China and            |
| People's Republic of  China (PRC)         |
| China Lake, California                    |
| 340                                       |
| chine                                     |
| 277                                       |
| Chinese Communist nuclear tests           |
| 240                                       |
| Chinese mainland                          |
| 319.  215,222.226                         |
| Chinese nuclear reactors                  |
| 238                                       |
| Chinese nuclear test                      |
| 237                                       |
| Christ, David L.                          |
| 339                                       |
| Christian Science Monitor                 |
| 18                                        |
| Civil Air Transport                       |
| 214, 222                                  |
| civilian supersonic transport (SST)       |
| 293                                       |

[page 374]
Secret NOFORN
Index
361

CL-282 Proje ct
10-17, 24-27, 29-37, 66.  327-331. 333
CL-400 aircraft
263
clandestine operations
16,321
Clandestine Services
192
Clark Airfield. Philippines
212
Clifford, Clark
311
Cline, Ray
209. 224
"coffin comer"
76
Co ld  War
17
collection requirements
80-81, 189. 253, 300
Columbia Broadcasting System
18
combat aircraft
6.  26. 45
Combined Shipping Adjustmenc Board
15
Commerce. Depanment of
254
commercial airliners
72
communications intelligence (COMINT)
189. 311. 335-336
Communications Satellite Corporation
328
COMPASS TRIP
254
competitive bidding
44
compressor vanes
291
computer-controlled radar
294
computers
52
Congress,  United States
44,  88, 98,  111.  159-160. 170, 293,
315, 317-3 18
constant-velocity  film  transport
281
Conste ll a tion airliner
IO. 329
Contingency Reserve Fund
40,44

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## Secret NOFORN-

Index
362

Curtiss-Wright Corporation
328
Czechoslovakia
101

D <empty>

D-21  aircraft
291
Dalai Lama
216
Dallas. Texas
293
Damage Assessment Team
183
David Clark Company
62
Davis, Saville
18
Dayton. Ohio
4. 8
DC-6 aircraft
341
deep penetration overflights
316.  123
Defector Reception Center (DRC)
")
defectors
2
Defense. Department of
33. 61. 122. 145, 154, 161.  234,
236-237, 239, 267, 292-293. 301-302.
304. 310. 317
Defense. Deputy Secretary of
81, 127, 144. 161, 188,  207. 300. 309
Defense. Secretary of
161.  298
Defense Mobilization, Office of
17,  26
Science Advisory Committee
37
Del  Rio,  Texas
256,  198
Delta-rI camera
250
denied territory
174,  188.  190

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

Deputy Director of  Central Intelligence (DDCI)
30. 36. 43. 327,329.88.  101,  122-123.
127,  139, 186-187, 201, 208-209, 223
Detachment A
94-95, !00-101, 106. 114, 116, 124-125,
139-140, 142-143, 181,316
Detachment B
113,  116,  120-121, 124-126, 133,
135,  139, 142-143. 152-153, 155-157.
164,  167, 181-182. 187. 316
Detachment C
133-134,  139,  143-144,  152,  157,
182,  211-212. 214-220. 224. 316
Detachment G
133.  181-182. 198-199. 211. 221-222.
230-233. 243. 248, 250-251, 254-257
Detachment H
225-226, 228-230. 232-237. 239-241,
243-246, 250-251, 255
Development. Deputy Chief ofStaff for
7.  11.  17.  35
Development Planning. Office of
12
Development Projects Division (DPD)
157.  191
Development Projects Staff
40. 55-56, 132.  157,  191.  212,331
Dirty-Birds
128.  130.  135
Donovan. Allen F.
18.  21. 24-26. 29-31, 35. 260. 328
Donovan. James
183
Doolittle, James H.
61. 167. 328
Douglas Aircraft
339
DRAGON
2
DRAGON LADY
77
drivers
59
drone
291. 343
Dryden. Hugh
89,  182
DuBridge, Lee
26-27

-Secret

[page 376]
Secret NOFORN
Index
363

Dulles, Allen
16-17, 30, 32-37, 39-40, 43-44, 56,
60, 73, 76, 80, 82, 86, 88, 93, 95, 97,
105-106, 109-111, 117, 120, 124, 127,
154, 161-162, 164-165, 167, 170, 180,
184, 189, 191, 214, 223-224, 260, 263,
295, 316-318, 327-328
Dulles, John Foster
20, 86, 109, 117, 122-123, 126
dummy corporations
44
Dunaway, Glendon
65

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## E

| Earman,  J.  S.                                     |
|-|
| 206                                                 |
| earth's atmosphere                                  |
| 278                                                 |
| East Berlin riots of June 1953 <br />16             |
| East Germany                                        |
| 100-101,  142,  147,183,303                         |
| Eastern Europe                                      |
| - 2,  84. 88-89. 100-101, 106.  I  IO.              |
| 123-124, 126-127, 139-140. 142,                     |
| 144.  304. 316                                      |
| Eastman Kodak                                       |
| 4,  31-32                                           |
| eavesdropping                                       |
| 2                                                   |
| EBONY                                               |
| 222                                                 |
| Eden. Anthony                                       |
| 93-95                                               |
| Edens, Buster                                       |
| 135                                                 |
| Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G)<br />130, 274 |
| Edwards AFB. California                             |
| 133,  149, 181. 198. 200,211,230                    |
| Eielson  AFB.  Alaska                               |
| 133-134                                             |
| Eisenhower, Dwight D.                               |
| I9, 26-27, 33-37, 39, 44, 56. 60. 73,               |
| 85-86. 88. 94-101, 104-106, 109-110,                |
| 112. 114, 116-117, l19-120.122-124,                 |
| 126-129,  135, 139, 143-147, 152-156,               |

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## E (cont.)

| 159-164. 167-168, 170-172, 180-181,                                              |
|-|
| 187,  191-192,  195.  211-212, 214. 221,                                         |
| 224, 263, 267, 270. 277, 297, 315-317,                                           |
| 322. 328-330                                                                     |
| electromagnetic energy                                                           |
| 335                                                                              |
| electromagnetic pulse indicator                                                  |
|                                                                                  |
| 240 <br />electronic countermeasures (ECM)<br />207.  239,304.313,  317, 335-336 |
|                                                                                  |
| electronic intelligence (ELINT)                                                  |
| I 14.  126, 144. 146, 153, 162-163.                                              |
| 175.  182,  215, 242. 244, 303, 335                                              |
| electronic intercept                                                             |
| 126,317                                                                          |
| electronic sensors                                                               |
| 292                                                                              |
| electronic warfare                                                               |
| 300                                                                              |
| ELINT collection                                                                 |
| 142,  339                                                                        |
| ELINT emanations                                                                 |
| 304                                                                              |
| ELINT-collection gear                                                            |
| 310                                                                              |
| ELINT-collection unit (System VI)                                                |
| 170                                                                              |
| Emergency Preparedness, Office of                                                |
| 254                                                                              |
| engine nacelles                                                                  |
| 291                                                                              |
| engineers                                                                        |
| 9-10.  12. 17. 25. 43. 45. 55. 61.                                               |
| 71.  255,260,269.286.  339,343                                                   |
| English Electric Company                                                         |
| 5,  23                                                                           |
| epoxy resin                                                                      |
| 277. 289                                                                         |
| EQUINE                                                                           |
| 82                                                                               |
| Ericson, Robert J.                                                               |
| 80                                                                               |
| espionage                                                                        |
| I                                                                                |
| Estonia                                                                          |
| 303. 339                                                                         |
| Eurasian  landmass                                                               |
| 145                                                                              |
| Europe                                                                           |
| 2,  4,  20.  23, 84-85. 88-89, 93. 100-101.                                      |
| 106,  110.  115,  123-124, 126-127, 139-140.                                     |
| 142.  144,  148,  178,255,304,316.330                                            |

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## E (cont.)

| 6ec1elNOFORN                                                                                                |
|-|
| Index                                                                                                       |
| 364                                                                                                         |
| Evang, Vilhelm                                                                                              |
| 142                                                                                                         |
| EVEN STEVEN                                                                                                 |
| 256                                                                                                         |
| Executive Branch                                                                                            |
| 109                                                                                                         |
| exotic fuels                                                                                                |
| 263                                                                                                         |
| F                                                                                                           |
| F-100 fighter                                                                                               |
| 71                                                                                                          |
| F-I 02 fighter                                                                                              |
| 270                                                                                                         |
| F- I04 fighter                                                                                              |
| 10-1  I,  45, 329                                                                                           |
| F-I 06 fighter                                                                                              |
| 270, 284                                                                                                    |
| F-I08A Rapier                                                                                               |
| 285                                                                                                         |
| F-111  tighter                                                                                              |
| 312                                                                                                         |
| Fairbanks. Alaska                                                                                           |
| 134                                                                                                         |
| Fairchild K-19 aircraft                                                                                     |
| 49                                                                                                          |
| FAN  SONG acquisition radar<br />234                                                                        |
| Far East                                                                                                    |
| 3,  110,  133-134.  140, 144. 190,<br />197.  201. 216. 224, 233-234. 242-243.<br />301,305.316.  320, 332. |
| "Fast Move" operations                                                                                      |
| 216                                                                                                         |
| Federal Aviation Administrator                                                                              |
| 289                                                                                                         |
| Federal procurement cycle                                                                                   |
| 44                                                                                                          |
| "ferret" equipment                                                                                          |
| 3,  335                                                                                                     |
| ferret flights                                                                                              |
| 123                                                                                                         |
| FFD-1                                                                                                       |
| 238                                                                                                         |
| FFD-2                                                                                                       |
| 238-239                                                                                                     |
| FFD-4,                                                                                                      |
| 282. 238                                                                                                    |

[page 378]
Secret NOFORN
Index
365

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## E (cont.)

Follow-On Group (FOG)
77
Ford Foundation
15
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
192,226,292,302,330
forest  fire  detectors
238
Formosa
305 (See also Taiwan)
Fort Worth, Texas
50
40 Committee
188,  257
forward processing center
212
Foster, John
343
France
113,  116-117,  120,201,249
Franco-Prussian War
I
Frankfurt, Germany
2
Free Europe Committee
88
French atomic test area
250
French Indochina
222
French Mediterranean
116
French Mystere
116
French nuclear developments
249
French Polynesia
249
Frogman Incident
94
Fujisawa, Japan
218
Fukien Province
226, 229

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## -Secret NOFORN

Index
366

Goering, Hermann
66
Goldmark, Peter C.
18
golf balls
50
Goodpaster. Andrew J.
89, 97, 100, 105-106, 109, 120, 126
128, 144, 146, 167, 172, 187, 329
Grace, Frank G.
80
GRANDSLAM
170, 172, 174-175
Granger Company
336
GRC-127
205
Great Britain
3, 7, 23, 93-95, 112-113, 115, 117,
120. 153-156, 181, 303, 319
Air Ministry
94.155
counterintelligence operative
94

Greyhound bus
289
Groom Lake
56, 66, 133
Groton
15
ground resolution
281-282, 250
Guatemala
157
"guided democracy"
212
Gulf Coast
254
Gulf of Finland
142
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
231
gust control
47
GUSTO
274

[page 380]
Secret NOFORN
Index
367

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## -Secret NOFORN (cont.)

high-altitude balloon program
22
high-altitude photography
I, 55, 84
high-altitude photoreconnaissance
7
high-altitude reconnaissance
I, 4-5, 8-9, 13-14, 17,  19, 22-25,
33-34, 39, 49, 52, 55, 254, 262,
292, 312, 330
high-altitude weather plane
178
high-impact plastics
313
high-resolution cameras
4
high-resolution infrared scanner
238
high-speed buffet
76
high-speed reconnaissance aircraft
262-263, 270
HIGH WIRE
164
Hitsman, Roger
209
Hitchcock, Alfred
29
Hokkaido, Japan
4
Holcomb. William
285
Hollywood, California
29
Hong Kong
217
Hoover, Herbert, Jr.
123-124
horizontal stabilizers
47
Horner, Richard
70
Hornig, Donald F.
309
HOT  SHOP
162
Houston, Lawrence R.
44
HR-333 camera
253

[page 381]
Secret NOFORN
Index
368

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## -Secret NOFORN (cont.)

| lncirlik Airbase, Turkey                                                         |
|-|
| 113,  181                                                                        |
| India                                                                            |
| 148,  231-232, 237, 247, 319                                                     |
| Indian Parliament                                                                |
| 232                                                                              |
| Indian Springs, Nevada                                                           |
| 274.  130,  132                                                                  |
| Indonesia                                                                        |
| 211-212,  214,319                                                                |
| Indonesian Air Force                                                             |
| 212                                                                              |
| inertial guidance systems                                                        |
| 313                                                                              |
| inflatable aircraft                                                              |
| 262                                                                              |
| infrared camera                                                                  |
| 282                                                                              |
| infraredjammer                                                                   |
| 336                                                                              |
| infrared scanner                                                                 |
| 238-239                                                                          |
| inland waterways                                                                 |
| 82                                                                               |
| instant-film camera                                                              |
| 330                                                                              |
| intelligence. collection of                                                      |
| 16,  31-32. 80-81, 142.  146. 153.                                               |
| 162. 170, I82. 189.  211, 245. 253,                                              |
| 256. 282. 300,303.310.  315. 319.                                                |
| 322. 333. 336, 339                                                               |
| Intelligence and Research. Bureau of                                             |
|                                                                                  |
| 209 <br />intelligence community<br />2.  20. 33, 81. 138,  153,  160.  164-165. |
|                                                                                  |
| 170-171,  190.  196,  232-233, 254, 298.                                         |
| 303-304, 322. 339                                                                |
| Intelligence Coordination, Office of                                             |
| 81                                                                               |
| intelligence requirements                                                        |
| 25-26, 80-82, 114,  122,  154,  188-190, <br />226.  230,233.250,  253,300,332   |
| Intelligence Requirements Officer                                                |
| 81                                                                               |
| Intelligence Star                                                                |
| 186                                                                              |
| Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP)                                                 |
| 21-22, 24-26, 30-32. 35,  327                                                    |

[page 382]
Secret NOFORN
Index
369

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## J

J-3 (Operations)
189
175  power plant
152
jamming devices
300
Jammu and Kashmir
231
Japanese airspace
4
Japanese Government
134,  182,  221
jet stream
94,  145
jet-propelled glider
II,25
Johnson, Clarence L.  (Kelly)
10-12, 13-14, 17,  24-26, 29-31,
34-36, 43-48, 50, 54, 56-57, 59,
64, 66-70, 76, 108, 130, 132. 149.
179. 185, 196, 247-248. 251, 262-263.
268,271,274,  277-279, 281, 284. 289,
293-297, 320, 329
Johnson. Lyndon B.
195.  236-237, 243, 293-295. 302.
304-305, 310-311, 332
Joint Chiefs ofStaff (JCS)
122,  124,  126, 161, 187-190, 223,
234,302
Joint Intelligence Committee
154
Joint Priorities Committee
154
Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC)
189
Jones,· Edwin K.
138
Jordan
117,  153
JP-7 fuel
62

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## K

K-21  framing cameras
49
K-38 camera
50-5I, 53
Kadena Airbase, Okinawa, Japan
301
Kaliningrad missile plant
105
Kamchatka Peninsula
128, 134, 197
Kandalaksha, Soviet Union
176
Kapustin  Yar,  Soviet Union
16,  23-24,  109,  139,  143,  164
Kara Sea
142
Kazakh language
135
Kazakhstan
135
Kazan', Soviet Union
167
KC-I35 tankers
71,  199
KEDLOCK
285
"Kelly's Angel"
66
KEMPSTER
300
Kennedy, John F.
186,  191-192, 195-196, 198. 207-208,
2  I0. 225, 229, 232, 235. 292-293,
297-298, 330
Kennedy, Joseph W.
29
Kennedy, Robert
215
Kennedy administration
191, 195, 225
kerosene fuel
62
Khan,  Ayub
135

_ Secret

[page 383]
Secret NOFORN
Index
370

Khimki rocket-engine plant
105
Khrushchev, Nikita
94, 96, 100-101, 147, 160, 163-164,
168, 179-180, 299
Kiangsi Province
235
Kiangsu Province
229
KICK OFF
198
Kickapoo Joy Juice
45
Kiefer, Eugene P.
7, 9, 11, 260, 330
Killian, James R.
27, 29-30, 33-34, 89, 100, 191-192,
263, 292, 330
KINGFISH
270, 273

Kirkpatrick, Lyman B.
190
Kirov, Soviet Union
172, 176
Kirtland AFB
79
Kissinger, Henry
256
Kistiakowsky, George
171
Klein, Burton
11
Klyuchi, Soviet Union
134. 143

KNIFE EDGE
167
Knowles, Harold F.
344
Kohler, Foy D.
112
Koko Nor
233
Kola Peninsula
182

Kollman Instrument Company
59
Koon, Ralph E.
79
Korea, demilitarized zone (DMZ)
305 (See also North Korea)
Kotlas, Soviet Union
172
Krag, Jens Otto
299
Kratt, Jacob
65, 79, 116
Kremlin
123

Kunming, China
226

Kuybyshev, Soviet Union
164
KWCORK
113
KWEXTRA-00
59
KWGLITTER-00
59
Kyshtym, Soviet Union
176

L <empty>

L'il Abner
47
L-pills
66, 125
Lahore, Pakistan
135
Lakenheath AFB, England
93

<empty>

_Seeret-

[page 384]
Secret NOFORN
Index
371

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## K (cont.)

Land. Edwin H. (Din)
18,  21, 25, 29-34, 36, 80-81, 89, 96,
100. 110, 19 1-192, 260, 262-263, 269-27 1,
292,307,330,  332-333
Land Panel
37
Langley, Virginia
43,  192,  306,
Langley AFB. Virginia
23
Laos
2 I6, 22. 1.  231. 233
Las Vegas. Nevada
284
Latham, Allen. Jr.
29
Latvia
303
Laughlin AFB, Texas
1 98,200
Lebanon
114, 117, 152-153,  343
Ledford, Jack C.
207, 288. 297
Leghorn, Richard S.
• - • 4-8. 18, 23. 110 , 330
LeMay, Curtis E.
11 - 12.  14.  60
"Lemon-Drop l(jd"
124
Lend-Lease
7
Leningrad, Soviet Union
104-106.  109,  142, 298. 303
lens
I.  18.  21-22, 30. 49-55, 93.
I08. 250. 247 . 253, 28 1-282.
321,  327
lens curvatures
52
lens designs
52,55
LeVier. Tony
56, 68-7 1, 75
LF-lA fuel
62
Libya
121

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## K (cont.)

lightweight  film
32
LINCOLN
18
Lindsey Air Force Base. Wiesbaden. West Gennany
80
liquid-fueled missiles
161,317
lithium deut,eride
19
Lithuania
303
Little, Arthur D., Inc.
29
LiuleQuem1:ly
215
Lloyd, Selwyn
93
Lockheed A:ircraft Corporation
9, 24, 329
Lockheed  D:ay  Fighter
14
Lockheed m,echanics
66,  13,0,  225
London School ofEconomics
.  15
LONG GREEN
198
long-range bombers
20, 81. 98-99, 316
LONG  SHAFT
245
Lop Nor test site
237
Los Angel es ., California
186, 254
Lovelace, W.  Randolph, III
62, 74
Lovelace Foundation for Medical
Education  antd  Research
74
low-radar-cross-section vehicle
344
low-level phmography
209
low-vapor-pressure fuel
278
Luke AFB. Arizona
74

_ Seeret

[page 385]
Secret NOFORN
Index
372

Luna 2 rocket
163
Lundahl, Arthur C.
82, 114-115, 117, 119, 121, 135,
142, 154, 191, 209, 241, 331

M

M Building
83
M-12 aircraft
291
M-195 aircraft
9
MacArthur, John
167
Macdonald. Duncan E.
22, 154-155
Macmillan, Harold
155-156,  164. 167, 187
Malaya Sazanka, Soviet Union
144
Malinovsky, Rodion
160
Malta
114,-116
Manchuria
229. 233. 237
Mandrake
148
Manhattan Project
329
Manila, Philippines
311
manned space program
62
March AFB, California
75
Mark-30
335
Marquardt ramjets
268
Marr, William H.
72
Mars
79
7:
Marsna1  Plan
15,327

[page 386]
Secret NOFORN
Index
373

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## K (cont.)

meteorologists
42,  87
MI-6
93,  154
Michigan, University of, School of Aeronautics
329
microwave reconnaissance
19
Middle East overflights
114,  116
MiG aircraft
336
MiG-15
108,  148
MiG-17
5,  108,  148
MiG-19
148
MiG-21
148,  237, 244
Military Adviser to  the President
188
Military Air Transport Service
72
MILL TOWN
216
. Miller, Stewart E.
18.  21. 39-40, 55-56, 331

"million-dollar" photography I
Ill
miniaturization
339
mirrors
54-55
Mirza
135
"missile gap"
157,  159,317
missiles
2,  22, 81, 98-99, 137, 139, 149,
160-161,  165,  167,171,201,205-206,
209, 226, 239, 243, 257, 285, 299, 301,
303-304, 306-307, 315, 317-318, 336,339
Mississippi River
78,310
MKNAOMI
66
Monthly Activities Book
189

moon
163
Morotai
214
Moscow, Soviet Union
3, 20, 85, 94, 101, 105-106, 109,
124, 143, 145, 160, 167, 177, 179, 318
MUDLARK
178

multiengine aircraft
12, 24-25
multiple sensors
22
Murmansk, Soviet Union
140, 142, 172, 174, 176
Mururoa Atoll
250
Myasishchev-4 (see Bison bomber)

N

[page 387]
## _Secret NOFORN

Index

374

National Security Council Intelligence
Directive (NSCID)
191
Nationalist China
319,215,224,226,229,236
Nationalist Chinese
201, 205, 222-226,
229-230, 234-237, 239-240,
243, 245-246, 253,257,319
Air Force
223,225
insignia
225
pilots
319,223,230,235,243,246,253
U-2
205, 223-224, 229,  246
Navajo missile
22
Naval Air Station at Atsugi, Japan
134
naval quarantine
210
Nehru, Jawaharlal
231~233
Nelson, Nonnan
68
Nevada
56-57, 341, 113,  130-131,  133, 149,
182,  241, 274, 283, 286, 290, 295,
297, 302-303, 31  I
Nevada Proving Ground
56,241
New Delhi, India
232
Ngo Dinh Diem
230
NICE GIRL
310
nickel-cadmium batteries
240
Nile River
119
NIMBUS
200
1973  Middle East war
256,320

[page 388]
Secret NOFORN
Index
375

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## _Secret NOFORN (cont.)

| nuclear fireball                              | Optical Research Laboratory                                         |    |
|-|-|-|
| 240                                           | 21-22                                                               |    |
| nuclear resonance                             | optical systems                                                     |    |
| 332                                           | 52                                                                  |    |
| nuclear strike                                | order-of-battle                                                     |    |
| 292                                           | 82,  134,  322                                                      |    |
| nuclear testing moratorium                    | "Oscar-Sierra" unit                                                 |    |
| 317                                           | 234                                                                 |    |
| nuclear tests                                 |                                                                     |    |
| 133, 147, 240                                 |                                                                     |    |
| nuclear weapons                               | over-the-horizon radar                                              |    |
| 2,  19-20, 99, 147,  226,                     | 241                                                                 |    |
| 238,240,317                                   | Overhage, Carl F.  P. <br />18,  21,  331                           |    |
|                                               | overhead photography<br />82, 87. 172,  237-238                     |    |
| 0                                             | overhead reconnaissance missions                                    |    |
| GARFISH                                       | 188 <br />Overstreet, Carl K. <br />100                             |    |
| 44                                            | OXCART                                                              |    |
| O'Donnell, Emmett (Rosy)                      | 61, 73, 157,  191,236.238,  252-253,                                |    |
| 7J.                                           | 259,274,  277-313. 320-322, 327-333,<br />336, 339<br />oxygenation |    |
| oblique photography<br />__  -- 135.  189,244 | 62                                                                  |    |
| Offshore Islands Crisis<br />215-216          |                                                                     |    |
|                                               | P                                                                   |    |
| OILSTONE                                      |                                                                     |    |
| 60-61                                         | P-38 fighter                                                        |    |
| Okinawa                                       | IO,  329                                                            |    |
| 301-302, 305-306, 308. 311                    | P-40 fighter                                                        |    |
| Old Executive Office Building                 | 328                                                                 |    |
| 27                                            | P-51  Mustang                                                       |    |
| OLIVE HARVEST                                 | 214                                                                 |    |
| 257                                           | P-80 fighter                                                        |    |
| Omaha, Nebraska                               | 10,  45                                                             |    |
| 60                                            | P-80 Shooting Star                                                  |    |
| 112A  camera                                  | 45                                                                  |    |
| 250                                           | P2V7                                                                |    |
| 112B  camera                                  | 222                                                                 |    |
| 250, 252                                      | P3A                                                                 |    |
| "Open-Skies"                                  |                                                                     |    |
| 96                                            | 222 <br />Pacific Ocean                                             |    |
| Operation  Overflight                         |                                                                     |    |
| 186                                           | 247 <br />Padang.  West  Sumatra                                    |    |
| optical distortion                            |                                                                     |    |
| 282                                           | 212                                                                 |    |

[page 389]
## - Secret NOFORN-

Index

376

Pakistan
128,  135.  139,  148, 163, 167-168.
170,  172,  174, 178. 189,247,316,319
Paksane, Laos
231
Palmdale, California
31I
panoramic-type framing camera
53
Paradise Ranch
57, 66
PARAMOUNT Committee
114,  116,  120
Parangosky. John
274,288.296, 309. 331
"parasite" aircraft
263
Paris Summit
172.  181-182
Pasadena, California
13.  50,252
Pathet Lao
221
PB-4Y aircraft
222
Pearl Harbor
322 _
Pearson.  Drew
299
Peenemunde  rocket  project
2
Peiping. China
228-229
Pellegrini. Joseph J.
6
Pennsylvania State Police
222
Pentagon
5,  7,  9,  ll.  13-14, 39, 78-79, 238
People ·s  Liberation Anny (PLA)
215
People's Republic of  China (PRC}
85,  135.  201, 215, 222, 225-226,
228-247, 253. 282, 301, 319. 339. 341
(See also China)
radars
215
troop movements
215
nuclear plants
238

[page 390]
Secret NOFORN
Index
377

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## - Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

Plans, Directorate of
73,  81,  157,197,211,287
Plesetsk, Soviet Union
176
Poland
I00-101, l04, I 10,  123,  145,303
polarizing filters
330
Polaroid Corporation
18,  24, 29
POLECAT
221
Polish Ambassador to  the  US
109
Polyarny Ural
172
polygraph examination
185
Pope, Allen L.
214-215
poppy fields
254
Port Said, Egypt
120
Portsmouth Harbor
94
P9tassium cyanide
66.  125
powered glider
14,  25. 339
Powers. Francis Gary
88,117,124,  174-178, 181-187,
190-191,  195,  197,201.219,  221.
224,252,316,322.332,  336
Poznan, Poland
104
PR3  aircraft
5
Pratt, Perry W.
31
Pratt & Whitney
12,  31. 35, 40, 48, 67, 71. 152,217,
251,268,270,  284-285, 290
Pratt & Whitney J58 power plant
270
Pratt & Whitney J75-Pl3jetengine
152
Pratt & Whitney J75/19W engines
284
Pratt and Whitney J57
12

[page 391]
Secret NOFORN
Index
378

Pyroceram
268, 271

Q <empty>

Quarles, Donald
81, 127, 144-145, 161-162, 263, 267
Quarters Eye
42
quartz glass window
282
Que Building
83, 111
Quemoy
215, 229
QUICK KICK
216
quick-reaction capability
301, 313

R <empty>

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## - Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

Raborn, William F.,  Jr.
240, 301, 332
radar
3,  7,  15, 19, 23,,  82, 87, 94, 97, 101.
104- 106,  110-111,  123,  128-130, 132-134,
139,  142,  144, 148, 168, 175-176,  178,
197,  211,215,230,  234-237, 239, 241-243,
247,257, 259-260, 263, 267-271, 273-274,
277,289,294,300,  303-307, 310-311, 317,
331-332, 335-336, 339, 341-342
radar camouflage
128
radar cross section
15,260,263,267-270, 271, 273-274,
277, 300, 332, 339, 341-343, 110
radar deception
130
radar defense systems
343
radar image
259,332
radar pulses
87,  110, 130, 175,  268,  335

[page 392]
Secret NOFORN
Index
379

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## - Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

RB-58 aircraft
22
Reber.  James
81.  114-115. 154,332
reconnaissance
1-9.  12-19. 21-25, 27, 30-37,
39, 41. 43. 46, 49, 52. 55.  59,
61-62, 66, 80, 84, 94, 96, 98, 109.
113,  115 -116, 119, 122, 12 6-127.
133. 153-154. 161-162. 188-193.
196-197, 201, 205-206, 208, 2!0-212.
216. 222-223, 226, 228, 230-233. 240,
249, 253-254, 260. 262-263, 267-268.
270. 287. 291  -292, 295. 297-299, 301.
303-304. 308-309. 311-313. 319-322.
327-331,  333,339,  341-344
reconnaissance aircraft competition
9
reconnaissance drones
301
reconnaissance satellite project
16 1
"reconnaissance strike"
295
Reconnaissance Systems Branch
4
records. altitude
302
records.  speed
302
RED  DOT
254
reflecting cube
281
reflective  system
55
refueling
114.  198-200. 231. 237, 241.
302. 306. 308
refugees
2
Republic RF-84F Thunderflash
22
Research, Directorate of
192. 287
Research and Development, Director of
66
Research and Reports (ORR). Officeof
21. 81. 237
Returnee Exploitation Group (REG)
2
Revolutionary Counc il
212

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## - Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

Rhodes
116-117
Ridenour,  Louis  N.
18
Ridenour Associates. Inc.
18
Rieland, Osmond
56, 61, 70, 78
ROBIN
23
ROBIN HOOD
21  I
Robinson. Robe1t
16 4
rocket planes
60
rocket-powered  ai1rcraft
312
Rodgers. Franklin A.
129, 267-268, 274, 332
Rodgers· Effect
267
Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engines
5, 23
Romania
I OI.
RoO! ,  L.  Eugene
9.  24
Rose, Wilburn S.
Ml  '70.l!Qj __________ 7

runway
57, 68-69, 79-80, 108, 140, 176,
283-284, 291, 302, 305

RS-71
295
Ruseckas, Joseph
63
Rusk, Dean
183, 201, 209, 236, 293, 304, 307

<empty>
Secret

[page 393]
Secret NOFORN
Index
380

Russell, Richard B.
88
Ryan Aircraft
343

S

S-band radar
87
sailplane
10-11.  24-26.  47
Sakhalin Island
201
Saltonstall. Leverett
88
SAM site
177.  205. 306
San Cristobal. Cuba
206-207. 209
San Diego, California
2-P,  343
SANDY HOOK
343
Santa Barbara Channel
254 _-
Santa Clara Airfield. Cuba
201
Saratov Engels Airfield. Soviet Union
IM
Saryshagan. Soviet Union
139.  168,  232. 336
satellite imagery
298,  255
satellite navigation systems
341
satellite photography
87.  195-197,  22~  233. 237. 241
satellites
22.  100. 104. 159. 162,211.299,
303.  312. 320. 322.  328
Saville. Gordon P.
17-18
Schalk. Louis
288-289
Schlesinger. James R.
257. 333
Schoech. William A.
285

[page 394]
Secret NOFORN
Index
381

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## - Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

security
2, 27, 40-41, 43, 55, 59-60, 72, 81,
94, 112, 125, 127, 140, 161, 167,
185, 187-188, 191, 197, 201, 209,
212, 218, 221-222, 224, 236, 256,
273, 283-284, 294, 318, 327
Security, Office of
59, 112, 222
Semipalatinsk, Soviet Union
128, 138-139, 147, 168
SENSINT--Sensitive Intelligence
3
sensors
11, 22, 241, 292, 310
Seventh Air Division
89
Severodvinsk, Soviet Union
172, 176
Shanghai, China
222, 228, 242
sheep-dipping
74
Shell Oil Company
62, 328
shellfish toxin
125
Shelton, William
125, 176
shock wave
290-291
short-range reconnaissance vehicle
342
show trial
183
Shuangchengzi, China
226, 228, 235
shutter assemblies
53
Siberia
3
Sichuan, China
230
Sicily
116
Sieker, Robert
131
Sierra snowfield
254
SIGINT Committee
332
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
222

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## - Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

| Sinai penins1ula                                                   |
|-|
| 117                                                                |
| "single-pass'" mission                                             |
| 306                                                                |
| Sino-Indian border                                                 |
| 231 -2:33.  319                                                    |
| Sino-Soviet lborder                                                |
| 336                                                                |
| "Skonk Works"                                                      |
| 45                                                                 |
| Skunk Work:s                                                       |
| 45, 71, 132.  251. 262, 273-274                                    |
| SKYLARK                                                            |
| 299                                                                |
| Smithsonian Institution                                            |
| 55                                                                 |
| "snap-up"                                                          |
| 148                                                                |
| Snark missil,:s                                                    |
| 22                                                                 |
| Snider, Sammy V. C.                                                |
| 138                                                                |
| snowmelt                                                           |
| 254                                                                |
| SOFTTOUCH                                                          |
| 135, 139, 143                                                      |
| software algorithms                                                |
| 52                                                                 |
| solar cells                                                        |
| 240                                                                |
| solid-fueled imissiles                                             |
| 161.3  17                                                          |
| sound barrier                                                      |
| 289                                                                |
| SOUTH  GATE                                                        |
| 2 16                                                               |
| South Vietnam                                                      |
| 230-231, 243, 301. 305                                             |
| Southeast Asia                                                     |
| 1 90,198,216, 221.301, 310                                         |
| Sovetskaya Gavan'. Soviet Union                                    |
| 144 <br />Soviet B loc<br />1-2.  4,  6.  16-20. 87. 93. 112. 123. |
|                                                                    |
| 147. 152,159. 19~ 197,211.330                                      |
| Soviet Communist Party Congress<br />160                           |
| Soviet Far East                                                    |
| 134,144                                                            |

[page 395]
Secret NOFORN
Index
382

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## - Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

| Soviet Union<br />1-3,  4-7. 14-27. 31, 39, 65, 81-89,                                      |
|-|
|                                                                                             |
| 93-101. 104-106. 108-112. 120,                                                              |
| 122-124, 126-130, 133-135, 137-                                                             |
| 140,  142-149. 152-157, 159-165,                                                            |
| 167-168. 170-172. 174-183. 186-187,                                                         |
| 189,  195-197. 200-201, 205-206,                                                            |
| 209-211, 215. 219,221,225,232,237,                                                          |
| 247, 254, 259. 294, 297-299, 301,                                                           |
| 303-304, 312. 315-320, 322. 329-330,                                                        |
| 332. 335-336. 339,341,344                                                                   |
| activity  in  Cuba                                                                          |
| 200,201                                                                                     |
| air defense system                                                                          |
| 2.  3.  I 08.  I68. I70, 317                                                                |
| air power ofthe                                                                             |
| 20                                                                                          |
| air show                                                                                    |
| 98                                                                                          |
| atomic energy program                                                                       |
| 317                                                                                         |
| bomber                                                                                      |
| 21.  11  I.  167.  317                                                                      |
| borders                                                                                     |
| 123,  127,  143                                                                             |
| diplomatic protests                                                                         |
| 315- -                                                                                      |
| electronic defenses                                                                         |
| 317                                                                                         |
| fighters                                                                                    |
| 3.  5.  23,  26.  I27. 144                                                                  |
| G-class ballistic-missile submarine                                                         |
| 237                                                                                         |
| guided missile and nuclear programs                                                         |
| 135                                                                                         |
| guided missile research                                                                     |
| 99                                                                                          |
| guided missiles                                                                             |
| 81. 99                                                                                      |
| guided-missile test range                                                                   |
| 16                                                                                          |
| intentions                                                                                  |
| 4. 318                                                                                      |
| intercept attempts                                                                          |
| 142                                                                                         |
| interception  ofU-2                                                                         |
| 19,  24-25. 47. 87. 106, 108. 110.  122.                                                    |
| 127, 134. 144.  I70, 244. 270. 3 I5, 339<br />medium-range ballistic missiles<br />201, 206 |

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## - Secret NOFORN- (cont.)

| missile program                                                                                        |
|-|
| 128.  I59- I61. 163-164                                                                                |
| missile test range                                                                                     |
| 16.  23,  143,  164.  167,  176 <br />overflight operation                                             |
| 110                                                                                                    |
| propaganda campaign                                                                                    |
| 317                                                                                                    |
| Protest Note                                                                                           |
| 109                                                                                                    |
| radar coverage                                                                                         |
| 106                                                                                                    |
| radars                                                                                                 |
| 3.  7.  15,  97.  130,  134,  168. 176.                                                                |
| 259.  339                                                                                              |
| rail network                                                                                           |
| 167                                                                                                    |
| strategic capabilities                                                                                 |
| 2.  19                                                                                                 |
| Supreme Soviet                                                                                         |
| 179                                                                                                    |
| surface-to-air missile (SAM)                                                                           |
| 177, 168, 304                                                                                          |
| surprise attack                                                                                        |
| 19.  26-27, 89. 147, 159, 329-330                                                                      |
| Soviet-Finnish border                                                                                  |
| 303.  142                                                                                              |
| Soviet-Iranian border                                                                                  |
| 124.  162-163.  168                                                                                    |
| Special Activities. Director of                                                                        |
| 193                                                                                                    |
| Special Activities (OSA). Office of                                                                    |
| 43. 192-193, 207. 234-235. 242. 247.<br />252. 257,288. 296-297, 299. 303. 312.<br />328. 341-342. 344 |
| Special Assistant for National Security Affairs<br />188                                               |
| Special Assistant to  the DCI                                                                          |
| 40                                                                                                     |
| "special" missions                                                                                     |
| 116                                                                                                    |
| Special Operations Division                                                                            |
| 192                                                                                                    |
| Spica. Incorporated                                                                                    |
| 51                                                                                                     |
| spotting camera                                                                                        |
| 282                                                                                                    |
| Sputnik                                                                                                |
| 159                                                                                                    |
| SQUARE DEAL                                                                                            |
| 168.  170                                                                                              |

[page 396]
## Secret NOFORN

Index
383

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## Secret NOFORN (cont.)

| SR-71                                    | Suez Canal                                   |
|-|-|
| 295, 302, 308-31 I, 321                  | 112-114,  117,120,256                        |
| SS-4 (SHYSTER) MRBM                      | Suez Canal, Israeli-British-French attack on |
| 206                                      | 116                                          |
| SS-6 ICBM                                | Suez Canal Company                           |
| [  160, 165, 171-171                     | I  12-113                                    |
|                                          | Suez Crisis<br />152                         |
| stainless steel                          | Suhrawardy, Huseyn Shaheed                   |
| 277, 280                                 | 135                                          |
| Stassen, Harold                          | suicide pill                                 |
| 330                                      | 65                                           |
| State Department                         | Sukarno, Achmed                              |
| 81, 95, IOI,  146,  154, 163, 179, 186,  | 212,215                                      |
| 196-197, 212, 224-225, 229,243,249       | Sulawesi (Celebes)                           |
| "stealth" research                       | 212                                          |
| 313                                      | Sullivan, Dennis                             |
| stereo camera                            | 307                                          |
| 281, 252                                 | Sumatra                                      |
| stereoscopic lenses                      | 212                                          |
| 250                                      | SUN SPOT                                     |
| Steuart Building                         | 171                                          |
| 83,  Ill,  114                           | Super Snooper                                |
| STEVER                                   | 132                                          |
| 260. 333                                 | supersonic designs                           |
| Stockman, Hervey                         | 260 -                                        |
| 65. J-04-105                             | supersonic interceptor                       |
| STPOLLY                                  | 285                                          |
| 222,224,240                              | supersonic technology                        |
| Strategic Air Command (SAC)              | 292-293                                      |
| 11, 14, 17,  20, 26, 42, 60, 74-76, 78,  | Support. Directorate of                      |
| 89, 93, 95, 198,  201, 207-210, 299, 230 | 40,  83                                      |
| meteorologists                           | surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites          |
| 42                                       | 201                                          |
| strategic bombing                        | surface-to-air missiles                      |
| 49                                       | 257,299,301,303,339                          |
| "strategic hamlet"                       | surface-to-surface missiles                  |
| 230                                      | 205-206, 209. 304. 306                       |
| strategic intelligence                   | Sverdlovsk, Soviet Union                     |
| 82,115,152,302,304,313,315,              | 172, 176-179, 185                            |
| 319,322                                  | Symington, Stuart                            |
| strategic reconnaissance                 | 99,  161                                     |
| 9,  122,230,295,  297, 299, 313,         | synthetic lubricants                         |
| 320,322,329                              | 279                                          |
| Strauss, Lewis                           | Syria                                        |
| 56                                       | 114, 120, 133,  153                          |
| Strong, Philip G.                        | Syrian radars                                |
| 14-17, 21-22, 24-25, 29-30, 333          | 343                                          |
| subsonic                                 | System-I                                     |
| 8,  14,  260, 263                        | 335                                          |

[page 397]
## _ Secret NOFORN

Index
384

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## _ Secret NOFORN (cont.)

| System-II                                        |
|-|
| 335                                              |
| System-III                                       |
| 335-336                                          |
| System-IV                                        |
| 335                                              |
| System-Y                                         |
| 126.  215,  335                                  |
| System-YI                                        |
| 335.  175                                        |
| System-VII                                       |
| 335-336                                          |
| System-VIII                                      |
| 335                                              |
| System-IX                                        |
|                                                  |
| 335 <br />System-IXB device<br />175             |
|                                                  |
| System-X                                         |
| 256. 336                                         |
| System-XII units                                 |
|                                                  |
| 23-4 <br />System-XIII <br />234.  236-237.  239 |
|                                                  |
| System-XVI                                       |
| 336                                              |
| System-XVH                                       |
| 336                                              |
| System-XX                                        |
| 336                                              |
| System-XX!                                       |
| 336                                              |
| System-XXII                                      |
| 336                                              |
| System-XXIV                                      |
| 256                                              |

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## _ Secret NOFORN (cont.)

| tactical reconnaissance                            |
|-|
| 9.  25,  115,  153                                 |
| TAGBOARD                                           |
| 291                                                |
| Tahiti                                             |
| 250                                                |
| tailless subsonic aircraft                         |
|                                                    |
| 263 <br />Taiwan <br />215-216, 222. 224-225. 229, |
|                                                    |
| 233, 236-237. 239, 241-243.                        |
| 2-46.  251                                         |
| Taiwan Strait                                      |
| 229                                                |
| Ta Khli. AFB. Thailand                             |
| 230                                                |
| ~                                                  |
| lalbott.  Harold  E.                               |
| 13-14,  36                                         |
| TALL  KING                                         |
| 294                                                |
| Tallinn. Estonia                                   |
| 303                                                |
| Tashkent. Soviet Union                             |
| 176                                                |
| TASS                                               |
| 137                                                |
| Tatar Strait                                       |
| 144                                                |
| Taylor. Maxwell                                    |
| 188                                                |
| TCP                                                |
| 27                                                 |
| Technical Services Division (TSO)                  |
| 66.  125                                           |
| Technicolor                                        |
| 331                                                |
| Technological Capabilities Panel                   |
| 26-27, 29-30. 35, 62, 80, 327-<br />329. 332       |
| Technology. Deputy for<br />192                    |
| Teheran, Iran                                      |
| 144                                                |
| Teledyne J-100-CA-IOO Turbojet engine<br />343     |
| Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical Company                 |
| 343                                                |

[page 398]
Secret NOFORN
Index
385

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## _ Secret NOFORN (cont.)

| television reconnaissance package           |
|-|
| 343                                         |
| Tennessee                                   |
| 78,238                                      |
| tent-ology                                  |
| 116                                         |
| test ban                                    |
| 147                                         |
| Tet offensive                               |
| 243                                         |
| Texas Instruments Corporation<br />238, 282 |
|                                             |
| Third World                                 |
| 211                                         |
| three-camera trimetrogon unit               |
| 52                                          |
| three-dimensional movies                    |
| 29                                          |
| 3000 I camera                               |
| 333                                         |
| 303 Committee                               |
| 243, 257, 301-302, 304, 307                 |
| Thule, Greenland                            |
| 172                                         |
| Tibet                                       |
| 157,  216, 219, 232                         |
| Time                                        |
| 99                                          |
| TIME STEP                                   |
| 172,  174                                   |
| Titan  ICBM                                 |
| 160                                         |
| titanium alloy                              |
| 271                                         |
| Titanium Metals Corporation                 |
| 280                                         |
| TOKEN                                       |
| 87                                          |
| Tomsk, Soviet Union                         |
| 138                                         |
| TOPPER                                      |
| 219                                         |
| TOUCHDOWN                                   |
| 163                                         |
| Toulon, France                              |
| 116                                         |
| tracker  camera                             |
| 241                                         |

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## _ Secret NOFORN (cont.)

tracking
3,  7, 52-53, 87, 97, 106,  128-129,
144,  170, I76, 178, 234, 259, 263,
267-268,  303,307,343
tracking radars
7,267
Trans-Siberian Railroad
144
transport aircraft
25,  45, 66
traveling-wave tube (TWT)
236
trimetrogon K-17 mapping-camera system
49
Tripartite Declaration, 1950
117
tropopause
152
Truman administration
17
TRW Corporation
335
Tuamotu Archipelago
249
"Tuesday lunch"
305
Tukey, John W.
29
turbojet engine
8,  11,  262, 268, 343
Turkey
3,  112-114,  116,  121,135,146,
152-153,  178,  181, 189,247,
316,319
Tuslog Detachment I0-10
113
Twining, Nathan
60-61, 86, 88, 96, 99, 101, 127,
134, 139, 161,  165
Tyler Building
43
Type-I camera
281, 304, 310
Type-II camera
281
Type-IV camera
282
Typhoon Winnie
216
Tysons  Comer,  Virginia
43

-Secret-

[page 399]
Secret NOFORN
Index
386

Tyuratam, Soviet Union
135, 137-138, 160, 163-165, 167-168,
171-172, 176

U <empty>

U- 1
66

U-2
accomplishments
316
assembly
45, 47, 66. 75. 164. 280, 284, 291
bailout experiments
64
bases
93
bicycle-type landing gear
47
blue-blackcolor
149
brakes
69
canopy
80.  149 .  177
cockpit
11. 63-64. 79, 125.  283. 292. 296
cost
34.  124.  149. 250-252. 263. 269. 273.
280. 285-286, 309, 322. 341-342
cover story
60. 85. 89-90, 94, 99, 132,  156,  178-180.
182,  207-208,  216,224,295
coverage
316
deadstick landing
79
deployment
2, 74. 76. 78. 88-89. 93-94. 134. 161.
165,  167,  247, 250. 255-257, 297.
301-302. 304. 307,3 1 3,31 7.332
design
47
destruction device
177
detachable pogos
47
ejection  seat
64.  177, 302

<empty>
Secret

[page 400]
Secret NOFORN
Index
387

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## _ Secret NOFORN (cont.)

| mission 2023                               |
|-|
| 108                                        |
| mission 2029                               |
| 124                                        |
| mission 3086                               |
| 200                                        |
| mission 3088                               |
| 200                                        |
| mission 3089                               |
| 201                                        |
| mission  3091                              |
| 205                                        |
| mission 3093                               |
| 205                                        |
| mission 3095                               |
| 205                                        |
| mission 3098                               |
| 206                                        |
| mission 3 100                              |
| 206                                        |
| mission 4016                               |
| 124                                        |
| mission 40 18                              |
| 124                                        |
| mission 4019                               |
| 126                                        |
| mission 4030                               |
| 133                                        |
| mission 4154                               |
| 175                                        |
| mission 4 I55                              |
| 168                                        |
| mission  6011                              |
| 144                                        |
| mission length                             |
| 199  ~                                     |
| mission plotting                           |
| 60                                         |
| mission programmers                        |
| 78                                         |
| missions                                   |
| 59, 75, 82, 87, 106,  I  14,  124, 127,    |
| 129,  154,  164, 167, 179, 187, 196,  207, |
| 210,224,237,245,254,263,  316-317,         |
| 322,336                                    |
| Nationalist Chinese crews                  |
| 222                                        |
| oleostrut                                  |
| 47, 69                                     |
| operational altitude                       |
| 76, 79, 108,  152                          |
| Operational Objective system               |
| 309                                        |

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## _ Secret NOFORN (cont.)

| Operational Readiness Inspection                                    |
|-|
| 77                                                                  |
| outrigger wheels                                                    |
| 79                                                                  |
| overflights                                                         |
| 6,  32, 62, 74, 76-77. 84-86, 88-89,                                |
| 94-98, I00-10 I,  I04-106, 108-111,                                 |
| 114,  l  16,  122-128,  135,  138-140,                              |
| 142-143,  146,  148,  152,  154-157,                                |
| 159,  161-165, 167-168, 170,  172,                                  |
| 180-181, 195-198, 200-20 I,  205-206,                               |
| 208, 210-21 l, 219, 222-226, 228-237,                               |
| 239-240, 242-244, 249, 253, 257, 259,                               |
| 294, 297-301, 310, 315-317, 318-320,                                |
| 322                                                                 |
| paint penalty                                                       |
| 149                                                                 |
| payload                                                             |
| 262,  8,  11.  50, 54, 340, 87, 145,  152 <br />peripheral missions |
| I89, 206, 244, 246                                                  |
| phaseout                                                            |
| 257, 310                                                            |
| pilot fatigue                                                       |
| 199                                                                 |
| pilot hypoxia                                                       |
| 80                                                                  |
| pilot life-support system                                           |
| 64                                                                  |
| pilot selection                                                     |
| 60,283                                                              |
| pilot-survival gear                                                 |
| 62                                                                  |
| pilot training program                                              |
| 75                                                                  |
| pilot urination                                                     |
| 64                                                                  |
| pilots                                                              |
| 42, 299, 47, 56, 59-60,62-66, 68-69,                                |
| 71-77, 79-80, 94, 109,  113-114,  116,                              |
| 125, 127. 132-135.  140,  148-149, 153-                             |
| 156,  164.  175-176,  179.  181-183, 186-187,                       |
| 198-199, 207-212, 214, 221, 223-226,                                |
| 229-230, 233-236, 238-240, 243, 246-248.                            |
| 250-253,  256,283,319,321,332,340 <br />pilots dessicated           |
| 65                                                                  |
| pitch-control servo device                                          |
| 296                                                                 |
| pogos                                                               |
| 47, 79, 108                                                         |

[page 401]
| -Secret NOFORN   |
|-|
| Index            |
| 388              |

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## _ Secret NOFORN (cont.)

| prebreathing                            | 117,  121, 124. 140, 142. 147-148. 153-156.                     |
|-|-|
| 64,  125                                | 159, 161. 163-164,  179.  181-183. 187,201.                     |
| projects                                | 205,215. 221-222, 224-226. 229-232, 245-                        |
| 39-40. 42-44. 56, 59, 61-62. 71, 73.    | 247. 254. 256. 285, 294. 297, 299. 301-302.                     |
| 74, 81-82, 88-89, 97, 153-155, 157.     | 306. 315. 60. 316, 318-319. 332                                 |
| 186,257,316, 327-331<br />rocking mount | unmanned reconnaissance aircraft<br />'1QJ  304                 |
| 51,  53                                 |                                                                 |
| stall envelope                          |                                                                 |
| 71                                      | UPWIND                                                          |
| stalls                                  | 303                                                             |
| 80                                      | Urals                                                           |
| tail section                            | 22.  163                                                        |
| 47,  76                                 | uranium gaseous-diffusion plant                                 |
| taxi trials                             | 239                                                             |
| 68-69                                   | uranium-processing facility                                     |
| training                                | 138                                                             |
| 302                                     | US Air Attache in  Moscow                                       |
| vertical stabilizers                    | 177                                                             |
| 277,343 <br />vulnerability study       | US  Air Force. Secretary ofthe<br />I  I.  32, 78, 81.  327-329 |
| 97,  207 <br />U-28                     | US Air Force                                                    |
| 95                                      | Air Weather Service<br />94                                     |
| U-2Cs                                   |                                                                 |
| 152, 196, 208,  210,  217               | ChiefofAir Scaff                                                |
| U-2F                                    | 78 <br />EC-130.  146                                           |
| 198 <br />U-2G                          | Inspector General                                               |
| 248.  250, 252. 255                     | 61                                                              |
| U-2R                                    | oxygen mask                                                     |
| 251-253,  257,  282, 336                | 62                                                              |
| U-3                                     | RB-57D Canberra                                                 |
| 66                                      | 162                                                             |
| Ukraine                                 | Third Air Force                                                 |
| 106                                     | 89                                                              |
| Under Secretary ofState                 | US deterrent force                                              |
| 188,  225                               | 317                                                             |
| Unidentified Flying Objects (UFOs)      | US Geological Survey                                            |
| 72                                      | 254                                                             |
| United Arab Republic                    | US House ofRepresentatives                                      |
| 153                                     | Appropriations Committee                                        |
| United Kingdom (See Great Britain)      | 88                                                              |
| United Kingdom Requirements Committee   | US  Marine Corps                                                |
| 154                                     | 40.  153.  247, 328                                             |
| United Nations                          | US Marine Corps Reserve                                         |
| 20                                      | 14                                                              |
| United Press International (UPI)        | US Military Academy at West Point                               |
| 232                                     | 329                                                             |
| United States                           | US Navy                                                         |
| 2-4, 7-8. 19-21. 26-27. 73. 77-78.      | Chiefof Naval Materiel                                          |
| 85,  89-90. 96. 98- I 00. I08-110. 112. | 285                                                             |

[page 402]
Secret NOFORN
Index
389

Nept une  bomber
3
Privateer patrol aircraft
3
Naval Ordnance Test Station
340
U.S. News andWorld Report
99
US nuclear test monitoring system
139
US nuclear tests
147
US  Senate,  Anned Services Commiuee
88. 99, 185
US  Senate.  Foreign  Relations Committee
165,  185
US 6th Fleet
153
US 7th Fleet
215
US lmelligence Board (USIB)
19 6-197.  225,228,249 ,332,336
USS  Kitty  Hawk
247
USS  Ranger
250
utility  aircraft
66

V

Vance, Cyrus
238, 300, 309-310
Venezuela
211
vernier adjustment
76
very-high-acuity lenses
50
Viet Cong
230, 243
Vietnam
190, 216, 221-222, 230-231, 233-234.
242-243, 246, 301, 304-308, 311, 336,
342-343
Vito, Carmine
65, 105, 124-125, 214
Vladimirovka, Soviet Union
171

[page 403]
Secret NOFORN
Index
390

# Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 (cont.)

## _ Secret NOFORN (cont.)

WHALE TALE
247,249
Wheelon, Albert (Bud)
240, 287, 333
Wheelus AFB
121
White House
33, 43, 97, 109,  ll  1-112,  120, 122.
128, 154, 172,  186,  189
Wienberg, Charles F.  {Bud)
7,  11-12
Wiesbaden, Gennany
80,  95, 104-105, 108.  l 14-ll5,
120-121
Wiesner, Jerome B.
37
Williams, John J.
185
Williamsport, Pennsylvania
222
Wilson. Charles
126
wind currents
87
wind tunnels
269
wing  teeth
277
wings
5, 8. 1I. 23-25, 42, 45, 47, 66. 68.
72.  75-76,  80.  89,  95.  129,  148-149,
199.  242,248, 25!, 271. 274,277,
286, 312, 340
wiretaps
2
Wonsan Harbor
307
Worcester, Massachusetts
62
world press
85,  122
World  Warr
l
World War II
1-2.  4,  7-8.  13, 15. 17. 22.  42,
49,  56,  62. 87, 95.  97, !24. 135,
214, 222, 232. 317, 322. 327-33!

Wright Air Development Command
4-5,  8,  12, 14, 18, 35,  73
Wright-Patterson
73
WRINGER
2
WS-461L
144-145
Wu-ch'ang. China
228

X

XF-104
(See Lockheed Day Fighter)
X-16
9, 13, 15, 26, 34-35
X-band radar pulses
335
X-rays
291

[page 404]
Secret NOFORN
Index
391

<empty>
Yur'ya, Soviet Union
176
Yutzy, Henry
31

Secret

[page 405]
392

- Blank -

[page 406]
Secret NOFORN

Secret